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PART II—HUMANITIES



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PREFACE

The name of Dr. C. R. Reddy is well known to scholars and educationists both in India and abroad. The articles that were presented to him by Indian and European economists, historians and philosophers on the occasion of his *śaṣṭyabdapūrti* in December 1940, are now published in a collected form as Ramalinga Reddy *Śaṣṭyabdapūrti* Commemoration Volume: Part II—Humanities. The sale proceeds will be utilized for the benefit of the Andhra University of which Dr. Reddy is the Vice-Chancellor. The thanks of the Publication Committee are due in the first place to the contributors for their valuable articles, and secondly to the Proprietor, G. S. Press, Madras, for his patience and courtesy in dealing with the difficulties of printing a work of this character. In compliance with Dr. Reddy's desire that there should be no eulogistic references to him in the Commemoration Volume, the Committee are obliged to content themselves with inserting only a brief biographical notice in the Preface.

CATTAMANCHI RAMALINGA REDDY, born Dec. 10, 1880, in Chittoor District, Madras. Educated at (i) High School, Chittoor, (ii) Christian College, Madras, and (iii) St. John's College, Cambridge, where he was a Foundation Scholar. Graduated B.A. in Philosophy and History from Madras University, 1901. Took a first in History Tripos at Cambridge University, 1905. Vice-President of Cambridge Union Society, and Secretary of Cambridge University Liberal Club, 1905. Travelled in Germany, France, Canada, America, China, Japan and the Philippines for study of educational organizations, systems of local self-government, and state methods of promoting industry and commerce, in those countries. Vice-Principal of Maharaja's College, Baroda, 1908. Principal of Maharaja's College, Mysore, 1916-18. Inspector-General of Education, Mysore, 1918-21. Member of All-India Advisory Board of Education, 1921. Elected by Madras University to the 1st and 2nd Legislative Councils. Vice-Chancellor of Andhra University, 1926-30, and since 1936. President of Inter-University Board of India, 1937. Awarded D.LITT. *honoris causa* by Andhra University, 1937. Nominated to Upper Chamber of New Provincial Legislature. Publications:—Lectures on University Reform, Political Economy (in Telugu), Kavivatattvavicāramu (in Telugu), Vyāsamānjari (In Telugu), Deputation Studies in 2 Vols.

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ORIENTAL ANALOGUES OF THE LEGEND OF THE HOLY GRAIL

By

J. C. COYAJEE

The human mind has ever been conscious of the existence and ceaseless continuation of a great struggle for the attainment of power and domination alike on the earthly and the spiritual planes; and man has been attempting for ages to throw his impressions of that struggle in the form of myths, legends, parables and epics. The natural tendency towards Dualism in some Aryan nations contributed to this many-sided embodiment of the central idea. It is this struggle which the Legend of the Holy Grail strove to describe in Medieval Europe in its ethical and knightly aspects. A series of versions of the Legend stretch from that of Chrestien de Troyes, through Gautier de Doulens, Mannessier, Gerbert and Wolfram Von Eschenbach to Sir T. Malory, Wagner and Tennyson. All these versions have enjoyed unique popularity owing to the fascination of the central problem—the attainment of spiritual merit and knightly fame through a talisman which gains for its possessor a supernaturally prolonged life, royal power and food-producing potentialities. The origins of such a great legend soon became one of the foremost problems of comparative literature. Advocates were found for the claims of the Celtic tradition and general folk-lore. The claims of the Greek mysteries were also strongly pressed. Hahn brought in the conception of the “Aryan Expulsion and Return formula.” This started the search for Eastern origins of the Legend which was prosecuted—though on a limited scope—by eminent scholars like Gaster and Wesselofsky. But it is being felt that we must go much farther into Aryan traditions in the East for a full explanation of the origins, though it is not denied that various features must be traced to Celtic legends, local folk-lore, Greek mysteries and Christian symbolism. It

is, however, curious that while every other source of the Legend has been carefully investigated, no one has ever suggested Mithraism—that great store-house of Indo-Iranian beliefs, and a system which prevailed for centuries in the very lands in which the Legend was to take its rise and to blossom forth.

To start with, let us examine the central ideas of the Legend—those of the Holy Grail and the Quest for it. In the medieval forms of the Legend there is a Quest carried on by the knights of the Round Table for a great and complex magic talisman which will satisfy not only all aspirations for earthly power and possession but “the noblest and the most mystic longings of man.” That complex talisman assumes the shapes of a great food-producing vessel, a cup or a stone which possesses healing and revivifying powers, and a magic sword or lance which gives to its possessor the powers of domination. In fact, this great talisman amounts to a complex of treasures including the means and instrumentalities of health and immortality, Royalty and dominion over the Earth as well as the capacity for feeding large populations. We must bear in mind these *four main elements* of the talisman in the Legend of the Grail; for these will be found common to that Legend and to Indian and Iranian traditions. But before pointing out these notable parallelisms we might note another quality of the Holy Grail, viz., *its connection with the element of water*. Thus the very name of the “Fisher King” who plays such an important role in the Legend shows the mysterious connection of the Grail and the element of Water. But there are other lines of connection worth noting. Thus according to Dr. Nutt “the Grail hosts go a questing Avalon—wards” i.e. towards the sea. King Arthur’s sword rises from and has to be taken back to the sea, and the king, when wounded, is taken beyond the waters to the land of Avalon for his healing.

Now the very mention of a great talisman like the Grail bestowing Royalty, healing and nutrition, and connected intimately with the watery realm must needs bring up before the mind of any student of Indian Mythology the grand conception of the “*churning of the ocean*.”

In the *Mahābhārata* we are told of the Quest which obtained from the churned ocean Amṛta, Lakṣmī, the Cow and other treasures. Now Amṛta corresponds obviously to the Grail's power of bestowing health and immortality; Lakṣmī corresponds to the wealth-giving powers of the talisman, while the cow points to the food-producing quality of the Grail. The fact that these priceless jewels were obtained from the Ocean emphasises the connection of the Grail and the element of Water, while the notion of the king who keeps constantly "fishing" very closely approaches that of the gods and demons "churning" the ocean for valuable gifts.

Moreover we learn from the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* that the quest and rivalry of the Devas and the Asuras is not merely over the cow created by the Prajāpati but over the food and the wealth and the earth (owned first by the Asuras)—not to mention the Ambrosia which Cusna the Asura had seized. Here we have present *all the four elements symbolized by the Holy Grail*—elements of immortality, royal power, spiritual power and food, while the Quest is carried on by the gods and the demons. This dualism of the members of the Quest is represented in the Grail Legend by the fact that the "Fisher King" is sometimes thought of as a "wizard" (Asura) and some times as a good man. Thus the legend of the "Churning of the Ocean" is found to be very similar to that of the Holy Grail; for in the earlier forms "the home of the Grail host" was Avalon or the land in which there was neither death nor old age. Then, both in the *Mahābhārata* and in the Grail Legend it was the immortals who formed the Quest. At first sight, the figures of the Round Table seem human; but on closer inspection they enlarge themselves into gods. Thus, among other authors Loomis, in his great work on *Celtic Myth and Arthurian Romance*, has shown that the Grail-heroes—Gawain, Lancelot, Boors, Percival and Galahad—all "may claim to be young Sun-gods."

Having considered the Indian analogues of the Grail Legend, we come to the Iranian analogues—and looking to the very close connec-

tion between Indian and Iranian Mythology such close correspondences were only to be expected. For tracing these Iranian analogues we have to go to the liturgy called *Zamyad Yasht*—an ancient Aryan document of which large portions, as Prof. Hertzfeld believes, go back far before the age of Zoroaster. In the Iranian legends it is the conception of “Royal Glory” (*Khwareno*) which corresponds to the Holy Grail. The nature of this talismanic concept is as complex in the Iranian accounts as in the Vedic tradition or in the Grail Saga. One of its aspects is that of *Ambrosia* in its widest sense, for it is capable of making the whole World young and strong, immortal and everlasting (*Zamyad Yasht* verse II). It is also capable of giving its possessor enormous strength—that of a warrior or that of the strongest animals (*Ib.* verse 68). Another aspect of the Royal Glory is its capacity to endow its possessor with royal power or dominion over the Earth—such great power, indeed, that he can at once overcome all non-Aryan countries put together.” The idea of nutritive capacity—forcibly emphasised by the cow in the “churning of the ocean,” is also to the fore in the Iranian account, for the Royal Glory has power to overcome both hunger and thirst, while rivers giving fertility to lands flow towards it. Thus the nature of the Royal Glory of the Holy Grail is identical with that of the boons gained by the “churning of the Ocean”—comprehending in each case the notions of Royal power, *Ambrosia*, healing and prosperity. The connection of the Royal Glory with the element of Water is as close as that of the Holy Grail, since the Glory finds refuge in the Ocean and is to be sought and found in that watery region.

The nature of the “Quest” is also identical in the Indo-Iranian legends and in the Grail saga. As in the Indian epic so in the earliest forms of the Grail legend it is the gods who strive with demons (or *Asuras*) for possession of the talisman. For, to repeat, the Grail heroes like Gawain, Perceval and Galahad were all, to start with, solar deities. Similarly, in the *Zamyad Yasht*, the scene opens with a truly Miltonic battle

between the gods and the demons for the possession of the Royal Glory—and we find these mighty combatants hurling darts at each other. The honours of the day rest with the watery deity Apām Napāt who takes the Royal Glory into his special protection—as was indeed to be expected from the special connection of the Glory and the Grail with the watery element. But as in the Grail Saga, so in the Yasht the Quest is taken up later by mortal heroes. Among the mortals the foremost champion of evil is the Turanian King Frangrasyān, while the good side is championed, amongst others, by King Kava Husrava (corresponding to the Vedic King Suśravas). Needless to say that the champions of the good side are rewarded with success.

One important factor common to the Grail Saga and the Iranian accounts deserves to be emphasised. The Royal Glory is the special possession of the deity Mithra (Vedic Mitra). He is pre-eminently the “King of all countries” in the *Avesta*, and it is in his power, as such, to bestow or take away kingly powers and position. As “the lord of wide pastures” Mithra can also confer plenty and has in his hands the gift of cattle. It is noteworthy that many of these attributes were possessed by Merlin in the Grail legend. Before he was reduced to the rank of a Prophet he was the chief Sun-god, in the Saga and hence, like Mithra “he knows all, does all and sees all.” He founds the Round Table and gives the kingdom to Arthur, and he is the lord of cattle and their pastures.

Having thus established the close similarity between the nature and quest of the Holy Grail and corresponding features in Indo-Iranian Mythology, we come to the chief forms assumed by the Grail. We know that the Grail was represented in different narratives as having been visible in the shape of a cup or chalice or of a food-supplying vessel, as well as in that of a lance and a stone. In the corresponding Indian legends the form emphasised is that of the sacrificial cup or of a food-supplying vessel. Thus in the *Taittirīya Samhitā*, the Devas and the Asuras carry on their conflict by means of sacrifices;

and, in the course of such sacrifices, various cups were used—the Upāṃśu cup, the Agrayaṇa cup and the Ukthya cup. These were sacrificial cups of great efficiency, and they also “tested veracity” as the Grail also did. Again in the *Vana Parva* of the *Mahābhārata* the sun bestowed a food-supplying vessel on king Yudhiṣṭhira which provided food for his entire retinue for several years.

When we turn to Iranian mythology we find all the forms of the Holy Grail paralleled in those of the Royal Glory. Curiously enough we find them all mentioned in the epic in connection with the King Kava Husrava (Vedic Suśravas). The *cup* possessed by that king had the wonderful faculty of revealing to its possessor all events and affairs happening, not only on the Earth, but in the planets and stars. The *stone* (“Muhreh”) which belonged to the same great prince had wonderful healing powers, and could bring back his wounded knights back to life even from the brink of death. Another form which the Grail assumed was that of the *lance* with which every hero starts on his knightly career. It is with respect to this form of the Grail that the Iranian parallel is the most complete. For before Kava Husrava was crowned he was required to prove his title to the throne by showing that he was indeed the true keeper or guardian of the Royal Glory (or Grail). This he demonstrated most convincingly by storming the magic castle called Bahman-dezh, corresponding to the Grail-castle of the medieval legends. He achieves this object by directing one of his knights to take a *magic lance* and touch with it the walls of the fort. When this was done, the spell was broken, the former demons’ hold disappeared, and was replaced by a new and beautiful castle. Thus closely in his Iranian Epic, Firdausi approaches some of the main incidents of the Grail Saga.

But though such parallelisms between the Legend of the Holy Grail and the Indo-Iranian legends are of high value to the student either of comparative Literature or of Sociology that does not exhaust the value and utility of our thesis. A high authority has laid down the test which must be satisfied by any valid theory like ours : “A

parallel is of no real value unless it throws light upon the puzzling features in the development of the romances." Now our thesis can meet this test and we can give one or two examples of its utility in this respect. To take one great puzzling feature of the Grail Legend—the fickleness of Guinevere and her abductions by Lancelot and other heroes. This curious fact has puzzled most commentators of the Legend—But the problem is solved when we envisage queen Guinevere as an aspect of Lakṣmī (especially Rāja Lakṣmī) in Indian legends, and of Ashi (goddess of Fortune) in Iranian legends. Thus both Lakṣmī and Ashi "once lived with the Dānavas and then with the gods." The reason is that Fortune is ever unstable and it is this incursion into comparative mythology which affords us the real clue to the character of Guinevere. Another difficulty felt by the commentators was regarding the character of the "Fisher King" in the Grail legend. Why is a king given the task of fishing? Why is he sometimes a good personality and sometimes "the wizard working at his tricks"? The true solution of the problem is that the "Fisher King" represents the Devas and the Asuras working at the task of churning the Ocean.

The solution of such difficulties in the light of our thesis demonstrates that we are on the right track. But so far, it must be frankly admitted, that only the beginning has been made in this essay of the great task of connecting the legends of the Grail Saga with Indo-Iranian legends. It will require the labours of many specialists to investigate the matter thoroughly. But enough has been said here to show how promising that field of investigation is.

BIHĀRĪ LĀL

By

AMARNATH JHA

Among Hindi poets, Bihārī occupies an honoured position. His verses have been widely admired. His skill as a metrist has been much praised. His *Satsai*, collection of 700 metrical pieces, has been frequently published. From the early eighteenth century to the present day scholars have attempted elaborate commentaries on these verses; it is said that more than sixty commentaries are in existence; many of the commentators have themselves been poets of high repute. Alike in style, in language, in the sweetness of suggestion, in the beautiful delineation of the sentiment of love, in the subtle atmosphere of devotion and holiness mingled with physical charm, in the grasp of religious truths, and in the range of his interests, Bihārī may well claim an eminent place among the poets of India. One marvels at his gift of compression; his poems are like Persian miniatures, rich-set, brilliant, complete. Whether it is a description of a natural scene, or a mention of a mood, or a glimpse into the secret corners of the human heart, or a maxim packed full with worldly wisdom, or a paean of praise, whether in moments of languor or exaltation or calm, the verse is perfect, alike in expression and sureness of effect. One curious feature of the collection is that it is not certain what the original order of the verses was; like Shakespeare's Sonnets, many different arrangements have been suggested. The one most followed is that associated with the name of Azam Shah, the son of Aurangazeh.

It is a pity that this great work is not accessible to those who do not know Hindi. Sir George Grierson says that in the seventies of the last century he had started to translate the *Satsai*, but "I have," he continues, "only been convinced of the impossibility of the ade-

quate performance of the task at my hands." What Sir George abandoned it were venturesome for another to attempt. But I have tried to render some of these verses into English prose.

O Rādhā, whose mere reflection can shed lustre on the dark-complexioned Kṛṣṇa, take away from me all the sorrows of the world.

O Kṛṣṇa, dwell for ever within my breast, with a crown on your head, a garment round your loins, a flute in your hand, and a garland round your neck.

The dark attractive form of Kṛṣṇa garbed in yellow robes appears like a sapphire hill crowned with the morning sun.

There are so many noble brides in Gokul, all ready to proffer counsel of prudence and right conduct; but which of them has not lost her heart, listening to the strains of Kṛṣṇa's flute ?

Half under the control of modesty and half dominated by curiosity, she cannot stand still; she moves this way and that, now peeps out and again conceals herself.

Dally awhile here while the sun is yet strong; innumerable bees hum prettily, and here, on the banks of the Jumnā, the tamāla trees mingle with the Jasmine creeper.

She does not bathe, nor does she leave the river-bank in order to go home. With a distracted look, she stares at the water; she touches it, and shivers, and moves away, all the time smiling and yet not entering the water.

You stand motionless, like a painted picture. Abandoning all shame and all regard for the world, whom are you looking at ?

My eyes are rapt in meditation on one affection for whom will transcend death. Not one hundred of your wise men can do anything for me.

You counsel well and I know too that I should show that I am offended. But I can do so if on seeing Kṛṣṇa I can keep control over my heart.

May these miserable eyes of mine be destroyed; they are perversely unintelligent. I try to be indignant and angry, but these eyes show delight when Kṛṣṇa comes.

Now she opens them, for a while she touches them, then she tries to conceal them; the whole day long she keeps looking in the mirror at her lips bruised by her lover's kiss.

My body has not even yet regained its natural hue; the paleness caused by the previous separation has not yet disappeared. Oh Kṛṣṇa, how can you speak so soon of your impending departure ?

The news of her lover's departure brought tears to her eyes. But she effectively concealed these from her companions by pretending to yawn.

My lover has gone, taking all my delights with him. To me he has left only the livelong summer day and the unending night of the śīr season.

As he gazed at the eyes of his beloved, about to overflow with tears, his own throat choked with emotion, the lover postponed his departure, and clasped her to his bosom.

You address me variously, oh lord of my heart, as 'girl' 'passionate one'; but do you feel no shame in calling me 'darling,' you who propose to depart abroad in this season of rain and union ?

Right up to the moment of his reaching the gateway mutual messages—scores of them—were exchanged, full of longing, full of anger, and full of the pangs of impending separation.

After separation the lover and beloved can utter no word; they do not look at each other, but just rush forward for an embrace.

"Your lover has returned from foreign parts," some one shouted to her. Hearing this, she became delighted, she smiled, she laughed, and then tried to look out.

She stoops, and stoops again; then she shuts her eyes; and then yawns. She knows of her lover's arrival, suggests to her companions that she feels sleepy, and makes them get away and leave her alone

“ Oh, Kṛṣṇa, the grove is wooded, and thick clouds have caused darkness, the night is black; even so, she cannot be concealed like the flame of a lamp.”

Oh, Kṛṣṇa, you cannot cure yourself of the habit of roaming from house to house. Well, wander about where you will, but why, oh why, do you come again and again to dwell in my heart and rend it ?

ŚAŚĀŅKA, THE KING OF GAUDA.

By

R. C. MAJUMDAR

Śaśāṅka occupies a prominent place in the history of Bengal. He is the first known ruler of Bengal who extended his suzerainty up to Orissa in the south, and carried his victorious arms up to Kanauj in the west. He was also a great champion of Brahmanical religion, and was regarded by the Buddhists as having played a great part in the decline of Buddhism in India.¹

Yet, like many other great figures in Indian history, some of the important aspects of his life and career are involved in obscurity. Perhaps no final judgment can be pronounced on them until new and more positive evidence is available. But as definite opinions have been categorically expressed by some scholars it is necessary to examine them in some detail with the available evidence. It will be our endeavour to find out by a critical examination of the known data, the most probable conclusions which we should tentatively hold, even where it is beyond our power to arrive at decisive conclusions.

In an article in *I.H.Q.* Vol. XII, pp. 456, ff. Dr. D. C. Ganguly has discussed most of the disputed questions about Śaśāṅka and we may take this as a basis of discussion.

I. *Origin and Early Life.*

Referring to the Rohtasgadh inscription which records the name “of the Mahāsāmanta Śrī Śaśāṅka” Dr. Ganguly says: “As the inscription, from the palaeographical point of view, is to be placed

1. Beal. *Hsien Tsang*, Vol. I, p. 212.

in the early part of the seventh century A.D. *there cannot be any doubt*² that Śaśāṅka, referred to therein, is identical with Śaśāṅka, the adversary of Rājyavardhana ” (p. 456).

The fact is that what is referred to as an inscription is really a mould or matrix, cut in the rock, used for casting copper seals in relief. It is, therefore, very probable, but by no means certain, that the dominions of this Mahāsāmanta included the region of Rhotasgadh. For, while it is very unlikely that people seeking to prepare a mould on the rock would go a long way from their place of residence, there may be special circumstances, unknown to us, why a mould was cast in a far off region.

Similarly the palaeographical evidence cannot lead to any definite conclusion. It merely shows that one Mahāsāmanta Śaśāṅka lived in the sixth or seventh century A.D. It is always very risky to rely on palaeographical evidence alone for fixing a date within narrower limits than a century or two centuries. Mahāsāmanta Śaśāṅka may, therefore, for all we know, be a different person from Śaśāṅka, the king of Gauḍa. But, here again, as no other Śaśāṅka is known to us, the identity of the two is a reasonable presumption, which may be provisionally accepted so long as it is not in conflict with any positive evidence or more probable hypothesis. Fleet, who originally edited the inscription, remarked that “the age of the characters would justify us in identifying him with the Śaśāṅka, king of Karnaśuvarṇa.”³ This is the utmost that we can say and the identity cannot be regarded as beyond doubt.

Dr. D. C. Ganguly next proceeds to show that the two Maukhari kings Sarvavarman and Avantivarman granted a village in the Shahabad district (which includes Rhotasgadh) and that Śaśāṅka

2. The Italics in this and other quotations are our own.

3. Fleet. *Gupta Ins.*, p. 284.

was a contemporary of the latter. "This", says he, "*definitely settles* that Śaśāṅka was a feudatory of Avantivarman, and probably for a short period, of his son Grahavarman" (p. 457). Proceeding on this basis he remarks: "the *conclusion becomes irresistible* that it (Rhotasgadh) was his early capital" and that he later conquered "Magadha, Gauḍa and Rāḍha and transferred his capital to Karna-suvarna." Finally he remarks that "Śaśāṅka had as much claim to be called a national hero of Bengal as any successful invader of that country." (457-8).

These are far-reaching conclusions which totally upset the current views, and must therefore be examined with great care.

It is one of the fundamental axioms of critical interpretation of historical data that where we have to deal with probabilities or uncertainties, we must select as the basic or starting points those facts and data which are known or rest on more satisfactory evidence than others, and proceed to find out whether or how far these can be reconciled with the latter. Now in the case of Śaśāṅka, both Bāṇabhaṭṭa and Hiuen Tsang refer to him as a Gauḍa, and there can be no motive on their part in ascribing a wrong nationality to him. We cannot, of course, discount the possibility that both of them were ignorant of the origin of Śaśāṅka and took him to be a Gauḍa, simply because he was the king of Gauḍa. But still the only positive evidence, so far known to us, is in favour of the Gauḍa origin of Śaśāṅka. It remains, therefore, to be seen how far this natural presumption is destroyed by the facts referred to by Dr. Ganguly.

Dr. Ganguly has referred to the suzerainty of two Maukharis over a portion of Magadha. But it is wrong to base any conclusion on these isolated facts, and, in order to obtain a true perspective of historical events, we have to review the general trend of political events in this period.

The decline of the imperial Guptas after Skandagupta (or even Budhagupta) did not mean the end of Gupta power. The Later

Guptas might or might not have been connected by blood with the Imperial Guptas, but they were, to begin with, in possession of the eastern and central provinces of the empire.⁴ That their pretensions as successors of the Guptas were tacitly recognised is proved by references to "the Gupta suzerainty" in the records of the Parivṛāja rulers of Bundelkhand in the sixth century A.D.

One of the most outstanding facts in the early history of the Later Guptas was the unceasing struggle with the Maukharis who coveted Magadha and Gauḍa which formed part of the dominions of the former. Īśānavarman, the Maukhari king, had defeated the Gauḍas and probably also conquered a part of Magadha. But Kumāragupta III of the Later Gupta dynasty took up the challenge and claims to have defeated the Maukhari army. Similar claim is made by his son Dāmodaragupta. It is evident from what we know of the Maukhari kings Sarvavarman and Avantivarman, particularly their landgrants in Magadha, that in this duel between the Guptas and the Maukharis, victory inclined alternately to the two sides, but neither party could achieve any decisive result. But fortunes were more favourable to Mahāsenagupta who claims to have carried his victorious arms up to Lauhitya or the Brahmaputra river. Now, whether the home territory of Mahāsenagupta was Malwa or Magadha, a fact on which opinions differ, there cannot be any doubt that the Maukhari aggression was definitely checked, at least for the time being, and both Magadha and Gauḍa were included in his suzerainty. Mahāsenagupta thus re-established his supremacy over the dominions which once belonged to his family. As his son Mādhavagupta was a playmate (or friend) of Harṣa, Mahāsenagupta must be regarded as a contemporary of both Avantivarman and Śaśāṅka, at least for some years. If therefore Śaśāṅka began his career as a Mahāsāmanta, the most natural presumption is that as a Gauḍa chief he acknowledged the suzerainty of the Guptas rather

4. H. C. Raichaudhury. *Pol. Hist. Anc. Ind.* p. 492.

than that of the Maukharis. It is to be remembered that the Gupta supremacy in Northern Bengal is definitely proved by a record of 544 A.D. and we know of no independent king ruling in Gauḍa or Puṇḍra earlier than Śaśāṅka. The more reasonable view is, therefore, to regard Śaśāṅka as the Chief of Gauḍa who at first recognised Mahāsenagupta as his overlord. Whether a portion of Magadha (up to Rhotasgadh) was added to his dominions by his own prowess, or whether it was added to the territory of the vassal state by the suzerain, it is difficult to say. The title Mahāsāmanta would not be incompatible with the independence or even an aggressive career of Śaśāṅka. For well-known historical examples show that even after the downfall of the imperial house the rulers of provincial states, though *de facto* independent sovereigns, prefer to continue the old titles rather than openly assume insignia of sovereignty. It is probable that the rise of the Pushyabhūti family, or of the Kalachuris, weakened the power of the Later Guptas, and Śaśāṅka seized the opportunity to establish an independent kingdom in Gauḍa and Magadha which he already held, at least in theory as a subordinate ruler.

This view is in accord with the testimony of contemporary writers who describe Śaśāṅka as a Gauḍa, and is not in conflict with any known facts. For it cannot be contended by any means that Rhotasgadh was in continuous occupation of the Maukharis till the time of Śaśāṅka, for then we have to ignore the conquests of Mahāsenagupta, and we have no more reason to accept the epigraphic evidence about the victory of the Maukharis than that about the Later Guptas. In any case, no one, I hope, would subscribe to the view that Rhotasgadh inscription “*definitely settles* that Śaśāṅka was a feudatory of Avantivarman”, or that it makes the “*conclusion irresistible* that Rhotasgadh was his early capital”. It is needless to point out that there is, therefore, no ground to regard Śaśāṅka as a successful foreign invader of Bengal, and no bar to regard him as the national hero of Bengal.

II. *Śaśāṅka's conquest of Kalinga.*

Dr. Ganguly's view that "the kingdom of Śaśāṅka extended up to the Godavari river" (p. 460) is also based on very unsatisfactory evidence. The Śailodbhava chief Mādhavarāja Sainyabhīta was undoubtedly a vassal of Śaśāṅka in 619 A.D. as his Ganjam plates show. We know from the Khurda plates of the same chief that he got the sovereignty of the whole of Kalinga. But this does not necessarily imply that Śaśāṅka was also the Lord of Kalinga. For it is equally likely that Mādhavarāja assumed independence after the death of Śaśāṅka and extended the boundaries of his kingdom. A comparison of the Ganjam and Khurda plates confirms this view. For in the former Mādhavarāja acknowledges the suzerainty of Śaśāṅka, but there is no reference to any such allegiance in the Khurda plates.⁵

III. *Śaśāṅka's alliance with the Mālava king Devagupta.*

Dr. Ganguly does not believe in this alliance, and reconstructs the entire episode of Śaśāṅka's conquest of Kanauj and fight with Rājyavardhana on the theory that the Kalachuri king Buddharāja killed Grahavarman. This, as well as the theory that Mahāsenagupta was defeated and perhaps killed by Buddharāja's father, rests on the solitary fact that a single grant of the Kalachuri king was issued from the victorious camp of Ujjayinī. It is too weak a foundation to support such a big superstructure. Reserving the discussion of this point for a separate paper, it will be enough to observe for the present that this view of Dr. Ganguly cannot be regarded as in any way more justifiable than the rest.

IV. *The assassination of Rājyavardhana.*

On this topic Dr. Ganguly has followed the older view on the ground "that there is no warrant for thinking that Bāṇa and Hiuen

5. Cf. *J. A. H. R. S.*, Vol. X, p. 11.

Tsang blackened the character of Śaśāṅka with accusations knowing them to be false.” There can, however, be no denying the fact that a perusal of their writings shows them to be definitely prejudiced and hostile. How far the evidence of such witnesses can be accepted is a matter of opinion. Known historical instances prove that there is no limit to the vilification and falsification in which one indulges against one’s enemy.

A second reason for suspecting the truth of the above writers is the discrepancy between the three contemporary accounts of the episode that we possess *viz.*, the writings of Bāṇa and Hiuen Tsang, and Harshavardhana’s inscription. As regards the fourteenth century commentator the *Harṣacarita*, who seems to have known all the details of the foul plot more than seven hundred years after the incident, all that need be said is that we must remain sceptic about it until we know the source of his information. Fortunately, the *Mañjuśrī-Mūlakalpa* shows that even later traditions were not unanimous in this respect. For according to the generally accepted interpretation of this text Rājyavardhana was murdered not by Śaśāṅka, but by a king of the Naga caste.⁶

These grounds may not be conclusive evidence for acquitting Śaśāṅka of the charge of murdering Rājyavardhana, but they certainly prove that the charge itself cannot be regarded as definitely established. In view of the nature of the evidence, which all comes from the opposite side, the presumption of Śaśāṅka’s guilt or otherwise must remain a matter of opinion until fresh evidence is forthcoming.

In conclusion it may be pointed out that there are well-known historical examples where even contemporary writers falsely accused a king of treacherously murdering his opponent. The case of Shivaji and Afzal Khan furnishes a good illustration. The Muslim writers

6. Jayaswal. *Imperial History*, p. 50.

regard Shivaji as deliberately plotting to murder Afzal, while the Mahratta writers hold the opposite view. In the case of Śaśāṅka we have only the version of his enemies, and it would not be unreasonable to expect on the above analogy that his own partisans had an altogether different tale to tell. Another apt illustration is furnished by the capture of the Roman emperor Valerian by the Persian king Shapur in A.D. 260. It is generally held that in course of negotiations for peace "the Persian king expressed his desire for a personal interview; the emperor agreed; in fatal confidence he met the Persian king and was taken prisoner." The following comment is made in Cambridge Ancient History on this episode. "On the fact of the capture our sources are in complete accord, but they disagree in their accounts of the manner in which it was effected. While Zosimus represents it as a treacherous breach of faith on the part of Shapur, others would place it after a battle with insufficient forces against the superior strength of the enemy, others again and this must certainly be false—will have it that Valerian had fled from beleaguered Edessa to the Persian King in face of a mutiny of his own starving soldiers." (Vol. XII, p. 135). Mr. R. P. Chanda pointed out long ago⁷ that Rājyavardhana had to face Śaśāṅka with a very small army and suggested that he was either captured or forced to surrender. This is in perfect accord with the second alternative view, mentioned above, about the capture of Valerian. In any event these two examples are sufficient to warn us against putting implicit faith in the accounts of Bāṇa and Hiuen Tsang.

7. *Gauḍa-rāya-mālā*, p. 9.

LANKĀ

By

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

The location of Lankā of Rāvaṇa has been the subject of several inconclusive investigations; and scholars have sought it in all sorts of places, some finding it possible even to defend a Central Indian location. In spite of the traditional association of the name with Ceylon, supported by the proximity of Rāmeśvaram and Rāma's bridge so-called, readers of the *Rāmāyaṇa* will find it difficult to accept this identification as satisfying all the data to be gathered from the epic. One is tempted to think with Jacobi¹ that at first the city was no definite geographical entity, but a mere figment of the poet's imagination, and that all the places which have since assumed the name have been inspired by the Rāma-legend and its far-flung popularity. The case of *Agastya-bhavanam*, the abode of Agastya, is a close parallel. However that may be, the *Vāyu Purāṇa* contains some verses in chapter 48 which clearly locate Lankā in the Malaya peninsula, Malayadvīpa which is at first named in v. 14 along with Yavadvīpa (Yamadvīpa is obviously a wrong reading) and other islands, thus :

Āṅgadvīpam Yama (va?) dvīpam Malayadvīpam eva ca|
Śaṅkhadvīpam Kuśadvīpam Varāhadvīpam eva ca||

Then we get details of the Malayadvīpa a little further on in the following verses :—

tathaiva Malayadvīpam evam eva susamvṛtam|
maṇi-ratnākaram sphīlam ākaram kanakasya ca|| 20

ākaram candanānām ca samudrāṇām tathā'karam|
nānā-mleccha-gaṇākīrṇam nadī-parvata-maṇḍitam|| 21

1. Das Ramayana, p. 90.

tatra śrīmānstu Malayāḥ parvato rajatākaraḥ |
Mahāmalaya ityevam vikhyāto varaparvataḥ || 22

dviṭīyam Mandaram nāma prathitam ca sadā kṣitau |
nānā-puṣpa-phalopetam ramyam devarṣisevitam |
Agastya-bhavanam tatra devāsura-namaskṛtam || 23

tathā kāñcana-pādasya malayasyā-'parasya hi |
nīkuñjais-trṇasomāṅgaiḥ īśramam puṇyasevitam || 24

nānāpuṣpa-phalopetam svargād api viśiṣyate |
tatrāvatarate svargaḥ sadā parvasu parvasu || 25

tathā Trikūṭanīlaye nānādhātuvibhūṣite |
aneka-yojanotsedhe citrasānu-darīgrhe || 26

tasya kūṭalate ramye hemaprākāratarāṇā |
nīrvyūha-valabhī-citrā-harmya-prāsāda mālinī || 27

śatayojana-vistīrnā trīmśad-āyāma-yojanā |
nitya-pramuditā sphītā Laṅkā nāma mahāpurī || 28

sā kāmarūpiṇām sthānam rākṣasānām mahātmanām |
āvāso baladṛptānām tad-vidyād-devavidviṣām |
mānuṣāṇām asambādhā hyagamyā sā mahāpurī || 29

tasya dvīpasya vai pūrve tīre nadanadīpateḥ |
Gokarṇa-nāmadheyaṣya Śaṅkarasyā-'layam mahat || 30

These verses may be rendered as follows : ' So also the Malayad-vīpa, well surrounded (by the sea), rich in mines of precious stones and of gold, the home of varieties of sandal and of the seas (?), inhabited by various tribes of mlecchas and adorned by rivers and mountains. There is the beautiful Malaya mountain, a mine of silver, the noble mountain celebrated as the Mahāmalaya (Great Malaya). A second mountain is Mandara by name, ever known for its variety of flower and fruit, and visited by gods and sages, and there is Agastya's abode worshipped by gods and demons. Likewise, the

āśrama on another gold-footed part of the Malaya with its bowers of *trasōmāṅgas* (?) is visited by holy (beings), and even excels heaven by the variety of its flowers and fruits; and there, heaven descends on every *parva* day. Again, on the top of the Trikūṭa decked by the (ores of) many metals, many *yojanas* in extent and full of beautiful peaks and caves, on this fine hill top is located the great and ever prosperous and happy city of Lāṅkā, thirty *yōjanas* by a hundred in its extent, and teeming with its innumerable palaces and terraces adorned with inimitable paintings on their walls. That city is the abode of the great *Rākṣasas* who can change their forms at will and who, in their pride of strength, have sworn enmity to the gods. That great city knows no men and is inaccessible to them. On the eastern shore of that island there is the great temple of Śāṅkara under the name of Gokaṇṇa.”

This text, not easy to follow in every respect, cannot be held by any means to simplify the problem of the location of Lāṅkā, though there can be no doubt that the author of these verses was definitely thinking of Rāvaṇa's abode and of no other place. As early as 1893 Jacobi² pointed out that the case for Ceylon being considered Lāṅkā was very weak indeed; he showed also that there were several Indian authorities that could be cited against this view, in particular that of the astronomers, Varāhamihira mentioning Lāṅkā and Simhaḷa as two distinct places in his enumeration of the localities in the southern division of his topography of the world. Indeed Fleet, who noticed this at about the same time, remarked: “Lāṅkā would seem to denote here, not the island of Ceylon, but its capital city, which it was perhaps thought necessary to mention separately, because it provides the Hindu prime meridian.”³ This explanation would be satisfactory if the identity of Simhaḷa and Lāṅkā were otherwise certain; but this is not so. And when we see that as Jacobi points out, Varāhamihira's separation of Lāṅkā and Simhaḷa is kept up by three later dramatists

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-93.

3. *Indian Antiquary*, xxii, p. 183.

like Bhavabhūti, Murāri and Rājaśekhara, there is considerable room for hesitation in accepting Fleet's ingenious suggestion.

More recently, in the course of a monograph on the history of Malaka and other questions connected with it, Rouffaer⁴ has sought to argue that the Laṅkā proper of the epic *Rāmāyaṇa* must be sought in the southern extremity of the Malaya peninsula, in the corner of Johore jutting into the sea and separated only by a narrow strait from the island of Singapore. He cites a verse from the old Javanese *Rāmāyaṇa* in which the *Rākṣasa* king Rāvaṇa says: 'My royal castle stands on by the sea, on Laṅkā, stately like the splendour of the moon. The (island) better land is likewise called Ratnapārāyaṇa (Ratna-dvīpa) on account of the multitude of shining precious stones'. Rouffaer's comment on this verse is that this is not sung of a place like Galle or Colombo or Trincomale, but of the emporium Zabana as Ptolemy (VII. 2, 5) calls the sea-state at the farthest corner of the Golden Chersonesus.⁵ According to the Dutch savant, Rāvaṇa was for the Hindu-Javanese of the first millennium A.D., not a creature of imagination, but a real pirate king who was ever lying in wait for ships sailing from India to Campā, Kambhoja, and Tonkin, or returned from these countries towards Ceylon, Quilon, Negapatam and other places. Such is the economic interpretation of the Trojan war in its Indian setting offered by Rouffaer who finds further support for his view in the numerous references in the Chinese annals and elsewhere to Langkāśuka; it is well known that Ilāṅgāsōkam is one of the conquests said to have been effected by the Cōla fleet in the reign of Rājendra I (1012-44 A.D.) in the course of the campaign against Kaḍāram and Śrī Vijaya.

Personally I do not think that Rouffaer's hypothesis has more in its favour than the others which locate Laṅkā in Central India, or

4. Bijdragen Tot de Tool-Land-en Volkenkunde van Nederlansch Indie Deel 77 (1921).

5. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

Ceylon. In spite of the *Vāyu Purāṇa* text I have cited here, and Rouffaer's arguments which point to Malaya peninsula as the seat of Lankā from quite other considerations, I still find it easier to treat Lankā of the *Ramāyaṇa* as legendary in origin, and the legend as the real source of the geographical names resembling Lankā or identical with it.

TRADE AND TRADE ROUTES OF THE EARLY ARABS

By

S. MUHAMMAD HUSAYN NAINAR

A long time before the proclamation of Islam the people of Southern Arabia were noted for their skill in navigation and commerce. Yemen, the *Arabia Felix* of Ptolemy, was the first in power and importance in the whole of Arabia. The Yemenites had trade connections in Persia, in India and further east in the islands of the Indian Ocean. In the west they explored the East African coast and established several colonies in that continent. In the north their commercial relationship spread out to Palestine and Syria. They also carried on trade with the Phoenicians. But with the rise of the Israelites under David, and Solomon, his son, the Yemenite power gradually declined. Besides, the new land and sea routes which connected Europe and India affected their prosperity.¹ Finally they could not compete with the rising power of the Romans in the West and Sassanians in the East for supremacy in trade. Egypt became a Roman province and its trade also passed into the hands of the Romans. Persian traders vied with the Southern Arabians in their trade in the East Indies. In consequence of these changes the wealth and power of the Yemenites declined, a great part of the population was forced to seek new homes in the North and their cities became desolate. All this happened before the rise of Islam.

1. The land and sea routes which connected Europe with India were: (a) through modern Afghanistan to Balkh, and Central Asia, (b) to the Caspian Sea and Russia, (c) to the Black Sea ports and the Balkan peninsula, and (d) *via* the Iranian (Persian) Gulf to the Euphrates and thence to the interior Asia Minor and Syria. A. M. A. Shustari: *Outlines of Islamic Culture*, Vol. I, p. 196.

Islam became the religion of the Arabs in the 7th century A.D. This spiritual awakening was accompanied by the tremendous consolidation among the Arabs, who were soon attempting to establish their supremacy by overthrowing their two powerful opponents, the Persians in the East and the Romans in the West. The first Muslim invasion of India was in 711 A.D. under the command of Qasim² from Basra, and secured the temporary conquest of Sind. With the advent of Islam came a great impetus for travel, commerce and adventure. The Arabs who were, from the ancient time, traders in the coast of the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, engaged themselves with an avidity to trade on a much larger scale after the advent of Islam. Even during expeditions and pilgrimages articles of trade were carried. When the early adherents to the Faith were forced to migrate from Mecca to Medina, some of them after their arrival to Medina, used to enquire their way to the market place where they could do some business. References to commerce in the holy Quran also encouraged the new converts to pursue trade and commerce.³

The first thirty years following the demise of the Prophet were spent in the conquest of Egypt, Syria and Persia. When the Arabs became masters of most of the centres of ancient learning in Africa and Asia, the Muslims were able to take advantage of older knowledge and this they did, to an extraordinary degree. No race has ever shown a greater keenness for the acquisition of knowledge than the

2. Muhammad Ibn Qasim Ibn Yusuf Thaqafi, a cousin of Hajjaj Ibn Yusuf, Governor of Basra.

3. (a) "For the covenants (of security and safeguard enjoyed) by the Quraysh, their covenants (covering) journeys by winter and summer, let them adore the Lord of this House, Who provides them with food against hunger and with security against fear of danger; (b) Your Lord causes the ship to sail far into the sea so that you may seek wealth through Him. When distress comes upon you in the ocean, you call upon Him, but when you are safe on the land you turn away from your Lord and forget Him.

—Quran.

Arabs. Leaving on one side their achievements in various branches of learning, and looking only to their geography we can say that the Arab mind accomplished much. The Arab explorers may be said to have realised for the first time in history the true bulk of Asia. The lands beyond the Ganges, the Jaxartes, and the Bolor mountains had never before been so thoroughly brought within the range of the knowledge of the Levantine countries. Again it was the Arabs who, of all civilised peoples, made any lasting impression on Soudanese Africa beyond the Sahara, or upon the Zanzibar coast of the Indian Ocean. Lastly the earliest attempts to penetrate the plains of European Russia were due to the commercial enterprise of the Arab merchants. As a result of these the Caravan routes were improved, and kept in repair. Halting places for caravans were constructed, roads were made, a postal system was established and every facility was provided for the merchants. Thus from about the ninth century to the 14th century A.D. the Muslims were the masters of the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Arabic became the *lingua franca* of all Muslims from Spain to the confines of China. The commerce like the politics of the Muslim Empire centred in Baghdad and Basra. It was from this source that the main current of trade started for India and China, while the East African commerce took its rise in the harbours of the Red Sea. Many books relating to kingdoms, roads by sea and land, the fauna and flora of various countries came to be written at the instance of the ruling powers and by enthusiastic travellers. There are also many compilations of such information by men of learning and leisure who induced by love of knowledge of unknown countries, took pains to meet and enquire from many a traveller to distant lands.

Sulayman, who lived about 850 A.D., is perhaps the earliest Arab writer who gives information on the East. His account has a good deal of general information on the seas, the islands, the sea route to China, a description of the habits, government, religion, social customs, and national or tribal characteristics of the Chinese and the Indians. The narrative of Sulayman takes us by sea from the Persian

Gulf to China. He relates that most of the ships from China take in their goods at Siraf where they ship also the goods that are carried hither from Basra, Uman and other parts, because of frequent storms in the sea of Uman, the scarcity of water on the way to these places and the distance between Siraf and Basra being one hundred and twenty *parasangs* by sea. After shipping the goods they take in sweet water also from Siraf. Then they set sail to a place called Masqat situated at the extremity of the province of Uman, at a distance of about two hundred *parasangs* from Siraf. Sayf-bani-al-Safaq is one of the towns on the eastern part of the sea separating Siraf and Masqat. Then comes the island of Ibn Kawan. There are in this sea the Mountains of Uman and a place called Dardur situated between two rocks. Small ships pass through it, but Chinese ships dare not venture. There are also two other mountains called Kusayr and Uwayr which are scarcely visible above water level. After crossing these mountains the ships come to a place called Sahar Uman. At Masqat sweet water, drawn from the wells, was stored and also the cattle from the cities of Uman. Then the ships depart to the ports of Hind, sailing towards Kukam-malai (Quilon). It is a month's journey from Masqat in moderate wind. There is a garrison in Kukam-malai. The ships from China also come in here. There is sweet water available from the wells here. One thousand *dirhams* are collected as duties from the Chinese ships, while other ships pay a sum ranging from one *dinar* to ten *dinars*. Between Masqat, Kukam-malai and the sea of Harkand it is about a month's journey. At Kukam-malai they store sweet water. Thence the ships sail towards the sea of Harkand. They cross that sea and come to a place called Likhyalus. The inhabitants of this place understand neither Arabic, nor any other language generally spoken by merchants. They are a people who do not wear clothes. They report that women are not found among them. But men depart, in quest of them from the island in small boats hollowed out of one block of timber. They carry with them cocoanuts, sugarcane, plantain and coconut juice. This juice is white in colour ; if it is drunk

immediately after taken out of the fruit, it is sweet as honey ; if kept long it ferments and becomes an intoxicating drink ; if it is allowed to remain for a number of days it is turned into toddy. They sell this in exchange for bits of iron. They transact business by showing signs with hands because they do not understand the language. They are very skilled men in swimming, sometimes they carry off iron from the merchants and give them nothing in return for it.

Then the ships set sail towards a place known as Kalahbar. The country as well as the coast are called *bar*. It is the kingdom of Zabaj (Java) situated to the right of the cities of Hind. Their dress is *al-fut* (waist-wrappers) worn by high and low. Sometimes they wear only one *futah*. They take in sweet water from the wells here which they prefer to water from springs and rain water in tanks. The distance between Kukam-malai and Kalahbar is a month's journey.

Then the ships sail to a place called Batumah where sweet water is available for those who desire it. The distance to this place is ten day's journey.

Thence the ships depart and in ten days time they reach a place named Kadranj where also sweet water is available. Thus in all the islands of Hind they always found sweet water in the wells whenever they dug for it. At Kadranj there is a lofty hill. It is generally peopled by fugitives and robbers. Then the ships sail for ten days and reach a place Sanf-masira (Champa ?) where sweet water is available. They also get from here aloes which are called Udu-Sanfi. The people are of brown colour and every one wears two *futas*. After taking in water from here, they set sail and in about ten days they reach an island known as Sandarfulat where there is sweet water. Thence they steer upon the sea of Sanja and thence to the gates of China. These are mountains in the sea and in between two mountains there is only a narrow space through which ships could pass. If the ships have a good weather the

journey from Sandarfulat to China is covered in a month's time and the journey through the rocks takes seven days. After the ship crosses the gates, it enters the gulf which is of fresh water and drops anchor in one of the ports of China known as the city of Khanfu (Canton).

Thus the account of Sulayman and the narratives of other writers like Ibn Khurdadhbēh, Ibn Rusta, and Ibnul-Faqih show clearly that Muslim navigators were quite familiar with the seas as far as China. The Muslim vessels left Canton and passed towards the north-east as far as Korea, Japan and Phillippine islands. Muslim traders imported silk, camphor, cinnamon, wood, cocoanuts, musk, aloe and other Indian and Eastern commodities to Persia, Iraq, Egypt and the Mediterranean ports. Although the Muslims showed great eagerness for trade and commerce, yet they did little for the development of a strong navy. This was one of the chief reasons why they lost their supremacy on the high seas, and their empire crumbled.

SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF SALADIN'S LIFE

By

AFZAL-UL-ULAMA M. ABDUL HAQ

Lane-Poole has portrayed the career of Saladin in an admirable passage wherein he has said "If the taking of Jerusalem were the only fact known about Saladin, it were enough to prove him the most chivalrous and great-hearted conqueror of his own, and perhaps of any, age." It is obvious that this outstanding feature of the career of Saladin overshadowed the other aspects of his life. An intensive study of the contemporary records reveals that during the short intervals of peace when Saladin was at Cairo, he busied himself with certain activities of public utility which equally entitle him to the foremost place amongst the Sultans of Egypt.

The first act of his that deserves our attention is his untiring zeal in establishing public hospitals and asylums for the mentally weak and defective. The grand palaces of the Fatimides, which were of little use to him as he was wont to lead a simple and austere life of an ordinary soldier, were dedicated to this laudable object.

It is said that on an occasion he was taken round the palaces of the Fatimides among which there was one particularly beautiful building and regarding it there was a tradition that ants and insects would not appear in its premises. When the Sultan was informed of this he immediately suggested that the building was fit to be a public hospital as the patients housed in it could be free from the nuisance of vermins. His Vizier, Al-Qāḍi-al-Fāḍil, has recorded in his diary under the events of the year 577 A.H. (1181-82) that the Sultan ordered the opening of a hospital for the sick and an asylum for the aged. A palace was set apart for accommodating these institutions and a monthly contribution of about 200 Dinars from the trea-

sury was made for its upkeep. In addition to this grant the institutions received the income and the produce from the lands in the District of Fiume. "He appointed a Director, physicians, physicits, surgeons, supervisors, and servants to look after the place." Very soon the hospital became popular and we are informed by Ibn Jubayr, the famous Spanish traveller, who visited the place during the reign of Saladin that these institutions and hospitals were of a type that the Sultan could very well be proud of. He says the doctors, on duty there, had a store of medicines and different useful herbs which they used according to their discretion. The palace had numerous rooms and halls in which cots with beds were laid and there were a number of servants to look after the comfort and convenience of the sick. A separate ward was attached to the main building where sick women were treated as in-patients. Another ward with a separate open space, surrounded with iron railings and barred windows was set apart to house the patients suffering from insanity and mental diseases. The Sultan, according to this traveller, was very particular about these institutions, and so they were very efficiently managed. Besides, he ordered the old hospital of Cairo, which had been closed down, to be reopened and appointed several doctors and supervisors to look after its management.

Ibn Abī-Uṣaybī'ah in his biographical dictionary of the Physicians gives a long list of the famous doctors of Egypt and Syria, both Muslims and non-Muslims, who were patronised by Saladin. Some of these famous physicians and surgeons with their staff and medical stores, he says, accompanied the constantly moving armies during the Sultan's incessant campaigns across Palestine and Syria. The well-known traveller of Bagdad 'Abdul Latīf al Baghdādī who visited Saladin's armies at Acre describes the life in camp in detail and says that Saladin had established one hundred and forty depots with Veterinary surgeons in the main bazaar forming part of the camp. The extraordinary interest that the sultan evinced in matters pertaining to the treatment of the sick and the ailing gave rise to such stories as Scott has incorporated in his book *Talisman* in which Sala-

Saladin is made to visit Richard's camp in the garb of a Hakim. Lane-Poole has rightly remarked that 'the fact that Saladin during his occupation of Acre, did actually endow the hospitals there' would have made the minstrel Ralph de Diceto describe Saladin as the pious benefactor of this house of charity.

Another distinguishing feature of the reign of the Sultan was his liberal policy towards the spread of education among his subjects and the establishment of various colleges and public libraries for its furtherance. The liberal endowments he provided for these institutions made them self-sufficing institutions and centres of learning to which men from various countries flocked in search of knowledge. Several institutions like Al-Nāṣiriyyah, Al Qamḥiyyah and Al-Suyūfiyyah came into existence in Cairo and Alexandria at this time. At Damascus and Aleppo he founded several colleges and endowed them with landed property and revenues from the state. In this respect Saladin was so enthusiastic that he himself attended the lectures of the well-known scholars like Al-Salafi and his example was soon copied by the members of the Royal family and the State officials. A careful study of the chronicles of the age will enable us to make a long and exhaustive list of the colleges and public libraries that sprang up during this period in spite of the troublous times when the Crusades were in full swing. These institutions owed their origin entirely to Saladin's untiring zeal and energy. And the Sultan's pre-occupation with the Crusades in no way interfered with his plan to provide his Vizier, Al-Qāḍi-al-Fāḍil with all facilities in founding a unique college at Cairo which was known for a long time as Al-Fāḍiliyyah. The palace library of the Fatimide Caliphs was distributed among the various institutions and Maqrizī records that nearly one hundred thousand volumes were selected by the Vizier and kept in the library attached to the College he had found at Cairo.

Saladin's reforms in other directions as well deserve our utmost consideration. It is no wonder that his diverse activities in peace time would easily equal, if not excel, the energetic conduct of his

successful campaigns against the Franks. In the light of these evidences one cannot but endorse the opinion of the Sultan as expressed by 'Abdul Latif when he describes him as "deeply intellectual" and even in the battlefield "surrounded by a large concourse of learned men who were discussing various sciences."

VIJAYĀDITYA II, MAHĀRĀJĀDHIRĀJA 802—842 A.D.

By

K. R. SUBRAMANIAN

Vijayāditya II was one of the most distinguished of the Eastern Chālukyan kings who ruled over the Andhra country for about four and a half centuries from 615 A.D. He was the eleventh ruler in succession. The regnal period of Vijayāditya is variously given as 40, 41, 44 and 48 years. But, we have adopted the number of years found in the earliest of the copperplates to give a continuous genealogy and chronology those of his grandson Vijayāditya III (ac. 844 A.D.). Calculating from the accession of the first sovereign Kuṇḍa Viṣṇuvardhana I (615-632 A.D.) we arrive at about 802 A.D. as the date when Vijayāditya II ascended the throne.

This famous king turned the winter of defeat and despondency into a glorious summer of victory and rejoicing by repeatedly routing the invading Rashtrakutas of the Deccan and erecting memorial temples in gratitude to Śiva the Lord of the hosts.

Dantidurga overthrew the Chālukyas of Vātāpi and established the rule of the Rāṣṭrakutas in or about Śaka 675 and his dynasty ruled for about two centuries till about Śaka 895 when it was superseded by Tailapa a scion of the old Chālukyan stock. During these 220 years there was incessant warfare between the Rāṣṭrakutas and the Eastern Chālukyas. At first warfare must have been caused by the help rendered to their declining cousins by the Eastern Chālukyas against the rise of the Rāṣṭrakutas. Shrewd marriage alliances with the Rāṣṭrakutas brought peace to some extent to the Pallavas and this augmented the trouble to the Eastern Chālukyas by providing an active foe in the south and by enabling the Rattas to concentrate their efforts on their eastern enemies.

Viṣṇuāditya I (ac. 747) was the first to face the Ratta fire. His son was also successful in many battles and he ruled Vengiṃaṇḍala 12,000¹ according to a record of his great grandson.

If, however, we read the version of the enemies, the picture is different. The victories of the Pallava general Udayachandra over the kings of Vatapi and Vengi enabled Dantidurga to found his dynasty, and his successor Krishna I to “churn the ocean of the Chālukya race”. Yuvarāja Govinda, son of Kṛṣṇa issued his Alas plates of Śaka 692 “from the camp of the victorious army that invaded the Vengiṃaṇḍala, when the Lord of Vengi was humbled by the cession of his treasury, his forces and his own country, at the confluence of the Kṛṣṇavenna and the Musi.”² Then, Govinda forced the Andhra king to help him in his civil war with his younger brother Dhruva. The cause championed by the Andhra failed and so he was tormented by the victorious Dhruva ‘lord from sea to sea’ and by his equally powerful son Govinda III.³ The Paithan grant of Śaka 716 speaks thus of the events—‘although that brother (Govindarāja) of his had fetched in large numbers those hostile kings even, the ruler of Mālava and others, who were joined by the lord of Kanchi, the Gaṅga and him of Vengi, his (Dhruva’s) mind underwent no change in regard to him when afterwards he (Dhruvarāja) had possessed himself of his ruby ornaments and his store of gold. When even after Dhruva’s conciliatory overtures, Vallabha (Govinda) did not make peace, then Dhruva speedily defeated him in a battle offered by the brother, and he afterwards drove away the eastern and northern opponents and obtained the whole sovereignty.”

Govinda, son of Dhruva was victory personified. His Wani grant to a brahmin of Vengipura, a grandson of Viṣṇubhaṭṭa contains the following—‘though alone, by the expansion of his preeminent valour, (he) quickly (bereft of their lustre) twelve famous (kings)

1. I.A. XIII, 55; XX, 414; S.I.I I. 33; J.A.H.R.S. V, 112.

2. E.I. VI. 213.

3. E.I. III, 104; I.A. V, 144.

who combining together, had prepared themselves to destroy the earth.⁴ Govinda's son Amoghavarṣa I records his father's victories over Nāgabhaṭa and Candragupta, Dharma and Cakrāyudha and his 'acquiring the Mālava country along with the Kosala, the Kalinga, the Veṅgi, the Dahala and the Odraka that Vikrama himself made his *servants* enjoy them.'⁵ This reference to the ruler of Veṅgi as his servant is reinforced in Govinda's Radhanpur grant of A.D. 808.⁶ "In obedience to one brief half sentence which Govinda sent by the mouth of his messenger, the lord of Veṅgi came thither and worked for him like a servant without cessation, desiring his own welfare."

The lord of Veṅgi who became the abject slave of Govinda III was his own creature Bhīma Salukki, brother of Vijayāditya II who proved a traitor, joined the enemy and profited himself. He was one of those servants of Govinda III made to enjoy Veṅgi referred to in the Sanjan Plates.⁷ Govinda thought he had inherited the overlordship over the whole Deccan from the Chālukyas of Vatapi and this pretension was enforced by feat of arms. He would recognise only Bhīma Salukki his puppet and protege as the Veṅgi ruler and not his elder brother !

It was at this juncture when the fortunes of the Telugu dynasty were at a low ebb that Vijayāditya (son of Viṣṇuvardhana IV and grandson of Vijayāditya I) or the 'sun of victory' rose in all glory. For some time he was eclipsed by the Rāhu of his brother Bhīma whom the clouds of foreign invasion protected from being scorched to death. The traitor's tenure was short, the hosts of enemies were dispelled and the fair name of Veṅgirājya, besmirched for a while, was restored to its old status of respect. The legitimate king of Andhra destroyed the Gangās and the Ratta generals after warring

4. I.A. XI, 161.

5. E.I. XVIII, 253.

6. I.A. VI, 71; E.I. VI, 239.

7. E.I. XVIII, 253.

with them (as we learn from the Sataluru grant of Vijayaditya III,) for twelve years and drove out Bhima Salukki the pretender and usurper.⁸ Another copper plate of the same king⁹ speaks of our hero 'as a fire of destruction to the Gaṅga family' and 'as having the valour of a lion splitting open (the temples of) the lordly elephants of his enemies (arinagadhipa) with his unsheathed sharp sword.'

Govinda III was succeeded by his young son Amoghavarṣa I and that partly accounted for the triumph of Vijayaditya II. That the Andhra ruler was victorious is admitted in the later Navasari Plates of his enemy.¹⁰ 'While raising *again* the glory of the Ratta kingdom, which had been *drowned* in the *Chālukya* ocean Amoghavarṣa fried like gram his enemies, the *fiery* Chālukyās, having plucked out their stalks from the roots and having threshed out by means of *danda* the *kantakas* (obnoxious persons).

There is a vagueness about the reference to the Gaṅgas with whom Vijayāditya is said to have fought to a glorious end. The Gaṅgās of Kalinga never missed an opportunity to join the enemy of the Chālukya king of Andhradeśa or to bring some other trouble on his head.

But, in one inscription it is made clear that the Gaṅgās belonged to the south.¹¹ The Gaṅgās of the south were feudatories of the Ratta and the Sanjan Plates of Amoghavarṣa speak of the Gaṅgā in fetters in the Ratta capital in his as well as in his father's reign. So, we have to infer that the Gaṅgā army was entirely at the disposal of the Ratta and Vijayāditya had thus to fight against the Gaṅga and the Ratta.

8. J.A.H.R.S. V, 113.

9. E.I. V, 122; I.A. XX, 415.

10. J.B.B.R.A.S. XVIII, 266.

11. M.E.R. 1914, 84; 1918, 131.

Vijayāditya speaks of himself as Mahārājādhirāja, a great conqueror and lord of many vassals.¹² The *ājñapti* of one of his grants¹³ was Niravadyesa Vatsala. Niravadyesa being a surname of Vijayāditya II of Vatapi, perhaps the *ājñapti* was a princeling of the dethroned Vatapi Chālukya family who had sought favour under his cousin ruling over Andhra. Another feudatory who stood by our hero was Prince Nriparudra his half-brother by a Haihaya queen and a due meed of praise must be accorded to him for his staunch loyalty and fraternal regard.

An inscription of his great grandson Chālukya Bhīma credits Narendra with the defeat of an army of the Gaṅgā of the south and of another army of Bhīma Salukki whose cause was taken up by the Ratta.¹⁴ A still later copperplate¹⁵ tells us how Vengisa fought night and day for twelve years with the Gaṅgās and Rattas in 108 battles and built the same number of large temples of Siva under the name of Śambhu. The devastating war seems to have ended in the marriage between Kali Vishnuvardhana son of Vijayaditya II and Silamahadevi a Rashtrakuta princess.¹⁶

Vijayāditya II is said to have built 108 temples to Śiva to expiate his sins committed in the 108 battles he fought. Some of the old Śaiva foundations may be traced to this epoch. Two temples at Kolluru and Vipparru and the Ūmāmaheśvara shrine at Bezwada were raised by him.¹⁷ The deity in all his temples was named Narendresvara after one of his surnames. Temple-building was not, however, new to the age as Hiuen Tsang notes the existence of 130 Deva temples in Andhra and Mahandra.

12. I.A. XX, 414.

13. M.E.R. 1917, 117.

14. M.E.R. 1914, 84; 1912, 84; 1918, 131.

15. I.A. XIII, 50-51; S.I.I. I, 39.

16. M.E.R., 1909, 108.

17. M.E.R., 1915, 11, 1921; 92.

All the predecessors of Vijayāditya II bore the title of Mahārāja. He was the first to assume the titles of Mahārajādhirāja, Parameśvara and Parama Bhaṭṭāraka which show, without any doubt, that he was supreme and independent in his kingdom. Chālukya Arjuna, Narendramṛigarāja and Tribhuvanāṅkuśa were some other names of Vijayāditya II which emphasise his prowess in war so well borne out by many inscriptions. It was left to his grandson Vijayāditya III to carry the war into the enemy's country and win epic fame for himself, his family and his kingdom.

KĀKATĪYA GAṆAPATIDEVA AND THE SOUTH INDIAN POWERS

By

M. RAMA RAO

The Kākatīyas of Warangal were the successors of the Eastern Cālukyas of Vēṅgi in the sovereignty over the Āṇdhra country. They rose to power about 1000 A.D. and became one of the leading powers of the Dekkan in the 12th century.¹ When the hold of the Cālukya-Cōlas over the Telugu Districts on the east coast weakened in the middle of the 12th century,² the Kākatīyas extended their power into this region.³ About the beginning of the next century Gaṇapatidēva began the systematic conquest of Cālukya-Cōla territories and feudatories and built the Kākatīya empire. His conquests in other directions⁴ brought him to the borders of the dominions of the South Indian powers in the Nellore and Cuddapah Districts. A conflict thus became imminent between the Kākatīyas and the rulers of the south. This paper is devoted to the study of the relations between Gaṇapatidēva and the rulers of South India.

Kulōttuṅga III, (1178-1218 A.D.) the contemporary Cōla king, was a weakling and so many of his feudatories became troublesome.

1. See my paper entitled "The rise of the Kākatīyas" in the Proceedings of the Trivandrum Session of the Ali-India Oriental Conference pp. 728-33 wherein this view has been elaborated.

2. This was the consequence of the departure of Vikramacōla, the last of the Chālukya-Cōla viceroys over Vēṅgi, in 1118 A.D.

3. The first successful attempt in this direction was made in 1158 A.D. by a subordinate of Gaṇapatidēva's uncle Rudradēva, who figures in Drākṣārāma in that year. (S.I.I. IV. 1107).

4. Cf. his conquest of the *Sēvaṇas* of Addaṅki (Nel. Dist. Ins. O. 88) and the Telugu Cōḷas of Pottapi. (S.I.I. VI. 628).

The Telugu Cōḍas of Nellore were ruling over parts of the Cuddapah and Chingleput Districts, besides their home province in the Nellore District, as his vassals.⁵ An inscription from Pudukōṭṭah dated in the 34th year of this monarch's reign⁶ states that he sent an expedition to the north which culminated in the subjugation of Vaḍugu and Vēṅgīmaṇḍalam and the recapture of Kāncī. It is known that the Cōḷa king was the sovereign at Kāncī in 1212 A.D.⁷ If so from whom did he reconquer the city? A record from the Nellore District dated 1211 A.D.⁸ mentions Tikka, a prince of the Telugu Cōḍa family of Nellore, as ruler of Kāncī. Obviously, the Telugu Cōḍas of Nellore made a temporary raid on the city in 1211 A.D. and Kulōttuṅga conquered it from them. Kulōttuṅga's subjugation of Vēṅgīmaṇḍalam in 1212 A.D., however, seems to be a mere boast, for even as early as 1209 A.D. the Kākatiya king Gaṇapatidēva was in possession of parts of the east coast⁹ and there is no evidence to indicate that a Cōḷa invasion of this region occurred subsequent to this date. Still, however, Bhīmanāyaka, a minister of Gaṇapatidēva is described in an inscription dated 1213 A.D. as the plunderer of Kāncī.¹⁰ Since, as stated above, Kulōttuṅga was in possession of Kāncī from 1212 A.D. onwards, Bhīmanayaka's plundering the city must have taken place prior to that date. It was, in all probability, connected with the temporary conquest of that city by the Telugu Cōḍas in 1211 A.D. Perhaps Gaṇapatidēva concluded an alliance with the rulers of Nellore and despatched his minister at the head of an army to help them in their conquest of Kāncī. He might have backed the Telugu Cōḍas with the hope that they would be an

5. K. A. Nilakanta Sastry—The Cōḷas II pt. i. p. 107.

6. Pudukōṭṭah Inscriptions 163 and 166. See also S.I.I. III. 87 lines 2-3.

7. MER 346 and 361 of 1919.

8. Nel. Dist. Ins. p. 1254. Tikka was at this time a prince and did not become the ruling chieftain till 1223 A.D.

9. MER 803 of 1922.

10. Cf. the title "Kāncī-cūrakāra" in MER 47 of 1929-30.

effective barrier to Cōḷa expansion towards the north especially in view of his conquest of their former territories on the east coast. This view is supported by the fact that Maṇmasiddhi, son of Tikka, helped Gaṇapatidēva in his war with the rulers of Kaṭiṅga in 1237 A.D.¹¹

The first half of the thirteenth century was a period of great confusion and disorder in south Indian history. Owing to the weakness of the contemporary Cōḷa kings, the Pāṇḍyas and a later Pallava chieftain called Kōpperuṅṅa became aggressive and each of them in turn defeated and imprisoned his Cōḷa overlord. The Hoysalas interfered in these politics, first sided the Cōḷa and then allied themselves with the Pāṇḍyas and thus complicated the politics of the time.¹² Tikka *alias* Tirukālattidēva ascended the throne at Nellore in 1223 A.D.¹³ He too found it profitable to enter these tangled politics and held Kāncī fighting with the Hoysalas and Kōpperuṅṅa on behalf of his Cōḷa suzerain and thus tried to maintain the balance of power in South India.¹⁴ The ultimate result of these fights for supremacy was the triumph of the Pāṇḍyas by about the middle of the 13th century.

The Pāṇḍya first concentrated his attention on his rivals in South India and succeeded in repelling the Hoysala intruder and subjugating the Pallava. He then turned his attention to the north and the Cōḷa dominions in that quarter which were then in the hands of Tikka. A number of inscriptions in Chidambaram refer to Sundara Pāṇḍya's attempts to conquer the Telugu districts of the Cōḷa empire. One of them¹⁵ states that he annihilated the forces

11. MER 580 of 1907.

12. K. A. Nilakanta Sastry—The Cōḷas II pt. i. pp. 145-48, 172 and 199-200.

13. Cf. MER 659 of 1904 dated 1225 A.D. in his third regnal year.

14. Tikkana—Nirvacanōttararāmāyaṇamu verses 33 and 34.

15. MER 340 of 1913.

of the Teliṅgās that surrounded him. Another record from the same place¹⁶ mentions that the Pāṇḍya conquered the kings of Vēnāḍu and those of the north (i.e. the Teliṅgās) and killed Gaṇḍagōpāla. A third epigraph refers to Suṇḍara Pāṇḍya's fight with the Telugus at Muḍugūr.¹⁷ It is known, further that the Pāṇḍya defeated Gānapati, occupied Kāncī and performed Virābhiṣēka at Nellore. Evidently, the events mentioned above were parts of a single campaign. Muḍugūr, referred to above, may be identified with the village of that name in the Punganur Taluk of the Chittoor District. The course of events may then be stated as follows : alarmed at the rapid expansion of Pāṇḍyan power and worried about his own safety, Tikka seems to have appealed to his friend and ally Gaṇapatidēva for help. The Kākatīya monarch sent a suitable force to his aid. The combined armies marched into the Chittoor District and encountered the Pāṇḍya while he was still on his way to the north and surrounded him. In the battle that ensued, they were defeated, and fled to Kāncī. The Pāṇḍya pursued them and inflicted a second defeat on them near that city. The allied armies then retreated to Nellore. Once again Suṇḍara Pāṇḍya followed them and fought another pitched battle before the town of Nellore. Once again the allies were defeated and Tikka was killed in the battle. The victor then entered Nellore, performed Virābhiṣēka there and returned home. Since it is known that Tikka died in 1249 A.D.¹⁸ and since in June of that year the Kākatīyas occupied Kāncī, the exploits of Suṇḍara Pāṇḍya, mentioned above, have to be ascribed to the early months of 1249 A.D. This Pāṇḍyan inroad into the Telugu Cōḍa territory and the death of his friend and ally Tikka worried Gānapatidēva considerably. He, therefore, despatched his general

16. *Ibid* 354.

17. *Ibid* 361.

18. Cf. Rangacharya's *Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency* II Nel. 633 dated 1251 A.D. in the third regnal year of Tikka's son and successor Maṇmasiddhi.

Sāmaṇtabhōja to the south in order to set matters right. This Kākatīya general instituted Maṇmasiddhi, son of Tikka, at Nellore, pushed on to Kāncī, occupied the city, established Maṇmasiddhi's authority there also and returned home. Sāmaṇtabhōja's occupation of Kāncī took place in June 1249¹⁹ and he seems to have stayed in the city during the early part of 1250 A.D. also.²⁰

Maṇmasiddhi was not, however, left in peace for a long time. Kōpperuṅṅa seems to have taken advantage of the departure of Sāmaṇtabhōja and occupied Kāncī in 1253 A.D.²¹ Next year hostilities broke out between the Pāṇḍyas and the Hoysalas and once again Kāncī became the objective of these rivals. Maṇmasiddhi had to fight these rulers in defence of the city. Nor was this all. He is said to have fought with the Draviḍa and Kaṇṇāṭa kings and a chieftain called Vijaya, ruler of Koṅgu.²² He does not seem, however, to have fought with all these foes single handed. Bappadēva, a subordinate of Kākatīya Gaṇapatidēva and his daughter Rudrāmbā, is described in an inscription dated 1261 A.D. as having "shown to Sāmparāya the dance of enemy corpses."²³ This Sāmparāya may be identified with Vijaya, the rival of Maṇmasiddhi, and with Vijaya Śāmbuvarāya. Thus it is evident that Maṇmasiddhi was helped in his struggle with the rulers of South India by his allies the Kākatīyas. Since it is known that Kōpperuṅṅa was in possession of Kāncī till July 1264,²⁴ and since Maṇmasiddhi figures in that city in September of the same year,²⁵ the fights waged by the Telugu Cōḍa chieftain in defence of Kāncī may be ascribed to the intervening period.

19. Ind. Ant. p. 122.

20. MER 2 of 1893.

21. Sewell—Historical Inscriptions of South India, p. 150.

22. Tikkana—Nirvacanōttarāmāyaṇamu verse 39.

23. MER 194 of 1905.

24. Sewell—Historical Inscriptions p. 150.

25. *Ibid*

There was serious trouble in the Kāncī region once again in 1260 A.D. The Pāṇḍya-Hoysala rivalry was brought to a close in 1255 A.D.²⁶ by the triumph of Suṇḍara Pāṇḍya. The Pāṇḍya next subjugated Kōpperuṇjīṅga and became supreme in the south. He then turned his attention towards Kāncī once again. Kōpperuṇjīṅga figures in the city in 1266 A.D.²⁷ About the same time, the Pāṇḍyan king is described as an enemy of Gaṇḍagōpāla and Gaṇapati.²⁸ It is said that he marched to the north through the territories of Kōpperuṇjīṅga and Gaṇḍagōpāla driving the Telugu troops before him as far north as Nellore, had himself crowned in that town and then returned home.²⁹ The Pallava was in Kāncī even in 1261 A.D. Maṇmasiddhi was in the Nellore and Chingleput Districts in 1263 A.D.³⁰ and at Kāncī in 1265 A.D.³¹ It is likely that Maṇmasiddhi lost both Nellore and Kāncī in 1261 A.D. and was not able to regain them for some years, and that he was biding his time elsewhere, possibly in the Kākatīya empire.³² Kōpperuṇjīṅga seems to have been unable to withstand the pressure of Suṇḍara Pāṇḍya and taken refuge in Kāncī. He was not, however, satisfied with the occupation of this city. Taking advantage of Suṇḍara Pāṇḍya's invasion of Nellore and the absence of Maṇmasiddhi, he entered the Āṇḍhra country in search of adventure and fortune. Curiously enough, he figures at Drākṣārāma on the northern border of the Kākatīya empire in 1262 A.D. making gifts to the local Śaivite temple.³³ But his records found in this temple indicate clearly that his adventure

26. *Ibid* p. 151.

27. MER 38 of 1890.

28. *Ibid* 32 of 1891; Ep. Ind. p. 307.

29. Sewell—Historical Inscriptions pp. 154-55.

30. MER 230 of 1922 and Nel. Dist. Ins. p. 442.

31. MER 27, 35 and 36 of 1890.

32. Rangacharya mentions an inscription from Guḍivāḍa dated 1260 A.D. (Kt. 293) which mentions Maṇmasiddhi in a local grant. This supports the view expressed above that he was away from his capital.

33. S.I.I. IV. nos. 1341, 1342 and 1342 B.

did not prove successful and that on the other hand he was humiliated by the Kākatīyas and made to acknowledge their suzerainty at least for the time being.³⁴ The Pāṇḍyan aggression of 1261 A.D. seems to have gone unchallenged, for, Gaṇapatidēva died in 1262 A.D. when his friend Maṇmasiddhi was still a fugitive outside his own dominion. The Kākatīya monarch had retired from active politics even in 1260 A.D.³⁵ and was also preoccupied at the time with the consolidation of the position of his daughter Rudrāmbā on the Kākatīya throne.

This survey of the relations between Gaṇapatidēva and the south Indian powers indicates clearly that the monarch inaugurated a new policy. This was the result of the unprecedented expansion of his territory into the southern districts of the Āṇḍhra country. He could easily have conquered the territories of the Telugu Cōḍas of Nellore as he did those of many minor ruling chieftains of the time. But being a shrewd statesman he decided otherwise. He realised that it would be far more prudent to allow the Telugu Cōḍas to exist so that they might form a friendly and feudatory buffer state between his vast empire and the territories of the south Indian powers. He

34. Two of the records mentioned above (nos. 1341 and 1342) register gifts for the merit of a Kākatīya king. In the third occurs a title of Kōpperuñjiṅga which begins with the word "kāketi", then contains a gap of five letters which is followed by the expression "dāravinda-madhukarāyamāna-mānasēna." This gap may be filled up by supplying the letters "Gaṇapati-pa" and the entire expression taken to mean one "who is the bee to the lotus feet of Kākatī Gaṇapati." This suggestion is justified by the occurrence in the same record of the expression "Gaṇapati-mahārājasyā-jñām-pravartayatā." This proves the Pallava's acceptance of Gaṇapatidēva's suzerainty, (*Ibid.*, no. 1342 B).

35. MER 194 of 1905 bearing the date S. 1183 is said to belong to the second year of Rudrāmbā's reign S.I.I. IV. no. 1342 B mentioned above, indicates that Gaṇapatidēva was alive in 1262 A.D. Obviously, the monarch threw the burden of the state on the shoulders of his daughter even in 1260 A.D. and was content with merely supervising her administration.

also knew that Kāñcī and Nellore were two vulnerable points in the south and did his best to see that both of them remained, as far as possible, in the hands of his Telugu Cōḍa allies. Gaṇapatidēva's two successors, Rudrāmbā and Pratāparudradēva continued his prudent policy and tried to check the northern aggressions of the south Indian rulers indirectly through the instrumentality of the Telugu Cōḍas.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MUSLIM VICEROYS OF LAKHNAUTI AND THE RĀJĀS OF JĀJNAGAR.

By

M. SOMASEKHARA SARMA

The Muslim chroniclers have rendered great service to the study of Indian History. Since they were contemporary writers about men and events, some of their chronicles are of utmost importance. But either through ignorance or through prejudice some of their accounts are incomplete or of doubtful validity. Recently Prof. S. H. Hodivala has elucidated several obscure points and corrected some of the statements in the Arabic and Persian Histories of India with the help of other sources of information. Still much more has to be done before the one-sided versions of the Muslim Chroniclers are accepted as unimpeachable facts. This can be accomplished by a re-examination of their accounts in the light of the available epigraphic and literary evidence.

In this paper an attempt is made to review the relations between the Gaṅgas of Orissa and the early Muslim Viceroys of Lakhnauti in the light of the information furnished by some of the inscriptions of the former, which serve to supplement or correct some of the statements made in the *Tabakāt-i-Nāṣirī* and *Riyāzu-s-Salātīn*, the two important chronicles relating to the history of the early Muslim rule in Bengal.

The Eastern Gaṅgas of Kaṭiṅga became very powerful from the time of Anantavarman Cōḍagaṅga and extended their dominions far and wide. Anantavarman Cōḍagaṅga defeated the king of Utkala¹

1. The Kendupatna C. P. grants of Narasimha II—*J.A.S.B.*, Vol. LXV, pp. 233 ff. Verses 22 and 26.

in battle and brought that country under his subjection. He ruled the country between the Gautamagaṅgā and the Gaṅgā (that is, between the Gōdāvarī and the Gaṅgā—the Ganges). Ever since the Gaṅgas extended their power over the Utkal country they came into conflict with their neighbouring Muslim rulers of Gaur or Lakhnauti. Lakhnauti is a corrupt form of Lakṣmaṇāvati,² another name for Gauḍa or Gaur of the Muslim Chroniclers.

Muḥammad-i-Bakhtyār KHiljī, the first Muslim ruler of Bengal, reigned at Lakhnauti from A.D. 1198.³ When he led an expedition to Tibet he despatched two of his KHiljī amirs, namely Muḥammad-i-SHerān and his brother, Aḥmad-i-SHerān with a portion of his forces against Jājnagar, the Utkal or Orissa of the Muslim historians. Major Raverty, the translator of *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī* places this event⁴ towards the close of A.H. 601 or about A.D. 1205. At that time the ruler of Orissa was Rājarāja III (A.D. 1197 to A.D. 1213), the son of Anaṅgabhimā II. The Muslim Chroniclers are silent about the details of this campaign. They simply state that on hearing of the news of the failure of the Tibetan expedition of Bakhtyār and of his return to Lakhnauti, Muḥammad-i-SHerān “came back from that quarter (Jājnagar) and returned again to Dīw-koṭ.”⁵ This is the first conflict recorded in history between the Hindu Gaṅga rulers of Orissa and the Muslim rulers of Bengal. The very meagre account given by the Muslim Chroniclers seems to indicate that the campaign against Jājnagar was unsuccessful.

2. Major Raverty in his translation of *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī* uses the form Lakhnawati. All references to *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī* in this paper are to Major Raverty's translation.

3. *Riyāzu-s-Salāṭin*, p. 68, fn. 3, (Maulavī Abdus Salam's translation. All references to *Riyāzu-s-Salāṭin* in this paper are to this translation). According to Raverty it is A.D. 1194—Vide *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī*, Vol. I, p. 559, 2nd para in foot notes.

4. *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī*, Vol. I, p. 560, fn. 4.

5. *Ibid*, pp. 573-74.

Some time after the death of Muḥammad-i-Bakhtiyār K̲H̲iljī, G̲H̲iyāṣ-ud-Dīn K̲H̲iljī, a contemporary of the slave king, Sultan ṢHams-ud-Dīn. Iltutmish of Delhi, became the ruler of Bengal in A.H. 612 (A.D. 1215).⁶ It is stated that he consolidated the Muslim sovereignty in Bengal and extended his rule over Jājnagar or Orissa. Minhāj-ud-Dīn in his *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī* states that Jājnagar sent tribute to Sultan G̲H̲iyāṣ-ud-Dīn.⁷ Except this bald statement, no details of any campaign against Jājnagar have been recorded by him. Anaṅgabhīma III (A.D. 1213 to A.D. 1239), the son and successor of Rājarāja III was the ruler of Orissa or Jājnagar, contemporaneous with G̲H̲iyāṣ-ud-Dīn. None of the many records of Anaṅgabhīma III allude to G̲H̲iyāṣ-ud-Dīn (A.D. 1210 to A.D. 1227). G̲H̲iyāṣ-ud-Dīn's invasion of Jājnagar, if it were true as is stated by Minhāj-ud-Dīn, must have taken place some time before A.D. 1225 because from 1225 he was engaged in battles with the emperor, Iltutmish of Delhi and his son, Sultan Nāṣir-ud-Dīn. But G̲H̲ulām Ḥusain Salim, the author of *Riyāzu-s-Salātīn* does not even refer to G̲H̲iyāṣ-ud-Dīn's expedition to Jājnagar, let alone his exacting tribute from its ruler.

It must, however, be pointed out here that the Cateśvar inscription⁸ of Anaṅgabhīma III alludes to his war with the Yavanas, presumably the Muslim rulers of Bengal. There are two verses in this record which extol the heroism of Viṣṇu, the minister of Anaṅgabhīma III in this war. They state as follows:

“The Vaikhānasas could not have even by their most austere penance, comprehend the omnipresence and all-pervasiveness of Viṣṇu to the extent to which the idea was realised by ‘Tuṅghāna-Prthvipati’ (king Tuṅghāna) when he began, apprehending Viṣṇu

6 *Riyāzu-s-Salātīn*, p. 71, fn. 1st Para.

7. *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī*, Vol. 1, p. 587.

8 *J.A.S.B.*, 1898, Vol. LXVII, pp. 317 to 327. First noticed in the *Viśvakōśa*. Vol. VI. p. 229.

here and there, to look around through extreme fear while fighting on the bank of the Bhīma, at the skirts of the Vindhya hills on the sea-shore."

"He alone fought against the Musalman king and applying arrows to his bow, killed many successful warriors. His heroism transcends description."⁹

Who is this 'Tuṅghāna Prṭhvīpati' or king Tuṅghāna? Opinion is divided as to the identity of this king. Some consider the word Tuṅghāna to be a mistake for Tummāna, the country of the Haihayas of Cēdi, and hold the opinion that the king referred to therein was the king of Tummāna,¹⁰ whoever he might be. In the opinion of some others Tuṅghāna Prṭhvīpati is identical with Malik 'Izz-ud-Dīn Ṭughril-i-Ṭughān KHān of Lakhnauti."¹¹ I am inclined to accept the latter view.¹² It is evident that what is stated in the two verses quoted above refer to one and the same battle. Since the second verse alludes to the opponent of Viṣṇu as 'a Musalmān king' Tuṅghāna Prṭhvīpati is, in my opinion, the personal name of

9. *Ibid.*, Verses 12 and 13. Translation by N. N. Vasu.

10. H. C. Ray: *The Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. I, p. 478, *Kāliṅga Saṁcika*, p. 611; P. Acharya—A note on the Bhuvanēśvar inscription of Candradēvi—*Jour. Bi. and Or. Res. Soc.*, Vol. XV (1929), p. 281.

11. N. N. Vasu. *J.A.S.B.*, Vols. LXV pp. 233-34 and Vol. LXVII, p. 319

12. The Cateśvar inscription was first noticed in the *Viśvakōśa*, Vol. VI, p. 229. While editing the Kendupatna grants in *J.A.S.B.*, 1896, Vol. LXV, Vasu quoted in his paper the verses from the Cateśvar inscription extolling the valour of Viṣṇu. The inscription was subsequently published in *J.A.S.B.*, Vol. LXVII, pp. 317-327 (1898). N. N. Vasu gives the reading of the text as "...Viśvam-Viṣṇumayam yathā parinatam Ṭuṅghāna-prṭhvīpatēḥ ...Kim brume yavan-āvan-indusamarē tat-tasya vīra-vratam", and identifies 'Tuṅghāna prṭhvīpati' with Ṭughān KHān. But the late Mon Mohan Chakravarti, while writing on the Eastern Gaṅgas of Kāliṅga in *J.A.S.B.*, (1903), part I, states that the king with whom Viṣṇu fought was 'Tummāna prṭhvīpati'

that Muslim ruler—the governor of Lakhnauti. But it must be pointed out that while the verse refers to the vanquished as Tuṅghāna the Muslim Chronicles give the name of the governor as Ṭuḡhān (Tughāna or Tughāna in Sanskrit). The composer of that record—the Cateśvar inscription—appears to have changed Tughāna to Tuṅghāna to meet the requirements of the metre.

Malik ‘Izz-ud-Dīn Ṭuḡhril-i-Ṭuḡhān KHān, according to Major Raverty, became the governor of Lakhnauti in A.H. 631 or A.D.

and not Ṭuḡhān KHān. He writes as follows: “He (Anaṅgabhīma III) had a brahmin minister named Viṣṇu who fought for him with Ṭummāṇa pṛthvīpati (Cat. ins. Ll. 14-15), and with the Yavanas—“*Yavan-āvan-īndu samarē*.” (ibid, 1.15). N. N. Vasu reads Tummāṇa as Tuṅghāna and identifies this with Ṭuḡhril-i-Ṭuḡhān KHān (J.A.S.B., Vol. LXV, pp. 233-4, LXVII, p. 319), The identification is open to objections. Firstly, the expression “*Tummāṇa-pṛthvīpatiḥ*” means of the king of the Tummāṇa land therefore “Tummāṇa cannot be applied to any person. Secondly, the fight with Ṭuḡhan KHān took place on 13th SHawwāl, A.H. 642 or in March, 1245 A.D. i.e., six or seven years after Anaṅgabhīmadēva had ceased to rule—etc.”

Many of the subsequent writers approved Mon Mohan Chakravarti’s identification.

I cannot say whether N. N. Vasu’s reading is correct or not, as the plates have not been published. I do not think that even Chakravarti consulted the original plates and corrected the reading into ‘Tummāṇa.’ His main difficulty in accepting Vasu’s reading and identification appears to be in the date 13th SHawwāl, A. H. 642 (14th March, 1245 A.D.), the date of the battle with Ṭuḡhān KHān, as we know that Anaṅgabhīma ceased to rule long before A.D. 1245. Chakravarti, therefore, suggests that the verses refer to two battles waged by Viṣṇu, one with the ruler of Ṭummāṇa and the other with the *yavanas*. If this suggestion is accepted there seems to be some difficulty as has been noted by some other scholars also. H. C. Ray says. “The reference in the same inscription to his (Anaṅgabhīma’s) fight with a *yavana* ruler is obscure’—(*Dyn. Hist. of Northern India*, p. 478). In my opinion those verses refer to one and the same engagement with the *yavanas*. Chakravarti identifies the *yavana* ruler as GHiyās-ud-Dīn (A.D. 1210-1227), GHiyas-ud-Dīn was, no doubt, an early contemporary of Anaṅgabhīma III, but

1233.¹³ He ruled the country till A.H. 642 or A.D. 1244.¹⁴ He was, thus, a contemporary of both Anaṅgabhīma III and of his son and successor, Narasimhadēva I (A.D. 1239-40 to A.D. 1263). The Cateśvar inscription of Anaṅgabhīma III is an important record as much as it brings to light a war unnoticed by the Muslim Chroniclers, which was fought during the early years of the reign of Malik ‘Izz-ud-Dīn Ṭughril-i-Ṭughān KHān between himself and the ruler of Jājnagar or Orissa. This battle was fought “on the banks of the Bhīma at the skirts of the Vindhya hills (off-shoots of the Vindhya range) on the sea-shore.”

Anaṅgabhīma’s son, Narasimhadēva I following the example of his father again invaded Lakhnauti after his accession to the throne. To meet him Ṭughān KHān marched with his forces towards Jājnagar in A.H. 641 in the month of SHawwāl (A.D. 1244, March-April). Minhāj-ud-Dīn describes this campaign in his *Tabakāt-i-Nāsirī* as follows.¹⁵

“In the year 641 H., the Rāc of Jājnagar commenced molesting the Lakhanawaṭī (Lakhnauti) territory; and in the month of SHawwāl 641 H., Malik Ṭughril-i-Ṭughān KHān marched towards the Jējnagar country, and this servant of the state (Minhāj-ud-Dīn, the author) accompanied him on that holy expedition. On reaching

Ṭughān KHān also was his contemporary as he was the ruler of Lakhnauti from A.D. 1233 to 1244.

Granted that the original reading of Tuṅghāna, given by Vasu is correct one need not hesitate to identify Tuṅghāna prthvīpati” with Ṭughān KHān and there is no necessity to correct Tuṅghāna into Tummāna.

All that is written here in this connection has to be modified in case Vasu’s reading is proved to be wrong. I keep an open mind in this matter.

13. *Tabakāt-i-Nāsirī*, Vol. I, p. 736.

14. *Ibid.* p. 740.

15. *Ibid.* p. 738.

Katāsin,¹⁶ which was the boundary of Jājnagar (on the side of Lakhanaṭī), on Saturday, the 6th of the month of Zī-Ḳa'dah, 641 H., (16th April 1244 A.D.) Malik Ṭughril-i-Ṭughān KHān made his troops mount, and an engagement commenced. The holy warriors of Islām passed over two ditches, and the Hindū infidels took to flight. So far as they continued in the author's sight, except the fodder which was before their elephants, nothing fell into the hands of the foot-men of the army of Islām, and moreover, Malik Ṭughril-i-Ṭughān KHān's commands were that none should molest the elephants, and, for this reason the fierce fire of battle subsided.

“When the engagement had been kept up until mid-day the foot-men of the Musalmān army—every one of them—returned (to the camp ?) to eat their food, and the Hindūs, in another direction, stole through the cane *jangal*, and took five elephants, and about two hundred foot and fifty horsemen came upon the rear of a portion of the Musalmān army. The Muḥammadans sustained an over-throw, and a great number of these holy warriors attained martyrdom ; and Malik Ṭughril-i-Ṭughān KHān retired from that place without having effected his object and returned to Lakhanaṭī.”

After his return to Lakhnawaṭī Ṭughān KHān sent the SHarf-ul-Mulk, the Ash'arī to the Court of Sultān 'Alāuddīn Mas'ūd SHāh at Delhi to solicit his assistance against Jājnagar.

In the same year 642 A.H. the rāja of Jājnagar, according to *Ṭabakāṭi-i-Nāṣirī*, invaded the territory of Lakhnauti with a huge army to avenge the plundering of Katāsin by Ṭughān KHān. The

16. “This place is situated on the northern or left bank of the Mahānadī, which river *may have* altered its course in some degree during the lapse of nearly seven centuries, some thirty miles East of Baroda, in about Lat. 20°32' Long. 84°50'; and some extensive ruins are to be found in its neighbourhood.” —Raverty in *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī*, Vol. I, p. 587 fn. 4, para 8.

date¹⁷ of this invasion is given as Tuesday, the 13th of the month of SHawwāl, 642 A.H., (14th March, 1245 A.D.). The armies of the rāja of Jājnagar passed beyond the frontier of Jājnagar territory, attacked Lakhaṇor and slaughtered a large number of Musalmāns including Fakhr-ul-Mulk Karīm-ud-Dīn Lāghrī, the commandant of Lakhaṇor. After taking that fort, they appeared before Lakhnauti.

Minhāj-ud-Dīn gives also the name of the leader of this campaign as Sabantar in another context,¹⁸ while describing the hostilities that arose in A.H. 678 (A.D. 1279) between Malik Ṭughril KHān-i-Yūzbak one of the successors of Malik ‘Izz-ud-Dīn Ṭughril-i-Ṭughān KHān and the Rāc of Jājnagar.

“The leader of the forces of Jājnagar” says he, “was a person by name, Sābantar, the son-in-law of the Rāc, who during the time of Malik ‘Izz-ud-Dīn Ṭughril-i-Ṭughān KHān had advanced to the bank of the river of Lakhanawaṭī and having shown the greatest audacity, had driven the Musalmān forces as far as the gate (of the city) of Lakhanawaṭī.”

The above passage clearly refers to the battle between Ṭughān KHān and the rājā of Jājnagar, Narasimhadēva I, in his second expedition to Lakhnauti in A.D. 1245.

Sabantar¹⁹ of the Muslim chronicle appears, as has been remarked by Major Raverty, to be a corruption of Sāmantarājā or a feudal chief.

17. *Ibid*, p. 739.

18. *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 763.

19. Some scholars incline to identify Sabantar, the leader of the Jājnagar forces with the Haihaya prince, Paramardin or Paramādi, the son-in-law of Anaṅgabhīma, mentioned in the Bhuvaneśvar inscription (Refer—*Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XIII, p. 150 ff; and *J.B. and O.R.S.* Vol. XV, p. 281) of Bhānudēva I, the son and successor of Narasimhadēva I. But this identification is untenable.

We learn from the Bhuvaneswar inscription that the Haihaya prince, Paramardin fell in a battle with the *yavanas* (the rulers of Bengal), the

The Muslim Chroniclers state that Sabantar drove the Musalmān forces as far as the gates of Lakhnauti. The Eastern Gaṅga records confirm this statement. They allude to the victorious battles fought by Narasiṃhadēva I, the Rāc of Jājnagar in the territory of Lakhnauti. The Kendu-patna copper-plate grants²⁰ of the Eastern Gaṅga king, Narasiṃhadēva II, son of Bhānudēva I state that his

enemies of Narasiṃhadēva and that Candrādevī or Candrikā, daughter of Anaṅgabhīma, constructed a temple for Hari at Ekāmraṅgśētra or modern Bhuvaneśvar in Śaka 1200, while Bhānudēva, son of Narasiṃhadēva was ruling the kingdom. Regarding the date of the record I agree with Dr. Sten Konow, the editor of the inscription that the date intended was Śaka 1200. But I differ from him regarding the identification of Narasiṃhadēva who was, according to him, Narasiṃhadēva II (Refer also H. C. Ray's *Dyn. Hist. of North India*, p. 484, fn 1.) Narasiṃhadēva II succeeded his father, Bhānudēva I (A.D. 1263 to A.D. 1279) in A.D. 1279. The Bhuvaneśvar record, thus, falls in the reign of Bhānudēva I (Vide also, *S.I.I.* Vol. VI, No. 719). As such Narasiṃhadēva referred to therein must be Narasiṃha I and not Narasiṃha II. Candrikā, the daughter of Anaṅgabhīma II was the sister of Narasiṃhadēva I in whose wars with the *yavanas* his brother-in-law, Paramāḍi lost his life. Candrikā outlived both her husband and her brother, Narasiṃhadēva I (A.D. 1239-40 to A.D. 1263):

Verse 20 in the Bhuvaneśvar record contains this passage—"Paramāḍi-dēva, having found the enemies of the battle-loving king, Vīra Narasiṃhadēva to be dwelling in the world of the gods went himself thither in fury to conquer them (i.e. he died) etc." (Translation). This clearly shows that Paramāḍi lost his life in one of the battles of Vīra Narasiṃhadēva I with the *yavanas*, that is while Vīra Narasiṃha was alive. Now, Sabantar, as we know from the *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī*, led the Jājnagar forces to Lakhnauti during the administration of Malik 'Iuḡhril KHān-i-Yūzbak, the governor of Bengal in the days of Balban (Vide *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī*, Vol. II, p. 763). If Sabantar were Paramāḍi himself how could he lead an expedition to Lakhnauti in A.D. 1279 when he was already dead before A.D. 1263 even during the reign of Narasiṃhadēva I? For this reason I hold the identification of Sabantar with the Haihaya prince, Paramardin or Paramāḍi to be untenable.

20. *J.A.S.B.*, Vol. LXV, pp. 229 ff

grand father, Narasimhadēva I conquered Rādha and Vārendra from the *yavanas* or the rulers of Lakhnauti. I may be excused for reproducing the relevant passage (translation of the verse) from the grants alluded to above.

“The (white) river, Gaṅgā, blackened for a great distance by the collyrium washed away by tears from the eyes of the weeping *yavanas* of Rādha and Vārendra and rendered waveless, as if by this astonishing achievement, was now transformed, by that monarch (Narasimhadēva I) into the (black-watered) Vamunā.”

Rādha and Vārendra mentioned in the above record were the two main divisions of the territory of Lakhnauti. “The territory of Lakhanawaṭi,” writes Minhāj-ud-Dīn, “has two wings on either side of the river Gang. The western side they call Rāl (Rāṛh) and the city of Lakhaṇor lies on that side, and the eastern side they call Barind (Barindah) and the city of Diw-koṭ is on that side.”²¹

Narasimhadēva I achieved these victories in the course of his campaign undertaken in A.D. 1245. But we learn from the Muslim Chronicles that these victories were only temporary and not lasting. When, according to them, the forces of the rājā of Jājnagar were before the gates of Lakhnauti news was spread that fresh forces were arriving from Delhi in aid of the ruler of Lakhnauti and we are told by Minhāj-ud-Dīn that the Hindus were struck with terror and decamped on hearing the news.²²

Really speaking help came to Ṭughān KHān. Sultan 'Alāud-Dīn Mas'ūd SHāh of Delhi ordered Tamur KHān to proceed to Lakhnauti with troops and amirs. Obeying the commands of the Sultān Tamur KHān marched with his forces to Bengal and arrived at Lakhnauti on the 1st of the month of Zī-Hijjah, 642 A.H., (30th April, A.D. 1245).²³

21 *Ṭabakāt-i-Nāṣirī*, Vol. I, pp. 584-585.

22 *Ibid*, p. 740.

23 *Ibid*, p. 666.

When the forces had reached Lakhnauti distrust arose between Tamur KHān and Ṭughān KHān. Consequently the course of events took a curious turn and ultimately Malik ‘Izz-ud-Dīn Ṭughril-i-Ṭughān KHān had to deliver up Lakhnauti to Tamur KHān and finally to leave Bengal.²⁴

We are once more told that Sabantar was the leader of the Jājnagar forces when they marched towards Lakhnauti during the reign of Malik Ṭughril KHān-i-Yūzbak also. Minhāj-ud-Dīn credits the rāja of Jājnagar with invading Lakhnauti thrice during the rule of the Viceroy referred to above and states that the Viceroy came out successful in the first two engagements, in spite of the intrepidity and valour, displayed by the leader of the Jājnagar forces. “On a third occasion”, he writes “Malik Yūzbak sustained a slight reverse and a white elephant, than which there was no other more valuable in that part and which was ruttish, got out of his hands in the field of battle and fell into the hands of the infidels of Jājnagar.”²⁵

The same authority tells us that Malik Tughril KHān-i-Yūzbak, in his turn invaded Jājnagar some time after. “The following year, however”, he writes, “Malik Yūzbak asked assistance from the court of Dihlī, and, then, marched an army from Lakhanāwaṭī into the territory of Ūmurdan and unexpectedly reached the Rāe’s capital, which place they style Ūmārdan. The Rāe of that place retired before Malik Yūzbak and the whole of the Rāe’s family, dependents and followers and his wealth and elephants fell into the hands of the Musalmān forces.” After this even Malik Yūzbak is said to have declared himself independent and assumed the title of Sultān Mughīṣ-ud-Dīn. He had the KHuṭbah read in his own name in his kingdom. This was in A.D. 1279.²⁶ So the wars and invasions alluded to

24. *Ibid*, pp. 740-741.

25. *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 763.

26. *Riyāzu-s-Salāṭīn*, p. 79.

above must have taken place before A.D. 1279, during the last years of rule of Bhānudēva I (A.D. 1263 to 1279 A.D.), the son and successor of Narasiṃhadēva I and a contemporary of Malik Ṭughril KHān-i-Yūzbak. After A.D. 1279 Malik Yūzbak was involved in the imperial wars with the Sultān, GHiyāṣ-ud-Dīn Balban who sent his forces to crush the rebellion in Bengal.

Other accounts regarding these campaigns slightly vary from what is given above. *Rīyāzu-s-Salātīn* states that Ṭughril marched with his forces to Jājnagar in A.H. 678 (A.D. 1279), vanquished the rājā of that place and obtained many elephants and much riches.²⁷ There is no reference to the military campaigns led by the rājā of Jājnagar against Lakhnauti, as has been stated in the *Tabakāt-i-Nāsiri*. Even Zia-ud-Dīn Barni in *Tārīkh-i-Fīroz SHāhi* refers only to the invasion of Ṭughril KHān against Jājnagar. He states that Ṭughril attacked Jājnagar and carried off great spoil in valuables and elephants.²⁸ We thus observe that Minhāj-ud-Dīn is the only chronicler who tells us that the rājā of Jājnagar invaded thrice the kingdom of Lakhnauti, during the governorship of Malik Ṭughril KHān-i-Yūzbak. Whatever may be the differences, it is a fact that the enmity between the rulers of Jājnagar and of Lakhnauti continued even during the reign of Bhānudēva I.

The Muslim viceroys who succeeded Ṭughril KHān-i-Yūzbak on the throne of Lakhnauti were probably too busy with their own affairs to turn their attention to Jājnagar, and the Muslim chronicles do not record any more conflicts between the two kingdom of Lakhnauti and Jājnagar.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Elliot and Dowson, Vol. III, p. 113.

VĪRA NARASIMHA AND YŪSUF 'ĀDIL KHĀN

By

N. VENKATARAMANAYYA

The Telugu literary works and the inscriptions of the Āraṇḍu kings of about the middle of the 16th century A.D. refer to an invasion of the northern districts of the Vijayanagara empire by Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān during the reign of Vīra Narasimharāya. The *Dvipada Bālabhāgavatam* of Dōnēri Kōnērinātha, which was completed in 1547 A.D. states that the early Āraṇḍu chief Bukkaya-Rāmarāja, the grandfather of Aḷiya Rāmarāja, opposed the Savā (Savāin—Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān) who came at the head of seventy-thousand horse to besiege Kandanaṇḍu (Kurnool) and having inflicted on him a defeat scattered his forces. He is also said to have marched upon Ādavani, vanquished Kācha, the rebellious chief of the place and deprived him of the seven constituents of his royalty. Rāmarāja's son Timma, who seems to have accompanied his father, greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Ādavani. He took, according to the same work, the stern governor of the fort prisoner and delivered him into the hands of Vīra-Narasimharāya, who, in appreciation of Timma's valuable services, bestowed upon him the title of *Svāmīdrōharaganda* or 'the subduer of the traitors'.¹ These incidents are also enumerated in the *Padya Bālabhāgavatam* of the same author composed a little later, and in the *Rāmarājīyam*, a chronicle of the late 17th or the early 18th century A.D. The 'Ādil KHān (Sapāda), according to a passage in the latter, advanced on Kandanaṇḍu at the head of an army of 3,500 elephants, 70,000 horse, and 630,000 archers, swordsmen and lancers.²

1. Bhārātī, VI. pp. 852, 854.

2. The learned author of the Sources of Vijayanagara history has mis-

The Āravīḍu inscriptions which are slightly later in date allude also to Rāmarāja's victories at Kandanavōlu and Ādavani ; but they differ from the literary works in certain respects. The Pengulūru grant of Tirumala, the earliest epigraphic record in which the exploits of Rāmarāja are enumerated, states that he won a victory over Sapāda's army of seventy-thousand horses near Ādavani, wrested the fort from him. and expelled therefrom Kāsappuḍaya ; and that he captured also by force of arms from some unnamed enemy the fort of Kandanavōlu.³ It is evident that this account is not quite in agreement with what is given above. In the first place, the inscriptions speak of Rāmarāja's conquest of Kandanavōlu from an unnamed enemy, whereas the *Bālabhāgavata* and other works describe the investment of the fort by Savā (the 'Ādil KHān) and its successful defence by Rāmarāja. Secondly, the inscriptions represent Ādavani as the scene of the conflict between Rāmarāja and the 'Ādil KHān. The latter, it is said, sustained a defeat in battle, and retired from the neighbourhood ; whereupon Rāmarāja invested the fort, expelled Kāsappa Uḍaya, the governor, and took possession of it. The *Bālabhāgavata* and the *Rāmarāṇyam*, on the contrary omit completely any mention of the 'Ādil KHān in this context and refer to the governor, Kāchādhīsa or Kāsa Udaya, as the sole defender of the fort who had to forfeit his personal freedom and independence, as he was not able to withstand the onslaughts of his enemy.

The difference between the literary and the epigraphic evidence is more apparent than real. The epigraphic and literary sources are not mutually exclusive. The events described in them are the same,

construed this passage and ascribed wrongly the huge force mentioned therein to Bukkaya-Rāmarājā (pp. 102, 104). The earlier works, however, speak only of 70,000 horse in this connection ; and the estimate of the strength of the 'Ādil KHān's army given in the chronicle must therefore be accepted with reserve.

though the exclusive emphasis laid by each on certain incidents creates the false impression that they are different and unconnected. The inscriptions, it may be remembered, refer to the conquest of Kandanavōlu by Rāmarāja ; that is to say, that Rāmarāja fought against somebody who was holding it at the time, and wrested it from him by his superior might. Now, Rāmarāja was a loyal servant of the Rāya ; he would not have waged war on the ruler of Kandanavōlu without the consent of his master ; and the latter would not have sanctioned an attack upon the fort, if he had no cause of dissatisfaction with the conduct of its ruler. Therefore, it may be reasonably held that Rāmarāja proceeded, at the instance of the Rāya, against the chief of Kandanavōlu who assumed an attitude of hostility to the government, and took from him his fort. This is one episode in the history of the fort. The information furnished by the inscriptions stops here. What followed at Kandanavōlu after Rāmarāja's conquest is narrated in the *Bālabhāgavatams*. The Savā ('Ādil KHān) came with his seventy-thousand horse determined to take the city and surrounded it. Rāmarāja who was conducting its defence from inside did not lose heart. With great intrepidity, he placed himself at the head of his followers and sallying out of the fort fell upon the camp of Savā and scattered his forces. Similarly, the account of the events which happened at the siege of Ādavani given in the literary works is incomplete. They describe only the concluding episode leaving what happened before the commencement of the siege unnoticed. The *Bālabhāgavata* and other works based upon it state that Rāmarāja, accompanied by his son Timma, marched upon Ādavani, defeated Kāchādhīśa or Kāsa Uḍaya in battle, and having taken him prisoner captured the fort. The inscriptions, on the other hand, describe the siege fully. When Rāmarāja arrived in the neighbourhood, he found Sapāda (the 'Ādil KHān) encamped under the walls of the fort barring his path. He was therefore obliged to engage the Mussalman forces first to get them out of the way. When he succeeded in dislodging the 'Ādil

KHān after a battle, Rāmarāja proceeded to invest the fort, and concert measures for reducing it to submission.

The inscriptions and literature are thus seen to supplement each other, and taken together they provide us with much valuable information about a Muslim invasion which swept over the northern districts of the Vijayanagara empire during the reign of Vira Narasimharāja. The identity of this monarch cannot, however, be discovered easily. Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān who established himself at Bijāpūr in 895 A.H. (1489 A.D.) ruled there until the time of his death in 915 A.H. (1510 A.D.). During this period there ruled at Vijayanagara three kings who bore the name of Vira Narasimha. Sāluva Narasimha, the earliest of these three monarchs, ascended the throne of Vijayanagara in 1485 A.D. and his reign lasted for five years until 1490 A.D. He was succeeded by his son Immaḍi Narasimha who ruled up to 1506 A.D. On the death of Immaḍi Narasimha, the throne was usurped by Tuḷuva Narasimha, the son of Narasā Nāyaka who occupied it until 1509 A.D. when he died. As all these three monarchs assumed the name of Vira Narasimha, the identity of Vira Narasimha in whose reign, Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān invaded Vijayanagara territory cannot be established, and the time when the invasion actually came cannot be ascertained definitely. Of the three kings bearing the name of Vira Narasimha, Sāluva Narasimha may, however, be left out of consideration ; for Bukkarāju, the father of Rāmarāja who warded off the invasion of the 'Ādil KHān, is said to have been the best friend and the mainstay of his throne.⁴ It is,

4. *Bālābhāgavatam* (Bharati, VI, p. 851, and n. 18):—

సంనాథమణి సాశ్వతి సంసింగరాయ

వరసఖండన బుక్క:- వసుధేశుఁడలరె

* * * * *

అతఁడు దనుమన్నెపులి యని యఖిలదిశలఁ

జెలఁగిపొగడ సాత్తువ సంసింగరాయ

therefore, reasonable to presume that Rāmarāja flourished during the time of Sāluva Narasimha's successors. Consequently, the invasion of the 'Ādil KHān referred to in the *Bālabhāgavatam*, *Rāmarājīyam* and the inscriptions must have taken place in the interval between 1491 A.D. and 1509 A.D.

Ferishta mentions two Muslim invasions against Vijayanagara kingdom during this period. The earlier of these invasions which came in 1491 A.D. was organised and led by the 'Ādil KHān himself⁵

రాజ్యసంస్థాపకుం డయ్యె బ్రాహ్మణుఁ
నేటిబుక్కన రేండుఁ డుద్ధాటితారి ||

5. Ferishta assigns this invasion to 898 A.H. (1492-3 A.D.); but the data furnished by him clearly show that the event must have taken place earlier. In the first place, the Rāy of Vijayanagara is said to have been a boy of tender age :

Rāy-i-Bijānagar ke kūdak-i-kūchak sāl būd wa vakīl-khud Ṭimrāj rā ba lashkar-i-bisiyār bar vilāyat-i-yūsaf 'Adil KHān faristāda.

Tarikh-i-Ferishta, Part III, (Lucknow), p. 368.

Secondly, this boy king who followed his minister Timrāj a little later to oppose Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān is said to have died as a consequence of the wounds received in the battle.

The identity of this young monarch is disclosed by Nuniz who briefly describes the events that happened at Vijayanagara on the death of Sāluva Narasimha. Narasā Nāyaka who was appointed as regent by the late monarch raised Sāluva Narasimha's eldest son to the throne. He was assassinated by his minister Temeresa who wanted to get rid of Narasā Nāyaka by attributing to him the crime. The latter to free himself from calumny placed Tammarao, the younger brother of the dead king on the throne, (*Forgotten Empire*, pp. 308-09). The young king of Vijayanagara who, according to Ferishta, lost his life as a consequence of the wounds, was an elder brother of Tammarao, i.e., Dhammarāya Immaḍi Narasimha. He appears to have been identical with Timmabhūpāla, the son of Sāluva Narasimha, who, according to the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, held the office of *yuvarāja*

He is said to have defeated Timrāj, the general of the king of Vijayanagara and conquered from him the forts of Rāichūr and Mudkal with their dependent territories which had been taken by him at the instance of Qāsim Barīd in the previous year.⁶ The second invasion which was led by Sulṭān Maḥmūd Shāh personally set out from Bidar at the beginning of 1503 A.D., and reached the doab between the Kṛṣṇā and the Tungabhadra; Maḥmūd Shāh met with little opposition. He took possession of the forts of Rāichūr and Mudkal without much difficulty; and having handed them over to Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān retired to his capital Bidar.

The information given in Ferishta's history does not, however, yield any clue as to the actual date of Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān's expedition. An examination of the inscriptions of the period may perhaps lead to more fruitful results, and enable us to fix the date of the expedition more precisely. Two epigraphs, in particular, demand special attention in this context, as they seem to furnish some information about Kāsappa, whom Bukkaya-Rāmarāja is said to have dislodged from Ādavani. One of these epigraphs, which is dated 1497 A.D. is engraved on the wall of Sankarasvāmin temple at Agali in the Maḍakāsira taluk of the Anantapur District; it registers the gift of a village to the said temple by Immaḍi Kāchappa Nāyaka son of Kāchappa Nāyaka of Ādavani. The village which was included in the Agali-*s/hala* of the Rāyadurga-*chāvaḍi* was granted to the donor as his *nāyankara* by Narasingarāya and the regent Narasā Nāyaka;

under his father (The Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. I, part iii, pp. 91-92). Now, Immaḍi Narasiṃha was already ruling as the king of Vijayanagara in November 1491 (Mac. Mss. 15-4-30, p. 234; cf., V.R. ii, Kur. 602). It follows from this that his accession took place earlier. Therefore, the rule of Timma-bhūpāla should be assigned to a still earlier date; and the invasion of the 'Ādil KHān in which Timma-bhūpāla died must have taken place about the same time.

6. Briggs: *Ferishta*, III, p. 10; VI, pp. 537-38.

and the gift was made in the presence of the God Rāmēśvara at Sētubandha-Rāmēśvaram whither he had gone in the company of the latter.⁷ The other inscription dated in 1502 A.D. is engraved on a slab standing in the compound of the temple of Mallesvarasvāmin at Uruvakoṇḍa in the Gooty taluk of the Anantapur District. It refers itself to the reign of a king called Kācharājēndra, son of Kācha, who was ruling over [Yā] davagiri-rājya⁸ and records the gift of a village to the temple of the god Singēśvara Mahādēva and the construction of a well by Dēvāmbike, the wife of Kācharājēndra at Uruvakoṇḍa.⁹

Kācharājēndra mentioned in the latter epigraph has been identified with Kāsappaṇḍaya, the ally of Sapāda, whom Bukkaya-Rāmarāja expelled, according to the Āraṇiḍu inscriptions, from Ādavani.¹⁰ There is much to recommend this identification. In the first place, Immaḍi Kāchappa Nāyaka refers to his father in the Agaḷi record, as Kāchappa Nāyak of Ādavani. Secondly, the *Bālabhāguvata* speaks of the governor of Ādavani, who defended the fort against Bukkaya-Rāmarāja, as Kāchādhisa, and the Rāmarājiyam as Kāsa-Uḍaya. It may therefore be taken as certain that Kāchappa-Nāyaka, Kāchādhisa, Kāsa-Uḍaya, Kāsappa-Uḍaya and Kācharājēndra are but the variants of the name of the same chief. Kācha, Kāsa or Kāśa as it is sometimes spelt alternately (the letters *cha*, *sa*

7. A.R.E. 719 of 1917.

8. The name of the place has been wrongly read as Dēvagiri and identified with the old Sēuṇa capital of that name (MER 1921, part ii, para 12). On an examination of the impressions (made accessible by the kind courtesy of the Superintendent for Epigraphy, Madras) of the inscription under consideration, it has been found that the end of each line is damaged and that the actual spelling of the name which, by the way stands at the commencement of a line, is Davagiri and not Dēvagiri. As the end of the previous line like those preceding it is damaged, the first syllable of the name of the place appears to have been obliterated.

9. A.R.E. 409 of 1920

10. MER. 1921, part ii, para 12.

and *śa* being interchangeable) is the name proper to which the honorific suffix 'appa' and the appellations *nāyaka*, *uḍaya*, *adhīśa* and *rājēndra*, all denoting lordship or sovereignty, are added. Assuming the correctness of this identification, it may be pointed out that Kācha's authority extended from Ādavani to Rāyadurga in the Bellary District. |Yā| davagiri from which he is said to have been ruling appears to be identical with Ādavani. According to the Kaifiyat of Ādavani, the hill on which the fort was originally built was known as Yādavagiri.¹¹ Moreover the name Ādavani itself seems to recall forgotten associations with some Yādava chief or clan, for Ādavani durga which is obviously an abridged form of Yādavuni-durga means the stronghold of the Yādava.

The records of Kācha show that he was in possession of the Rāyadurga-rājya between 1397 A.D. and 1502 A.D. He held the district at first as a fief from Immaḍi Narasimha and Narasā Nāyaka ; but he appears to have thrown off his allegiance to his overlord later.

The *Bālabhāgavata* declares, as a matter of fact, that Kācha rebelled against Vira Narasimharāya.¹² He seems to have taken up arms against his master about 1502 A.D., as the Uruvakoṇḍa epigraph dated in that year refers to his happy rule over |Yā| davagiri, and makes no mention whatever of his subordination to any king or superior. The removal, by death, of the strong hand of Narasā Nāyaka from the helm of state appears to have roused into activity the latent forces of disintegration which threatened the unity of the empire. The nobles who were in charge of the government in different parts of the realm rose up in rebellion and asserted their inde-

11. *Local Records*, X, pp. 9-10.

12. *Bharati*, VI, p. 852.

వినుతింపఁదగు నాదవేని దుర్గమున
ననత్తుఁడైయుండు కాచాధీశుఁగెలిచి
యరుకుగా సప్తాంగహరణంబుసేసె ||

pendence. "Busbulrao (i.e. Vīra Narasimha)", according to Nuniz, "inherited the kingdom on the death of his father, Narsenayque and reigned for six years during which he was always at war, for as soon as his father was dead, the whole land revolted under its captains who in a short time were destroyed by that king and their lands taken and reduced under his rule."¹³ It is obvious that Kācha made common cause with the rebels and set himself up as an independent chief at Ādavani.

How long Kācha managed to keep his hold on the territory which he had treacherously seized cannot be definitely ascertained at present. The absence of any record bearing a date later than A.D. 1502 testifying to the continuance of his rule seems to indicate that his authority was overthrown within a short time after the outbreak of his rebellion. Now, the 'Ādil KHān's expedition into the Vijayanagara territory must have taken place about the same time; for, he was found encamped in the vicinity of Ādavani when Bukkaya-Rāmarāja came there to recapture the fort from Kācha.

The 'Ādil KHān's expedition was not an isolated enterprise undertaken for the sake of obtaining any temporary gain. It was the off-shoot of a comprehensive plan of conquest devised for subjugating the Hindu kingdom. The death of Narasā Nāyaka and the rebellion of the nobles against the authority of his son and successor, Vīra Narasimha had brought in their train conditions specially favourable to foreign invasion. The Bahmany nobles whose estates lay adjacent to the Vijayanagara frontier realized the advantages of waging war on the Hindu kingdom, and resolved that all '*the amīrs and the vazīrs* should come to the royal court' every year 'and join in a *jihād* against the idolators of Vijayanagara'.¹⁴ Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān, one of the great *amīrs* of the kingdom, who took a prominent part in the gathering of the nobles at Bīdar, threw himself whole-heartedly

13. Nuniz ; Forgotten Empire, p. 134.

14. *Burhān-i-Ma'ūşīr* ; I.A., XXVIII, p. 316.

into the enterprise ; for he was anxious to recover the forts of Mudkal and Rāichūr which he was compelled to surrender, under humiliating circumstances, to Narasā Nāyaka some time prior to the latter's death in 1502 A.D.¹⁵ Sulṭān Maḥmūd Shāh proclaimed accordingly a *jihād*, and placing himself at the head of the assembled forces of his nobles marched, as stated already, upon the Vijayanagara terri-

15. The actual date of the surrender of Rāichūr and Mudkal to Narasā Nāyaka is not known. It may be remembered that these forts were conquered in 1490 A.D. by Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān from Timmabhūpāla and his minister and general Timrāj; but they were lost by him subsequently; for Sulṭān Maḥmūd Shāh Bahmany had to effect their reconquest in 1503 A.D. (*Burhān-i-Ma'ūşir*, I.A., XXVIII, p. 317; *Tārīkh-i-Muḥammad Quṭub SHāhi*, Briggs Ferishta III, pp. 348-49). Narasā Nāyaka's victory over the 'Ādil KHān is briefly alluded to in the inscriptions (E.C. VIII, Sh. 1, *Viryōdagaram Turushkam*). But the literary works produced in the court of the Tuḷuva kings give a fuller description. Nandi Timmana asserts in the introduction to his Telugu Pārijātapaharaṇam that Narasā Nāyaka destroyed the irresistible prowess of the Pāraśika in the region around the fort Mānava

పారశికుడు దుష్టరమానవత్వంబు దొలగించె మానవద్వందీసు

(Sources of Vijayanagara History, p. 107). The Pāraśika mentioned in this work is the 'Ādil KHān: The *Bālābhāgavata* states that Rāmarāja Timma, who appears to have accompanied Narasā Nāyaka defeated the formidable 'Ādil KHān in a battle near Mānava (Bharati, VI, p. 855). What happened at Mānava is narrated in Diṇḍima's Achyutarāyābhyaḍayam and Tirumalāmbā's Varadāmbikāpariṇayam (in greater detail). It is said in the former that Narasā captured the Śakādhināḍha together with the fort, but released him.

महीपतिर्मानवनामदुर्गं शकाधिनाथेन समं गृहीत्वा ।

स्फुटी चकारास्यपनर्वितीर्थ्य शौर्यं तथौवार्यमवार्यचर्यम् ॥

(*Ibid*, p. 175).

The latter furnishes more interesting information. The Sulṭān Sapāda ('Ādil KHān) crept into the inaccessible mountain fastness Mānava to save dear life though he was the master of a kingdom protected by a cavalry comprising the horses of Kāmbōja, Bāhika, Makka, Tukkhāra and Kankhāṇa

tory in the Kṛishṇā-Tungabhadṛā doab. The invaders met with little resistance ; the forts of Mudkal and Rāichūr fell into their hands easily. Their activities were not, however, confined to the doab as the Muslim historians would have us believe. Led by Yūsuf 'Adil KHān, they crossed the Tungabhadṛā and penetrated as far as Ādavani in the south ; and turning to the east they swept along the southern bank of the river, until they reached Kandanaṇṇolu at the confluence of that river with the Handrī. The Hindu chiefs of Ādavani and Kandanaṇṇolu who must have been apprehending an attack from Vira Narasimha appear to have entered into an alliance with the 'Adil KHān and placed themselves under his protection. The territory extending on either bank of the Tungabhadṛā from Ādvani to Kandanaṇṇolu thus passed into the hands of the Mussalmans, and the interior of the Vijayanagara kingdom consequently lay open to their attacks.

The 'Adil KHān, however, was not able to keep his hold on the tract of territory which he had subdued. The tide of Muslim victory soon turned. Vira Narasimha did not lose much time in concerting

origin. Narasā Nāyaka pursued him thither and captured him in the middle of the fort, but released him generously as becoming a hero (*Ibid*, p. 175).

कांबोजवह्नीकमस्त्रातुस्त्राखंखाण तुरगरिंखासंवृत्तस्थपुटितधरणीतलोऽपि सुरत्राणः
प्राणत्राणपरायणो दुर्गमं मानवदुर्गं तत्क्षणमध्यरुक्षत् ।

त्रासाद्द्रुतं मानवदुर्गमध्ये धृत्वा सुरत्राणव वरं सपादम् ।

अमुञ्चतानुग्रहधीस्स धीरो गृहीतमब्धिं किल कुम्भं जो यथा ॥

These extracts make it abundantly clear that the 'Adil KHān was not only defeated by Narasā Nāyaka but also had the misfortune of falling into his hands. Though the writers patronised by the Tuluva kings attribute the 'Adil KHān's release to Narasā's generosity, it is inconceivable that the latter would have set him at liberty without demanding the restoration of Rāichūr and Mudkal which he had taken by force. As these forts were in the possession of Vira Narasimha in 1503 A.D. it is not unlikely that the 'Adil KHān surrendered them to Narasā as the price of his freedom.

measures for putting down the rebels and ejecting their Muslim allies from the kingdom. He commissioned the Āraṇḍi chief Bukkaya-Rāmarāja to lead the royal forces against the rebels and reduce them to subjection. Rāmarāja seems to have proceeded at first against Kandanavōlu ; he engaged the governor in a battle, and having inflicted a defeat on him wrested the fort from him. It was probably to recover the fort and reinstate his ally that the 'Ādil KHān came with his seventy thousand horse and made an unsuccessful attempt to invest it. Rāmarāja sallied out of the fort and falling upon the 'Ādil KHān's forces routed them ; and the 'Ādil KHān, foiled in his attempt to regain his hold upon Kandanavōlu, had to beat a hasty retreat. Encouraged by the brilliant success which attended his arms in his first encounter with the 'Ādil KHān, Rāmarāja advanced upon Ādavani at the head of his victorious army. Ādavani was a key fort which commanded the route along which the Muslim armies poured forth into the uplands of Karnāṭaka. So long as it remained in the possession of an enemy who was in league with the Mussalmans, it was impossible to check effectively the stream of foreign invasions, and ensure the safety of the kingdom. Ādavani therefore demanded immediate attention ; and Rāmarāja proceeded with his troops towards the fort to effect its capture.

The importance of Rāmarāja's move was not lost upon the enemy. Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān, who appears to have been watching his movements keenly, hastened to Ādavani with his famous cavalry and lay encamped under the walls of the fort. When Rāmarāja arrived in the neighbourhood, an engagement took place between the two armies. The 'Ādil KHān's forces again suffered defeat in the battle. Beaten in the field for the second time by the Hindu general, he was obliged to retreat towards his dominions, leaving his ally, Kācha to defend the fort as well as he could. Deprived of outside help the latter could not hold out long. The fort soon fell into the hands of Rāmarāja ; and Kācha himself with all his wealth was captured by Rāmarāja's son, Timma, who sent him to the Rāya and obtained from the

grateful monarch the title of *Svāmidrōharagaṇḍa* as a mark of appreciating of his valuable services.

Rāmarāja's victories over the Muslim armies at Kandanavōlu and Ādavani appear to have been decisive in their results. They freed the country from the danger of Muslim invasion and compelled the Sultān to return to his own country. Sultān Maḥmūd Shāh who was perhaps convinced that the war could no longer be carried on with advantage resolved to conclude the *jihād* and return to his capital. He entrusted the administration of Mudkal and Rāichūr and their dependent territory to Yūsuf 'Ādil KHān, and marched away with his forces to Bīdar.

THE PRICE OF MILITARISM—A LESSON FROM VIJAYANAGAR

By

K. V. RANGASWAMI AIYANGAR

In critical appraisals of the causes of the fall of the great empires of India, modern historians have stressed military inefficiency and economic weakness ; but the connection between the two causes and their cumulative effects have not received attention. The late Mr. W. Irvine in his famous study of the military organisation of the later Mughal empire attributed its decline and fall primarily to military weakness. "The war organisation of the Mughal Empire", he said, "offers something more than a mere anti-quarian interest. The more I study the period, the more I am convinced that military inefficiency was the principal, if not the sole, cause of that Empire's final collapse. All other defects and weaknesses were as nothing in comparison with this. Its revenue and judicial system was on the whole suited to the habits of the people, and so far as those matters were concerned, the empire might have endured for ages. But, long before it disappeared, it had lost all military energy in the centre, and was ready to crumble at the first touch. The rude hand of no Persian or Afghan invader, no Nadir, no Ahmed Shah Abdali, the genius of no European adventurer, a Dupleix or Clive, was needed to precipitate it into the abyss. 'The empire of the Mughals was already doomed before any of these had appeared on the scene.'¹ Robert Orme² pointed out a century and a half earlier that excepting want of personal courage, every other fault in the list of military vices may be attributed to the degenerate

1. William Irvine. *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 1903, p. 296.

2. *Historical Fragments*, 1805, pp. 417-420.

Mughals indiscipline, want of cohesion, luxurious habits, inactivity, bad commissariat and cumbrous equipments." To Elphinstone we owe the caustic observation that the Mughal army "formed a cavalry, admirably fitted to prance in a procession and not illadapted to a charge in a pitched field, but incapable of any long exertion, and still less of any continuous fatigue and hardship".³

The half century following the death of Aurangzeb saw all over India the appalling features of a 'great anarchy'. Its distinguishing mark was economic collapse not only of the governing powers but of the common people. Dr. James Buchanan writing a century later noticed its effects. Though cultivation had revived since the time of Warren Hastings and much land had been reclaimed since the Permanent Settlement of 1793, the people were still miserably poor, the older industries had died out, and gold had completely disappeared from circulation. It took 150 years of ameliorative measures to lift the common people from the depths to which they had sunk in the period. It has been usual to ascribe the widespread bankruptcy to the confusion following the collapse of the great Empire, and the ravages of the armies. What has not been so readily perceived is that the country was already suffering from economic exhaustion even during the reign of Aurangzeb, and that it was largely the consequence of the reaction of the military organisation and policy of the empire on the economic condition of the people.

The causes that made for the fall of Mughal empire in India operated with similar effect on Hindu empires in India. A prominent illustration is furnished by the empire of Vijayanagar which, for two centuries, served as a bulwark against the tide of Musulman conquest and an asylum for Hindu religion and culture. The Indian renaissance, whose force is still not fully spent, has a tendency to invest the older Hindu sovereignties with a halo of glory, to attri-

bute to them every kind of political wisdom, and see in their downfall only the workings of destiny. The services to Hindu religion and culture rendered by the "Forgotten Empire" need not be minimised in a critical appraisal of its strength and its weakness. Within fifty years of the battle of Rakshas Tangadi (1565), which laid South India open to the invader, the economic exhaustion of South India was becoming patent, and it persisted to the days of Sir Thomas Munro and Dr. Buchanan. Even the Jaghir of Madras, which had been in the possession of East India Company for half a century was not in a flourishing condition.⁴ In what had been the heart of the empire, Buchanan found the villages along his route "poor and miserable, and some of them in ruins"⁵ The many invasions and changes of dynastic supremacy which the plains of Hindustan had experienced before the Musulman conquest, could not deprive the common people of a capacity for economic recovery. In contrast to it, we find that the crumbling of the great empires of the seventeenth century India reveal a complete breakdown of economic structure. It is in this period that the self-governing village community fades out. Among a people whose military power is broken but whose economic strength has not been sapped, even a calamitous war cannot wholly remove the power of rapid recovery after the tide of invasion is rolled back or the marauder is either driven out or settles down to rule the country. That this was not so in South India in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is largely due to the fatal policy of lavishly spending the resources of the kingdom on the maintenance of a military force out of all proportion to the financial strength of the kingdom, or withdrawing the flower of population from productive occupation.

In its short history of two and a half centuries the kingdom of Vijayanagar witnessed three usurpations and changes of dynasty. If

4. Buchanan's *Travels*, cited in F. C. Dutt, *India under Early British Rule*, 1906, p. 199.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

the kingdom had not exhausted the strength of its people, the victory of the Musulmans in 1565 could not have killed it.

To foreign visitors the exhaustion of the country was clearly perceptible even when the Aravidu dynasty was asserting a shadowy supremacy from Penukonda. But, the cause of the collapse was not of recent origin or due to the policy of the Karnataka line. It was inherent in the organisation and policy of the empire even in its palmy days. The final bankruptcy was staved off on so long as the kingdom had capital to live on.

In the accounts left by foreign observers of the Dakhan and Vijayanagar from the 14th to the 16th centuries, two points attract attention. The first is urban concentration, and the second is the astronomical size of the armies. The capitals of kingdoms are stated to have accommodated over a million inhabitants. A neglected countryside is the corollary to a rush of people to the cities. The Russian Nikitin (c. 1468 A.D.) noted: "The country is over-stocked with people; but those in the country are very miserable, while the nobles are extremely opulent and delight in luxury."⁶ In such epochs the greater security offered by the cities is the main reason

6. Major: *India in the Fifteenth Century*, (Hakluyt Society), p. 14. "The latter statement," observes W. H. Moreland (*India at the Death of Akbar*, 1920, p. 267), "agrees with what we have found was the case in the time of Akbar, and the former need not excite surprise. Barbosa, who wrote at the beginning of the sixteenth century was struck with the poverty existing on the Malabar coast. A similar impression is given by Varthema." After quoting Nuniz's description of the revenue system of Vijayanagar, Mr. Sewell (*A Forgotten Empire*, pp. 280-1) remarks: "This statement strongly supports the view that the ryots in Southern India were grievously oppressed by the nobles when subject to the Hindu government. Other passages in both these chronicles, each of which was written independantly of the other, confirm the assertion here made as to the mass of the people being ground down and living in the greatest poverty and distress."

for urban concentration.^{6a} Among the myriads of inscriptions that have come down from this period, there are very few which refer to measures for the amelioration of the condition of the people or for developing their wealth.

If we turn to the military organisation of Vijayanagar two results emerge from a study; firstly, the consistent way in which throughout its history the empire maintains very large forces ; and, secondly, a difference between a smaller permanent body, better armed and disciplined and paid direct by the exchequer and far larger forces which are provided by the feudatory chiefs and governors. Even the former would appear very large when compared with the present day military requirements of the areas concerned. According to Varthema, (A.D. 1505) the Raya “ keeps up constantly 40,000 horsemen ” and 400 elephants. Each elephant carried six soldiers.⁷ Duarte Barbosa, a cousin of Magellan, who visited Vijayanagar early in the reign of Krishna Devaraya, notes :⁸ “ the king keeps at all times 900 elephants and more than 20,000 horses, all of which elephants and horses are bought with his own money. . . . This king has more than 100,000 men, both horse and foot, *to whom he gives pay.*” According to Paes, Krishna Devaraya had “ continually a million fighting troops in which are included 35,000 cavalry in armour; *all these are in his pay,* and he has these troops always together and ready to be despatched to any quarter whenever such may be necessary.” He draws a distinction between the troops supplied by the feudatories and those directly maintained by the treasury. “ These captains whom he has over these troops of his, “ continues Paes, “ are the nobles of his kingdom; they are lords and they hold the city and the

6a. W. H. Moreland: *India at the Death of Akbar*, pp. 37-41. Bernier noted the drift from the villages to the army and the cities as an important feature of his day in India (c. A.D. 1650). *Ibid.*, p. 190.

7. *Travels*, ed., Hakluyt Society, p. 126.

8. *East Africa and Malabar*, ed. Hakluyt Society, p. 78, ff.

towns and villages of the kingdom; as each one has revenue so the king fixes for him the number of troops he must maintain in foot, horse, and elephants. These troops *always* ready for duty, whenever they must be called out; and wherever they may have to go; and in this way he has this million of fighting men always ready. Each of these captains labours to turn out the best troops he can get because he pays them their salary; and in this review (i.e. of the Mahanavami) there were the finest young men possible to be seen or that ever could be seen, for in all this array I did not see a man that would act the coward. Besides maintaining these troops, each captain has to make his annual payments to the king, and the king has his own salaried troops to whom he gives pay. He has 800 elephants attached to his person, and 500 horses always in his stables, and for the expenses of these horses and elephants he has devoted the revenues that he received from this city of Bisnaga. You may well imagine how great these expenses may be, and besides these that of the servants who have the care of the horses and elephants.”⁹ Nikitin (c. 1470 A.D.) apparently refers to the smaller standing army, directly recruited and paid by the state, when he gives the strength of the Vijayanagar forces as 300 elephants, 100,000 ‘men of his own troops,’ and 50,000 horse.¹⁰ The statement of Ferishta that the army of Ramaraya consisted of 70,000 horse and 90,000 infantry apparently also

9. Sewell. *A Forgotten Empire*, 1900, pp. 279-281. This quota system was followed in the Mughal *Mansabdar* system. W. H. Moreland, *India at the death of Akbar*, p. 16, says: “The total of these contingents amounted *on paper* to about a million. But this. . . . does not imply that an army of a million ever took the field. . . . This view is borne out by such details as we possess of the actual strength mobilised. The array of the army in 1522. . . (according to the details given by Nuniz) shows about 650,000 men. . . . were put in the field.” This criticism overlooks the fact that *all* available troops do not take the field and that a considerable proportion of the army must remain for garrisoning the forts and for home defence.

10. Sewell, p. 105.

refers to the standing army.¹¹ That both Couto and Faria y Sousa give the same figure for the cavalry, but describe the infantry of Ramaraya as more than 600,000 in strength, might imply that the cavalry arm was more or less directly recruited by the state while the feudal levies consisted largely of foot soldiers.¹² The account of Nuniz giving in detail the troops which eleven great feudatories had to furnish shows that the contribution in cavalry and elephants was relatively smaller than the number of foot soldiers furnished. Thus, these eleven chiefs had to supply only 243 elephants and 10,100 horses as against their obligation to put into the field 151,700 foot soldiers.¹³

That the distinction between the standing army and the standard feudal levies existed from the commencement of the empire is disclosed by the apparently conflicting figures supplied for the military strength of the empire. Ferishta's statement that in the attack on Adoni (A.D. 1366) Bukka I led an army of 100,000 foot, 30,000 horse and 3,000 elephants seems to imply that in a campaign of this character, against a continuous area Bukka used only the standing army.¹⁴ Nicolo di Conti found 900,000 soldiers in Vijayanagar when he visited it in 1421 A.D. These must have been the standing forces. Abdur Razzak who visited Vijayanagar during the reign of Deva Raya II in A.D. 1442 gives the strength of the Vijayanagar troops as 11 lakhs (1,100,000). He noted that in the city "one

11. Trn., Briggs, Vol. III, p. 247.

12. Couto, VIII, p. 89; Faria y Sousa II, p. 432, (sighted by H. Heras, *the Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagara*, 1927, p. 201).

13. Sewell, pp. 384-389. Nuniz states that the entire kingdom was divided between more than 200 "Captains who are all heathen" (p. 389). The aggregate strength of the feudal levy is given by him (p. 373) at 600,000 foot soldiers, 24,000 horse and an unspecified number of elephants. Apparently the contribution of about 200 minor chiefs brought the quota to these figures.

14. Trn., Briggs, Vol. II, p. 314.



H. E. SIR ARTHUR HOPE AND DR. C. R. REDDY
*At the latter's Sashtyabdpūrti Celebrations
over which His Excellency presided*

sees more than a thousand elephants, in their size resembling mountains and in their form resembling devils.”¹⁵ The strength of the elephant army as given by the different writers who visited Vijayanagar is fairly uniform, and probably denotes that following a precept as old as Kautilya,¹⁶ the kings of Vijayanagar believed that victory depended primarily on the elephant arm, and kept the bulk of the elephant brigade at their capital.

In the days of Krishna Devaraya almost the full strength was apparently mobilised for his campaigns, and was kept more or less on permanent footing. In the battle of Raichur (A.D. 1519) Krishna Devarāya's army consisted, according to Nuniz¹⁷ of 7,03,000 foot soldiers, 32,600 horsemen and 551 elephants, and “infinite of people” comprising camp-followers and others who joined him near Raichur. The figures staggered Mr. Sewell, who has remarked: “It certainly demands a large strain on our credulity.”¹⁸ But that such large armies were the usual feature in the opposed Hindu and Muslim states of the Dakhan is shown by the statement of Nikitin, who had lived for over six years at Gulburga and had opportunities for exact information that the army of Sultan Mahomed, which had been marshalled to attack Vijayanagar amounted to 900,000 foot, 190,000 horse and 575 elephants.¹⁹ The tradition of the immense strength of Vijayanagar persisted in the Dakhan down to the days of Aurangzeb when Dalpatrai (A.D. 1690) notes that in former days

15. Cited in Sewell, p. 88.

16. *Arthasastra*, II, p. 2, and VII, p. 2.

हस्ति प्रधानो विजयो राज्ञाम् !

हस्ति घातिनं न हन्युः !

हस्ति प्रधानो हि परानीक वधः !

17. Sewell, p. 147, and the detailed account by Nuniz, pp. 326, 327.

18. Sewell, p. 147.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 105. The Sultan was liable to attack on two sides, North and South.

Vijayanagar kept an army of 30,000 horse and a million of infantry.²⁰ Paes indicates the potential strength of Vijayanagar at 2 million soldiers.²¹ Indigenous records corroborate such estimates. According to the *Kṛṣṇarāya Vijayamu*, Krishna Devaraya's army consisted of 600,000 foot, 6,600 horse (apparently 66,000) and 2,000 elephants; while according to the *Rāyavācakamu* the army employed by Krishna Devaraya in his campaign against the Mohamedans consisted of 500,000 foot, 60,000 horse and 1200 elephants.²²

We may note the financial implications of the employment of such large forces. The cost of elephants was probably what it would be to-day, for as against the diminished numbers of elephants in modern forests we may have to set the larger wastage in wars during the days of the Rayas. The number specified in the quotas to be furnished to the state will by no means exhaust the number under each head which were maintained by the feudatories. For, emulation and enmity as well as habitual truculence and a remote hope of adding to one's power by the maintenance of small private armies must be counted as influences making for the upkeep of large bodies of troops by the chiefs over and above those which they were bound to furnish to the royal army. It is possibly the consideration of these reserves which led Paes to the apparently conflicting statements in regard to the military strength of the empire, which he puts down at "a million fighting troops, in which are included 35,000 cavalry in armour," and to the further statement that "when the king wishes to show the strength of his power to any of his adversaries amongst the three kings bordering on his kingdom, they say that he puts into the field two million soldiers."²³ The cavalry was an

20. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

22. S. K. Iyengar, *Sources of Vijayanagara History*, p. 131 & pp. 113, 120.

23. Sewell, p. 279 and p. 280, in which the apparently conflicting statements occur.

equally costly arm. According to Nuniz²⁴ the king brought every year 13,000 horses, both Persian and country-bred the best of which were kept for himself, the remainder being sold to the chiefs at 200 'Pardaos'²⁵ a horse. The prices paid for horses seem to have varied, according to Barbosa between £78 and £26 or approximately Rs. 1200 and Rs. 400, which approximate to modern prices for chargers.²⁶ In the royal stables for the service of the cavalry guard alone 300 trainers and 1600 grooms were employed. Each cavalry soldier in the 6000 horsemen forming the king's bodyguard received provisions for them, along with a groom and a slave girl for personal service and daily provisions supplied from the royal kitchens.²⁷ Throughout the kingdom rent-free lands were granted to those who supplied grass to the king's horses, and sometimes entire villages to those who maintained the state horses farmed out to them.²⁸ The commissariat employed a vast contingent of camels and bulls for the transport of provisions and accoutrements. Ten thousand camels are said to have been maintained by the Raya, and wildly improbable figures are given in some indigenous accounts for the number of camels and bulls maintained by Ramaraya.²⁹

24. *Ibid.*, p. 381.

25. Yule (*Hobson-Jobson*) equates it to the Pagoda, traditionally worth Rs. 3½. The cost of the annual purchases would exceed a *crore* of Rupees, if these figures are trustworthy. The annual income of the king will be about 40 million *Varahas* (or 14 crores of Rupees), if we couple Pae's statement that 10 million *pardaos* represented the yearly contribution to the state hoard (p. 282) with Krishna Devaraya's own injunction to hoard a fourth of the revenue.

26. Barbosa, ed. Dames, Hakluyt Society, 1918, Vol. I, p. 210.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

28. *Epigraphia Carnatica*, XII, Tm. 52 and *Madras Epigraphist's Report* for 1913, inscription 216.

29. Saletore. *Social and Political Life in Vijayanagara Empire*, 1934, I, p. 429.

The army was not a motley gathering of persons casually recruited, and falling as in the days of the decay of the *Mansabdari* system of the Mughal empire, far below the quota fixed in the registers of the state. A strict examination of physical efficiency preceded, according to Barbosa the enlistment of a foot-soldier.³⁰ Nuniz considers the soldier of his time to be adequately armed.³¹ The cavalry remounts represented 'actuals', not book figures. The annual review during Mahanavami precluded fraud and shortage in the supply of the prescribed quota. In a consideration of the incidence of the burden of the army of Vijayanagar the full nominal strength may have to be taken.

Service even in the ranks of the irregular forces implied the obligation of the soldier to remain on duty without interruption. Contemporary observers pointedly allude to the practical impossibility of soldiers of the Raya getting leave to visit their homes. Apparently they could do so at the end of a campaign. In the prolonged wars in which the empire was engaged from the commencement of the sixteenth century the army could have had no rest. The absence of even a feudal levy from home might extend to years. Every part of the kingdom sent its quota to the unceasing wars of Krishna Devaraya. An illustration is furnished by an inscription at Tirukkadaiyur in Tanjore district in which a Brahmin claims to have won royal appreciation by his service in the campaign against Raichur.³² No section of the community was immune from liability to be called to the colours. The Brahmin who had enjoyed traditional exemption from military service was largely employed by Krishna Devaraya in the army. In his famous testament, *Amuktamālyada*, Krishna Devaraya justifies the departure from orthodox practice. "The

30. Barbosa, Vol. I, p. 212.

31. Sewell, p. 327; "All were equally well-armed each after his fashion". (Nuniz).

32. *Epigraphist's Report*, 1907, para 59.

king can lay his hand on his breast and sleep peacefully if he appoints as governors of his forts loyal Brahmins." "The service of Brahmins are also needed. So it is proper that the king gives him well-equipped fortresses and troops." "Place your forces under Brahmins whom you know well. Do not keep them feeble, but arm them with such troops as will make them fear no enemy. A Brahmin will remain at his post even in times of danger and will willingly serve even if placed under Kṣatriyas or Sūdras.³³

The maintenance of such a large army, involving the subsidiary employment of almost an equal number of persons to look after the needs of the army and follow it in campaigns, involves of necessity in days of continuous war the withdrawal of not less than two million men in the prime of life and representing, from the point of physical efficiency, the pick of the population from ordinary avocations and economic employment. What this diversion of the most efficient element in the population to direct or indirect military service amounts to can be inferred by a consideration of the population of the kingdom and its financial strength. In the days of its *maximum* extension the area which accepted the sovereignty of Vijayanagar could not have exceeded one lakh and twenty thousand square miles, i.e. an area equal to that of the present Indian states of Hyderabad and Mysore. The population of the tracts under Vijayanagar in 1520 had a population of about 25 millions between 1880-1900. This figure represented the steady increase of a century of peace and security under British rule. In the days of Vijayanagar considerable portions of the area were uninhabited. The annual wastage must have been considerable owing to wars and absence of internal security. It is therefore unlikely that the population of the empire in its most palmy days could be put at more than twelve millions.³⁴ The with-

33. Canto 4, verses 207, 217, 255 and 261.

34. W. H. Moreland. *India at the death of Akbar*, p. 19, estimates the combined population of the Dakhan and Vijayanagar at thirty millions. The

drawal from economic occupation of a fifth of this population, representing its most efficient element, must imply that the ordinary functions of production—cultivation and industry should have devolved on women and on men who had either passed the age for military service or were otherwise unattractive as recruits for the army, and the service of the corps. It amounts to the economic sterilization of the entire physically efficient elements of the population of the empire.

The effect of this policy did not escape the attention of shrewd observers. Nuniz had noticed it in a striking passage :³⁵ “ This king has foot soldiers paid by his nobles, and they are obliged to maintain six lakhs of soldiers and 24,000 horse. These nobles are like renters who hold all lands from the king and besides keeping all these people they have to pay their cost; they also pay to him every year sixty *lakhs* of rents as royal dues. The lands, they say, yield hundred and twenty *lakhs* of which they must pay sixty to the King and the rest they retain for the pay of the soldiers and the expense of the elephants which they are obliged to maintain. For this reason *the common people suffer much hardship*, those who hold the lands being

basis of his calculation is the proportion of the levy to population in modern mobilisations, viz., 1 to 31 or 32. Conscription in Vijayanagar was more thorough. Moreland's estimate has to be reduced further as he includes the whole of South India under Vijayanagar. My estimate errs on the liberal side. Paes was not blind to the effect of the wholesale diversion of the effective element in the population to the army and offers this defence. “ Although he takes away so many men from his kingdom, it must not be thought that the kingdom remains devoid of men ; it is so full that it would seem to you as if he had never taken away a man, and this by reason of the many and great merchants that are in it. There are working people and all other kinds of men who are employed in business, besides those who are obliged to go into the field ; there are also a great number of Brahmins.” (Sewell, p. 280). Pae's knowledge of the country-side was negligible and the defence has to be discounted by it.

35. Sewel, pp. 373-374. By Pae's reckoning, the aggregate revenue.

so tyrannical. Of these sixty *lakhs* that the king has as revenue every year, he does not enjoy a larger sum than twenty five lakhs, for the rest is spent on his horses, and elephants, and foot soldiers, and cavalry, whose cost he defrays." That is to say half the land revenue demand is assigned to the nobles for the provision of their levies and their own maintenance while the other half goes to the fisc, to be supplemented by such other income as a state can raise. That the noblemen exceeded the demands on the land seems fairly clear. The revenue reforms of the king could not have materially restrained the great feudatories whose support was so vital for the success of his wars. That the great Raya himself did not grudge the huge price to be paid for securing the independence of his kingdom and an extension of his sovereignty is clear from his own statement in the famous testament in which anticipating such distinguished followers as Frederick the Great and the late Maharaja Madhava Rao Scindia, he composed for the benefit of his successors.³⁶ "The expenditure money which is utilised in buying elephants and horses in feeding them and in maintaining soldiers, in the worship of Gods and Brahmins and in one's own enjoyment can never be called an expenditure." Large reserves in the treasury and a huge army, side by side with measures to win the favour of the Gods, are indicated to rulers constantly threatened by the danger of overthrow by an implacable and watchful foe of alien religion and culture, animated by ambition and fanatical zeal. Unbridled power finds an excuse for lavish expenditure on the personal satisfactions of an absolute king. The policy of the rulers of Vijayanagar were in accord with these hypotheses. Krishna Devaraya has declared his adherence to these ideals in a famous passage in his testament³⁷ in which he divides the king's income into four parts of which one is to be used in personal enjoyment, the upkeep of religion and in charity, two in maintaining the army and the fourth quarter in being added to the state hoards. The custom of

36. *Amuktamalyada*, Canto 4, verse 282, would be 400 lakhs of varahas.

37. Canto 4, Verse 238.

maintaining royal hoards is ancient. Paes refers to it.³⁸ “The previous kings have held it a custom to maintain a treasury, which after the death of each is kept locked and sealed in such a way that it cannot be seen by any one nor opened, nor do the kings who succeed to the kingdom open them or know what is in them. They are not opened except when the kings have great need and thus the kingdom has great supplies to meet its needs. This king (i.e. Krishna Devaraya) puts into the treasury ten million Pardaos without taking from them one Pardao more than for the expense of his house. Krishna Devaraya’s precept closely follows that of the *Śukra Nīti* which prescribes 52% of the revenue for military expenditure, 30% of it for religion, charities, education and civil service, and the remaining 18% for being added up annually to the state’s hoards.”³⁹

The burdensomeness of the military expenditure in the old Hindu states was thus both direct and indirect. It usually ate up half the income of the state. But more than such expenditure, the loss to the community arose from the primitive conditions of warfare which made victory in battles appear to lean on the side of numbers more than efficiency. The discovery that small and compact bodies of well-disciplined and well-organised troops united by a common feeling born of intense religious emotion could overcome vast numbers of unorganised armies, loosely knit and badly trained and marshalled, was made when the Muhammadans conquered Hindustan in the 12th century A.D. It is proved again when with much smaller numbers Barbar overcame the Rajputs. Unfortunately, the lesson was not learnt by the rulers of Vijayanagar. They did not rise above the employment of a handful of Europeans to manage a cumbersome and inefficient artillery arm and of much less dependable Musulman mercenaries. The forces of the Dakhan against which they contended were hardly superior except in point of the feeling of union and the

38. Sewel, p. 282.

39. *Sukra-Niti*, Book IV, Ch. VII, verses 47-58.

ferocity developed by religious emotion. The accumulation of vast royal hoards, and the conversion of the savings of the nation into gold and jewellery, acted as a permanent incitement to the invader who hungered for loot. The state hoards instead of being a source of help in times of national stress served only as a permanent temptation to spoliation. The feckless brothers of Ramaraya fled from their ravished capital, carrying with them treasure in gold and precious stones, valued at more than a hundred million sterling on the back of 550 elephants.⁴⁰ Few foreign observers saw beneath the surface.⁴¹ Most were dazzled by the luxury and splendour of the Raya's court, the immense size of his army and the populousness and prosperity of his capital. A few, like Paez could not but observe that the bulk of the population lived perilously near the margin, and that they hardly had more than what was needed for bare life, and possessed no capacity to withstand seasonal or political vicissitudes. How even the failure of rains led to a widespread famine in the empire in which thousands perished is vividly described in an inscription of A.D. 1390 which illustrates the severity of the famine by the observation that "innumerable skulls were rolling about and paddy could not be had even at the rate of ten *nali* per Panam."⁴² The mainten-

40. Sewell, p. 206.

41. Most of them saw only the cities.

42. *Epigraphist's Report* for 1907, para 53.

How the staying power of the people being lost they succumbed to every famine is illustrated by contemporay accounts, which show that the Vijayanagar territory suffered from terrible famines in 1618-9, when according to Methwold (who left India in 1622) "parents brought thousands of their children to the seaside, selling there a child for 5 fanams or rice." In the more severe famine of 1630 men and cattle perished, the famished survivors abandoned their villages and wandered aimlessly, men, women and children sold themselves into slavery, and wholesale suicide became common. There were famines again in South India in 1640, 1645, 1648 and 1659, in which all the horrors were repeated. (*Vide* Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangazeb*, 1923, pp. 204-219.)

ance of the smaller irrigation reservoirs was an old duty laid on villagers, which was discharged only so long as they were affluent and united. Attention to tank restoration by the government was occasional and sporadic. The provision of tanks like the building of temples was a pious duty laid upon the opulent. What the great rulers of Vijayanagar could spare from their own splendid living, from the upkeep of their huge armies and the occasional patronage of learning and what did not go into the state hoards, they expended in the renovation of old and the construction of new temples, and in the conduct of splendid festivals. These added to their contemporary fame for piety. While such expenditure may have resulted in occasional addition to earnings of artisans and the labouring population in the areas concerned and provided some colour to a drab village life, the economic condition of the country as a whole failed to improve. The state's coffers like the private hoards of the nobility and the well-to-do constituted an idle reserve, formed by the withdrawal of capital from industry. When the empire fell, its capital was ravished and plundered and the treasury was looted by the invader, the savings of generations of common people were lost. The empire died without being conscious of the fact that its army had ate it up, and that militarism had proved a delusion and a snare. The fate of the Forgotten Empire is not without a lesson to us.

URBAN LIFE IN VIJIYANAGAR

By

V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR

Though many of the foreign travellers who visited the Vijayanagar empire during its glorious years have given descriptive accounts of the large and important cities in the empire, yet there must have been many others which have not been described then, perhaps because they were not visited. Though the country was, as it still continues to be today, a land of teeming villages, yet there were many cities and towns in the different parts of the empire. Marco Polo, for instance, informs us that to write about them would make too long a story.¹ Abdur Razak the Persian ambassador, mentions that, in the course of his travels, he came each day to a town or village well populated.² Paes, the Portuguese chronicler mentions that there were numerous cities, towns and villages in the empire,³ while Nikitin the Russian traveller observes that there were many small towns between larger ones and that each day he passed through three or four such places.⁴

We have good descriptions of the city of Vijayanagar in the writings of some of the foreign travellers. And it is possible that some of the cities in the empire, at least those that served as the headquarters of the provincial units of administration, were a smaller replica of the imperial capital in their form and construction. Quite in keeping with the principles of town planning in mediaeval times the city of Vijayanagar was in the form of a circle situated on the

1. Travels II, p. 390.
2. Elliot, *History of India*, IV, p. 104.
3. Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire*, p. 237.
4. Major, *India*, p. 12.

summit of a hill.⁵ We get widely divergent accounts about the size of the city. Nicolo dei Conti says that the circumference of the city was sixty miles and that the surrounding walls of the city were carried up to the mountain⁶ while Paes says that the circumference of the city was twenty four leagues.⁷ But Abdur Razak tempers the rather exaggerated accounts of the above two writers when he says "From the northern gate of the outer fortress to the southern is a distance of two *statute parasangs*, and the same with respect to the distance between the eastern and western gates."⁸ According to Caesar Frederick the circuit of the city was twenty four miles. It appears that the descriptions of Abdur Razak and Caesar Frederick are more trustworthy than those of the others.

The main part of the city was surrounded by seven lines of fortifications, one within the other, and each of them was pierced by openings which served as gateways. From the first to the third wall there were cultivated fields, gardens and houses, while from the third to the seventh fortress shops and bazaars were closely crowded together, and by the palace of the king there were four bazaars, situated opposite to one another.⁹

The factor which contributed largely to the growing prosperity of a city was besides its administrative importance, its trade activity. Vijayanagar, for instance, was the meeting place of the traders from different countries. According to Paes in it were "men belonging to every nation and people because of the great trade which it has, and the many precious stones there, principally diamonds."¹⁰ Barbosa too observes: "They (i.e. the wide streets and squares) are con-

5. Elliot, *op. cit.*, IV. p. 106; Purchas, *His pilgrims*, X, p. 97.

6. Major, *India*, p. 6.

7. Sewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-43.

8. Elliot, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 107.

9. Elliot, *op. cit.*, p. 107; Major, *India*, p. 24.

10. Sewell, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

stantly filled with an innumerable crowd of all nations and creeds ; for besides many Moorish merchants and traders, and the Gentile inhabitants of the country who are very rich, an infinite number of others flock there from all parts, who are able to come, dwell, trade and live very freely and in security."¹¹ At Vijianagar behind the mint was a sort of bazaar street which was more than three hundred yards long and twenty yards broad.¹² Likewise at Bijapur the big road containing the bazaars was thirty yards wide, and four miles long. The merchants in them dealt in goods including the rare variety.¹³

An important feature of the organisation of city life was the existence of mercantile corporations or guilds which gained recognition as a local quasi-political body discharging certain political functions of a local character. Almost every group of merchants dealing in a particular trade had a guild, and had the shops close to one another. The jewellers who had their shops at Vijianagar sold their rubies, pearls, diamonds and emeralds openly in the bazaar.¹⁴ A community of interest or a common bond of union brought them together.¹⁵ Each guild appears to have had a chief who was known to inscriptions as the *Paṭṭaṇasvāmi* or the *Vaddavyavahāri*.¹⁶ One is tempted to identify him with the *Nagaraśreṣṭhi* of ancient India. In all probability he represented the mercantile classes in the Town Council.

Though we have evidence of the existence of many towns and cities in the Vijianagar empire our knowledge of the city govern-

11. *Barbosa*, I, p. 202.

12. *Elliot*, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 111.

13. *Ibid.*, VI, p. 163.

14. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 107.

15. The guilds were known as *nagarattars* or more generally *śeṭṭis* in the epigraphs.

16. See *Ind. Ant.* V. p. 342.

ment is very slender. A striking characteristic of local government in the days of the Cholas was the active functioning of representative assemblies both in the rural parts and in the urban areas. In the inscriptions of the Cholas we get very detailed and valuable accounts of the working of these institutions, which unfortunately we do not get in the Vijayanagar epigraphs. But it is evident that since such assemblies are referred to in the epigraphs of such a comparatively late period as the second half of the seventeenth century they continued to exist on the period and did almost the same work that was done by the Chola assemblies. Thus an epigraph of A.D. 1459-60 mentions a Mahāsabhai (an assembly) at Kāvēripākkam, North Arcot district, while another of A.D. 1558-59 mentions one Rājarājacaturvedimangalam. The latter is said to have held its meetings in the temple maṇṭapa. But they were losing their vitality in the period and hence we see the *āyagārs* taking their place in the villages. Their activities recorded in the epigraphs of the latter period of Vijayanagar history afford very late instances of the weakening power exercised by the assemblies.

In the urban areas the guilds appear to have exercised enormous influence in municipal administration. Their consent was taken for the taxation policy of the government. They themselves levied certain customs and taxes of a local character. They controlled markets and temples in their areas. They had the right to legislate for themselves in social and religious matters. Thus according to a fragmentary record they made rules for a woman who lapsed from marriage.¹⁷

But as days rolled on their powers came to be curtailed a little. The centralisation of the governmental machinery necessitated the appointment of *Adhikāris*, or what we may call 'Special Officers' over

17. See T. V. Mahalingam. *Administration and Social Life under Vijayanagar*, pp. 222-24.

important cities and towns who began to take upon themselves the discharge of some functions originally done by the assemblies and guilds. But where these institutions existed it appears the *Adhikāri* had to consult them before doing a thing. Thus, when one, Tirumalā-rasa, the chief of Kap made a grant of land in the village of Mailāsa he got the previous consent of the assembly (*nalīnavāru*), communal and professional guilds, (*gaṇa* and *paṇa*) and subordinate officers. A royal officer was seen occasionally in the settlement of disputes of a local character. The city of Vijayanagar itself came to have a Governor of whom both the Portuguese chroniclers speak. Thus it appears that with the coming into existence of the *Āyagār* system in the villages and the "Special officers" in the towns and cities the assemblies and guilds slowly lost their usefulness and vitality.

Added to this was the fact as is evidenced by the records of the 16th, 17th and even 18th centuries that it was a recurring period of unsettlement and disorganisation. With the invasions from the north by the kings of Orissa on the one side and the Sultans of the Bahamani kingdom on the other, there was evacuation of the inhabited parts and emigration due to a state of considerable unrest. Similar disturbances in times of rebellions, wars and invasions affected the smooth working of municipalities and rural *agrahāras*. These attracted the notice of the state authorities and attempts were made then and there to rectify them.¹⁸

18. S. K. Aiyangar, *Contributions of South India to Indian culture*, pp. 352-3.

SIR THOMAS MUNRO AND THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY

By

C. S. SRINIVASACHARI

An attempt at the evaluation of the work of Sir Thomas Munro during his long official career in the Madras Presidency (1780-1827) is bound to prove interesting to all students of the history of British Indian Administration. Munro rose from the ranks of the Company's military service to important positions in the administration of the Madras Presidency ; and he belonged to that school of Anglo-Indian statesmanship which produced such eminent men like Sir Charles Metcalfe, Sir John Malcolm and the illustrious Mountstuart Elphinstone—a school which, in the opinion of a contemporary sympathetic exponent of British relations with India, was marked “alike by brilliancy and humanity, never again surpassed in the period of British rule.” The great Sir Henry Lawrence—himself fully inspired by the traditions of that school and designated to occupy the post of Governor-General in the event of anything happening to Lord Canning in the crisis of the Mutiny—has thus written on Munro:—He was “an extraordinary man, and I think without exception the very best servant the Company ever possessed.”

In fact, the first three decades of the nineteenth century in British Indian History produced a good crop of administrators and ‘politicals’ whose conduct created a most fruitful moral effect on the administration and who initiated that spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation between Indians and Englishmen in India which enabled men like Rammohun Roy and Dwarkanath Tagore to be received on perfectly equal terms in the best English society, and which the succeeding generation of broad-minded Anglo-Indian administrators, like R. M. Bird, James Thomason and the Lawrence

Brothers sedulously and successfully cultivated. Munro's labours towards the generation of a sympathetic bond between the ruling race and the Indians were very successful in their time ; but their effect was undone by the reaction of the Mutiny which, on the one hand, tempted Englishmen " to be patronizing, critical, watchful for and resentful of a liberty taken " and, on the other hand, produced in the mind of the Indian " an excessive and often absurd sensitiveness, a tendency to see bad manners in an accident and scorn in an unconscious gesture ". This mutual warping of the mind has not been wholly effaced even after the lapse of more than three quarters of a century, and can be seen frequently indicated and occasionally stressed in the Anglo-Indian literature of the period, particularly in memoirs, biographies and other forms of quasi-historical literature.

The Munro School made its impress effectively felt on the administration of the Madras Presidency in its most formative period and particularly so, in the departments of land revenue and district administration, including the assessment and collection of revenue. Munro himself was trained in the hard-working and sympathetic school of such masters of the processes of settlement and assessment operations, like Col. Alexander Read. He successively served as an Assistant Collector in the Baramahal, as the Collector of Canara and as the Principal Collector of the Ceded Districts. He was an eyewitness of the results of the working of the different types of land settlement which were experimented upon in those years of indecision when Government was not fully cognisant of all the bearings of its experiments on revenue collection and on the condition of the peasantry. It has been remarked with great justice by Mr. J. T. Gwynn, that the three radical evils from which the Madras Presidency suffered at that time were, (1) the insubordination and turbulence of the zamindars and the poligars ; (2) the lack of a proper system of recognised laws and law courts ; and (3) the uncertainties of the land revenue system. It is significant that Munro should have tackled every one of these three defects, though generally it was only his work in respect of the second and the third that have

received the greatest amount of attention and stress from the hands of his biographers and of the historians of the British Indian administration. Munro's apprenticeship as a practical District Administrator is best seen reflected in the letters that he wrote to his father and other relations during his long career as Collector in the several mofussil stations for 15 years from 1792-1807.

It was Colonel Read that first enunciated the main principles of the Ryotwari Settlement which was later on moulded to be his own special perfection by the genius of Munro. 'The Ryotwari principles were claimed by Read to have been directly evolved from the indigenous system of land settlement and assessment which he found to be prevalent in the Salem District on his assumption of the charge of its administration in 1792. As early as July 1793 Munro, then an Assistant under Read, made his own independent criticism on the latter's Fifth Revenue Report submitted to Lord Cornwallis. In his letter, dated Tenkaraikottai, 31st July, 1793, Munro pointed out the defects of Read's scheme, in the following terms:—

"The principle which, of all others, one would think, required the most proof, you have assumed as an axiom, and have told us as laconically as Euclid could have done, 'the produce of the soil increases in half the ratio of the labour.' I should draw a very different conclusion from your data; (*viz.*) that the produce of labour is not in a standard, but a progressive ratio to a certain degree; for instance, in dry grains as little or nothing is produced by a first ploughing and no excess arises after the fifth, it appears that this ratio has a rise and fall; it is therefore probable that at some of the intermediate points between 1 and 5 it is more and at others it is less than half the produce. I should also think you have allowed too much for subsistence and contingencies; and my reason for this supposition is the near correspondence of your estimate with the *karnam's* (village accountant's). You have omitted some trifling

articles of the farmer's gains by selling cattle and ghee. You have also in your account of labourers forgotten some of their allowances." In the same letter he brings home to his chief the great truth that "revenue ought not to be all that the subject can pay, but only what the necessities of the state require ; and it is neither wise nor just to demand more and the remainder will be more beneficial to the country in the hands of the subjects than in the treasury of the Government."

Read issued his famous Ryotwari proclamation to the ryots of Salem, on the 10th December 1796, which consisted of 29 rules given in full by Mr. Dykes in his *Salem, an Indian Collectorate* (1853) and by Sir A. J. Arbuthnot in his *Selections from the Minutes and other Writings of Sir Thomas Munro* (1886), Section I. The keynote of this so-called Charter was its third paragraph, in which it was said that the assessment of every individual field was fixed for ever and Government was never to require more or receive less unless when those fields actually dry should thereafter be converted into wet by the construction of tanks at the expense of government, when rates would be proportionately raised. The paragraph continued. . . . "But if you carry on such works at your expense, plant topes of palmyras, cocoanuts, etc. . . . on which a high rent has been formerly exacted, you may depend on receiving the advantages accruing from these and from every other improvement of your land while you continue to pay the established rates ; those constituting, except in the case above mentioned, the annual demand upon them on the part of the Sarkar for ever."

But Read was, strangely enough, opposed both by the Board of Revenue and by his own Assistants one of whom, Munro, criticised the proclamation, paragraph by paragraph, in a letter, dated Dharmapuri, 15th November, 1796, "in that free and searching spirit of enquiry which Read always strove to promote between himself and his Assistants." Munro desired (1) an explicit statement that the settlement was intended to be permanent; and (2) that the

proposals for applying changeable rates to fallow land should be made less intricate. Before Read and Munro could explain their respective proposals to the Board of Revenue, they were recalled to their military duties in connection with the last Mysore War. Thus, there was no one to plead for the ryotwari policy before the Madras Government, which, in its eagerness to assimilate its revenue system to that of Bengal, forced the Zamindari tenure on the Baramahal and the Talagat. In 1802, by Regulation XXV, Government declared for a zamindari settlement and attempted forthwith to create a class of Zamindars in Salem who should possess the self-same rights as their brethren in Bengal. The system of farming out the land to artificially created Mootadars failed even in the first quinquennium of its operation.

Before his departure for England Read presented to the Board of Revenue at Madras an exhaustive report of his work which embodied a vast amount of commercial and agricultural statistics "classified with great care and accuracy and forming most valuable data for comparing the state of the district now and then."¹ Munro himself was beginning to veer round, during the last years of his stay in the Baramahal, to the views of Read. In 1797 he pleaded for a reduction of the rates of assessment if the ryots should not be made to throw up some portions of their lands and enunciated certain rules which would, if annual settlements were to be adopted, afford to the ryots every advantage that could be granted to them. It may be said that only one or two links were now required to complete the chain by which Munro whom after-times called "the father of the Ryotwari system". came to think that not only yearly settlements were the best, but the ryots must also be further left to choose for themselves and must not be bound to hold for a second year what they did not want, *viz.*, the field which they found it better not to keep. In the same communication in which Munro tried to recon-

1. Baramahal Records: Management, Property etc.

cile himself to this new idea of allowing the farmers the option of varying the quantity of cultivation every year, he opined that this would be beneficial both to the farmers and to the revenue ; but he laid that the option should be withdrawn in proportion as the circumstances of cultivation should improve under the influence of British peace and security ; and he summarised the various heads of securing a permanent revenue on this basis, like a reduction of 15 per cent on the lease assessment of Read, annual settlements, the option of every cultivator to have a part or the whole of his lands in lease, the responsibility of the village for an individual farmer's failure, and no imposition of additional rent for the conversion by the farmer of dry land into wet land or gardens. Soon afterwards, Munro recorded in a letter to Read—the same as that in which he justified his own changing opinion—an able and detailed report on the state of the people when the country came first under British occupation ; and he concluded that land was cheap not only because of the high rental imposed, but also on account of the operation of other causes like the general poverty of the people which hindered them from stocking their farms efficiently.

Munro was convinced, after his experience of the revenue management of Canara and the Ceded Districts, that the Ryotwari system was the truly indigenous system of South India. Under his fatherly direction, its application had yielded good results in Canara. During his Collectorship of the Ceded Districts for seven years (1800-07), Munro carefully kept the demand of Government at a level which was held to be very low from the point of view of the Madras Council and the Board of Revenue, but which was in reality only a little below the actual average collections made under the preceding administrations. He gradually increased the demand as the ryots accumulated stock, developed a sense of security and extended their cultivation. The pressure for an increase of assessment came ceaselessly from the Board of Revenue and seemed irresistible. Munro felt alarmed at this increasing pressure ; but he boldly recommended

an actual reduction in the assessment by 25 per cent of the standard rate when he handed over the charge of the Ceded Districts in 1807. Dr. K. N. Venkatasubba Sastri has, in his very useful book, *The Munro System of British Statesmanship in India*, published recently, given in full Munro's answers to questions regarding the Ryotwari settlement embodied in his letter dated Anantapur, 20th June 1806.² In the course of this letter the advantages and disadvantages of a permanent Ryotwari settlement are very well contrasted with those of the Zamindari and Mootawari settlement like that recently introduced in the Baramahal jurisdiction.³ Side by side with his earnest pleadings for a Ryotwari settlement, Munro developed a zeal for the restoration of the indigenous Panchayat courts and a desire to tolerate custom and the religious practices of the people; and these he very well displayed in his reorganisation of the administration of the Ceded Districts. He emphatically condemned the Government's proposal made in 1804, recommending a reversion to a permanent settlement. Here, more than even in the Baramahal, it seemed to him that a direct settlement with the Ryots was more suited to the manners and prejudices of the inhabitants, was more native to the soil and less liable to embarrass the Government by the risk of failure. Writing to the Directors on the departure of Munro to

2. Selections from the Records of the Bellary District (Mysore, 1939), pp. 22-46.

3. In the Ceded Districts the atmosphere is even at the present day, full of the Munro tradition. It was at Anantapur that the great man had his head-quarters during his sway as the Principal Collector. The tale is even now told that when Munro toured for the last time in his beloved Ceded Districts a few days before his death, early in 1827, he rode through the Gandikotta pass in the Yerramalais; and as he went he called attention to the yellow flowers strung in his honour from cliff to cliff and while his followers looked on wondering, one of them, wiser than the rest, whispered to his comrades:— "Soon a great and good man will surely die", for he knew that his chief has got a glimpse of the golden blossoms with which the gods welcome an honoured guest."

England on the 21st October 1807, the Madras Government said that "from disunited hordes of lawless plunderers and freebooters they (the people of the Ceded districts) are now stated to be as far advanced in civilization, submission to the laws, and obedience to the Magistrates, as any of the subjects under this Government. The revenues are collected with facility ; every one seems satisfied with his situation, and the regret of the people is universal on the departure of the Principal Collector."

During his stay in England, (1808-14) Munro was a strong critic of the Bengal system, in particular of the complete supremacy of the District Judges and of the ignorance of the Bengal Collectors. By his evidence he deeply impressed the Select Committee of the Commons and also the Board of Control and helped to confirm the Directors in their opinion that the Bengal system was not to be extended to the other Provinces. The result was that Lord Minto was forbidden to establish a permanent revenue settlement in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. The Fifth Report of the Select Committee of the Commons was printed in July 1912 and "first publicly called in question the principle of the permanent assessment of the revenues." The Board of Control and James Cumming, the head of its Revenue and Judicial Department, had come to implicitly believe in the virtues of the system advocated by Munro ; Cumming was even prepared to order its extension to all the Company's territories except Bengal. But the Secret Committee of the Directors deprecated this excessive haste, recommended that it should be first given a fair trial in Madras and set up a special committee to compile a revised administrative system for that Presidency. Munro was sent to Madras at the head of a special commission to reintroduce the Ryotwari settlement ; while the Directors' Special Committee drew up a draft for the revision of the Madras judicial system. "This draft advocated the transfer of the judicial authority in fiscal matters to the collectors, who were also to be given power as magistrates to try petty cases, with power of punish-

ment by imprisonment up to fifteen days, and also urged the employment of native commissioners with power to try petty offences.⁴

Munro had always felt that the Cornwallis Regulations were unsuited to the country ; and his experience of their working through two decades had shown them particularly defective in respect of a reformed and efficient police and of a speeding up of civil and criminal justice. He had always advocated the revival of village panchayats and the restoration of the judicial functions of the village officials, as well as the transfer of the supervision of the police from the Judge to the Collector of the District. The Court of Directors approved of his proposals ; and in 1816 the Madras Government sanctioned a series of Regulations giving effect to the changes.⁵ In one respect Munro was not successful in his aims. He wanted that village panchayat officials should deal with petty suits and the village panchayat should function as an efficient lower court; but so popular were the new judicial officers that were created by his Regulations, particularly the native District Munsiffs, that the village panchayat was not invigorated with a new life and was not able to survive in competition with professional lawyers and regularly constituted courts.

Munro believed that Indians would be efficient as officials in all the Government departments and that, in particular, they would make good judges as they could more easily follow the facts of the disputes before the courts. He helped Indians to get the posts of Munsiffs and thus to qualify themselves later on for higher places like that of the Sudder Amin. It may be said that, of the administrative reforms carried out on Munro's recommendations in 1816, none was more important from the point of view of Government and people alike than the separation of the association of the Judge with the

4. C. H. Philips. *The East India Company, 1784-1834*: (1940), p. 203

5. K. N. V. Sastri. *The Munro System of British Statesmanship in India* (Introduction and section B of appendices).

Magistracy and the Police and none was more popular than the creation of District Munsiffs. By their very popularity these District Munsiffs rendered ineffectual Munro's attempt to revive the old method of the decision of small causes through the village panchayats. Consequent on the increasing popularity of these Munsiffs, the Directors pressed for a still more extended use of Indian agency in the Judicial Administration; and the result was the creation of "auxiliary" and "native" civil and criminal courts; and the judges of the latter courts known as Principal Sudder Amins after 1836, have lasted down to-day. According to Regulation X of 1827, passed in the year of the death of Munro, a modified form of the English Jury system was introduced in the Circuit Courts.

Coming down to Munro's final triumph in the matter of the Ryotwari Settlement, one has to note that the Madras Board of Revenue urged, between the years 1808 and 1818, the wise plan of recognising village communities and of making settlements with them. But representative village communities had no definite place in the Company's scheme of totalitarian and comprehensive administration. Munro was examined on this, among other matters, by the Committee of the House of Commons on the eve of the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1813; and he strongly pressed for a permanent assessment on the basis of *ryotwar*. The decision of the question between a ryotwari settlement and a village settlement, was delayed by the Directors for a time, as the impending judicial and administrative reforms were felt to be more urgent. Even during Munro's second visit to England in 1819, the Directors had not yet decided on the question of land settlement. They had however come to feel that the ryotwari system had generally been answering their expectations. When the great author of that system returned to India in 1820, as His Excellency Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, K.C.B., Governor of Madras, it was finally accepted for the province, excepting those places where settlements had already been made with Zamindars and Poligars. The Ryotwari Settlement was, strangely

enough, neither permanent nor moderate as Munro had wished it to be ; nor did it foster the maintenance and encouragement of village institutions which were so near and dear to his heart ; and it is, indeed, an irony of history that the very settlement that had been fathered upon him, in spite of its deformities which he wanted to get cured, proved to be one of the sources of emasculation of the village community as a living and organic institution. Munro had again and again pleaded that the essence of the ryotwari system should be its permanency of assessment; and this permanency continued to be recognised, at least in theory, by the Madras Government till 1862. The high rate by which the state demand on the ryot was originally fixed at 45 per cent of the gross produce (or 50 or 55 per cent of the field produce) caused great oppression. But the oppression was substantially mitigated under the considerate administration of Munro.

Munro was also a very enthusiastic supporter of the indigenous educational institutions of the land. In 1822 he instituted an enquiry into the state of indigenous education in the Presidency, being greatly distressed at the rapid decay of literature and the arts which he saw going on round him. He felt that it was one of the chief duties of the Company to carry out the wishes of the Parliament by providing for "the moral and intellectual amelioration of the people". As a result of that enquiry which was entrusted to the Board of Revenue, it was found that there were merely 12,500 schools of all grades serving a population of over 12 millions.

In contrast with the Government of Bengal, Munro paid, like Elphinstone, great attention to the encouragement of indigenous education and to the value of conducting higher teaching through the vernaculars. He was, likewise, convinced of the importance of admitting Indians to "a larger share . . . and higher positions in the civil administration"—"tantamount" in the words of a historian, "to a declaration that higher instruction should be imparted to Indians through English."

It may not be generally known that Munro who had generously decided to postpone his departure to Europe, in 1825-26 because of the crisis of the Burmese War, was thought of as the best possible choice for the Governor-Generalship in the event of Amherst's resignation or recall.⁶ Liverpool is said to have told Canning:—"I am afraid that it will not be possible to maintain our friend Amherst much longer. If so, what is to be done ; Sir Thomas Munro or the Duke of Buckingham ? Judging upon public grounds, I should prefer the former upon the whole...."⁷ Munro owed a great deal of his inspiration and initiative in his later work as Governor to the Duke of Wellington with whom he was on intimate terms and to Colonel Mark Wilks of historical fame.⁸

6. *Courts and Cabinets* quoted by C. H. Philips, p. 256.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

8. K. N. V. Sastri. *The Munro System of British Statesmanship* (Section B of Introduction) ,

MISSIONARY SERVICES TO TAMIL LITERATURE

By

R. P. SETHU PILLAI

The spirit of missionary religions has played a conspicuous part in the development of the Tamil language. Ancient Jainism and modern Christianity—two great missionary religions, have laid the oldest language of South India under an eternal obligation. The activities of the Jaina monks ushered in the Augustan age of Tamil literature and the labours of the great Christian missionaries laid the foundations of Dravidian philology.

The zeal of the Jaina ascetics has left its traces in the vocabulary of the Tamil language. Their monasteries were known as *paḷḷi*, a word which is preserved in the modern expression *paḷḷivāsal*. The learned monks not only practised religious austerities at the *paḷḷi* but imparted instruction to their disciples. With a view to make them efficient instruments for propagating their faith, the monks gave their disciples a course of instruction in grammar and literature in addition to religion and philosophy. The classical compilations called *Tokainūl* were probably poetic anthologies compiled by these learned monks to make the best treasures of the Tamil literature easily available to their disciples. Metrical lexicons were composed to enable them to master the vocabulary of the language and grammatical rules were versified to ensure correctness of expression. The memorable lexicons of old, *Tivākaram*, *Piṅgalam* and *Chūtāmani* owe their existence to the strenuous labours of the Jaina scholars. It is needless to say that the instruction imparted in the monastery or *paḷḷi* was exemplary. Although emphasis was laid on religion and philosophy, the brilliant exposition of poetry, grammar and logic by the ascetics of the *paḷḷi* exercised a great fascination over

the public mind and the reputation that some of the *paḷḷis* attained was so great that even non-jainas were anxious to obtain the hall-mark of a renowned monastery. Hence boys were sent to the *paḷḷi* in large numbers for receiving instruction and *paḷḷi* which originally signified a monastery came to denote a public school.

Some of the monks who thus promoted the cause of learning were also votaries of the Tamil muse. Great epics like *Silapadikaram* and *Chintamani* were composed by them. Thus the impetus given to Tamil studies by the Jaina monks survived the destruction of their monasteries in the middle ages.

There is a remarkable parallelism in the methods adopted by ancient Jainism and modern Christianity for propagating their faiths. The various Christian missions existing to-day in South India correspond to the ancient Jaina sanga which played a prominent part in popularising the tenets of their religion. The numerous Christian schools and colleges all over the Tamil country remind us of the glorious monasteries of Jainism. Above all the methods adopted by the distinguished missionaries of Christianity are reminiscent of the methods of the Jaina monks.

During the 18th century the great Catholic missionary, Beschi, better known in the Tamil country as Viramāmunivar, rendered great service to the vocabulary and grammar of the Tamil language. He realised that the metrical form of the early lexicons tended to obscurity rather than clarity, and devoted himself to the compilation of a Tamil dictionary. His *catur akarāṭi* (Dictionary) was followed half a century later by the *Malabar and English Dictionary* of Fabricius of the German Lutheran Mission. These formed the basis of the bi-lingual dictionaries compiled by Rottler and Winslow of the American Mission.

The metrical grammar of Centamil (the standard language) composed by Beschi entitled *Tonnūḷ-viḷakkam* resembles *Nannūḷ*, the

popular grammar of Pavanandi (a Jaina monk) in terseness but is more comprehensive. "This is not only a complete and copious grammar of the language, but embraces all that is comprised in the scholastic term 'humanities'." A school was started at Elākuricci on the northern bank of the Coleroon where the catechists were taught Tamil Literature and Grammar by Beschi himself. The acquisition of an exact knowledge of the colloquial language was, in the opinion of Beschi, as important for the success of missionary enterprise as the cultivation of the literary language. With this object he wrote in Latin the grammar of '*Koduntamil*' or the colloquial dialect of Tamil.

After accomplishing the task of compiling a dictionary and formulating the principles of colloquial Tamil, Beschi composed an epic poem on the model of "*Chintāmani*" and styled it "*Tēmbāvaṇi*" ('the garland of fadeless flowers'). The poem of which the hero is Joseph, is "so elaborately correct, so highly ornamented and so invariably harmonious" that Caldwell assigns to Beschi the first rank among the Tamil poets of the second class.

This great missionary rendered a distinct service to the cause of Tamil prose by adopting it as the medium of metaphysical disquisition and religious controversy. His exposition of the Scripture entitled *Vēda-viḷakkam* is controversial in character, but his *Vēḍiyar-oḷukkam* (Rules for Catechists) has elicited universal appreciation. Dr. Pope acclaimed it as 'the best model for the student of Tamil prose.'

The services rendered to Tamil Literature by Dr. Pope, popularly known as Pōppaiyar in the Tamil country, are as memorable as those of *Vīramāmuniyar*. Pope's translations in English of *Tirukural*, *Nāladiyār* and *Tiruvācakam* testify to his ardent admiration of the ancient Tamil culture. He was attached to the S. P. G. Mission in Tinnevely and started a theological seminary at Sawyerpuram, then a sub-station of Nazareth. He secured the service of a blind German Professor Seymour, a Cambridge Graduate, who

taught Logic, History and Moral Philosophy. It was his aim to make Sawyerpuram a kind of University surpassing any institution then existing in Southern India. But the premature character of the enterprise made the scheme a failure.

The latter part of the 19th century is rendered memorable in the history of Tamil language by the activities of the illustrious trio to whom the Dravidian Languages owe a deep debt of gratitude. Three eminent missionaries working in three distant lands contributed to the inauguration of the scientific study of the Dravidian Languages. Dr. Gundert and Dr. Kittel of the Basel Mission expounded the linguistic aspects of Malayalam and Kannadam ; and Dr. Caldwell of the S. P. G. Mission, perhaps the greatest of the European missionaries in South India, discovered the fundamental unity of the Dravidian languages and laid the foundations of Dravidian Philology in his "Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages." In the preface to this monumental work he says : "The comparative method of study has done much in every department of science for Europe : might it not be expected to do much for India also ? If the natives of Southern India began to take an interest on the Comparative study of their own languages and in comparative philology in general they would cease to content themselves with learning by rote versified enigmas and harmonious platitudes. They would begin to discern the real aims and objects of language and realise the fact that language has a history of its own throwing light upon all other history and rendering ethnology and archaeology possible." The increasing interest evinced by the Universities in South India in the scientific study of the Dravidian languages is in a large measure due to the distinguished missionary 'who was content to live for half a century in a remote part of Tinnevely spending and being spent for the benefit of the people.'

THE PLACE OF IDEAS IN HISTORY

By

MUHAMMAD QUTBUD-DIN

The history of the human race is the story of a continuous growth. Its events can hardly be isolated, nor its leading actors dissociated from those events. It can no more be taken to pieces than the human system can be broken up into its component parts. It is a living organic whole. Just as the removal of one organ of the body leaves that limb nothing but a lifeless mass, so the division of history into a study of bare facts is bound to leave it cold and lifeless. History, is neither a catalogue of facts, nor is it a science of human causal relations. While it partakes of the nature of both to a considerable extent, it is at the same time something more comprehensive than both, demanding the largest grasp of intellect, the warmest human sympathy and the highest imaginative powers. It requires an insight into and a knowledge of human character, and not least, the art of making the dead past live before us once more in all its pulsating vividness. It was because of the possession of these rare gifts that Carlyle and Macaulay, and to a lesser extent Gibbon, in the field of narrative history, and Maitland on its legal side have been able to unravel historical tangles and elucidate enigmatic characters. It was Carlyle who discovered that Cromwell was not a hypocrite and Maitland it was who revealed that the medieval mind was not a mass of atrophied flesh.

Hence, history should never be allowed to degenerate into a simple chronicle of events or a mere narration of dry-as-dust facts and dates, for a faithful enumeration of events and facts, however interesting these may be in that form, is not desirable. Facts are infinite and it is not the millionth part of them that is worth know-

ing. History is, only in part, a matter of "fact", and as Trevelyan remarks, if one sets about collecting them, say, for instance, in regard to the French Revolution, one has "to go down to Hell and up to Heaven to fetch them", and at the end of his quest, be none the wiser. Then again, even after one gathers all the facts necessary for his purpose, it cannot be all facts which will be the subject of knowledge. A man might get up by heart a Telephone Directory or a Postal Guide which may be a very remarkable mental exercise, but how far that would give him a claim to be considered a well-informed man will always remain a debatable proposition. It would hardly broaden his vision or widen his outlook on men and things.

Facts are only dry bones of history ; it is ideas that are its flesh and blood. Facts do not add to one's power, nor do they enable one to act. They only give us knowledge,—they are only a part of education. Nothing better illustrates this point than a study of science. We may study Mathematics and Physical Sciences ; the knowledge of the one may bring home to our minds the conception of scientific axioms, and the understanding of the other, may enable us to grasp the plain facts about gravitation, or heat or light. But our real object is not gained thereby, for we do not want merely to know something of the simplest principles which underlie all the sciences, but to comprehend a little also of the mystery that surrounds our existence. We wish to ascertain the ideas and the consistent unity that pervade the partly intelligible and the partly unintelligible structure of society in which we live, move, and have our being. Our desire is to get a glimpse of the astonishing activities of the human mind, its powers and its capabilities, its defects and its weaknesses—the factors that depress it and the causes that develop it, why at certain moments it soars up to heights of patriotic fervour and at others sinks to depths of abject degradation,—in short, we seek to know something of the influences to which all human nature is subject, to be able to understand what people mean when they act in a particular manner, and what, when they act somewhat differently. We

desire to be in a position to decide for ourselves as to the motives that actuate the deeds of men who lived before us and played their parts ; and if we are to be provided only with a catalogue of the doings of these individuals without the ideas that informed their actions, history will turn out to be “ the play of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark ”.

If ideas are wanting in history, all the rest remains vague, incomplete and aimless. Mathematics would indeed be a jumble of figures and Physics a confused assemblage of laws of nature, if they ended in themselves. But the moment we learn how the principles underlying these sciences have affected and still continue to affect man's destiny, all our thoughts are lighted up ; a new meaning a fresh clue, an intelligent plan suggests itself to us as to the motives that should regulate human conduct. These, it lacks, so long as it remains disconnected from the history and the destiny of man—his past and his future. It is the same with history. What useful purpose will a scientific presentation of facts even in its relation of cause and effect in human affairs, serve, so long as it could not reveal the motives that lie behind the acts that have given birth to those causes and effects ? It can never be conceded that a mere exercise of one's intellectual faculties is an end in itself, for all knowledge is imperfect, unless it tends to give us sounder notions of human and social interests. What we need is a clear comprehension and a sound knowledge of the moral, intellectual and physical nature of man as a social being and of the elements of human society of which he is such an integral part. We want landmarks to guide us in our search after worthy guides, and striving after true principles for social or political action ; and these history can provide only when its treatment partakes somewhat of the nature of philosophy rather than of a mere chronology of past events or a science of causal relations.

Human nature being organic and variable, could not be described with scientific precision or mathematical accuracy, nor its activities reduced to exact formulae. A surgeon may dissect the body of a man,

and argue thence the general structure of the bodies of other men. But he cannot dissect a mind, and even if he could, he would be in a quandry when he attempts to postulate about other minds. There cannot be any two opinions about the inapplicability of laws of physical science to the interpretation of history, for, how could a scientific treatment of history give us an insight into the workings of a million minds that compose a nation, and especially, as we notice to-day that many of the great minds that compose the brain-trusts of nations are full of a divine discomfort ?

This aspect of the problem brings us on to a consideration of the next question : If history cannot be a chronicle of facts, how does it fail to be a science of cause and effect in human affairs ? It may immediately be stated that this history can never pretend to be. History being the story of man through ages in " a line of variable progress " develops into unexpected phases of objective reactions, some of which, in certain cases, mark an advance over the preceding ones, while in others, indicate a retrograde step. Complexity of this nature can scarcely permit of a scientific treatment of history.

The generally accepted belief about science involves the notion of a set of natural laws giving accurate results derivable from the principles which these laws embody. Further, scientific phenomena can be repeated at will, the circumstances under which they occur can be varied in as many ways as the investigator can devise ; while no historian can experiment with his characters though in a moment of scientific exaltation, he might conceive of a scientific laboratory in which experiments might be conducted by skilled investigators upon different forms of societies, thoughts and acts measured, knowledge gained and theories tested. After all this labour, the results arrived at through a careful and analytical sifting of facts may not be susceptible of either quantitative or arithmetical tests. No historical calculus could be imaginable by the most confirmed statistician or sociologist, for there is a good deal of ego in human cosmos to easily lend itself to mathematical treatment or laboratory methods. Then

there are the errors of observation to which the most careful historian may, sometimes, fall an unconscious victim ; and lastly the “ generalised dramas ” that can be constructed happen necessarily to be long and clumsy compared with the principles of physical science. We are thus inevitably and step by step, forced back to the conclusion that this alleged science of history is as ephemeral as the alleged history of facts. History in the real sense of the word can neither be a mere chronicle of facts nor ever become entirely a science of cause and effect in human affairs; and if these two conceptions still persist, in our day, they are the result of analogies drawn from false notions of history which attribute to it “ direct utility ” and the characteristic of deducibility to physical laws of nature.

Coming now to the question of its real value, we find that it lies in its psychological treatment of human actions as interpreted in the light of ideas, impulses and motives that guide those actions. Facts no doubt leave their impress upon all generations, but facts without ideas are meaningless. Facts are static, while ideas are dynamic, and hence civilisation which is history in dynamic form, cannot be studied in the lifeless and fixed forms of facts, however logically they may be interlinked with one another. We can see it only in its movement and growth. Historical events can never be isolated, as the events themselves are nothing but a set of circumstances that will repeat themselves time and again. For instance, if we take the phenomenon of the fall of the Roman Empire in ancient times and of the Napoleonic Empire in the recent past, we notice that in both, the destinies of millions of persons were concerned the psychology of whose lives the most erudite chronicler of events and the most scientific of historians would find to baffle his ingenuity and unravelling skill. Where the crudition of the one and the analytical powers of the other fail, the grasp of intellect, the human sympathy and the imaginative powers of a philosophical historian like Carlyle may admirably succeed. It is only through human sympathy what is missing in the history of the present may often be discovered in the

history of the past. No other angle would enable one to grasp at those "missing links" in the chain which connect all races and all ages in one, or gather up the broken threads that must yet be woven into the complex fabric of life.

Dr. Marshall once remarked that the economist needed above all, imagination, to put him on the track of those causes of events which were remote or below the surface. When imagination is so necessary for the economist, how much more should it be essential to the work of a historian if he desires to locate the springs of human action? The more closely we examine the latter, the clearer becomes the conception of history as a philosophy of human actions and aspirations and the need for a psychological background is more fully appreciated, for human emotions are the driving force in life not so much reasoning. Each part is unfolded in due order, the whole branching out and flowering like a single plant. More and more clearly do we see each age working out the gifts of the last and transmitting its labours to the next. History regarded from this perspective will enable us to understand the continuity of human ideas, the sequence of human institutions and the unreliability of certain factors with which we are surrounded, much better than through its factual or scientific interpretation. Everything in the present, we then find is rooted in the past. Our present social existence, we realise, is but the outcome of the labours of our ancestors who cleared the land of its primeval forests, drained it of its marshes and first tilled its rank soil. Our political existence, it becomes plain to us, is no less implanted in the past than in the present, for our modern institutions of local and central Government and our legal systems were sketched out for us in their main outlines centuries ago. The same holds good with regard to moral and intellectual questions. This is easily seen in the hold that old customs, ancient traditions, antiquated survivals and archaic practices have still over our minds and our every day habits, and deeds. The persistence of these beliefs and aspirations which partly date back to an age long dead and past,

only emphasises the continuity of human thought and the conception of history as an expression of that thought in the form of a chronology.

Since true history, as we have now observed, has to deal with a complexity of human problems, social, political, intellectual and moral no mere cataloguing of events or scientific treatment of facts will aid us in the recovery of some of those precious contributions to human progress and knowledge, which our ancestors had made in their own day. The real significance of history would then be found not in its emotional, ethical and educational concepts but in its psychological import of "a school of wisdom, a means of broadening human outlook, a cure for man's political prejudices, a constant source of human enthusiasm and finally an enricher of literature." True history, therefore, should be a study of "realities," "purposes," "human behaviourisms," and not a compendium of "abstractions" of "human affairs" and of "hypotheses." History thus conceived far from being mere sound and fury signifying nothing, would belong to the plane of those rich experiences which alone count in appraising the temporal condition of absolute values.

SYNCRETISM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN CULTURE IN ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL TIMES

By

GURTY VENKET RAO

The living continuity of Indian history is mirrored not in her political fortunes, but in her cultural life. The culture of our land, in spite of its hoary antiquity and ever changing environment, has maintained its vitality adjusting itself to new ideas and assimilating them into a harmonious whole. We are the inheritors of a composite culture. It cannot be said to be the sole contribution of one race or religion. The genius of the land, all through the ages, has been for either assimilation or conservation of the diverse elements that came here from time to time. This corner of the world more than any other had the unique privilege and distinction of practising the principle of 'Live and let live.' The doctrine of *ahimsā* is the logical outcome of this spirit. The present chaos of mutually distrustful communities and hostile creeds is unnatural to our historical traditions.

Different races and cults entered India at different times, bringing their own civilisation in their wake. In no other country were peoples belonging to stocks of very unequal cultures thrown together. Here met the Dravidians, Assyrians, Aryans, Iranians, Bactrians, Śakas, Pahlavas, Kuṣans, Ābhiras, Hūṇas, Turks, Afghans, Mongols and finally the Europeans. India served as a crucible into which were flung together ideas and ideals to be recast and refashioned into a living organism. It was achieved more or less by the syncretising process, which made unity in diversity the basic principle of Indian life and thought.

Syncretism has a very curious history.¹ Here the term is used for the harmonising process between conflicting ethnical groups and rival creeds or cultures. It is not a purely mechanical process, like the simple exchange of material goods. It is a vital process involving the psychological reactions of both the transmitters and the receivers of cultures. Care must be taken, however, not to place too much emphasis upon syncretism as a universal, conscious and continuous process. It had its own ebb and flow according to the circumstances and the exigencies of different times.

When two cultures come into contact a struggle for survival ensues between them. Usually their fate is decided either by the extermination of the one by the other or by peaceful harmonisation between the two. The first process operated in the case of the Australian aborigines and the American 'Indians.' In India the second alternative was adopted, and in the very struggle for the survival of the fittest arose phoenix-like the spirit of syncretism. Once born it never knew death. Consciously or unconsciously it affected the entire course of our history, sometimes very vigorously and at other times lethargically. It is this spirit that made India live when ancient civilisations of Babylon and Egypt, of Greece and Rome perished. Indian progress was temporarily set back only when the people departed from the life giving principle of syncretism and developed a narrow exclusive outlook. This fact was noticed by Alberuni in the XI Century A.D. He wrote,² "The Hindus believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no kings like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs.their ancestors were not as narrow-minded as the present generation isIn former times, the Hindus used to acknowledge that the progress of science due to the Greeks is much more important than that which is due to themselves."²

1 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. XII, p. 155.

2. Sachau. *Alberuni's India*, Vol. I, pp. 22-23.

The beginnings of cultural life in India are revealed in the five millennium old archaeological relics of Harappā and Mohenjo Dāro in the Indus valley,³ and the earliest psalms of the Vedic Ṛṣis of the Sapta-Sindhu. The Indus valley civilisation is considered to be Non-Aryan in origin, exhibiting many features in common with the Summerian civilisation of Babylon. The Aryan Ṛṣis were the authors of the Vedic culture. A glimpse into the earliest cultural conflict on the Indian soil is given by their sacred hymns. They at the outset were equally hostile to 'godless Asuras' and 'rite-less Dasyus'—epithets of contempt used by the Aryans for their foes of 'dusky complexion.' Their unceasing anathemas forboded a war of extermination. In their religious prayers they denounced the Dasyus as demons and monsters of cruelty and invoked the aid of their gods (Indra, Varuṇa etc.) for their annihilation. As a measure of self-preservation, they organised themselves into occupational groups—the Brāhmaṇas, Rājanyas and Vaiśyas—devoted exclusively to learning, warfare and agriculture. These groups were very elastic, the same family having members of various occupations. Colour distinction (*varṇa*) appeared to ban permanently all chances of fusion between the Aryans and Non-Aryans.

But happily this conflict proved to be merely a passing aberration. The Aryans soon realised the suicidal implications of their intolerant attitude. It is said in the *Mahābhārata* that the Aryan emperor Māndhātā was advised to compromise with the Non-Aryans by allowing them to pursue their own customs so long as they were not *utterly incompatible* with the Aryan *dharma*.⁴ Not long before the Aryans began to feel that all other gods were manifestations of one Supreme Soul, and adopted the credo 'Sages name variously that which is one'. The syncretising potency of this small *mantra* in the

3. John Marshall: Mohenjo Daro and the Indus Valley Civilization, Vols. I, II & III; M. S. Vats: Excavations at Harappā, Vols. I & II.

4. Proceedings of the Second History Congress, p. 28.

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Rigveda was far-reaching.⁵ It led to the belief in the identity of many gods who resembled each other, so that slowly the Non-Aryan deities of hills and forests were assimilated to the Aryan gods and goddesses. The Dravidian Murugan became Rudra of the Vedic pantheon. In the *Sāṅkhāyana Gr̥hya Sūtra* Rudra is associated with Asuras and Rākṣasas.⁶ But in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* he is represented as Brahmā himself.⁷ The later phallic, tree and serpent cults have also been traced by some scholars to Dasyu origin. Phallic stones have been discovered in the excavations of the Indus valley. Even the Non-Aryan animal sacrifices, sympathetic magic and religious dancing found a place in the Aryan rituals. The *Atharvaveda* may be said to be the harbinger of the syncretism between the Aryan and Non-Aryan cultures, and of Hinduism which in due course of time replaced the early simple Vedic religion. The religion that is practised to-day by the Hindus is an amalgamation of the 'fire-rites' of the *Vedas* and the Āgamika Cults which were evolved from the ancient Dasyu practices.⁸ It is significant that in the *Atharvaveda* the term Śūdra took the place of the former scornful epithet Dasyu to indicate the Non-Aryans, and the Vedic Sanskrit lent itself to the expression of Non-Aryan magic rituals and Vrātya cults. "The Aryans even accepted a Non-Aryan representative of the 'black peoples'—Kṛṣṇa, and made him deliver the message of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man."⁹ The Non-Aryans on their part paved the way for their incorporation into the Aryan society by following the rites and ceremonies prescribed by the Aryan sacred books. There is no wonder if the once hated Dasyus and Asuras finally gained a recognised position in the Aryan fold as the fourth occupational group—the Śūdras.

5. D. R. Bhandarkar : Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture, p. 22.

6. The Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, p. 233.

7. J. E. Carpenter : Theism in Mediaeval India, p. 227.

8. P. T. S. Iyengar : History of the Tamils, Chap. VIII.

9. S. Radhakrishnan : The Heart of Hindusthan, pp. 51-52.

The institution of caste replaced the original colour division allowing the Non-Aryans to constitute the fourth section of the Aryan community. It was a bold attempt to organise society on a 'federal' basis which facilitated the assimilation of different levels of culture, allowing full scope for the development of the characteristics of each. It enabled diverse races to live together without indulging in internecine feuds, class conflicts and wars of extermination. The concept of the moral law of *Karma* and the theory of re-birth bound the individuals and communities to their *dharma* and reconciled them to their specified role in the society as a whole. Every caste had certain responsibilities towards the society and so there was no proper ground for caste-pride. In the human body the head and the heart are equally important. Manus admits even the possibility of change of caste, and in the *Mahābhārata* it is expressly stated that many who were originally not 'twice-born' became Brāhmaṇas. Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar¹⁰ has adduced some instances to show that "caste was an elastic feature of ancient Hindu social structure, and that a Hindu was raised to a higher or degraded to a lower caste in accordance with his deeds." The rigidity and exclusiveness of the caste system, as we now know it, are largely the product of medieval conditions. Still some of the aborigines and wild tribes of no culture such as the Niṣādas, Caṇḍālas etc., were disliked both by the Aryans and the Dravidians for their extremely dirty and depredatory habits. The Aryan culture, however, did not countenance their extermination. It tolerated as one more caste—the Pañcamas—on condition that they remained outside the Aryan settlements. Even these were given the solace of religion in the Āgama cults, which were open to all men.¹¹ Thus syncretism triumphed over racial prejudices and conserved the peoples of various stocks and modes of life.

10. *Op. cit.*, pp. 57-59; N. K. Dutt: *Origin and Growth of Caste in India*, pp. 134-39.

11. P. T. S. Iyengar : *History of the Tamil*, p. 108

But no institution can maintain for long its pristine purity as man's selfishness corrupts and distorts it. Human memory is short; the basic ideas are soon forgotten; degeneracy sets in; and the institutions outlive their utility.

By the time the Aryans and the Non-Aryans started fraternisation, their socio-religious organisation came to be encumbered with elaborate rituals, hair-splitting philosophies and high caste snobbery. The Brāhmaṇas claimed and asserted domination over the entire society and the Śūdras were treated as a servile class. Social equilibrium was lost, which evoked protests from all sides. The leaders of the protestant movement—Mahāvīr and Buddha—chalked out new paths of social order streaked with brilliant but simple moral concepts. Their followers multiplied and spread all over India. In due course of time Buddhism developed many schools of thought, and once more our land was threatened with social disruption. Aśoka saw the danger and tried to remedy the evil. He not only attempted to eradicate schism within the Buddhist church, but also exhorted¹² the people to listen to one another's *dharma*, because "he who disparages other sects from pride in his own really injures his own sect."

After Aśoka's death matters became complicated due to the degeneration of Buddhism into mechanical morality, and the invasions of the foreigners. However 'in the cosmopolitan kingdoms of Greeks, Śakas and Parthians in Gāndhāra and the Punjab, and of their successors, a remarkable syncretism of religious ideas was effected.'¹³ Slowly Mahāyānism made its appearance in the first century A.D. It introduced temples, images and rituals for the worship of Buddha and Bodhisatvas and thus made the nearest approach to Hinduism into which Buddhism was finally absorbed in India. Hinduism assimilated all that was best in Buddhism, and Buddha was recognised by it as an incarnation of God.

12. Rock Edict, XII.

13. G. E. Smith : Human History, p. 492.

The Yavanas, Śakas, Pahlavas and Kuṣans adopted the Aryan creeds—Buddhism or Hinduism—and assumed Indian names. Gifts of Yavanas to Buddhist institutions have been carefully noted in the cave inscriptions of western India. Menander's interest in Buddhism is immortalised by his leading part in the *Milindapanha*. Heliodora, the Greek envoy to the court of Kāśiputra Bhāgabhadra, has left an imperishable memorial of his faith in the Bhāgavata religion by setting up a *Garuḍadhvaja* in honour of Vāsudeva at Besnagar.¹⁴ Kadaphis II was an ardent votary of Śiva. King Kaniṣka worshipped both Greek and Hindu gods, although he considered himself a Buddhist. The Satrapa families of Taxila and Mathura professed Buddhism, and of Nasik and Ujjain espoused Hinduism. An example of matrimonial alliance between the Śaka-satrap and Āndhra-Sātavāhana families is also available.¹⁵ Hinduism proved contagious even to the Hūṇas, whose leader Mihirkula 'bent his neck to none but Śiva.'¹⁶ Indeed the Gupta period witnessed the development of the Paurāṇika Hinduism which enabled the people of all races to realise their brotherhood in the worship of Viṣṇu, Śiva or Ambā. In the Āgama schools were perfected the modes of their worship in temples which were open to all.

If the foreigners accepted Indian beliefs, they in their turn moulded the religious thoughts and aesthetic tastes of the Indians. The Mahāyāna school of Buddhism itself was the result of complex interaction of Indian, Zoroastrian and Hellenic elements. Indications of Græco-Roman influence are discernable in the domain of fine arts, and a happy blend of Indian, Iranian and Hellenic arts reached the acme of perfection in

14. Arch. Sur. of India, An. Rep., 1908, pp. 128 ff.

15. Arch. Sur. of Western India, Vol. V, p. 78; note by Rapson: Catalogue of the Coins of the Andhra Dynasty, etc., p. li, No. 17.

16. Fleet: Gupta Inscriptions, p. 146 and Ind. Ant., XVIII, p. 219.

the Mauryan and the celebrated Gāndhāra sculptures.¹⁷ In the words of Dr. Gourangnath Banerjee,¹⁸ "India owes to Greece an improvement in coinage and astronomy.....in the plastic arts and especially in the details of some of the architectural forms." The sculptures of Gāndhāra, Mathura, Bharhut, Sāñci and Amarāvati bear traces of classical inspiration. All ancient Indian coins with the slightest pretensions to artistic merit are ultimately traceable to Greek origin. The subsequent dynasties of North West India including the Guptas followed these models. Greek notions of astral regions found their way into Indian astronomy and Varāhamihra's *Pañca-Siddhānta* contains a whole chapter on them.

Under the fostering care of successive generations, great religious and educational institutions developed at Taxila, Nālandā, Odantipur, Vikramaśilā, Navadvipa and Kāñci, which attracted scholars of diverse races and climes. The laborious journey of Chinese pilgrims to India in quest of knowledge is well known. The whole sub-continent of India became dotted with temples dedicated to the worship of innumerable gods and goddesses without any feelings of intolerance. Every one was free to practise the creed or cult of his choice. This is clearly illustrated in the family of Harśavardhana. His royal line for several generations back had been Sun-worshippers. His elder brother had been a devout Buddhist. He himself was a worshipper of Maheśvara. Even after his conversion to Buddhism, he accommodated Viṣṇu and Śiva with Buddha on festive occasions.¹⁹ While ordinary mortals were reconciling themselves to the claims of rival gods, by resorting to pantheism or henotheism, philosophers like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, tried to achieve a similar syncretism in the domain of metaphysics, which reached its culmina-

17. It is significant that no architectural or sculptural specimen *in stone* earlier than of IV Century B.C. has yet been discovered.

18. Hellenism in Ancient India, p. 26.

19. The Madhuban Copper-Plate in Eep. Ind., Vol. I, pp. 66, ff.

tion in the school of Nimbārka. Indeed religious catholicism was a marked feature of Medieval Hindu India.

The syncretic process was not confined to religion or philosophy alone. It affected the speech of the people also, and led to the growth of 'Sanskritic languages'—Punjabi, Hindi, Bengali, Gujarati, Marathi, etc.

This harmonious development of Indian culture continued throughout the Hindu period of Indian History. Religions and sects were reconciled and practically all the foreign tribes were accepted into Hindu society, so that 'we now find throughout northern India a Hindu population fairly homogeneous in blood culture and religion.'²⁰ The work was so thoroughly accomplished that the terms *Dasyu*, *Asura*, *Yavana*, *Śaka*, *Pahlava* and *Hūṇa* are to-day unknown to our social structure and are of merely antiquarian interest.

But the advent of Islām in India ushered in the middle ages and brought in its wake a new problem of unprecedented complexity. Its simple doctrines, rational institutions, democratic outlook and above all its proselytizing platform constituted a challenge to the accepted socio-religious heritage of the Hindus—their theories of *Karma* and re-birth and their institutions of *Varṇāśramadharma* and image worship. In the words of Alberuni, "We (Muslims) believe in nothing which they (Hindus) believe".

The Musalmāns could not be merged into Hindu social structure by the same process of silent unification which had brought about the fusion of several local and foreign peoples with the Aryan in ancient times. Three facts account for this : firstly, both the communities have their own scriptures claiming revelation as their source ; what *Vedas* and *Smṛtis* are to the Hindus, *Qorān* and *Hadis* are to the Musalmāns; secondly, the pantheistic notions of the Hindu masses

could not be appreciated by the followers of Islām which knows no God but Allah, 'the God of the Muslims'; thirdly, the Hindus could not interpret the social structure of humanity except in terms of caste, evolved 'according to the aptitudes and works'—*guṇa karma vibhāgaśah*, while the Musalmāns emphasized the equality and brotherhood of mankind.

At first the traditional tolerant spirit of India constituted the best security for Islām in this country. From the seventh century A.D. onwards Persian and Arab Musalmāns settled in large numbers at the different ports of western and southern India, and married women of the country. They were welcomed as traders and soldiers of fortune, and in their wake came scholars and saints. They enjoyed complete religious freedom and pursued their avocations peacefully. This peaceful penetration of Islām into India was followed by the usual syncretic movement. It led to the appearance of new ideas and the emphasising of certain old ones in the teachings of Hindu saints and scholars of south India from the ninth to the fourteenth Century. Dr. Tarachand includes in this category the increasing emphasis on mono-theism, emotional worship, self-surrender, laxity in the rigours of the caste system and indifference towards mere ritual.²¹ The Hindus absorbed certain Muslim ideas but did not attempt to reconcile Hinduism and Islām because the problem did not arise then.

But when ambitious adventurers like Mahmud of Ghazni drew the sword, the clash of creeds and races commenced. He invaded India seventeen times, ransacked sacred shrines and royal treasuries, and enslaved thousands of Hindus. "The plundered people were not likely to think well of Islām when it come to them in the shape of the Ghaznavide conquest and left behind it an everlasting story of plundered temples, desolated cities and trampled crops. As a faith Islām had been morally disgraced, not elevated by Ghaznavide's

21. *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

achievement.”²² While making a critical survey of the causes that separated the Hindus from the Muslims,²³ Alberuni observed that the devastating raids of his master created the most inveterate hatred for the new faith in the Hindu mind, and Hindu sciences retired to places ‘where our (Turkish) hand cannot yet reach.’ The Turks presented Islām to India in a most unattractive form.

There was nothing in the conduct of subsequent Turkish war-lords to re-assure the Hindus about the real nature of Islām. Malik Kafur’s²⁴ depredations into the Dekkan in no way differed in nature and consequences from those of Mahmud of Ghazni into northern India three centuries earlier. Plunder and rapine, destruction of monasteries and temples and the enslavement of the children of the soil by thousands were the normal features of Turkish warfare in India. Both the political adventurers and ambitious theologians had no scruples to rouse the unholy enthusiasm of their followers by exploiting the idea of *Jihad* which literally means ‘exertion in the way of God’ or ‘fighting in defence of the true faith’. Qazi Mughisuddin went to the extent of telling Alauddin Khilji²⁵ that except Abu Hanifa, who allowed the imposition of the *Jazia* upon the Hindus, other schools offered to them the only alternative of ‘Death or Islām’. No wonder then that the Hindus, who had no first hand knowledge of the Qorān, came to associate the callous cruelty of their despoilers with the message of the Prophet, and made their caste rules more stringent as a protective measure. The Political antagonism of the victor and the vanquished temporarily clouded the vision of both. The Hindus called the Musalmāns *mlecchas*, and in their turn received the appellation of *Kafirs* or *Zimmis*. The rela-

22. Prof. Habib: Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, p. 41.

23. Sachau : *Op. cit.*, pp. 17-26.

24. He was a convert from Hinduism to Islām. Yet he excelled his Turkish master in acts of vandalism.

25. H. Elliot : History of India, Vol. III, p. 184.

tions between them were not dissimilar to what had prevailed between the Aryans and Dasyus at the time of their first mutual contact. History repeated itself, and it appeared to make syncretic approach between them impossible.

But the Indian tradition was against perpetuating any fissiparous tendencies in the cultural life of the country. Even the *Kafirs* and the *mlecchas* had to yield in due course of time to the magic wand of syncretism even as the Aryans and the Dasyus had to do centuries before.

At first Islām itself took the lead in creating a better understanding between the foreigners and the Indians. Its followers constituted a brotherhood so that even the new converts from among the Hindus rose to the highest positions in the state. Malik Kafur became the Commander-in-Chief of Alauddin Khilji's forces, Khan-i-Jahan Maqbul rose to the position of the chief minister under Firoz Shah Tughluq. When the Turks firmly established themselves on the throne of Delhi, they even abandoned the terrorism of the war conditions and allowed the Non-Muslims to pursue their peaceful avocations subject to the payment of the *Jazia* for the protection of their lives and property. But this was not enough. The Muslims were still the favoured children of the state which looked with contempt upon the honour and religion of its Hindu subjects. A revolutionary change in the psychology of the rulers was needed to put an end to these unnatural conditions.

A start was made in this direction by the Indians themselves—Hindus and Musalmāns. The Hindus of Upper India were attracted to Muslim *Faqirs*, and the Muslim converts retained Hindu customs which roused the wrath of the Turkish Sultan Firoz Shah Tughlaq.²⁶ In the reign of Sikandar Lodi a holy Musalmān protested publicly against the Sultan's interference with the religion

of his subjects.²⁷ These indicated the true spirit of India which found full expression in the revived *Bhakti* and *Sufi* cults of the XV and XVI centuries A.D.²⁸

Two kinds of reformers came forward—conservative and radical—to cleanse India of the intolerant spirit that was brought into the country by the Turks. Both emphasised the unity of God, futility of rituals, religious bigotry and caste prejudices, and preached the path of devotion (*Bhakti*). Here ended the similarity. The conservatives still stuck to their ‘revealed books’. For Rāmānanda and Tulsīdās, Rāma was the supreme deity ; for Sūrdās and Caitanya, Kṛṣṇa was the principal object of devotion. But the radicals touched the real syncretic note. In the teachings of Kabir, Nānak, Dādu, and a host of others we see a happy and harmonious blending of Hindu and Muslim influences. In the eyes of Kabir the Hindu and Turk were pots of the same clay, and Allah and Rāma were but different names of the same God. Nānak started his missionary work by the solemn declaration. “There is no Hindu and no Musalmān. Both have forgotten the truth of their religion”. Dādu proclaimed that there was no difference between Rāma and Rahim, Keśava and Karim. The Mahratta saints Nāmadeva, Tukārām, and Rāmadās—formed the vanguard of a similar movement in the Maharastra. Among the Musalmāns, the *Sufi* saints were of kindred spirit with these Hindu *Bhaktas*. The *Grantha Sahib* of the Sikhs is a standing reminder of the efforts of the saints of the age to evolve a synthesis of the two religions.

Such a movement ultimately compelled the rulers to change their attitude towards their Hindu subjects and paved the way for the Hindus and the Musalmāns to appreciate each other’s culture. Sher

27. Elphinstone: History of India, p. 410.

28. J. E. Carpenter: *Op. cit.*, pp. 449-79, Dr. Tarachand: *Op. cit.*, pp. 137-8, pp. 143-191, and M. G. Ranade: Rise of the Maratha Power, Chap. VIII.

Shah disregarded the theologians and adopted a policy of religious toleration towards the Hindus. He made separate provision for the two communities in the *Sarais* in the matter of food and drink. Babur in his will enjoined upon his successors to wipe off all religious prejudices, to administer justice according to the ways of every religion, to avoid especially the sacrifice of the cow, and not to ruin the temples and shrines of any community which obeyed the laws of the Government.²⁹ Akbar abolished the pilgrim tax and the *Jazia*, and bestowed offices and honours upon soldiers, statesmen, scholars and artists, irrespective of sectarian considerations. His court became 'the assemblage of the wise of every religion and sect'—Sufi, Sunni, Shiah, Brāhmaṇa, Jain, Parsee, Zoroastrian, Jew and Nazarene. He even attempted to found a creed transcending the dogmatisms of both Hinduism and Islām. Indeed his *Tauhid-i-Ilāhi*, promulgated in 1582 A.D., was the greatest 'experiment in religious syncretism made from the Muhammadan side.'³⁰ Had he followed it up with a sacrifice like that of Buddha, probably the cause which was so dear to him would have been crowned with full success. The initiative taken by him to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity found literary expression in his great grandson Dara's *Majmua-ul-Baharin* which means 'the confluence of two seas' (i.e. Hinduism and Islām).

These efforts of kings and saints bore a rich harvest. People in the villages began to live like brothers forgetting their religious differences. Each community began to appreciate the arts and letters of the other. The Hindus, particularly Kayasthas, Khatri and Kashmiris, attained mastery over Persian and even Arabic. Moslem scholars of Akbar's court rendered several Hindu secular and religious works into Persian. Dara translated the Upaniṣads into the language of Persia. The whole country became dotted with works of art enshrining the best traditions of the two communities. At

29. K. Srinivas Kini : A source Book of Indian History, p. 96.

30. J. E. Carpenter : *Op. cit.*, p. 489.

Old Delhi, Fatehpur Sikri, Ahmadabad, Mandu, Bijapur, Bidar and Vijayanagar the blending of Hindu-Muslim styles may be conveniently studied. Mughal painting broke the strict Islāmic trammels and enriched itself by deriving inspiration from the Hindu pictorial art in portraying living forms and materialistic life of the Court. Rajput painting appropriated charming touches of the Mughal technique, and mirrored the life of the simple villager, his pursuits and pastimes. Music also offered a common ground for the meeting of the Hindus and the Muslims. Long before the advent of the Mughal rule, Amir Khusru composed *Kheyal* and *Terena* which "were a delightful mixture of the Persian and Hindoo style."³¹ Bold experiments were made in the art under the patronage of the great Mughals (except Aurangzeb). The Hindus and Muslims exchanged ideas and by their joint exertion produced the Hindustani music. New varieties of *rāgas* were invented by famous singers. The most famous of these was Tansen, who is described by Abul Fazl as 'the most famous of the age among the *Kalawan/s* of Gwalior' Shah-jahan's Urdu compositions were so charming that 'many pure souled *Sufis* lost their senses in the ecstasy produced by his singing.'³² Hindustani, rooted in the rich soil of Hindi, Persian and Arabic, became the *lingua franca* of northern India. . Among many works written in Hindi by Musalmān scholars, *Padmāvat* and *Rahmi Satsai* may be cited as proof of the new spirit of union between the two communities that pervaded the entire society.

Aurangzeb by following a policy of political opportunism and extreme orthodoxy unconsciously resuscitated the crumbling barriers between the Hindus and the Musalmāns. Opposition gathered strength under the leadership of the Jats, Sikhs, Rajputs and Mahrattas. If he raised the cry of Islām in danger, the other communities in India took up the slogan of Hinduism in danger.

31. Gladwin : *Ayeen Akbery* (Ain-i-Akbari), Vol. II, p. 459.

32. Sarkar: *Studies in Mughal India*, pp. 12-13.

Sword and not reason was made the arbiter of this renewed conflict. Aurangzeb, like Philip II, brought a deluge after him which swallowed up the Mughal Empire.

But the deluge passed away leaving behind in more resplendent colours the solid achievements of syncretism which had been working in our land for so many centuries. A new culture had already developed which no longer remained purely Aryan, Dravidian, Hindu or Muslim. Our culture is a synthesis of the best elements of all, and may be called Hindustani culture i.e. the culture of the Indians. In the words of Dr. Tarachand,³³ "Not only did Hindu religion, Hindu art, Hindu literature and Hindu science absorb Muslim elements, but the very spirit of Hindu Culture and the very stuff of Hindu mind were also altered and the Muslim reciprocated by responding to the change in every department of life."

The process of syncretism has not ended with this great achievement. The impact of Western ideas and standards of life on India has shifted its operation in modern times from religious and cultural to social and political fields. The changes felt in the contemporary life and thought of India are but the result of the efforts of the reformers of the last century to reconcile the Eastern and Western outlooks of life.³⁴ Syncretism in its new role has to assert itself over the centrifugal forces that are once more reviving in our country. Already it is in operation : the *Pañcamas* are on the way to full incorporation into the Hindu society, and the better minds among the Hindus, Muslims, Christians etc., are discountenancing all separatist tendencies born of arrant communalism. If the precious heritage of toleration and spirit of assimilation is of any value it should enable the various communities to maintain the well-tested tradition of harmony and conciliation and behave towards one another as children of the same Mother India.

33. *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

34. H. C. E. Zachrias : *Renascent India*.

ARE THE DAYS OF DEMOCRACY OVER ?

By

E. ASIRVATHAM

1. *Democracy under the clouds.*

It is the fashion these days to decry democracy. Anybody who upholds democracy is considered to be an antideluvian, if not a knave or a fool. If we consider the fate of democracies during the last two decades, we have a right to be pessimistic. One of the aims of the Great War of 1914-18 was to establish the principle of "the self-determination of nations" beyond all dispute. But what has happened within the last two years to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France is too fresh and too painful in our minds to require re-iteration.

Woodrow Wilson, the person responsible for the idea of the self-determination of nations, declared that the world war was being fought "to make the world safe for democracy". No sooner did he say that than there came the sharp rejoinder that democracy had to be made safe for the world. We of this generation are not so hopeful of democracy as men of a previous generation. Our attitude is one of caution, if not of criticism. We no longer look upon democracy as an open sesame to peace, prosperity, and progress. We have come to realise that mere majority vote does not settle anything. The voice of the people, we are disposed to think, instead of being the voice of God, may very well be the voice of the devil. The ardent hope of Bentham to improve "this wicked world by covering it over with republics," seems rather a childish dream to-day. We would rather return an affirmative to Ludovici's rhetorical question when he asks "Who believes in democracy now-a-days? Who believes in

parliamentary government, in the brotherhood of men, or in universal suffrage ? ”

Expressions such as “ Democracy under Revision ” used by H. G. Wells and “ Democracy at the Crossroads ” used by H. J. Laski, seem already out of date. There are many to-day who are disposed to believe that a phrase like “ Democracy at the Crossroads ” is too complimentary to democracy. They argue that democracy has already left the crossroads and fallen into a ditch. The fall has been so very great that not all the king’s horses and not all the king’s men could put the humpty dumpty of democracy back again. It is rather significant that, according to an old custom, those who committed suicide used to be buried at the crossroads as an object lesson to those contemplating that way of exit out of life.

2. *Is the Principle of Democracy Unsound ?*

In the face of this array of witnesses against democracy, one needs an extraordinarily stout heart to defend democracy. What is wrong with democracy ? This question may be answered (a) from the point of view of the criticisms levelled against democracy itself or (b) from the point of view of the criticisms levelled against its practical working.

(a) Is the principle of democracy unsound ? Democracy assumes that people are passionately devoted to liberty both in individual and governmental relations. Those opposed to democracy claim that our ordinary experience shows that men care more for the satisfaction of hunger, for national greatness, and for the domination of others than for liberty. To such people a passionate plea like “ give me liberty or give me death ” is a *bourgeois* conception which the world has learnt to outlive. If this claim be true, democracy loses much of its strength.

In reply to it, it must be said that it is a mere truism to say that one cannot preach to a hungry man. To begin and end one’s think-

ing with the satisfaction of physical wants is to be guilty of subscribing to a "pig-trough" philosophy. In his calmer moments, man certainly cares more for the opportunity of ordering his life in his own way than for the mere satisfaction of his creature comforts.

Other critics of democracy say that the principle of democracy is unsound because it exaggerates individual importance to the exclusion of discipline and order. Instead of leading to order and unity, democracy, it is said, paves the way for disorder and anarchy. Even if it be true that some people care for liberty, it is said that many are satisfied with obeying authority imposed from without.

The answer to this charge is that democracy does not exclude discipline. It is an attempt at the reconciliation of order and liberty. The kind of liberty which it believes in is a self-imposed discipline which is a higher form of discipline than discipline imposed upon the individual from without. In the well-known words of J. J. Rousseau: "Obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty." If in the field of Imperialism it is true to say that "good government is no substitute for self-government", it is equally true to say that in the national and personal fields the good attained by one's own effort is of much greater moral value than the good bestowed upon a person or a nation from outside.

A third line of criticism levelled against the principle of democracy is that it is anti-evolutionary and unbiological in that it is based upon the principle of equality and expresses abundant faith in the common man. Faguet, who advances this argument, claims that democracy has no central nervous system and that it expects the brains to be located anywhere and everywhere in the organism. What he means by this argument is that democracy, as understood by him, assumes that the power of thinking, planning, and deciding on national issues is present—though, perhaps, not equally—among all the citizens. Democracy, according to Faguet, means the extreme decentralisation and thorough incompetency, because in it he holds there is no room for men of drive, initiative, and power of leadership.

It is needless to say that this criticism is a gross exaggeration. Democracy does believe in the necessity of leaders and wise administrators. A sound democracy, it has been well said, should make room for and include a sound aristocracy—an aristocracy based upon ability and character. With a true insight into the meaning of democracy, Mazzini defined democracy as “the progress of all, through all, under the leading of the best and the wisest.” Paradoxically speaking, democracy assumes the equality of all to discover who are the best.

Even if the principle of democracy be sound, it is argued by some that it is not suited for India. The diehard Englishman gleefully says that India can never be independent or democratic because of her innumerable differences of religion, language, caste, and community. Mr. M. A. Jinnah echoes a similar sentiment when he says: “Democracy presupposes the existence of the solid rock of one race and one culture. India is unsuited for it.” One wonders whether Mr. Jinnah would say the same thing if the Muslims formed a majority of the population of India, instead of 22 per cent as at present.

If unity of race, religion, language and culture is required as the first and essential condition of democracy, there is no place for democracy anywhere in the world. What is wanted is that in the midst of diversity there should be a spirit of accommodation, tolerance, justice and fair play, if democracy is to succeed. Great Britain has no unity of race. The Scots have had more than their share of offices and business in the national and imperial life of Britain. Yet nobody grudges that. Neither the U. S. A., Canada, South Africa, nor Switzerland has a unity of race, and perhaps even of culture. Yet one cannot deny the term “democracy” to their governments.

Culture itself is not a fixed and unchangeable commodity which can be shut behind stone walls. It undergoes a silent and

often a wholesome change under the impact of other cultures and other modes of living. It is only the unimaginative individual who would say that his country or community should be shut up in a water-tight compartment impervious to the influences of outside forces, even if that were possible. Democracy is possible in a country with heterogeneous conditions, provided the will to be a democracy is present. What the advocates of separatism are doing is to lay the axe at the will of India to be a nation.

(b) Has democracy been found wanting in actual practice? The chief criticism levelled against democracy on the practical side is that it is inefficient. Faguet sneeringly describes it as "the cult of incompetence." Democracy is said to be slow-moving and extraordinarily wasteful. At times of crisis it has frequently spoken with a divided voice. It is said to lack a unity of leadership, such as is possible under a dictatorship. When so many parties and interests have to be consulted, the agreement reached is not seldom the least common multiple. This means that people are represented not at their best and strongest, but at their worst and weakest.

This criticism has been illustrated in the recent history of England. The mild and vacillating policy of N. Chamberlain typified by the "philosophy of appeasement" meant the military unpreparedness of Great Britain at the beginning of the war. Although much has been done to remedy the situation, England has had to pocket insults at the hands of Germany, and even of Japan. For eight months after the war commenced, England had to put up with Neville Chamberlain and his associates till the fighting speeches of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Amery and others turned them out. France had three changes in her Premiership and two changes in her military command. Germany, on the other hand, has had no such change. Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, and Himmler have continued where they were, Hess being the only casualty.

The inefficiency of democracy is particularly marked in the military field. For military preparation, for sudden attacks on the

enemy, for unity of command, and for the unquestioning loyalty of the people, dictatorship is considered to be infinitely superior. Our answer to this claim is that so long as we have aggressive nations in the world, swayed by gangster mentality, democracies are bound to have a hard time, for democracy is "the art of living together in peace and freedom." Democracy is admirably fitted for peace and the securing of the fruits of peace. Dictatorship, on the other hand, is fitted for war, unprovoked attack, and domination.

But even in this field of war and military preparation and leadership, it is necessary to remember that dictatorships only have the initial advantage. Once people in a democratic country become fully alive to the dangers staring them in the face, there is no sacrifice which they will not be prepared to make. War-weariness is certain to overcome an unfree people earlier than it can a free people. Under the strain of war, democracy may bend, but does not break; whereas dictatorship breaks without bending. The sequel to dictatorship is bloody revolution.

Contrary to what the opponents of democracy say about the lack of strong leadership and executive action in a democracy, we find that England and the U.S.A. have strengthened themselves by giving extraordinary powers to their executive. The Home Secretary in England and, in turn, the Cabinet, and the President in America are exercising almost dictatorial powers, subject to the general supervision of the legislature and control by public opinion.

Other defects: Critics argue that democracy means government by an irresponsible multitude or by the ignorant masses. Votes are counted and not weighed. Attention is paid to quantity and not to quality.

The answer to this charge is that democracy, being a process of self-education, people can be trained in the art of democracy. They can be taught to believe that general will is far more important than

mere majority opinion. As Miss Follett says : " the will to will the common will is the core of democracy."

Over against those who claim that democracy means irresponsible government exercised by the mob, there are some who say that democracy leads to oligarchy of the worst kind. It was Talleyrand who defined democracy as " an aristocracy of black-guards." The demagogue, the grafter, and the boss gain ascendancy. Popular men are elected, and the " strong, silent man " is left in the cold.

Others have called attention to the evils of party politics in a democracy. Parties so control elections that one is at times obliged to choose between a knave and a fool. The " spoils system " in administration debases moral standards.

As against these charges, it must be said that parties enable us to get at the truth. They are " brokers of ideas ". Where there is no well-organised party system, people are fed on one-sided propaganda, as in Germany and Italy. There is no opposition in Germany, and if anybody criticises the administration or is lukewarm towards it, he is either shot or put in a concentration camp. In England, on the other hand, the leader of the opposition occupies a place of great respect, next only to that of the Premier.

It is needless to say that many of the criticisms of democracy are mere caricatures. Some of them cancel each other out.

3. *If democracy is bad, what is the way out ?*

Supposing for the sake of argument, we grant that democracy is unsound alike in theory and practice, what is the way out ? Certainly not autocracy, because we know enough of the misrule which goes on in some of the Indian states.

Some hold that a dictatorship backed by a strong popular support may be a suitable alternative to democracy. So far as we in India are concerned, we are not a regimented people. Valuing as

we do the personality of every individual, in spite of our unfortunate adherence to caste and community, we cannot profit by Fascism or Nazism. From the practical point of view, as things stand at present, we cannot agree upon any one as a dictator. Both "saints" and egoists are an anathema to some group or other.

Whatever the political advantages of dictatorship may be, there is no denying the fact that it means a wholesale destruction of all moral and personal values. The voice of Jesus which sounds through the ages is "What shall it profit a man (applies to a nation as well) if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul." Dictatorship sacrifices individual liberty and personality on the altar of the state. Opposition and criticism are stifled. What a person may say, read or hear is strictly controlled. If a German listens to an enemy broadcast he is sent to the concentration camp. In England, on the other hand, Lord Haw Haw's broadcasts constitute an important national amusement.

Things that really make life worth living—such as liberty, justice, and fair play, mercy and humanity, and truth—are lacking under dictatorship. Democracy means search for agreement by discussion. Compromise and tolerance are its essential principles. Even in war time England allows greater freedom to the individual than is the case in other countries. One has the feeling of safety in one's own house. Little is done to fetter Parliament. In Germany, on the contrary, the Reichstag is summoned occasionally merely to applaud the decisions of Hitler and acclaim his exploits.

If the treatment of minorities and conscientious objectors is an index to the degree of civilisation reached by a people, Germany must be satisfied with a very low place indeed.

In Nazi Germany there is open and contemptuous defiance of the rule of law. Germany is ruled by decrees, and these decrees have no regard to the usual standards of justice. Hitler has no scruples in killing and torturing those who in any way dispute his authority.

In the sphere of mercy, we find that democracies have a much better showing than dictatorship. As President Lowell and others have pointed out, a stable democracy seems to make human beings more kindly than a dictatorship. There is an immense growth of humanitarian feeling. Large sums of money are spent on social services. In Germany, too, there has been an expansion of social services, but the object has been to fit people to win the war. In their relation to outsiders and "non-Aryans" within their own borders, the Nazis have raised cruelty to the *n*-th degree.

As regards truth, Hitler's idea is "the bigger the lie, the more readily will it be believed." History for some years in Germany has been re-written in order to fit into the Nordic theory. Jesus Christ was not a Jew, but a Nordic! A text-book on anatomy, after describing the liver, naively adds that the liver of the Jew is inferior to that of an Aryan!

Dictatorship, thus, is inferior to democracy as regards individual liberty, devotion to justice and truth, and the practice of mercy.

Again, dictatorship can flourish only as long as the nerves of the people are kept at a high tension. For this purpose dictators are obliged to find reasons for dragging the country into war and keeping it there. They have to invent such plausible arguments as "encirclement" in order to keep themselves in power and avert civil war and revolution. As has been well said, dictatorship follows an internal policy whose external consequence is war. Given peace and security, democracy can accomplish greater results.

Once more, in evaluating the claims of dictatorship, it is necessary to remember that in all the countries where dictatorship prevails, democracy was either a weakling or had no existence at all. Therefore, dictatorship is not an improvement upon democracy, but upon a pre-existing autocratic form of government. Dictatorship may still pave the way for a fuller and freer democracy when

people become thoroughly disillusioned of the claims of dictatorship.

One further consideration in evaluating dictatorship is that there is no guarantee of a succession of capable and selfless dictators. Hitler happens to be a vegetarian. Who knows that his successor may not be carnivorous in more senses than one? People in the dictatorial countries exhibit an unjustifiable mystical faith in their leader. There is no certainty that extraordinary times will bring forth extraordinary men as leaders.

4. *Are we sure that the days of democracy are not over?*

People talk glibly about liberty and democracy without understanding all their implications. Daniel Defoe writing two centuries ago jokingly remarked that there were in England some 40,000 stout fellows ready to fight Popery to death without knowing whether Popery was a man or a horse! Likewise there are many to-day who fight for freedom without knowing whether "freedom means a phrase in a peroration or a pint of beer in a pub." They never take into account the meaning of freedom for those whom they keep in subjection and economic slavery.

If democracy is to have a sure future, it should be enabled to pervade every phase of man's life. So far it has been tried in the political field, but not very much in the social, economic, and international fields. Till that is done the battle for democracy will remain incomplete. We need to remind ourselves that democracy is not only a form of government, but also a type of state, an order of society, an economic or industrial condition, and a great moral and spiritual principle.

It is a pity that democracy in many lands is synonymous with imperialism, monopoly capitalism, and exploitation. So long as this connection persists, democracy rests on a foundation of shifting sand. Modern democracies are only partially democratic. They suffer a

great deal from the fact that they do not represent the interests of the whole people. Concessions have been made to the common people under pressure, but the dice is still loaded in favour of the privileged classes. Under the guise of national interests and national prestige, the poor are exploited by the rich. The press, the pulpit, the cinema, and the radio, while not controlled by a dictator, are at times insidiously controlled by vested interests.

When we pass from the exploitation of the common people within democratic countries to the exploitation of weak nations under the heel of democratic imperialism, and the racial arrogance and swagger that go with it, the situation is infinitely worse. In these circumstances it is no wonder that many competent observers believe that Fascism and Nazism wait round the corner, inasmuch as Fascism and Nazism, as a recent writer puts it, are simply an open and unashamed extension of the evil tendencies noticeable in democracy. If the principal democratic countries of the world do not become genuinely democratic, who knows that Fascism and Nazism may not overtake them before long ?

The interpretation which we have given of democracy makes it clear that democracy is not simply a form of government and that, even as a form of government, it is most difficult to operate. If democracy is to succeed, we need (a) certain great moral changes and (b) certain technical changes or changes in the mechanism of democracy.

Moral changes: Democracy cannot rise higher than the source from which it originates, *viz.*, the character, temper, and social institutions of the people. So long as caste, class and communal differences divide people into water-tight compartments, democracy will continue to be a delicate plant. Social democracy is even more important than political democracy. There should be a frank recognition of the principle of equality, in spite of the fact of natural inequality, resulting in equal opportunity to everybody who can benefit by it.

Without a much greater degree of social and economic justice than what obtains to-day democracy cannot succeed. It may well be that socialism is the next step in democracy. We cannot preach liberty and equality even as abstract principles, when we keep 9|10ths of the people in the ditch. There should be a "civic minimum" for everybody, and it may be that no one should be allowed to possess more than a "civic maximum."

Exploitation of the weaker nations by those who profess democracy should cease forthwith. A country cannot consistently be democratic at home and autocratic abroad. Such inconsistency will eventually bring destruction to the country practising it.

Democracy cannot succeed where the critical capacity is not cultivated and where the masses are not literate. An ignorant and misinformed electorate is the greatest enemy of democracy. The education given should cultivate a sense of discrimination and a critical power so as to enable the individual to distinguish essentials from non-essentials. Democracy requires an educated, intelligent, and discriminating electorate.

The successful working of democracy calls for a strong and sterling character on the part of both rulers and ruled. No democracy can long endure unless the people whom it is called upon to govern possess sound character. There should be present among them a high degree of honour and of honesty. It is most depressing to find that in current Indian politics the spirit of nobility and magnanimity is lacking. Democracy further calls for clean hands and a pure heart, particularly in officials.

If democracy is to succeed, its friends should spread among the people a whole-hearted enthusiasm and deep passion for justice and liberty, for mercy and truth which are the cornerstones of democracy.

Technical changes: Consideration of the technical changes need not detain us long. We, in India, need to remember that parliamen-

tary democracy of the English type is not the only form of democracy. On account of our peculiar difficulties we may have to subscribe to composite cabinets with a fixed period of office, representing the different elements in the population. If joint electorates cannot be had all at once, we may have to resort to joint electorates with reservation of seats or devise other means for seeing that minorities are effectively represented. In administrative posts communal representation needs to be kept up for some years yet in order to allay fears. We need a strong executive, an independent judiciary, and an uncorrupt administration.

5. *Conclusion.*

Are the days of democracy over? If democracy means mere lip service to the great ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity and toleration of the exploitation of the poor within the country and domination of those outside, if it means unpreparedness and party squabbling in the face of common danger, and if it means incapacity to adjust the machinery of government to rapidly changing world conditions, the days of democracy are over and deserve to be over. If, on the other hand, democracy means faith in the common man and a single-minded devotion to the liberty of the individual, to the protection of the weak and unfortunate, to the administration of even-handed justice to one and all, to the propagation of truth in thought, word, and deed, and to the evolution of a new world order in which every individual and every nation will be enabled to be at their best, the days of democracy are not over, but are as long and as enduring as eternity itself.

THE CONCEPT OF A FEDERAL UNION

By

P. NAGARAJA RAO

The gravity of our times has cast a deep shadow over the minds of men. There is a transvaluation of all the values of civilisation. The contemporary mood is of one of despair of the future. The slow gains of ages is in the melting pot. Our age long institutions, political and social are being trampled under the military jack-boot. We assert, and no longer argue, we don't discuss, but we dogmatise. The grave international situation promotes men only to take a short-term view of life. Gigantic military strength is working its way over the heads of men. The scientifically perfected nations have delegated the function of living itself to machines. In our anxiety to live we have lost sight of the meaning and purpose of life.

Side by side with this fact the great savants of humanity are seeking a way out of this dreadful chaos. They are bewildered at the collective insanity of men and the inhuman tactics of the Totalitarian Powers. They cry out for a stable spiritual basis for civilisation and are for giving up greed and land-hunger. The primitive lust for dominions they say must be replaced by a civilised standard of values. They take a long-term view of life and plead for a new order of civilisation based not on active reason, power politics, and aggression. Such civilisation make no doubt for brilliant display but are short-lived. So the new social order if it is to be stable has to be based on religious forces such as endurance, suffering, passive resistance, understanding, tolerance etc. It is these factors that are responsible for the strange vitality and the sound instinct for life characteristic of ancient civilisations. Such a remedy is not possible overnight. It

needs the slow process of education and an entirely different environment to take root. We know of no prescription by which we could manufacture virtue. The majority of mankind, i.e., the mobile middle opinion which constitutes ninety per cent of humanity is incapable of rising to the great ethical heights as to give up greed, ambition and lust. We are in an improving universe, as such we cannot be absolute pacifists of the Gandhian type.

Apart from such a long term remedy which expects a thorough remarking of men as the essential condition for the emergence of a new social order, and short of the alluring doctrine of despair preached by certain pessimists, there are many intermediary solutions attempted by constructive statesmen. All the constructive statesmen of the world are out for an entire abdication of violence. The perfectly non-violent, and the perfectly fearless is God. Short of it everything is only perfect to a degree only. The Gītā idea was not an out and out non-violent, one ; it represents and stands for the collective security principle. It is frankly sanctionist than pacifist. But the collective security idea as worked by the League of Nations proved bankrupt, because it was not able to deliver any political goods. The League idea though devised with a practical intention proved to be a mere piece of idealist non-sense. The League is not to be entirely blamed, for it. The men who worked them were fanatical nationalists, who were out to make the best for their country. The men who participated in the discussions of Geneva were in the words of Brailsford, national agents and not cosmopolitan statesmen.¹ He continues "it is too much to expect a Sir Samuel Hoare or an Eden working habitually in Downing Street salaried to serve the British interests, to acquire the cosmopolitan mind necessary to plan for the justice and prosperity of the distant Chinese or the dark Ethiopian." Their parish is England, Peru, or France but not the world. "In the political field it was a functionless fifth wheel

1. H. N. Brailsford, *Towards a New League*, pp. 49-59.

in the chariot of history that spun ineffective in the air". It controlled nothing and operated nothing. Besides the defects of the men who worked it, the constitution itself suffered from grave disabilities.² In the words of Bertrand Russell the League was not a Government at all, because it cannot act on majority vote and needs unanimity. The Council nor the assembly can compel the dissentient members. The treaties cannot be revised without the consent of the signatories. The power of the League depended upon the whim of the nation-states. The concept of sovereignty embodied in the nation-state was left in tact. Besides there was no international force at its disposal to implement its decisions.

Even amidst this great confusion some of the constructive statesmen of our age have commanded the serenity to conceive the ideas of a Federal Union and the World State. They have not only laid down the plan, but fashioned the technique to achieve it. The idea of Federation has charmed us and has proved the message of hope to the distracted world. The cry of the day is *either we federate or perish*. Two recent publications from the pens of Mr. Clarence K. Streit³ and Mr. H. G. Wells⁴ set forth in great detail as to what form the coming new social order ought to take. They are in favour of a world union of states. Streit and Wells prescribe a diet of great reform. It means a departure from the traditional nutrition. Streit's call to form a Federal Union of democratic states is a great improvement on the League idea. The Federal Union is a super state. The idea is to form a Federal Union of the Democratic states. The Union should be an Union of the peoples of the different states of the various democracies and not of their governments as the League was. It is to act on questions of common interest. It is to be composed of the representatives of the

2. Bertrand Russels, *Which way to Peace*.

3. Clarence K. Streit, *Union New*.

4. H. G. Wells, *The New Social Order*,

peoples. The scheme outlines the union of fifteen democratic countries. They are Great Britain and her five self-governing dominions, the United States of America, France, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland.⁵ The minimum condition for membership is that the State must be governed by democratic institutions. The Federal union consists of a Federal Legislature, a Federal Executive Board of five members, fulfilling the functions of a Constitutional President and the Federal Prime Minister and a Cabinet. The subjects which would be under the control of the Federal Union are war, peace, defence and foreign relations, trade and communications, postage and currency. Within the Federal Union there will be one citizenship, one defence force, one currency and one stamp. The colonial possessions would be administered jointly by the union. Matters touching local affairs are left to the individual nation's administration.

The concept of a Federal Union is decidedly an improvement on the League of Nation's idea. All the attempts of the League to preserve peace by regional agreements failed: Excepting for the signal success of Washington conference other conferences have produced no lasting results. The Locarno treaties, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Nine Power Treaty, the Ottawa Treaty have all proved broken reeds. Hence the need for a world-state or a Federal Union.

If it be contended by the Realists in politics that the spiritual regeneration of men is a long term remedy, it has to be feared, whether without such a regeneration the idea of the Federal Union would materialise. For the achievement of the Federal Union the fundamental necessity is the presence of the democratic temper in an unabounding degree. The democratic temper means infinite faith in power of Reason and Persuasion over force. Where the powers in the world are confronted with ignorance parading in the form of

5. Some of them were Democracies at the time when the author wrote the book. Since then their position has changed.

militant Nationalism it is for the prophet of the Federal Union to bring them to reason. This alone will not do. For mere logical presentation of claims by any Nation is hardly listened to-day by the military dictators. What perpetuates the feeling of isolation is not lack of logic but blind passions. To confront the blind and bloody passions of military nations and bring them to the path of a Federal Union needs sacrifice. "We can confound passion only by sacrifice." Sacrifice and faith in reason are the fundamental characteristics necessary for a democratic temper and they are not distinct from the spiritual regeneration of men.

It is a pity to see that Mr. Streit has dropped India out of his concept of the Federal Union, on the technical ground that it is not a self-governing dominion. Wherever there is the concept of the Federal Union, India has a prominent place in it. To ignore it is to give the lie direct to human nature. The central message of Indian thought has been to create the temper necessary for a Federal Union. The distinctive temper of the ultimate East that India represents is to achieve a form of world-wide political organisation, whose key-note is equality and friendship, not dominion or subjugation. These facts go to prove that India must have a place in such a union.

The need for a different type of education is another pre-requisite for the ushering in a Federal Union. The Totalitarian education has to be replaced by a liberal education. An education which through the proper training of emotions can deal a hard blow at greed, envy and hatred must be imparted. The current political dogmas which are calculated to rouse race prejudice, imperialist ambitions and pseudo-nationalist pride into objectives of civilisation can only be effaced by a right and a sound system of education. The educators of the world must place "the attractiveness of a life given to more interesting things than mere physical power" before the minds of the younger generation.

With these requisites and India having a place in the Federal Union, the idea would be complete. It is only by a collective effort in creating such a union we can hope to avert wars. It is the old collective security principle shorn of all its defects that has gone into the idea of the Federal Union. Short of absolute pacifism this is the only remedy that is practical and is of use in the near future. It is not a mere vision. Many an European statesman to-day is for a Federal Union. A Scientific approach leads us to the formation of a Federal Union. The history of evolution from the homogenous unicellular amoeba to the hetrogenious multicellular creature man is a long progress calculated to assure the safety and survival of the species. This is effected through the two well-known processes, differentiation of structure and integration of functions. In order to secure a greater differentiation in its activities than an ordinary Nation State and for the fit preservation of the intelligent human species, it is not without point to hope for the Federal Union as the next stage of the human evolution. The Federal Union is a biological necessity, expressive of the human need and a measure to stave off the catastrophe of civilisation. In the words of Wells there is one long race between education and catastrophe. It is for us to throw in our lot on the side of education by federating. The Federal idea is at once poetical as well as pratical.

NĪTISĀRA AND ITS POLITY

By

O. S. N. MURTY

Among the works in Telugu literature on polity the one called the *Nīlisāra* is noteworthy. The entire text of it is unfortunately not available for us and what little is known of it is to be gathered from the stray quotations of it appearing under several headings in *Sakalanītisammataṁ*.¹ Fragmentary though the available part of the *Nītisāra* is it is yet valuable in as much as it affords us an insight into the views held at the time of its composition on the various matters concerning State-craft. In this paper an attempt is made to study those views and present, as far as possible, a picture of the polity envisaged in the book.

Before proceeding with the subject proper it is necessary to ascertain the authorship and the date of composition of the work.

As regards authorship, the one known means of determining it is by believing the evidence of old texts according to which Rudradeva, the Kākatiya monarch who ruled in the Telugu country between 1158 A.D. and 1195 A.D. appears to be the author. And there are reasons to take the evidence for granted. In the first place, it is very well known that the Kākatiya monarch not only patronised the learned but he himself was an erudite scholar.²

1. This is a work on State-craft (in the extant form) and is compiled from various sources by Madiki Singana. But for the pains taken by Sri M. Ramakrishna Kavi carefully to edit the book, it would have remained a sealed book to us.

2. The Anumakonda inscription of 1163 A.D. besides referring to Rudradeva as having made hundreds of learned men the sole recipients of his wealth and therefore as the cause of their great joy describes him as one

In the second place, it is but fit that one actually engaged in the administration of a kingdom should set to himself such a kind of work as writing a treatise on politics.

Now that the authorship is fairly well established it is easy to guess the probable date of composition. Rudradeva is known from inscriptions to have ascended the throne in 1158 A.D. and ruled for a period of nearly 37 years. Supposing that during the earlier part of his reign politics monopolised his attention and that he might have begun writing the treatise after gaining sufficient practical experience in administration, the date may reasonably be placed somewhere in the later half of his reign.

One more consideration. Believing that there is some resemblance in ideas between this *Nītisāra* and what is called *Bārhaspatya Nītisāra* Sri M. Ramakrishna Kavi maintains that Rudradeva might have borrowed some ideas from the latter work. Even granting that, it may be said that the work of Rudradeva clearly reveals his personality behind it.

Now about the main theme. The form of government postulated in the book is monarchy. The political conditions of the 12th century A.D. demanded the lead of one capable person. Further, it is but natural that to the author who was himself a renowned monarch no other form should have appeared ideal.³ Hence the choice in favour of monarchy.

In that particular type of polity the monarch is given an exalted and unique place. He appears as the apex of the whole administra-

skilful above all others in investigating the various sciences and the receptacle of the grace of the goddess of learning. It is also pointed out that one of the Draksharama inscriptions dubs on him the title ವಿಶ್ವವಿಭೂಷಣ may be, as a compliment to his remarkable learning.

3. Dr. Beni Prasad in his *Theory of Government in Ancient India* observes that the Hindu writers generally accept monarchy as the government and glorify it. (italics mine)

tive structure. He is at once the head of the executive, the judiciary and the military departments. Whatever he recognises as law becomes the law of the State.⁴ There is no higher political body in the State to which he is subordinate. He is simply to command and his subjects shall obey him without questioning why. It is in his power to command that the whole strength of kingship is said to have consisted. Therefore a ruler without that commanding authority is, in the words of the *Nītisāra*, as inefficient as one in a picture.⁵ Disobedience to the king's commands is considered a serious offence and such a thing on the part of even the king's own son is held reprehensible. Not only is the power of the king so supreme but also it is absolute. That is to say, the king exercises his power without being technically responsible to those over whom he exercises it. Thus the tendency has been towards strengthening the hands of the monarch.

Though he is made all-powerful, yet he is persuaded to use all the power in his hands only to the best advantage of the people under his care. His power is no doubt absolute but it is by no means to become arbitrary or tyrannical. If he enjoys the enviable right of supreme command he has the onerous duty to promote public welfare. That rights imply duties is not lost sight of by the author of the *Nītisāra*. What is more, to the degree the monarch succeeds or fails in performing his duty, his reign is considered a success or a failure. Here we find that as much stress is laid on the monarch's duty as on his right.

Having placed power in the hands of the monarch and counselled him to utilise it for the sake of public weal, the *Nītisāra* seeks to suggest certain means of attaining the objective. Instead of wasting his precious time in such idle pastimes as drinking, gambling, and hunting he is advised to engage himself in cultural pursuits so that

4. Of course, this has certain limitations.

5. “అజ్ఞలేని నృపుడు నరయఁ జిత్తరువులో, నున్న రాజుఁ జూడ నొక్కరూప ”

he may gain knowledge of 'nīti' and learn to rule wisely.⁶ Not merely that, he is also to gather around him a circle of good friends and well wishers for helping him⁷—by way of giving advice, perhaps—in carrying on the administration. These are some of the ways and means suggested.

The need of a council of ministers to the monarch is well recognised in the *Nītisāra*. After stating the views of different jurists of old regarding the size of the council, it realistically leaves the matter to be determined by the needs of the government. Certain qualifications have been prescribed for the post of the minister and in this connection it may be revolting to the moderner to note that some castes as such should be declared as disqualified.⁸ The king is not bound to refer all matters of state to the council and ascertain its opinions. Sometimes he may consult only a few of its members and sometimes he may take the counsel of an outsider in whom he has confidence. Nay, he is even empowered to consult none except himself, if he so pleases. But in regard to matters of vital importance he is urged to place them before his ministers, hear them discussed, and then alone take decisions. Even when matters are referred to the council, the latter is expected only to discuss them in presence of the presiding ruler and tender advice. The power of the council is only thus far and no further. It is after all an advisory body. The right of final decision rests with the ruler alone.

6. గీ. “వ్యసనములు మాని రాజు విద్యవ్రతునిగ, సంగియై పురాణేతి హాసములు
వినుచు, నీతి వినునేని నృపతికి నేర్పు మిగులు, వసుధ బామున కెరకలు
వచ్చిన్లు ”
7. “భూపతికి మిత్రవర్గము ప్రాప్తైనగాక భూమి భరణము దలమే ”
“తేవసుహృజ్జనంబు జలధిక్రమ రాజ్యమునందు రాజుకున్ ”
8. క. “సాలీనిని నగసాలిని మాలని బరికత్తివాని మంగలిఁ జాకిన్
ఆలోకించిన పతినిర్మూలత నేటటితి భూజముంబలె బోవున్ ”

Such being the case he may or may not abide by the verdict of his council. Nevertheless, it is considered safe for him normally to decide as his counsellors suggest. In case he deems fit to disagree he is asked to think twice before actually doing it. For, a single unpremeditated and precipitated act might sometimes bring utter ruin not only to him but even to the whole kingdom.⁹ Before finishing with this topic one point is to be noted. The description of the place where the king and his council are to meet and carry on their business clearly discloses to us the author's intention that the deliberations in the council should be carried on with closed doors and kept strictly confidential.¹⁰ We find here a parallel to the modern practice.

There is no specific, written, law according to which justice is meant to be administered. Usually the Dharmasastras and the local customs are taken to serve the purpose of law. According to the *Nitisāra*, the following are some of those treated as offences: gambling, rioting, cheating, bearing false witness, and failure to repay debts. It is surprising to note that even such a slight thing as incivility should be included among offences. Now it must be said to the credit of the author that so early as his time he has boldly proclaimed equality before law. How keen has been the sense of it in him may be understood when he says that even the king's son, if he breaks law, deserves to be duly punished like any ordinary individual.¹¹

9. “నేచి మదోద్వృత్తి నేదియు నెఱుగక చేయంగ దగుపనుల్ చేయునపుడు మంత్రజనుల మీరి మంత్రరహితుడైన యతని నొక్కపెట్టి యహితవరులు చిక్కువడగ నడచి సిరియును రాజ్యంబు నలమి కొండు బుద్ధి బలముకలిమి”
10. “నిర్గవాక్షంబును నిస్తంభ సంశ్రయ మరయనిర్భిక్ష్యత రాశ్రయంబునగు నెడ హర్ష్యాగ్రమందు.”
11. “ఆనద్రోయు సుతునినైనను దండింపకున్న రాజ్య మేలయుండు జెడక?”

In regard to punishment of criminals, *Nītisāra* ably tries to justify it on utilitarian grounds. It is regarded as the 'sine qua non' for peaceful and orderly existence¹²—in holding such a view the author is not far wrong.

In handling criminals the king is cautioned to act shrewdly and skilfully. For instance, when a considerable number of people happen to commit one and the same crime he is asked to single out the individuals and then punish them lest otherwise there may be serious consequences. Trying to defend the action of the king in his dealings with criminals the royal author adduces the argument that there is difference in the standard of morality of a ruler and that of saint—thereby effecting a separation between politics and religion.¹³

Now, we shall turn our attention to the fiscal aspect of administration. The policy laid down in regard to it is certainly a laudable one. For, the king is said to levy taxes on his subjects only with a view to providing them as many facilities as possible for a fairly good living. His privilege of taxing the people is conceived to entail on him the responsibility of looking to their economic welfare. Thus the *Nītisāra* makes the king not a mere tax-gatherer, but the custodian of public good.¹⁴ In advocating such a policy as this what the author has in his mind is that the relationship between the ruler and the ruled is and ought to be similar to that obtaining between

12. “దండము లేకున్నను బ్రజలొండొరువుల నాక్రమింతురు.”

13. This trend of thought according to which *Danḍanīti* (science of government) stands by itself and is independent of religion began far earlier than the 12th century A.D.

14. క. “ఆపదలఁజెందు ప్రజలను భూపతి మొదలిచ్చి మగుడ బ్రోవగఁజనుఁదా జేపట్టి విడువవలవను.”

STUDY I OF DR. C. R. REDDY

By Mr. K. Ram Mohan Sastri



blishing friendly and lasting contacts with them individually.¹⁷ Thus the importance of keeping the fighting forces well contented and cheerful appears to have loomed large in the mind of the author and in this point too he has anticipated the present-day tendency.

The treatment of the army and its administration leads us on to the item of forts. Forts are rightly considered essential for the long life of a kingdom.¹⁸ The learned author chooses to divide forts into four kinds as the Sthala, Jala, Vana, and Giri Durgas. Every kind of fort, according to him, should have among other things the following arrangements: adequate garrison, sufficient means of subsistence and secret subterranean passages. Into the minute details regarding the foodstuffs that should be stored up in the fort and their relative importance it is not necessary to follow him, though he has much to say on the same. Of the several regulations laid down concerning the administration of a fort these points deserve our attention—constant vigilance of the approaches to the fort, impenetrable defence of the main gates, regular parades by the military forces and periodical inspection of the same by the governor in charge—perhaps all of these are observed nowadays.

The entire foreign policy outlined in the book seems to have been based mainly on territorial expansion. The greatness of a monarch would vary in direct proportion with the extent of the country under his rule. Hence the end of all activity outside his state has become acquisition of as much territory as possible.¹⁹ To achieve that end he is left free to adopt any means, fair or foul, he

17. భటులెల్లను దన్ను నెఱుంగ వారిచా నెఱుగుచు బ్రీతి
తోడ నిలువందగు రాజనువాని కెప్పుడున్ ||

18. Even the ancient Arthaśāstra thinkers were not blind to their importance, for they made the fort one of the seven elements of state.

19. క. ఎంతంతగలుగు రాష్ట్రం, బంతంతియ రాజపెద్దయగు గావున దే, శాంత
రము లొత్తి కొనుట ని, తాంతము ధర్మబుగాదె ధరణీశులకున్.

thinks fit. To the author no less than six ways of diplomatic relations with foreign states are well known and the two most commonly known of them are sandhi (alliance) and vighraha (enmity), concerning which he deals at length. The ruler concerned is asked to maintain such of the aforesaid six relations with neighbouring states as expediency would indicate. Generally speaking sandhi is to be concluded with a ruler equally strong,²⁰ whereas 'Vighraha' might be resorted to in case of a weaker one.²¹ But to plan to fight single-handed an enemy that is known to be stronger is rightly declared to be as foolish as trying to cross the sea without the help of a ship.²² Whatever the particular policy adopted, it must be done only with a view to attain the end already stated.

While considering foreign policy it is worthwhile noting what the author has to say about the diplomatic corps. The king is advised to have at his disposal 'dutas' (envoys) who are thoroughly conversant with many court languages and exceptionally cultured, prudent, painstaking, and above all loyal. They are to go to foreign courts and represent the case of their lord in such a manner as to however win it. Besides envoys, a ruler should have in his service a required number of 'chāras' (spies). Devoted and trustworthy servants alone, prescribed the author, deserve to be engaged as spies. The duty of these is to tour in foreign kingdoms in several guises,²³

20. By such means as exchanging ambassadors, letters of friendship, and presents. Matrimonial alliances are to be concluded in order to cement the friendship established.

21. This, as the author states, is observed first by snatching away cattle and crops, burning and pillaging villages and eventually by marching the fourfold army into the hostile territory and frightening the enemy into obedience.

22. "తోడులేక నధికుఁ దొడరుట యంబుధి, గలము లేక యాదగడగినట్లు",

23. వ్రతులు, సన్యాసులు, వైద్యులు, ఆచార్యులు, జోష్యులు, శకునగాంధ్రు మూగలు, బధిరులు, చపలలు, జంగాలు, జోగులు.

collect information about the ins and outs of the foreign rulers, and report the same to their ruler. What merits our notice in connection with espionage treated in Nītisāra is the regular and systematic basis on which the author seeks to place it.

It now remains to be said that in regard to internal or external affairs the monarch is allowed to adopt whatever means he deems necessary to secure the end, provided that is justifiable. The end justifies the means—in this respect the author of Nītisāra strongly reminds us of Kautilya²⁴ and Machiavelli. That spirit is quite evident when for instance, he urges the king to employ the caturvidha-upāyas to get rid of his enemies, internal or external,²⁵ and in another place asks him to treat even rogues, if they serve some useful purpose, kindly, having in view their serviceability.²⁶

This, in brief, is the study. It is to be regretted that such an important and interesting work as Nītisāra is not preserved for us in full. Even as it is, it occupies, as there is evidence to believe, a high place among the works of its kind.

24. Dr. Beni Prasad points out that Kautilya, not Kautilya is the correct Sanskrit form of the name. Vide "*Theory of Government in Ancient India*," p. 92, Foot Note No. 1.

25. గీ. రాజ్యకంటక తతిలోన రాజ విభుడు, చాలముఖ్యుని వధియించి శాంతి సరచి, సామ దానాదు లొనరించి సత్వరముగ, ఛిద్రమంతయుఁ బరిపూర్తి చేయవలయు.

26. "చాలన భీష్టుముల్ దనవశంబుగ జేయ నయోగ్యులైన నె, మేల్గులు దలంచి వారియెడ మిక్కిలి యర్థిలిసేత నేర్పగున్ "

ANCIENT MALABAR POLITY AS GLEANED FROM A BALLAD

By

C. ACHYUTA MENON

History of ancient Malabar is still shrouded in obscurity. Sons of the soil who have attempted to study it are few and far between. Mr. K. P. Padmanabha Menon collected the materials for a comprehensive history, but he was snatched away by the cruel hand of fate before he was able to use them for writing one.¹ These are now scattered in Traveller's accounts, traditions and folklore for the enterprising historian to decipher and interpret. Ballads and folk-lore are still an unexplored field and it is to one of them that I propose to invite the readers' attention for a while. A volume that commemorates the 60th birthday of such an eminent scholar, politician and academician like Dr. C. R. Reddy should necessarily seek to unearth many a hidden treasure of knowledge.

There is an ancient Ballad of Malabar in which an *ankom* fight² is described between two *Cakōrs*³ who played in ancient Malabar the role of the king of the mediaeval Europe. The events that led to the duel are briefly as follows:—

In a Nayar family of South Malabar (Ponani) a dispute as to the seniority of the title of *Kārṇavanship* arose between two members *Ṭṇikkōṇār* and *Ṭṇiccandrōr* by name, who were born more or less the same day. The evidence tendered by the midwife (*Vayarrātti*)

1. Modern period has been ably handled by Sirdar K. M. Panikkar in his *Malabar and Portugese* and *Malabar and Dutch*.

2. A ceremonial duel fought in ancient times for settling a dispute under the auspices of the State.

3. Professional fighters.

to the effect that one was born at midnight and other at day-break did not satisfy the parties. They placed the matter before the village assembly Tarakkūṭṭam⁴ that usually met before the village shrine. The two argued their case before the house and got a verdict which again was not acceptable to them. An appeal was preferred to the Nāṭuvāzi⁵ who presided over the Nāṭtukuṭṭam. His decision again did not find favour with the parties. A divine test was sought by casting lots before the lord of Tuprangod.⁶ In all these the decisions were in favour of Uṇikkōṇār. Uṇiccandrōr the other claimant was still unconvinced. He wanted the issue to be decided by an ankom. Conventions of the day demanded that the challenge should be accepted and the Nāṭuvāzi was duly informed. Both then set out in search of well known Cēkors. Uṇikkōṇār secured the services of Ārōmalcēvakar of Kadathanad fame and Uṇiccandrōr those of another namesake of his who is noted for sorcery and deceit. Ārōmalcēvakar was a young man of twenty-two still in the bloom of youth and the only son of his father. The ankom had to be fought till one of the party is dead. Ārōmalcēvakar's relations were not willing to send him as he was too young to face the risks of a duel as he showed signs of a great future that was in store for him. His sister Uṇṇiārca who had her military training along with her brother came all the way from her husband's house to prevent her brother from responding to the call. She smeared her body with oil so that she might be looked upon as an ill omen by Ārōmaḷ if he had not by that time started. She saw her brother in time and argued the matter with Ārōmaḷ who was adamant and rather keen on maintaining the sanctity of a promise. But the sister persisted when he gave her an idea of his horoscope

4. Tara=village, literally a raised ground. Kūṭṭam=assembly. Tara was the lowest rung of the administrative ladder.

5. Literally one who ruins a nāṭu which consists of a number of Taras. The President of the assemblies used to exercise executive and judiciary powers.

6. In Ponani Taluq.

which had predicted for him a premature death accompanied by glory and fame. He then proceeded to make the various arrangements for his leaving the house for the ankom. It is usual on such occasions to have a companion who will render his assistance to the chief fighter. Candu, the nephew of Ārōmal's father was thought of. He was sent for. Ārōmal had no faith in Candu's trustworthiness but accepted him as he was the father's choice. Candu had already another grievance against the family. He wanted to marry Uṇṇiārca who had no liking for him and dealt with him in a contemptible way when the subject was placed before. Candu had not seen them since. There was therefore every reason to suspect his loyalty. However he was sent in advance with four swords with instructions to have them sharpened well for the ankom. On the way he was caught by the other party who managed to purchase him. Instead of sharpening the swords he removed the iron nails of the swords and put wooden ones instead. The foul play commenced with this episode. Another deceit had already been achieved by this time by the other party conspiring with the carpenter also who built the Ankattaṭṭu.⁷ One of the planks thereof was put in a dangerous position so as to make it give way under the slightest pressure.⁸

Uṇikkōnār was then asked to make the customary payments (*i.e.* Anka Kizi, Viṭṭu Kizi, Nāṭṭu Kizi).⁹ Difficulty arose about the acceptance of the first two kizis (purses) as none of his relations wanted to bear the responsibility for Ārōmal's decision. He at last persuaded

7. The wooden platform over which the Cēkōrs fight.

8. The idea was that Ārōmal who was not aware of this trick might be driven to this when the plank gives way he would fall and die and the accident would be ascribed to chance.

9. Ankakizi is the purse given to the Cēkōr as a compensation to his services. In case of his death it would go to his heir.

Viṭṭukizi is another purse for the house to which the Cēkōr belongs—also in consideration of his services.

Nāṭṭukizi is for the state to meet the expenses of the ankom.

his younger brother to give his permission and repeated to him the prediction of his horoscope convincing him that death with honour was always preferable for heroes. After the preliminaries Ārōmal proceeded to the place of Ankom, where the authorities had made the necessary arrangements. It resembled a theatre with a wooden platform in the centre with seating arrangements around it, for the officers of the State, mālōker (people) and members of the kūṭṭams, who were required to witness the duel according to law and see that no foul play took place. The cēkōrs representing the parties ascended the platform after the carpenter who built it gave an undertaking that it was alright with fire as witness. They must then state their case, the procedure adopted by them so far and their ultimate decision to fight it out. Preliminary to the man-fight there was a cock-fight in which Ārōmal scored. Then commenced the duel. After a strenuous engagement the adversary was found to be giving way and Ārōmal getting more and more formidable. At that psychological moment his sword broke where it was fixed to the handle as the result of Candu's treachery. Ārōmal asked for another weapon but Candu replied he had none to offer. The rival Cēkōr took advantage of the position and dealt a mortal blow on Ārōmal who, however, being more alert and clever anticipated it by administering another to his enemy. The Cēkār fell down dead, but Ārōmal too received a slight injury on the stomach as he could not resist the blow of his rival with his broken weapon. The people immediately declared him victor and the crowd advanced to the platform to honour him. In the confusion his companion Candu who was already jealous of Ārōmal's reputation rushed in and thrust a pointed weapon into the small wound of Ārōmal which proved fatal later on.

This ballad is important in many respects. It is generally assigned to the 10th century A.D. but the period it deals with seems to be much older. We find no mention of kings such as Erandamannan (Zamorin), Cirakkal Raja and Valluvanād Raja, Veṭṭāttu

Raja who confront us in later history. In fact the place where ankom was fought was within the jurisdiction of Veṭṭattu Raja later. It gives us a picture of the democratic basis of the ancient Malabar polity in which dominant voice was exercised by the people. Disputes civil and criminal were first heard by the village assembly (Tarakkūṭṭam). They had absolute powers even in cases calling for extreme penalty. In every village there used to be a hidden corner called Talavēṭṭu kuzi.¹⁰ The Nāṭṭukūṭṭam which was a higher body, dealt with appeals or such original cases that were sufficiently important to receive their attention. These kuṭṭams were presided over by Taravāzi (later degenerated into Taravaḍi) and Nāṭuvāzi respectively. They had executive powers like the President of the American Republic. In practically all matters concerning a province Nāṭṭukūṭṭam had the supreme voice. There used to be a perumkūṭṭam (big assembly) which generally synchronised with the 'Māmānkam' festival that was held on the banks of the Ponani river once in twelve years. It assumed a socio-politico-artistic character and there was no subject it could not consider or decide upon.

With the continued exercise of executive function and the command of the army under their control the presidents of these assemblies became all powerful with the result that their ambitions were not satisfied with their short lived authority. They endeavoured to have their term extended indefinitely and in course of time those positions came to be occupied by the same families continuously. This practice paved the way gradually to the hereditary monarchy and the formation of small kingdoms which dominated Malabar Polity in subsequent history.

10. A pit where criminals were decapitated.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE

By

P. J. THOMAS

There is no doubt that, as a subject of study in the universities, economics has lately come into great prominence, but it is doubtful if this can be taken as a proper index of its popularity. In the days when Dr. C. R. Reddy was 'up' at Cambridge, economics attracted only a few students, and it was still under the tutelage of an old-established subject like Philosophy or History. But to-day economics is perhaps the most popular of the university courses, and occupies an independent status among subjects of study. This is true not only of Cambridge but of nearly all the universities of Europe and America. In some of them, economics has been raised to the status of a faculty and instruction in it is given in a separate school or institution. On the other hand, one doubts if the status of economists in society has risen ; there is a fear that it has fallen. In those days, the public and even the Government looked up to the economists and respected their opinions ; perhaps economists then intervened less frequently in current controversies, but when they did speak, their words carried some conviction. Things are rather different now. To-day, there are economists all over the world taking some interest in the shaping of policy, but their intervention is sometimes resented, and Governments and politicians are inclined to ignore their advice when it goes against their own pet ideas. Even Prof. Pigou, an economist of the front rank, had such cavalier treatment at the hands of politicians. On his expressing certain views regarding a current topic in the columns of a newspaper, a Minister of Government, who thought that Pigou's views favoured his own, referred to him as the 'distinguished Cambridge economist', but later when Pigou wrote in the same newspaper that the

Minister had misconstrued his views, the disappointed Minister replied that he was not concerned with the views of 'a mere academic theorist'. Dr. T. E. Gregory has also expressed similar views about the attitude of the public towards economics. If such is the condition in England, what can be the position of the economists in India where they have not established for themselves an independent position ?

Is Economics Played out ?

One may begin by referring to some of the criticism lately hurled against economics. A very familiar remark heard in recent years, especially after the world economic crisis of 1929-30, is that economics is played out. The implication is that the familiar theories have been proved to be wrong as a result of the catastrophic changes that have happened since 1929. But nothing is farther from the truth. The economic crisis was due to a series of maladjustments which resulted from the failure of the post-war governments to observe the clear dictates of economics. Tariff walls were erected sky-high in many countries, and economic nationalism of a very narrow type came into being. Most economists disapproved of all this, but a deaf ear was turned to them. Politics had the better of economics, as it usually happens. When the crisis occurred, economists were called in, and in countries like Sweden, Australia and the U.S.A., economists have played a great part in the lifting of the depression. Politicians seek economists as many people go to dentists—always too late. Economic theory has not been played out; rather it has been vindicated by the world economic crisis and the many sorry happenings since then.

Differences among Economists

A more serious criticism against economics is that its votaries differ too much among themselves. Many have giped at six opinions being held by five economists. While it is true that certain economists in the West have lately made too much fuss of small

differences, it cannot be denied that there is a large degree of agreement among the various schools of economic thought and the differences are mostly about details, some of which are of little practical consequence. Philosophers and theologians differ much more than economists; and their vital differences have mystified the public from time immemorial. There has been fairly complete agreement among economists on many important matters, and yet even in those matters Government have not cared to follow their advice.

It is true that differences between natural scientists are not so great; nor are they perhaps so loud in the expression of differences. But the world expects guidance from economics on rather more material problems than most of those on which the natural or mental sciences have been called upon to pronounce. The public ask for certainties, but we live in a world of uncertainties. The natural scientist deals largely with inanimate objects, but economist has to deal with human beings endowed with a free will, and with independent nations composed of such individuals. In spite of the work of many generations of economists for 150 years, our knowledge of the economic phenomena is still very imperfect and the ocean over which the economist has to sail remains uncharted and largely unexplored.

However, we cannot explain away in this way the serious charge that economists have not been as helpful as they might be in guiding policy. Philosophers deal with the realms of the mind, and differences between them are of little moment to the public, but economics deals with man's material welfare and the world has a right to obtain guidance from economists on these practical problems. By collecting facts over a wide range and by treating them on the inductive method for a pretty long time, it ought to be possible for us to guide the policy of Governments and thus contribute to economic welfare. But such has not been the view of many of the leading economists, especially in England. They are keen that economics should be a positive science and should have nothing to do with what ought to be.

They have also wedded the science to the abstract or deductive method.

The 'Classical' Tradition.

This view of economists is not new. The "Classical School" of economists who flourished in the first part of the 19th century made themselves and their science unpopular by a rigid adherence to the abstract method ; they formulated economic laws by making certain assumptions, and the most authoritative of these laws was that of *laissez faire*. They were against all interventions by the State in economic matters and thus turned out to be supporters of unbridled capitalism. Economics became thus a 'dismal science' in the eyes of social reformers and literary men of the time.

"Stern rugged nurse, thy rigid lore
With patience many a year we bore."

First John Stuart Mill and later Alfred Marshall rescued the science from that sorry plight and the latter enunciated the object of economics as concerned with human welfare. Marshall discarded the sole adherence to the inductive method and made economics a human and humane science. "May we not outgrow the belief that poverty is inevitable", asked that great economist, and he made it his chief concern to work for this lofty ideal. As a result of his work, economics became more popular with the public as well as with the votaries of other sciences. But this did not last long. Classicism has again returned, as if by some cyclical phenomenon, and many economists still want to guard the science against normative intrusions.

Economics a Positive Science ?

Professor Lionel Robbins, of the London University, is the chief protagonist of this neo-classicism. "Economics", he writes, "is concerned with that aspect of behaviour which arises from the scarcity of means to achieve given ends. It follows that economics is not concerned with ends as such. To speak of any end as being

itself economic is entirely misleading. . . . There are no economic ends. There are only economical or uneconomical ways of achieving given ends.”¹ Thus according to Robbins, economic ends are ruled out and economics is to be mere value theory and equilibrium analysis ; it has no relation with welfare. This rather narrow view of economics has been assailed by many economists ; yet it has produced a profound impression on many students who have a natural predilection for pure theory.

Robbins’ definition raises important issues. Man is a social being and must work out his salvation through society. That the normal working of the economic mechanism has not been leading to social justice is now admitted by all. Under *laissez faire*, the national dividend will be divided between rent, wages, interest and profits, but this scheme of distribution has not worked out justly. The laws of wages and interest have not operated satisfactorily in the past. Keynes, in his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* has shown with telling illustration that “the rate of interest is not self-adjusting at a level best suited to the social advantage but constantly tends to rise too high so that a wise government is concerned to curb it by statute and custom and even by invoking the sanctions of moral law.” He finds in this ample justification for the Schoolman’s strict views of interest and the old laws against usury. Similarly it can be shown that the working of the laws of supply and demand has not resulted in an equitable level of wages. These are all fundamental problems of economic welfare and if the economist will not study and elucidate them, who will ? Robbins says that “the borderlands of economics are the happy hunting ground of the charlatan and the quack,” but as L. M. Fraser retorts in the *Economic Journal*, “It would be a great pity if the charlatan and the quack were to be left in undisputed possession of the hunting field, and the right persons to oust them are the economists themselves; for economists alone have the equipment for changing the

ambiguous regions from deserts into gardens." This criticism cannot be easily brushed aside. Further, as Mrs. Wootton rightly says : " We spend too much time forging theoretical tools and too little time trying to make a practical use of them."

Economics cannot be divorced from Ethics; it is really the handmaid to Ethics. Economics has a normative as well as a positive aspect. The value analysis is indeed the core of economic theory, and it supplies the tools; but the economist must also use the tools, and the ends as well as the means form part of the economic organon. Says Prof. Macfie : " The older view that economics is entirely objective and positive led to the well-worn attitude that ethics should not criticise economics, that we can keep our business separate from our religion. Similarly this fallacy feeds the easy view that such deep-seated diseases in the body politic as trade cycle can be cured merely by currency or investment manipulation. And, on a cruder plane, all the cranks bred by depressions promise facile eldorados from the scattering of paper tickets.....we may stop the depression, but until we cure its ethical and instinctive sources, we have no grounds for believing that we will not be jumping from the frying pan into a perhaps slightly more comfortable fire. So both economists and philosophers have a duty to apportion to economy its proper weighting socially."

There is no doubt that the insistence of economics being a positive science will make the science even more unpopular than it now is. Already, the recent treatment of interest and wages on a purely equilibrium basis has exasperated the votaries of other special sciences as well as social reformers; and if we proceed further on this road, economics will be regarded as a mere theoretical study devoid of practical value.²

2. On this subject, see the able work lately published by the Rev. P. Carty, *Economics A Social Science*, Sir William Meyer Lectures (Madras University).

The Theoretical Approach

The use of the abstract method is another cause for the unpopularity of economists to-day. Economics deals with social phenomena which can be weighed and measured; therefore the laws in such a science must be based on ascertained facts. As in the case of natural sciences (unlike the mental) the advance must be through induction, and not mere deduction. The scientific approach means the careful systematization of observed facts, the framing of hypothesis for these facts, prediction of fresh conclusions on the basis of these hypotheses and the testing of these conclusions against further observed facts. But such has not been the approach of the economists so far. Many of them have preferred the abstract method and have lately utilized mathematical equations freely, forgetting the uncontestable Marshallian advice regarding the restricted value of the mathematical approach. Mr. Colin Clark says : "It would be laughable, were it not tragic, to watch the stream of books and articles, attempting to solve the exceptionally complex problems of present economics by theoretical arguments, often without a single reference to the observed facts of the situation. Worse still is the practice of basing a book upon theoretical arguments and then selecting a number of facts to illustrate the conclusions already reached, thus effectively putting the theoretical cart before the factual horse." J. M. Keynes is indeed one of the most practical of these theoretical economists; his treatises deal largely with facts and current problems. Yet even he in his "General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" hardly deals with facts but formulates various propositions and definitions by means of abstract reasoning. He is propounding a new theory, and we have a right to expect an appeal to facts. We have a large mass of ascertained facts about unemployment and interest rates; yet neither Keynes nor his critics have tested the theory by an appeal to facts. Keynes' main conclusion is that unemployment is due chiefly to the rigidity of the rate of interest demanded by capital. This need not be

argued in the realm of pure speculation; the actual phenomena can be studied for formulating and testing conclusions. After carefully observing recent economic studies for nearly two decades as Director of the London School of Economics, Sir William Beveridge says that the public who are materially interested in unemployment and allied problems cannot avoid "the conclusion that economics is not a science concerned with phenomena, but a survival of mediaeval logic and that economists are persons who earn their livings by taking one another's definitions for mangling."

It is not denied that theory has a place, and an honoured place, in the development of economic science. But the theory must be based on facts and not in place of them. In every age a person of transcendental powers of reasoning—a Ricardo, a Mill, a Marshall—will restate theory, but his work must be based on collections of economic facts by others less ambitious, perhaps less gifted. At present, men of all levels of intellectual acumen have taken to theory-making and this has caused some confusion and great uncertainty in the science. On the other hand, the many industrious persons who have been laboriously collecting facts are left out in the cold, as there is no link between theory and facts. One can be a good economic theorist with hardly any accurate knowledge of facts. Such economic theory has been vigorously criticized by some of the theoretical economists themselves. F. M. Durbin says: "As economists, we feel satisfied that we have done our work when we have advanced a new theory that is logically consistent but to support which we have offered no single jot or tittle of evidence. The neglect of evidence, indeed the contempt of evidence felt by economists is simply extraordinary. What on earth is the good of a new theory for whose truth no evidence is offered? How are conflicts between contradictory theories ever to be resolved apart from an appeal to new facts? Growing complexity and growing conflict must be the result—and is the result—as the present state of monetary and trade cycle theory demonstrate." Professor J. R. Hicks has also expressed similar views.

The right remedy for this serious malady is the development of statistics as a handmaid to economics. The collection and study of statistics over a wide range will give us the necessary factual basis for economic analysis. One line of criticism against economics is that it deals with generalizations. A wider use of statistics will make economics more exact and make it more respected among sister sciences. This will also enable the economist to give helpful guidance to State policy. It is most important that every university should make statistics an integral part of the Economics course. Our economic studies, both theoretical and realistic, will thus become more substantial and serviceable.

Conclusion

Economists have lately been confining themselves to what Barbara Wootton calls the 'apple-pie' world. They must come out into the world of realities, and use their delicate tools for tackling practical problems concerning human welfare. But this requires an exact knowledge of facts as well as a thorough grasp of theory, and such an equipment cannot be accumulated without hard work for many years. Economics is a most difficult discipline; but if this is undergone, it will put one in possession of a valuable organon for the guidance of economic policy. It is up to the younger generation to rebuild the science of economics on these new foundations. Let us hope that India will play a notable part in this work of rebuilding.

SOME QUESTIONS OF METHOD IN THE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS

By

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Let us see what a representative critic of regressions has actually to say: the critic in question gives what appears to be a fairly accurate account of the method of statistical regression. So far so good. But next, the critic goes on to refine his view of regression by contrasting it with his notion of scientific law. It is here that the trouble seems to lie. He regards the most general formulae of a science as being permanently true, as invariant in time. This position is obviously false, and it does not help matters when the critic contradicts himself in isolated passages where a more common-sense view of scientific law as a "working hypothesis" in process of constant revision and improvement, is presented. It is because of a mistaken notion of scientific law, that the critic is led to underrate and misunderstand the scope of regressive analysis even though he started well by describing the nature of the statistical method. The trouble is that the scope of the method cannot be fully grasped unless its relation to the more stable formulae of science is clearly indicated. Statistical regression is not employed in a vacuum—but always in combination with (a) facts, and (b) "theory," viz., the body of the more general principles (formulae) of a science. An error in the notion of "laws" falsifies the notion of the scope of this method. A few quotations will illustrate the above comments on the representative critic. Professor L. C. Robbins in his well known and stimulating treatise¹ outlines the scope of statistical economic regression as follows. They (statis-

1. Prof. Robbins. *The Nature and Significance of Economic Science*.

tical regressions) are a convenient way of describing certain forces (relations among economic variables?) operative during—period of history—“they may provide some guidance concerning what may happen in the immediate future”. There is nothing to quarrel with so far. But next regressions are compared to “laws of permanent validity”. Commenting on a regression study of demand conditions made at a certain place and time, he asks, “Is it possible reasonably to suppose that (regression)—co-efficients derived from the observation of a particular herring market... have any *permanent* significance—save as Economic History?” The answer is that nobody acquainted with economic correlation of time-series would imagine that a statistical forecast formula never grows out of date. Robbins is fighting a strawman if he thinks there is anybody not realizing the need for bringing regression studies up to date from time to time. That is an obvious feature of time-series analysis. To say this is not to belittle that type of analysis. It does say something about the proximate and in some cases distant future, and that is often extremely useful to know from the practical point of view. Robbins tends to underrate that advantage and refers to it *en passant* in the following: “Important as such investigations (statistical regressions) may be, at the moment at which they are made and perhaps for a short time after, there is no justification for claiming for their results the status of the so-called “statistical” laws of the natural science.” Assuming that by “statistical laws” here are meant only such as are substantially invariant in time (and there are many variant formulae in Physics, Meteorology etc.,) who is it that supposed economic regression equation to be invariant? The “historical” school certainly did not; they emphasize the evolutionary character of the economic process. So far Robbins could not be charged with anything more serious than an error of emphasis—understatement of the practical value of statistical formulae for the near (and in some cases distant, as in population forecasts) future. The trouble really starts when he attempts to relate economic regressions to the more general principles of economics. Strange to say Robbins says very

little about the logical structure of the principles—the “laws” of economics. We are told: “Economics is concerned with the disposal of scarce goods with alternative uses. That is our fundamental conception. And from this conception, we are enabled to derive (how?) the whole complicated structure of modern Price Theory”.

By “Price Theory” is presumably meant the whole of economic theory—including theory of accumulation of capital for instance. Unfortunately we are told very little about how the derivation of more specific laws from the scarcity principle is effected. “The generalisations which are deduced...are purely formal in character. If a certain good is scarce, then we know that with alterations of supply its price must move in a certain way.” The word “formal” is a misnomer. The sort of thing which Robbins has in mind, for example, is the sign of the slope of a demand curve—which is usually downward as distinct from the actual measurement of the gradient of the slope. If the equation of demand is $D=f(p)$, where D is the quantity demanded at price p , then the statement $df/dp < 0$ is called “formal”. All the formal statements of Robbins turn out to be statements of mathematical inequality similar to the above. Of course some of these formal statements can be wrong and often are contradicted by observation. And it is not true to say, with Robbins, that it is possible to deduce particular inequalities from the general scarcity condition (e.g., as stated by Hicks and Allen)—that is too unrestrictive a condition. The fact is that most of these inequality statements are based on observations—on correlation. Thus the notion of downward demand curve, of elastic ($e > -1$) and inelastic ($e < -1$) demand curves etc, is based on correlation. This correlation is a regression analysis even though it is often un-numerical and is performed in one’s head, instead of on paper or with the help of a calculating machine and the refined principles of probability calculus. Robbins overlooks this, and altogether minimizes the task of verification of hypotheses by testing them against facts. Nor are the “formal” laws necessarily

“permanent” as he suggests (although he does not really mean it). Inelastic demand can become elastic in course of time etc., and of course, the whole hypothesis of private profit motive in business is becoming steadily out of date with the extension of state control. Robbins will probably agree to this, but in his book he is distinctly carried away by his terminology from recognising these obvious things fully. Robbins says repeatedly about statistical regression that “there is no justification for claiming for their (numerical) results the status of the so-called ‘statistical’ laws of the natural sciences”, but exactly the same can be said about the bulk of “formal” economics. Indeed, the Marxists dismiss the economics of Robbins by saying that they relate only to a temporary—competitive—phase of economic life, and that the whole of the economics of private enterprise, the economics of the trade cycle and so on are just a summary of an episode of social evolution—and (to use Robbins’ very words *a propos* of the demand for herrings)—do not “have any permanent significance save as Economic History”.

It is true that “formal” statements (various inequalities) tend to be somewhat more stable than numerical estimates, *viz.*, regression coefficients, just because the sign of such a coefficient (e.g. negative slope of a demand curve) for instance, is less likely to change than its numerical size. But there is not that contrast between the two kinds of statement which Robbins is inclined to suggest. Moreover, in regression analysis the sign of a coefficient—the significance of its derivation from zero—is frequently the main object of investigation. Two elements in the exposition of Robbins are calculated to give a false idea of stability of “formal” laws (inequalities). First the constant reference to the principle of scarcity—which indeed is rather stable. This tends to suggest that all the “formal” propositions “derived” from it are equally stable, which is not of course the case. The false impression is facilitated by the use of the misleading term “formal laws.” The meaning attached by Robbins to “formal” is absolutely different from the meaning of

“formal” in the phrase “formal logic”. The second element which gives a false sense of “permanence” of the laws of competitive economics (which Robbins has chiefly in mind) is the unusual emphasis on the rules of logic (and mathematics) which are used in economic reasoning, and the fact that these rules are, indeed, eternal. Robbins’ exposition does build up an impression that this economic theory is eternal because it follows (or attempts to follow) the rules of eternal logic. The inference is obviously wrong, but it is facilitated by the use of the words “formal laws” of economics which sound similar to “formal logic”. The exposition would have been less delusive if the term “qualitative economics” consisting of statements of equality or inequality, without numerical measurements had been used throughout instead of the misnomer “formal economics” etc. The rules of logic do not require to be supported by empirical observation. All the laws of economics do. That is why, unlike the rules of logic, most of the propositions of qualitative economics are not “permanent” but get out of date sooner or later, as they cease to be confirmed by facts. *Thus the conclusions obtained on the assumption of maximization of private gains no longer apply when enterprise is taken over by the State—which will maximize social utility instead (shall we say)—and take account of all the relevant “external” economies etc., which private enterprise overlooks. Much of the irrigation development in India (as we have seen)² would simply have not taken place if it was left to private enterprise instead of to the State.* Of course, Robbins does not really believe that economics is a non-empirical science—he does say at times that its statements can be verified or falsified by facts. But most of his exposition gives the impression that qualitative economics need not bother about facts, only about consistency and logical deduction, and is in consequence, of “permanent validity,” i.e., beyond improvement. We are told: “Economic laws describe inevitable

2. Irrigation development has been considered at length in my book, *The Capital Development of India—1860-1919*. Vol. I.

implications....". A downward sloping demand curve implies that a fall of price means an increase in demand. This follows from the definition of the curve of demand. The "inevitable implication" of Robbins is a matter of logic or mathematics only, of the type : " $2+2$ inevitably implies 4 ". The latter statement can be looked upon as a "generalization" because it applies to oranges as well as to apples or anything. The "inevitability" of Robbins is simply the logical necessity that certain assumptions imply the conclusion which are "contained" in the assumptions. Thus it follows from the mere definition of a downward sloping demand curve that a fall in price means an increase in demand. Robbins gives an example of this kind to show that his "inevitable implications" of economic laws are purely definitional. Logical necessity is not the distinguishing feature of scientific law. Were that the only sort of necessity we could not distinguish science from logic or mathematics. And that is precisely what Robbins does most of the time. He thinks (most of the time) only of logical necessity of deduction in economics and jumps to the conclusion that there is no difference between economic laws and logic, so that economic laws are just as permanent as the rules of logic. That such a conclusion may be arrived at may seem incredible, unless a few quotations are given. We are told : "Economic laws describe inevitable implications. If the data they postulate are given, then the consequences they predict necessarily follow. In this sense, as Knight emphasizes they are universal (inevitable) as the laws of mathematics or mechanics." Something depends on what is meant by the "given data". If certain events and conditions are meant to which the law ascribes certain consequences, then the law predicts the "effect" given the cause. For Example : given the fall in the price of a commodity, other things remaining constant, the normal law of demand predicts that the quantity of the commodity demanded will increase. The necessity of the prediction then lies in (1) the assumption of the normal downward sloping demand curve, and (2) the assumption that such a curve is "true" i.e., that it does describe the actual behaviour of

consumers, and an upward sloping demand curve does not. The second assumption begs the question of “verification” of the normal demand curve—that is, require the support of observation of numerous instances of consumer behaviour. Robbins assumes that a law is verified; assumes the law to be true without discussing the process of verification. Such an account of scientific law is rather what “Hamlet” would be without the Prince of Denmark. By overlooking the question of verification, Robbins overlooks the fact that his laws will grow out of date as soon as “they cease to be verified”. He would probably argue that they cannot cease to be verified because they are assumed to be true. But that would be assuming that which is required to be proved. There is no wriggling out of the difficulty. For, without following the question into interesting details, it is obvious that any fantastic proposition can be assumed “true” viz., that “storks cause children to be born” and its failure to be verified—except accidentally in any important number of instances can always be attributed to “disturbing factors”. But if “verification” is not emphasized, so is “prediction”; and the only remaining necessity of a scientific law is a purely logical one of *implication* of particular instances under the heading of a generalization (a formula). It is this aspect which is emphasized by the foregoing quotation from Robbins. This is done by the words “Economic laws describe inevitable *implications*”—because “implication” is a matter of pure logic (like $2+2$ implies 4). Secondly, the logical necessity of economic law is emphasized by Robbins’ comparison with mathematics which, except for classical geometry, is not an empirical science at all—but a branch of logic. By dwelling on the logical necessity in the process of deduction of conclusions from formulae, Robbins tends to suggest that “formal” economics is a non-empirical science and is in consequence “eternal” like logic. The same idea is suggested in another “crucial” quotation: “The analytic method (deduction from economic laws ?) is...an instrument for ‘shaking out’ all the implications (sic) of given (sic) suppositions. It is a form of applied logic (sic)....” Robbins then adds: “...and grant-

ed the correspondence (truth ?) of its original assumptions and the facts, its conclusions are inevitable and inescapable". The word "granted" again begs the question of verification—it seems as if Robbins does not like verification. His reference to verification is so vague as to be hardly useful. Thus we are told "As we have seen already the *truth* (sic) of a particular theory is a matter of its logical derivation from the general assumptions of the science. But its *applicability* to a given situation (verification) depends upon the extent to which its concepts actually reflect the forces operating in that situation". The "truth" in the sense of Robbins is logical consistency with the "general assumptions of the science", viz., consistency of a "downward" demand curve with "scarcity". The sentence "But its applicability...depends upon the extent to which it reflects the forces..." seems to mean that its verification depends upon its verification, which is not enlightening. In addition the word "forces" is confusing. Does it mean "independent variables"? If so, then the theory may postulate the observed "independent variables" e.g., prices, and yet be altogether false—because the observed "consequences" are different from those inferred by the theory from assuming the wrong kind of "functions" i.e., assuming inelastic demand where it is really elastic and so on. Unfortunately Robbins does not make it clear what exactly he means by "given data" and a theory's "concepts which reflect forces" etc. The most favourable interpretation is to equate these terms ("data" and "forces") with those facts which theory attempts to postulate as independent variables or causes, such as a set of prices, a change in tariff, a change in technique and so on. By the "data" we did not take Robbins to mean the forms of functional connection between the dependent and the independent variables, e.g., an elastic demand curve—as well as a set of values (e.g. prices) of the independent variables. That is, we did not take it that a particular law of behaviour as well as a particular set of causes were implied by the term "given data". If we did do so, then Robbins' proposition "If the data they (the laws) postulate are given, then

the consequences they predict necessarily follow” becomes a tautology and the necessity of economic law which is emphasized is purely logical. The sentence then means “Given a set of causes (e.g. prices) and the mood in which they work (e.g. demand function) then the theory which postulates both these things (e.g. this function and these prices) makes a true prediction”. And that, quite likely, is what Robbins intends to mean. In this case the sole emphasis is on *logical implication* of consequences by the Law, and “verification” is taken for granted, without question. Whether “data” are interpreted as independent variables, or these taken in conjunction with the form of functional dependence of the dependent variables on the independent ones—the result is so far much the same. Robbins’ exposition lays principal emphasis on purely logical necessity of economic laws *qua formulae* which imply the totality of instances they subsume, purely by definition. On either interpretation of “data”, the account of necessity of economic law given, Robbins begs the question of “verification”—a remarkable omission. The “truth” of a theory (a fall of price will lead to an increase in demand) is said to be merely “a matter of its logical derivation from the general assumptions of the science—so that the particular theory is “true” if it is deduced without logical mistakes from the general assumptions—even if the basic assumptions happen to be stupid and fantastic. The process of verification is not analysed by Robbins—so that half the methodology, so to speak, is missing from his treatise. The necessity of economic law which is principally emphasised is the logical validity of deduction from them of particular conclusions, and in this way “formal” economics is vaguely identified with formal logic, and economic law is made to look as permanent etc., as logic itself. This effect of the methodological exposition is just a *leger de main*. The matter of verification is thrust into the obscure background of exposition and the first principles of economics—above all the law of “scarcity”—is made to appear either self-evident like the axioms of Euclid or else valid by a kind of divine revelation, so that the question of verification, so it appears, does not even arise. Actually,

as mathematical economists realize, the most general theory of "scarcity" and properties of "preference scales" are far from being self-evident. They are somewhat artificial and idealized abstractions. Their methodological status rather, depends on the fact that they happen to be extremely convenient summaries of the more concrete studies of type of actual market behaviour, various special "income" and "price" elasticities and "substitutions". These special theories are easily verified, and the pure theory of value is verified—to a large extent—through them, at one remove from the facts, so to speak.

Robbins does not emphasize the causal necessity of a scientific law, which is the distinctive property of science. This necessity arises from the belief that formulae which applied in the past will go on applying in the future, at least in the near future and with enough accuracy for most purposes. Since, in spite of all its continuity in the past, the world can conceivably turn upside down tomorrow and falsify all the laws of science (a point which is possibly Hume's principal contribution to human knowledge)—this sort of belief is called by Kant an *a priori* category, as contrasted with knowledge based on experience—*a posteriori* (viz., memory or historical description). No doubt, Robbins wished to bring out this prognostic, *a priori*, necessity of economic laws, but got in the wrong door by mistake in the dark and hit upon the necessity of pure logic. He labours under the delusion that the analysis of logical implication is a substitute for the analysis of scientific prediction and verification.

Of course, causal necessity and verification are closely inter-related matters. The neglect of one implies the neglect of the other so that it amounts to much the same thing to say that Robbins overlooks causal necessity as to say that his treatise dismisses the important and interesting topic of "verification" of hypotheses by a sleight of hand. There seems little doubt that Robbins dislikes statistical regression because he minimizes the importance of "verification". That is so, because statistical studies are the principal means of

verifications of theories in economics. Pushing the matter of "verification" into the sub-conscious background of thought, the treatise of Robbins fails to bring out the value of statistics as a means of verification. Obviously it is impossible for anyone to overlook this feature of statistics altogether and there are isolated remarks in the *treatise* which recognize it. But they do not constitute a systematic statement of the case, and the role of statistics consequently does not receive the emphasis which Robbins bestows on pure logic. The error of emphasis makes it easy to draw the false contrast between the "temporary" regression equation and the "permanent" economic laws. The false contrast is the result of failure to recognize that economic laws require to be verified just as regressions have to be in order to see whether they need bringing up-to-date. Robbins' suggestion that the "laws" do not require verification is, in turn, due to the neglect to analyse causal necessity—for the belief in causal necessity of a formula depends very much on the success with which it agrees with observation up-to-date. The actual reason given by Robbins in condemnation of "statistics" is the temporary validity of most "regressions", contrasted with the permanence of logic (falsely hooked on to economic laws). The motive behind the animadversion seems to be a dislike of verification, and a dislike of change in the economic order, rooted in the preoccupation with "static equilibrium" economics and the dislike of the regressive method which suggests that the world is changing more rapidly than those of conservative cast of mind like to think.

The causal necessity of economic law comes out especially clearly in statistical regression analysis. There, the confidence that the formula will hold in the future (in "relevant" circumstances) is split into *two* parts, one of which can often be actually measured (expressed in numbers). The measurable part consists of estimating *a priori* probabilities ("a priori" in Kant's sense) of "sampling errors"—or the range in which the predicted phenomenon may vary on account of chance disturbances alone (e.g. "standard error of estimate"). This measurement is made on the assumption that

the "universe"—the underlying conditions of the phenomenon—will remain the same as in the past. The non-measurable part of the belief consists of some estimate of judgment a "mental effort"—as to how far the forecast may be upset by the "probable" changes in the "universe". Perhaps in future statistical "logic" may progress so far as to devise measurement of this belief also—but there will always remain a residuum which can be tackled only by talented guesswork, or "intuitive judgment". In cases where changes in the "universe" can be assumed to be slow the measurable component of the belief is all we need bother about in forecasting the "near" future.

The *a priori* probabilities correspond to the *a priori* predictive certainty of the laws of classical mechanics which Kant had in mind. The "certainty" is just a limiting case (probability=1) where chance factors can be neglected. But even in classical "celestial mechanics" there is no complete certainty in its quantitative predictions. Errors in the measuring instruments etc., are dealt with by probability calculus under the name of "calculus of observations". Statistical economic regressions (including statistical "stabilities" of all kinds) have the general logical properties in common with the quantitative prediction formulae of mechanics, except that they grow more quickly out of date. But laws of "qualitative economics" also grow out of date rather quickly—and hence the need for vigilant and continuous process of verification both of the statistical and the qualitative formulae of economics. Even the formulae of celestial mechanics, it may be pointed out to Robbins, grow out of date because (1) some new observations do not fit old theory, and (2) there appears to be a "trend" in the physical universe (hence theories of "expanding universe").

And yet Robbins is nostalgic about "permanent" economic laws, although the process of evolution is "faster" in economic affairs than in the physical universe. As it turns out, the "permanence" which he clutches is that of mere logic. But what are the

factors responsible for the vain quest for permanent laws in a field “where there is no reason to think permanence is to be found”? Of course “lack of rationality” is the answer, but more specific reasons have to be found. We have already dealt with one factor : the conservative cast of mind which likes to think and says that the “status quo” is permanent, an activity which has a propaganda value for retarding the progress of opinion and social change. That is why an equilibrium economist is likely to be a *persona grata* with conservative bankers and officials. But of course as soon as the bankers etc., get into trouble they call in the aid of Mr. Keynes (using “Mr. Keynes” as a collective noun). Two more creditable factors responsible for the quest for permanence are (1) stability of certain general features of scientific method of investigation, and (2) the belief, held by some people, that the world is run on fixed objective rules, which it is the object of science to unravel (Determinism). First, certain general features of scientific method are fairly invariant in time. These are : scientific curiosity, careful observation construction of hypotheses, their verification, and the power for action (pragmatic worth) inherent in the successful results. That is why, to avoid giving an impression of the permanence of qualitative economic laws, Mr. Keynes defines economics as “a method, rather than a doctrine” (in a preface to the popular Cambridge handbooks on Economics). The general features of scientific method are (nearly) as permanent as logic itself. Qualitative economics, if sound, conforms to the pattern of general scientific method and is “in that sense permanent etc.” This fact may give rise to an exaggerated impression of invariance of the actual formulae, which in reality are true only in special historical contexts. To give some extreme instances: the Ricardian law of rent and the margin of cultivation did not apply to the nomadic era—because there was then no cultivation ; Gresham’s law does not apply to-day in countries which changed over to paper currency and to coins whose metallic value is below their face-value. And we have seen, that the theory which applies to finance in the London money

market leads only to confusion when applied to Indian money-lender finance.³ We can and must try, of course, to work out for convenience' sake some general principles which apply to the bulk of observations accumulated up to the present. But that does not mean that these principles will not require improvement in the future, as more facts occur. Even the principle of scarcity, as formulated by Robbins, is likely to get gradually out of date. That is so not only because further mathematical research will go on refining and modifying our way of looking at "scarcity" and the meaning of the term, but also because Robbins' concept has grown out of attempts to show the working of the competitive money economy, now in its twilight stage. There is no doubt that the continual extension of government control of economic affairs and the coming of collectivist economy will call into being a new concept of "scarcity" that will correspond to the new economic problems. The most general principle of economics will have somewhat different logical properties compared to what it has been in the past, although the new concept, if generalized, will include the past one as a special case. Roughly speaking, it will emphasize Social Utility rather than private utility of the present day pure theories of value. We have seen an example of this in the analysis of the Social Demand price of Irrigation in India. Private utility will appear only as an ingredient of the Social Utility. In behaviourist terms, the emphasis will be on collective action as compared to behaviour of individuals, and on "external" economies rather than on the cost conditions of an individual firm. The classical theory of Division of Labour foreshadowed the economics of the future—and false modesty apart—my work *Capital Development of India* also attempts to foreshadow it.

Robbins may object that he never claims his formulation of "scarcity" to be permanent and to be beyond improvement, but that

3. Vide chapter on "Banking" in *Capital Development of India—1860-1919*. Vol. I.

the idea of scarcity on the "scarcity aspect" of economic life is "permanent" etc. That is one of the meanings involved in his statements that qualitative laws of economics are "eternal" etc. But the moment he admits—as he is bound to do—that his formula of "Scarcity" ("Disposal of scarce means among alternative uses") and his deductions from it are capable of improvement, he throws up the sponge in his fight for "permanence" of economic laws. For, "scarcity" does not exist for us except as a formula. The "scarcity aspect" does not exist apart from the formula. Hence any "permanent aspect of scarcity" as distinct from the actual "temporary" formula is just a fiction and an optical illusion. Nor exactly: "permanent scarcity"—as distinct from the formula—is just a meaningless phrase. All we are offered by Robbins is a formula of scarcity which is not at all "permanent" because it is constantly being improved upon. If he knew what "permanent aspect of scarcity" was he would have told us. But he cannot do so for the simple reason that the meaning of a meaningless phrase cannot be expressed, even by a professor. The only permanent element in economic analysis which Robbins substantiates is the validity of deductive reasoning (pure logic). But even that is an overstatement. Even the theory of pure logic is subject to gradual improvement.

The illusory eternal aspect of scarcity which Robbins seeks to express in his formula of "allocation of scarce means among alternative uses"—is really an example of the second factor, mentioned before, which is responsible for the popular notion of permanence of scientific laws, namely—determinism. It is supposed, according to that view, that the world obeys objective rules ("uniformities") and that science attempts to formulate these rules. True, it is admitted that the formulae of science are only "approximations" to real laws and as such are subject to improvement from time to time. The advantage claimed for determinism is that belief in it makes scientists more optimistic and encourages their researches, because they think they will discover the objective laws some day. Objective laws, it is claimed, are a sort of carrot held before the donkey's

nose. Determinism tends to counteract the facile notion that history is a series of accidents and that politics and international relations are chiefly a matter of the whims, caprices and the goodwill of politicians. The disadvantage of the determinist doctrine is that for reasons of vanity, political expediency and the like, it lends itself easily to the identification of particular, often fantastic, theories, by those who held them, with the alleged objective laws of nature. This identification makes the theories of these people "true" and "objective" while all opposing, inconvenient, and realistic theories are held to be subjective and wrong. As the principal enemy of dogmatism is "verification", the dogmatists dislike verification and have a neurotic fear of facts which are likely to disprove their theories. The tendency (to dogmatism) is seldom found among original thinkers, and is dominant among those who absorb theories at second hand, e.g., among the McCullochs and James Mills of economics, Miss Martineaus and the minor Marxists. Dogmatism reaches its maximum when a scientific and social theory becomes officially guaranteed to be correct by the State. That happened with the Church of Rome when it guaranteed that the earth was flat, and in modern totalitarian countries where the whole of science is controlled by the police and is placed effectively "under arrest." An interesting instance of excessive determinism—too much of a good thing—leading to a dislike of "verification" is provided in a pamphlet written by Monsieur Stalin himself warning Soviet sociologists not to indulge too much in "verification." Quotations from the pamphlet were broadcast over Stalin's radio network. He gave this sharp reminder to Soviet sociologists, who began to see reason in positivism:—"Theory (Official Marxist theory) is not *verified* by facts. It is *confirmed* by them". If the facts do not fit the theory—so much the worse for the facts—or for the Soviet sociologist. It is somewhat piquant to observe that both Stalin and Robbins minimize the role of "verification" in science, and for exactly the same reason—they share the conviction that their own theories are "permanent", "universal", "eternal", etc., and consequently can

derive little benefit from submission to the process of verification by facts which are bound to "confirm" their theories. While Stalin is in the favourable position to prove his theories by the physical argument of *force majeure* of his Zwang-Apparat, Robbins is not so favourably situated.

Methodology, that of social sciences especially, is rapidly becoming an extremely practical matter, as Monsieur Stalin's interest in it suggests. Old fashioned politicians and administrators who are apt to think methodology an idle academical hobby, do so at their peril. Official methodologies of the dictatorships are nothing but formulae of the main principles of their policy—the methodology of their theory of society. Here one has to distinguish between two aspects of their official methodology—the propaganda aspect and the principles which actually guide their policy. The propaganda aspect can be dismissed as a pack of lies, except in so far as an occasional truth can have a propaganda value. The real principles are somewhat more clearly formulated by Stalin than by the other dictators, because he is an intellectual in comparison to the others, and received an intellectual twist not only from his training for the church, but also from the philosophic teaching of Marx and the scientific bent of Lenin. On the whole Stalin seems to accept evolutionary positivist methodology, of adapting sociological formulae (laws) to the varying circumstances of historical development. He abandoned Lenin's original formula (law) of imminence of world revolution in favour of the formula : "socialism in one country" that is, in favour of "National Socialism". His apparent rejection of positivist "verification" amounts merely to a prohibition of freedom of criticism of his principles and policy. He employs positivist methodology, but does not like others to do so (like a Prince of Machiavelli). His formula of "National Socialism" boils down to a planned national economy bent on rapid industrialisation with an accent on the armaments industries. His two main objects in order of importance appear to be developing military power for purposes of power politics in external relations, and raising of the national standard of life in so far as cir-

cumstances permit. These aims are qualified by the condition that he and his friends are to remain in power. The official methodology of science and of social science especially, boils down to subordination of scientific research to those three objects. The carrying out of the economic plan and the subservience of science are ensured with the assistance of one of the mightiest of Zwang-Apparat's in the world (the policy, etc.,) of which the "party" is an obedient cog. Methodology like industry, is nationalised because in social sciences it touches upon the principles of policy and in "Natural" science deals with their relation to policy, so that official methodology becomes the principle of policy in general and of control of scientific inquiry in particular. Private enterprise in science is discouraged for much the same reasons as private enterprise in industry. The same thing happens in the other totalitarian countries. In itself, centralized control of science is not an evil, provided always that the control of science is not exercised by a committee of gorillas and orang-outangs. It appears that the State control and bureaucratic control should allow a great deal more scope for individual enterprise in science—including social science—than in industry. Stanley Jevons has made this point when he said (quoting him by memory) that "in the republic of science and philosophy, sedition and even anarchy are conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number". The principles of dictatorship are defended by their proponents by alleging their superior efficiency in carrying out large economic and military programmes. The case for dictatorship in science is weak. By insisting on scientific results immediately applicable to policy, dictatorship discourages long range scientific research on pure theory and the like which are of the highest practical importance in the long run. Dictatorships suffer from excessive "Propensity to consume" the results of science. Also, suppression of the freedom of inquiry and criticism on social sciences, slows down the discovery and improvement of scientific laws so that less knowledge is available for the policy of the state. Also, errors and blunders survive for a long time under the protective wing of official methodology, and discon-

tent generated by blunders has to be suppressed by force. Hence the need for continual operation of the Zwang-Apparat.

It is now fairly obvious how important the matter of methodology is from the practical point of view, for it indicates the relation of science—especially economics—to policy and social purpose. It helps to see what use can be made of science and is of importance not only for the policy of higher education and organized research institutions, but also for actual application of its results in practice. The analysis of capital development of India, for instance, would be very incomplete without an account of its “regressive” methodology, for that alone places sufficient emphasis on the evolutionary factor in economic affairs and on the need to keep continually up to date both the principles of economic science and of policy. The principles of regressive methodology are the highest principles of social and economic policy—they insist on the importance of planning to meet the needs of the new age. Mere knowledge of past history and mastery of administrative routine are not enough, and old ideas are apt to be a hindrance to success in dealing with the problems of the emerging world. It is on account of this power of methodology that it is nationalized in the dictator states. Democratic governments would also benefit if they studied the methodology of science—of social science in particular. It is true that they study the evolutionary (gradualist) doctrine of Edmund Burke—frequently at second hand—but his formulation is a little out of date. There is nothing new in the suggestion of intimate connection between a philosophic methodology and policy. The connection was recognized in Ancient Greece, and the classical education of traditional civil servants was not so irrelevant to administration as is sometimes thought. It acquainted them with the regressive method both through ancient philosophy and through ancient history, the study of which represented an application of the “regressive” method for throwing light on the problems of more modern time. In brief, a grasp of methodology of social sciences is useful to rulers because it increases their power of foresight and action.

We have considered three factors contributing to the impression that qualitative economic laws are permanent: the identification of them with logic, the stability of the general features of scientific method, and the doctrine of "determinism"—or rather the identification of scientific laws with objective "uniformities". Two more factors remain of sufficient interest to be mentioned.

There is first the fact that old theories do not die out altogether. They are incorporated in new theory as special cases or else the "sound" elements of old theory appear also in the new. Thus, theories of perfect competition and pure monopoly appear as special cases of the modern theory of competition (viz., "imperfect competition" of Mrs. Robinson). Again, the equation of exchange of Jevons is (substantially) incorporated in the modern theory of exchange, while Jevon's "total utility" is suppressed. The fact that old theory is "incorporated" in the new suggests that old theory had permanent elements in it, and from this it is easy to jump to the conclusion that the whole of the higher generalizations is permanent—and not only some of their elements. The continuity of the growth of theory does not provide a basis for Robbins' suggestion that qualitative economics is permanent while statistical regressions are not. For old regressions are "incorporated" in the up-to-date versions just as much as old qualitative theories are in the new, so that from the point of view of continuity of development, statistical regressions are just as "permanent" as qualitative economics. Indeed, from that point of view—which Spinoza described as "*Sub specie aeternitatis*" everything turns out to be permanent, even "the snows of yester-year". So Robbins can derive little consolation from Spinoza.

Lastly, there is the factor of excessive preoccupation with static "equilibrium economics"—which tends to divert attention from all dynamic and evolutionary problems. Equilibrium economics, which is present in the mind of Robbins most of the time, leads him to develop a methodology which corresponds to equilibrium analysis

and to neglect the methodology of economic dynamics and evolution. That is one of the reasons why he omits a discussion of the regressive method in general and underestimates the importance of statistical analysis of economic time series. For both the general and the statistical "regression" are mainly concerned with the dynamic and evolutionary process. Since static economics (e.g. price analysis with given Supply and Demand curves) abstract from the process of adaptation and change (dynamic and evolutionary), this encourages the belief that equilibrium laws are themselves unaffected by time, and are "permanent," etc. On the other hand, correlation of time series is rather obviously concerned with time—and so it appears that statistical regressions cannot be "permanent". Of course, it does not logically follow that if a theory abstracts from time, it is itself unaffected by it—but this conclusion can follow *psychologically*, at least that is how the minds of some people appear to work. The psychology of thought does not always coincide with logic.

To illustrate the difficulties encountered by Robbins when he sails outside the self-imposed limits of equilibrium economics, to consider correlation of time series and the nature and method of economic history, two quotations from his treatise may be appended. First: "...And this unquestionably is one of the main uses of applied studies—not to unearth empirical laws (regressions?), but to provide from moment to moment some knowledge of the varying data on which, in the given situation, prediction can be based....". Secondly, on economics and history: "If the Economic Theorist, manipulating his shadowy abacus of forms and inevitable relationships, may comfort himself with the reflection that all action must come under its categories, the Economic Historian, too, freed from subservience to other branches of history, may rest assured that there is no segment of the multi-coloured waft of events which may not prove relevant to his investigations". The warning not to "unearth empirical laws" presumably refers to statistical correlations. But what is the meaning of the "multi-coloured waft of events" and

“the shadowy abacus” which the economist is said to be “manipulating”? Students of both sexes should be delighted to know.

The methodological position of Robbins has been assailed by numerous critics. Some of these appear to go altogether too far. For example, that eminent educationist and biologist, Lancelot Hogben,⁴ whose opinions on scientific method should be listened to with respect, goes so far as to describe the methodology of Robbins as “A Retreat from Reason”. There is very little truth in this suggestion. It is true that the economics that he describes are too static, and that he puts most emphasis on deduction and least on

4. Great interest in political economy is shown by the eminent biologists, Julian Huxley and J. B. S. Haldane as well as Hogben. They are unlikely to contribute to political economy unless they spend years of work studying economic facts. Their undoubted command of the scientific method is not enough, and acquisition of knowledge of economic facts is a slow process, because their fabric is complex, mobile and often elusive, and few, if any, laboratory experiments can be staged—which provide such a welcome check on blundering hypothesis in the other sciences. The opportunity for blunder in economics is almost unequalled. Mr. Weller Senior, coachman and authority on horses, was speaking as a biologist when he said: “The man as can form a ackerate judgment of a animal can form a ackerate judgment of anything.” (*Pickwick Papers*). Here Mr. Weller is expressing the confidence of biologists in their ability to deal with all matters falling outside their scientific specialism.

Engineers, physicists and mathematicians have also become enamoured of political economy, but *prima facie* they are less likely to succeed than the biologists, because they have not got quite their command of the “regressive” method. Better performances may be shown by the meteorologists. Some of the greatest economists, however, are mathematicians who turned full-time economists—*viz.*, Cournot, Marshall, Keynes and Bowley. Indeed, all the contributions to modern economic theory without a single exception, are the achievement of economists who were at the same time mathematicians—either expert mathematicians like Marshall or brilliant amateurs like Edgeworth. The function of the non-mathematical economist to-day is largely that of a populariser or propagandist.

verification, and makes it harder to grasp the nature of economic laws by roughly identifying them with formal logic (he calls them "formal", "applied logic", etc.). The identification is just a *tour de force* (a fallacy of "misplaced concreteness"—to use the phrase employed by Robbins and borrowed by him with acknowledgment, from Whitehead). There are also certain errors of statement. There is the mathematical error in his derivation of a demand curve from "preference". Also it is stated that little reliance can be placed in "a random sample of a random sample". But this is just a smaller sample of the "universe"—and can still be reliable. Also, breaking down of a large sample into smaller ones can yield valuable information on the distribution of certain parameters, and other useful things. But in the end, the objections to the methodological treatise of Robbins boil down to complaints about distribution of emphasis. He can be accused of certain errors of emphasis. But there is nothing fundamentally irrational in the methodology of Robbins. His sympathies appear to be positivist just as those of Hogben. All that could be reasonably requested in a future edition of the treatise would be a more rigorous exposition and a greater attention to *dynamic* and *evolutionary* economics and to its "regressive" method of analysis, especially statistical regression. The revision would be very simple. It would suffice for Robbins to employ Marshall's sensible and balanced account of the matter of method to be found in the introductory remarks to his *Principles of Economics*. Robbins makes fun of a statistical study of demand (for herrings)—perhaps a fleeting whim not seriously entertained. But his attitude was certainly not approved of by Alfred Marshall, who believed in a great future for statistical laws. For example, in the *Note on Statistics of Consumption* (*Principles*, 8th ed., p. 113) we read: "....As regards....the discovery of the (statistical) laws (sic) connecting variations in price, there seems much to be gained by working out a hint given by Jevons (*Theory*, pp. 11, 12) with regard to shopkeepers' books..... When some progress has been made in reducing to definite law the

demand for commodities that are destined for immediate consumption, then, but not till then, will there be use in attempting a similar task with regard to those secondary demands which are dependent on these—the demands, namely, for the labour of artisans and others who take part in the production of things for sale ; and again, the demand for machines, factories, railway material and other instruments of production. The demand for the work of medical men, of domestic servants and of all those whose services are rendered to the consumer is smaller in character to the demand for commodities for immediate consumption, and its laws may be investigated in the same manner. . . .” Marshall then adds a remark emphasizing the utility of Engel’s budget studies. The note concludes by indicating the value of what is now known as “ case ” studies or “ field work ”, but emphasizes the need for considerable intelligence on the investigator’s part for carrying them out. Marshall says : “ At its best it (case-study) is the best of all : but in ordinary hands (sic) it is likely to suggest more untrustworthy general conclusions, than those obtained by the extensive method of collecting more rapidly very numerous observations, reducing them as far as possible to statistical form (statistical correlation), and obtaining broad averages in which inaccuracies and idiosyncracies may be trusted to counteract one another to some extent.” Actually, it is a combination of the two methods—field work and statistical correlation that is most effective. That is a method which has been used by the writer in his work⁵ as for instance in the statistical study of rupee-undervaluation and Indian Exports, which has been supplemented by a study of the views of traders. Now, if Robbins employed Marshall’s estimate of the scope of statistics (and of economic laws) he would have laid himself less open to accusations from Hogben. The views of Robbins are balanced by extremists on the other side. This is fortunate, since the extremes approximately cancel out.

Discussion of method by economists is comparatively an easy thing—just as elementary discussion of scientific method. The difficult problems are left to the specialist logician and the philosopher. The amateur-methodology can be very useful as a convenient summary of what the economist is doing. That is why it was felt necessary to go into the matter of method in the present article.⁶ The deduction of “lessons” of the analysis from the point of view of policy will also be facilitated by the methodological framework.

Methodology is just a reflection of economics. If one's economics is poor so must be one's methodology. If one's economics is rather static and is based on a study of books rather than of facts, one's methodology is bound to miss out the methods of dynamic and evolutionary investigation, to underestimate the role of observation of facts and fail to indicate the proper place of statistics in economic investigation. On the other hand, if one's economic analysis is mainly evolutionary and dynamic—as is the case in the present work—then the principal emphasis of one's methodology is bound to fall on the regressive method in general and statistical regressions (the trends,

6. In the *Capital Development of India* (Vols. I and II) the object of the writer has been to link up the various parts of the analysis of capital development of India, to unify them under the common category of the “regressive method” and to make clear the role of the statistical investigations. When the writer first attempted an analysis of the effect of rupee-under-valuation on export he was inclined to minimise the importance of the views of the traders on statistical methods which convinced him that a combination of the two methods alone would be effective in bringing light on the problem. We can for instance separate the chaff from the grain of wisdom and consider the statement of traders and others on economic policy and incidentally ensure our appreciation of their work and presence. Those who are interested in finding out the views of the writer at an earlier stage of the research can refer to an article in the *Review of Economic Study*, 1937, Measurement of the Power of undervalued currency on Exports by Dr. Victor Edelberg and A. Krishnaswami.

and correlation among other variable than time) in particular. And inasmuch as we are living in an evolving world, the evolutionary methodology is the more realistic and useful of the two kinds of methodology.

The regressive method is referred to by Marshall. Of course, he refers to it under a different name, but he regarded it as the most important and the most general method of political economy. He thought dynamic and evolutionary economics to be the ultimate goal, but found it premature to write a treatise about it. It is only now that dynamic and evolutionary economics are becoming sufficiently worked out to be "potted-up" in the form of text-books.

Marshall speaks of the "regressive method" under the name of *biological* method. That is natural because evolutionary concepts—"variation" and "natural selection," "adaptation" etc.—were first clearly developed in the biological sciences. Marshall contrasts biological method with "dynamics" but the distinction is of one degree only. Both methods study how a situation grows out of the preceding situations. Both use "sequence" analyses. The difference is that "dynamics" is usually taken to denote "sequence" formulae for relatively short periods, *viz.*: trade cycle theory is "dynamics" while evolutionary method studies longer-run sequences, trends and secular changes. Evolutionary analysis is also distinguished by the fact that all the trends are to varying extent unaccountable—are indeterminate "explicit functions of time." All that can be done by way of prediction of such a trend is its projection in the near future. This kind of thing is the essence of the "regressive method"; we study how a "system" *i.e.*,—India's Economy—developed in the past, with a view to "projecting" the results, with necessary corrections into the future. As "dynamic" movements are superimposed on the long-run development, the regressive method strictly includes dynamics as well as evolution. Thus, our theory of the rupee exchange included both dynamic and evolutionary elements. It would have been artificial to have excluded the

dynamic account of the exchange crises of 1907-8 as a part of the trade-cycle mechanism. Inclusion of both dynamics and evolution is implied in our definition of the regressive method—"digging up the past in order to raise some useful crop in the future." The crop, in our instance, is capital development and therefore both short-run dynamics and long-term evolutionary forces are of interest and can be turned to useful account. Also, "dynamics" and "evolution" cannot be properly understood, in isolation from one another.

But all science consists largely of "digging up the past." How then is our "regressive method" different—if at all—from the general scientific method? It is only a part of scientific method. Science includes many problems in which the study of the past is largely irrelevant. There are cases where the phenomenon is a "function" of factors immediately preceding it; dynamic mechanics deals with problems of that kind, and so does strictly "static" equilibrium economics. It assumes given supply and demand curves (say) or given variation in the curves (or "functions" more generally) say as a result of an increment of tariff (Prof. Robbins' example of "equilibrium economics"). It then draws conclusions about the effects on prices and outputs, etc. But if the phenomenon in question is a function of factors occurring over the past—e.g., the size and composition of a human population existing at a given moment—it has to be investigated by the "regressive" method. The "regressive" method is used, therefore, only when "digging up the past" is *relevant* to the problem in hand and can throw light upon it. This distinguishes the "regressive method" from scientific method in general and assigns a place to it under the general concept of scientific method. Nevertheless, it is easy to confuse the "regressive" method with the most general formula of scientific method, just because "regressive analysis" includes static analysis (e.g. equilibrium economics) as a limiting case. The "static" case is the limit of the "regressive analysis" where the relevant past is very recent, or else process of "transition" to a long-term equilibrium is abstracted from. And of course we have employed static method in

our regressive study, whenever this was relevant, as in the discussion of Marshall's short period propositions on the rate of exchange and (in the appendix) of the short period part of his theory of money and interest.⁷ Short-period mechanisms had to be mentioned wherever they have been relevant. No application of the regressive method can altogether exclude reference to short-period mechanisms just as it does not exclude dynamics. It looks as if the regressive method uses all the special scientific methods at once, and hence is all-inclusive and is the most general formula of scientific method. But this is not quite true. Regressive method may employ *all* the methods *at once*—whereas the most general formula of scientific method includes not only this case but also all the cases where all the special methods are *not* used at once—*viz.*, includes the static method of equilibrium economics used separately—which represents, substantially, the intellectual position of Robbins, as reflected in his methodological treatise.

The distinction between the comprehensive regression method and dynamics and statics is further complicated by the fact that the difference is largely one of emphasis on the reference which is being made to the retrospective background of a problem in time. If we take the static short-period demand curve, it makes no explicit reference to the past—such as a “hereditary” demand function makes where demand is shown as depending not only on current prices, but also on those which ruled at various dates in the past. Nevertheless, the ordinary demand curve implies reference to the past. Indeed it may be said to have been suggested by observation of markets ever since the rise of exchange economy. The Modern concept of static demand curve is a result of a long process of evolution and observations. The implicit reference to the past—involved in static analysis—becomes especially clear when an attempt is made to secure a statistical demand curve by the method of correlation. There we

have a set of observations stretching over a period of time, and on the basis of this period an average demand relationship is derived which applies approximately at each interval of the period—and is thus a static short-period demand function. A demand curve (or a partial elasticity) obtained by statistical regression yields a static curve (or partial elasticity) but reference to a period of time is very explicit—particularly if trends are eliminated—so that statistical regression analysis of time series (*e.g.* series of demand data) cannot be described as a static form of analysis. It is rather a very typical instance of the general “regressive” method of “digging up the past.” Thus although the dependence of exports on currency under-valuation in the short period is a “static” relation, it has been obtained by the regressive method when we investigated the period 1876-96. But when, in the course of study of state irrigation, the trends of acreage irrigated and of the capital outlay were inspected for evidence of saturation—the reference to development in time has been more explicit—so that not only the method but the results—trend curves—have been regressive. For, we cannot theorise about saturation at times unless we know the shape of the trend before t .

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

By

P. S. LOKANATHAN

The object of this paper is to examine how far it is possible to mitigate inequality within the framework of the existing system of economic organisation and how far it will be necessary to modify the present system with a view to securing a large measure of economic equality. Inequality is undoubtedly an evil both in itself and because it is a cause of poverty. It may be that after a certain point greater equality will increase and not diminish the poverty of the poorest. But that sort of perfect equality is one which few would advocate. It is also perhaps undesirable in itself. But the present inequality of incomes and wealth prevalent in all countries is bad and unjust. It is bad because it creates a wrong scale of values, corrupts the rich, degrades the poor and undermines their self-respect. It is unjust because there can be no justification for a condition in which some people are allowed to have ten, twenty or even hundred times as much of the material goods as others, while they have done nothing to deserve them.

The facts of inequality present themselves everywhere in glaring light. In Great Britain it has been estimated by Mr. Colin Clark, the economic statistician, that 90% of the people get less than half the total income of the country, while 8·5% of the community get about 25% of the income and 1½% of the community the remaining 25% of the income. In the U. S. A. about 21% of the families received in 1929 only 4·5% of the income. At the other extreme 0·1% of the families at the top received practically as much as 42% of the families at the bottom of the scale. In other countries both poverty and inequality are even greater. In India the extreme poverty of the people is accompanied by extremes

of inequality as well. The average per capita income of the country according to most recent estimate is Rs. 62 for the year 1931-32. This income, however distributed, cannot but mean enormous poverty to a large section of the community. But the actual distribution heightens poverty, and unlike as in the West there is found to be a degree of destitution and misery unrelieved by any mitigating factors. According to Dr. V. K. R. V. Rao, taking the urban classes in India, nearly one-half of their total income belongs to less than one-tenth of the total number. Even among those whose annual incomes exceed Rs. 2,000, 38% of their number could claim only about 17% of the total income; while a little more than 1% were in possession of as much as 10%. Inequality is present in at least equally great measure among the agricultural classes. Taking Bombay Presidency as an example for which we have definite figures it was found that out of 22 lakhs of registered holders no less than 10 lakhs had holdings of less than 5 acres. But one per cent of the landholders had between them 16% of the total land. The amount of destitution prevalent in many of the Indian cities is unbelievably high. An investigation into the conditions of destitution and poverty prevailing in a certain part of the city of Madras revealed the fact that among the working classes three out of four were unable to have sufficient means for their subsistence.

Inequality in the distribution of property is, of course, even greater than in the distribution of income. In Great Britain 1% of the adult population owned 60% of the total capital of the country, while at the other extreme three-fourths of the total number of the adults owned only 5% of the total capital. The facts are about the same in other countries. The distribution of income derived from work is less unequal than that from property. The reasons are obvious. It is easy to add to property income, but it is harder to add to work income because the marginal disutility of work or labour increases steeply after a point. Further, only the propertied men can get all lucrative employments due to their easier and superior opportunities of training and education.

Inequality has not been diminishing to any extent anywhere despite all the modifications in the fiscal system. Even in Great Britain where the heavy death duties and progressive income-taxes have been accompanied by a large expenditure on social services and where apparently a considerable degree of transference of income from the rich to the poor has been taking place, it is found that the distribution of income remains more or less what it was 25 or 30 years ago. The number of fortunes over £ 25,000 increased from 30,000 before the war to 65,000 in 1924-30. The forces of accumulation have been so strong as to offset the distributional forces of high taxation and social expenditure. Further it has to be noted that the money spent for the benefit of the working classes, is raised by indirect taxation on the working classes themselves, while the same spent in interest on national debt goes mainly to benefit the rentier. Hence in the words of the *Economist* "there is very little sign that the system of taxation has effected any net redistribution of incomes between rich and poor. The very heavy taxation which has been imposed on the rich has not been necessitated by social service expenditure, but by the enormous cost of the war. Similarly the rise in the standard of living of the working class has not been achieved by a net subsidy from the Exchequer". Thus inequality of incomes seems to have remained roughly stable during the last 25 years, and merely by continuing the present burden of taxation in Great Britain inequality would not disappear.

The evils of inequality are admitted to be very grave. The existence of a rich idle class is a social evil partly because of the bitter sense of wrong and injustice that it creates among the hard working poor and partly because of the false standard that it implants in the minds of the would-be imitators. No democracy can allow great inequalities of wealth and incomes except such as are based on differences of worth. But it is not from the moral or political point of view alone that inequality should be condemned. From the strictly economic point of view its effects are even more damaging. It leads to a waste and misdirection of economic resources which are used to

satisfy the less urgent needs of the community while the more urgent needs are neglected. Inequality tends to perpetuate itself. By denying opportunities to the many and by affording opportunities to the few, it breeds inequality from generation to generation.

The argument that economic resources are properly directed because they get distributed to meet the needs of the community in the order of their urgency as expressed in terms of money is a most superficial one. Inequality distorts the working of the price system by enabling the most superficial, inane and whimsical wants of the rich to get a greater pull over the available resources than the most elementary needs of the poor. The price system does not compare the wants of different people at all, but merely the different wants of the same person. Hence although there may be a net social gain if productive resources are diverted from producing luxuries for the rich to providing necessities like sanitary houses to the poor, no such diversion can take place under the price system where supply adjusts itself only to that demand which is backed by offer of money sufficient to cover the money cost of production. There is therefore no ground for the opinion so widely held that the present system effects a right distribution of resources between all the possible uses. It is only to the extent that incomes are made less unequal that a really just and economical distribution of resources can be effected.

Of course complete equality cannot be established. The causes of inequality go deep into human life and are not merely the result of institutions and framework set up by men. There is no doubt that differences in inborn gifts and ability do account for a considerable degree of inequality. Men are born with unequal powers and without conceding to the eugenists all their arguments, there is no gainsaying the fact that heredity plays a significant part in the endowment of physical and mental powers of each individual. It is also true that the willingness to work varies with different individuals. Some occupations also require exceptionally high degree of natural ability. All these are bound to reflect in some degree of

inequality. But the view of those who hold that inequality is merely the expression of merit and that it is largely inevitable arising from permanent and unchangeable factors has no support either in theory or practice. The fact is that the so-called unequal worth and merit of individuals is the result of differences in opportunities. We are not all free to choose any occupation we like. Further the most fundamental cause of inequality is inheritance, the right of an individual to bequeath and to inherit properties. The unearned incomes which inheritance gives rise to sustain the continuing inequality. If it be possible effectively to limit inheritance and tax away unearned incomes without injury to production, much of the present inequality could be done away with.

Before exploring the ways by which inequality may be reduced it is necessary to examine the argument advanced by some that an environment and condition of inequality is necessary for maintaining a high standard of productivity. The argument is also reinforced by the further consideration that under capitalism since capital required for investment has to come from the voluntary savings of individuals, inequality is an essential condition of progress and that any large attempts to reduce inequality will reduce savings and therefore impair production and progress. These arguments are not convincing. Even to-day there are large alternative sources of savings, the bulk of which are derived from institutions and reserves of public companies. But if it be seriously urged that inequality is a *sine qua non* of progress under capitalism the answer will be that if it be so, capitalism should go or be greatly modified, so that no longer shall the community rely upon private savings. The question, however, remains whether a large reduction of inequality is not possible even under capitalism.

It is clear that a mere redistribution of income equally among all will not solve the problem. For one thing it would be like the levelling of the Himalayas; the level of the plains may rise by just a few feet. It may be that even so the increased income thus available to the

poor may go far to mitigate poverty. Indeed one author* has remarked that a redistribution merely of large inherited incomes in Great Britain would be sufficient to give half her population a sufficiency of food instead of the present insufficiency. But the objection to mere redistribution is that it will impair productive power and by itself will have done nothing to check those forces which are the root causes of inequality. The remedy lies therefore in adopting measures which while bringing about equality will not also affect adversely productive efficiency and incentive.

The Western world has shown the way for effecting real transferences of wealth and income from the rich to the poor by means of direct taxation of incomes and inheritances and by providing for liberal social services. But the pace in either direction has been too slow; and governments have been afraid that by increasing the level of taxation, the willingness and the ability to embark upon new work and enterprise will be sapped. At the other end the extension of social insurance and of ensuring to all a National Minimum of comfortable existence is hindered by lack of available resources. We have to see how far these are real difficulties.

So far as taxation of incomes is concerned, we must distinguish between earned incomes and unearned incomes. What will be the net effect of a steeper tax on earned incomes? The Colwyn Committee on Public Debt went into the matter in some detail and rightly concluded that the net effect of a tax larger than the present rate would be to stimulate effort among the classes earning fairly low or moderate salaries, unless of course a very high level of taxation was reached. But it is true that a rapid and heavy increase in the tax on earned income is likely to modify the willingness to take risks on the part of the smaller entrepreneurs. But, as recent experience of the trade cycle indicate, the predominant influence on enterprise is monetary policy and even a high rate of income-tax is not likely to

*Douglas Jay, *The Socialist Case*.

damage enterprise if monetary factors are so regulated as to keep businesses profitable.

With regard to unearned incomes the rate of tax should be very steep. Unearned incomes are the result mainly of inheritance and partly of investment, and clearly there is strong justification for levying a very high tax on it, provided its injurious effects are not serious. What will be the effect on willingness to work and to take risk? The volume of work will increase rather than diminish as a result of a relatively more drastic increase in the tax on unearned income because by taxing work-income less it will greatly strengthen the incentive to work. But the effect on enterprise will be different. In the case of private companies high rate of tax on unearned income will perhaps lead to an unwillingness to take speculative risks. But with regard to public companies enterprise may not be so adversely affected; because the manager and directors of public companies will not be influenced by those factors which influence a private company. The tax on dividends is payable by the shareholders, and the prospect of an increased tax on undistributed profits is not likely to induce the directors to limit their activity. Here again monetary and cyclical factors will be more important factors affecting enterprise than high taxation. The investor may perhaps be more affected, although, as the Colwyn Committee has pointed out, no sure conclusion can be drawn from the effect of high taxation on the willingness to take risk of either the small or the large investor. On the whole, it will be safe to conclude that a slight disinclination to bear risk is a likely result of a high tax on unearned incomes. But as regards savings, there is no doubt that it will reduce both the capacity to save and the desire to save. A considerable slackening in private saving may be regarded as one of the certain results of an extremely steep progression tax on unearned incomes. But as will be pointed out later this defect need not stand in the way of a really sharp discrimination against unearned incomes.

Of far greater importance is the taxation of inheritance. The objective should be to reduce greatly, if not altogether abolish inherit-

ed incomes. The large earned incomes are at least justified by the services rendered to society by men of genius and ability. Indeed their services are so valuable that even a country like Russia has been forced to recognise them and allow large differences in earnings. Further, earned incomes do not add up to a significant percentage of the total national income. In regard to unearned incomes there is always the difficulty of distinguishing between the income from inheritance and that derived from enterprise and investment. No such difficulty arises with respect to inheritance taxation. The present scale of death duties in Great Britain, high as it is, has been rightly regarded as inadequate. Taxes on inheritance cannot have very adverse effect on work and enterprise. The incentive to work and enterprise is not removed merely because at a man's death his estates are liable to heavy duty. On the other hand the fact that no man can rely in the future on inheritance will be a great stimulus to work. The only adverse effect of heavy inheritance tax is that it will reduce savings.

We are thus once again led to consider whether in view of their unfavourable effects on savings, heavy taxation on incomes and inheritance may be resorted to. The answer clearly is that it may be, because of two circumstances. It is now universally recognised among economists "that up to the point where full employment prevails the growth of capital depends not at all on a low propensity to consume." On the contrary an increase in the propensity to consume will in general, i.e., except in conditions of full employment serve to increase at the same time the inducement to invest and thereby the capital wealth of the country. Experience also suggests that in existing conditions in most countries saving by investments and through sinking funds is more than adequate for all purposes. In the words of Keynes "Our argument leads us to the conclusion that in contemporary conditions the growth of wealth, so far from being dependant on the abstinence of the rich, as is commonly supposed, is more likely to be impeded by it. But one of the chief social justifications of great inequality of wealth is therefore removed. I

am not saying that there are no other reasons, unaffected by our theory, capable of justifying some measure of inequality in some circumstances. But it does dispose of the most important of the reasons why hitherto we have thought it prudent to move carefully. This particularly affects our attitude towards death duties; for there are certain justifications for inequalities of incomes which do not apply equally to inequality of inheritances." The second circumstance is that the influences of cyclical forces and monetary factors are far stronger than taxation in determining the extent of saving. Saving is the result of investment which depends in turn upon marginal efficiency of capital. Increases or decreases in incomes brought about by changes in investment are more dominant factors influencing the extent of savings than low or high taxation.

The real problem of inheritance taxation is administrative. If the tax is so levied that no property will be allowed to be inherited by the third or fourth generation, will it not lead to all kinds of evasion and to gifts *inter vivos*? Dr. Dalton has a plan by which all inherited properties should pass into the legal ownership of the Public Trustee and that a fixed income alone should accrue to the inheritor during his lifetime. As regards gifts, they too can be taxed. Further according to Public Trustee plan only one's own savings could be gifted away. The part that is inherited will be in the hands of the State. Thus it is possible so to work out a scheme of death duties varying with the number of times a property or estate has been inherited as to enable the State to get to itself all the property in the third succession. For example, on the part of an estate which a man has saved the duty may be 50%; on the part inherited from his father 75%, and on the part inherited from his grand-father, 100%. The right of bequeathing is not taken away; but its injurious effects would be checked.

Such a system of inheritance tax enabling the tax-payers to pay the duties in kind would result in the states gradually owning large extent of property of various forms. These properties may be leas-

ed to various uses, and rents or interest charged therefor. It may be contended that the result of such a radical tax policy will be to vest the ownership of increasingly large amounts of property in the hands of the State. But this cannot be helped, as there is no other method by which greater equality can be secured.

With the proceeds of such taxation and with the stream of income which the State will get by the leasing of its properties a definite programme of expenditure for benefitting the poor should be outlined. A scale of National Minimum must be fixed for all based on the needs of each family taking note of the numbers in each family. Not the family but the number of individuals in the family must be taken as the basis for expenditure. In view of the fact that the knowledge of the nutritive values of different kinds of food is so scanty amongst the poor and the further fact that if well organised essential food can be had at a greatly reduced cost, there is justification for the direct provision by the State of the elementary necessities of life in kind to all. Houses, sanitation, health services, education, food and standardised clothing should be made available to all, as even to-day under conditions of the war soldiers are provided. Further distribution should take the form of a remission of regressive taxation, increased family allowances and pensions and social services.

Up to this point the suggestions and recommendations are such as will commend themselves to all schools of economic thought barring extremists on either side. The free pricing system will work; inequalities will be reduced; and entrepreneurs will adjust production according to movements in prices. Consumers will have free choice. Such an economic system may be regarded as a half way house to socialism.

Can one stop here ? Will this system work and will it eliminate all avoidable inequalities ? There are several reasons why this half way house cannot long remain where it is, and why circumstances will compel either going back or going forward. In the first place

the State which as a result of the acquisition of large properties paid by the taxpayers in kind will have to fix the prices at which they may be hired by the users of such property. It will imply authoritarian intervention in the price system. The price system under such conditions of state ownership of capital and fixing of factor prices cannot function properly. Further if some at least of the essential needs of the poor are to be supplied by the state, ownership and management of certain industries would become necessary. Again unless the government constantly interferes with a view to lessening inequality, inequality of earned incomes will continue, and under dynamic conditions will once again assume serious proportions. Nor is this all. The combinations among employers will tend to monopoly which will not only result in economic abuses but will lead to such political action that the government may be compelled to go back to a state of uncontrolled capitalism. Finally since the whole of our argument regarding capital and savings depended upon a proper monetary policy and since monetary and cyclical factors are found to be even more important than taxation in their effects on enterprise, the need for nationalising the whole of the banking system cannot be delayed. Nationalisation of industries will also be necessary on two other grounds. The existence of private monopolies will always remain a threat to the integrity and efficiency of a reformed economic system. Hence private monopolies must go and there must be nationalisation of all industries which are from their very nature, either due to technical or economic conditions, monopolistic. Railways and other forms of transport, electricity, gas and other power industries, insurance, public utility industries are all suitable for complete socialisation. Certain other industries which to-day are virtual monopolies like tobacco, sugar refining *etc.*, will also have to be nationalised on similar grounds.

The result will be that the State of the future will have to be largely a socialist state with a certain private sector in it. Complete socialism is not necessary for purposes of effecting greater equality. Certain industries are not also suitable for state ownership and

management. Very small industries, speculative industries and completely new industries may well be left over to private initiative. These industries will have to function under conditions of prices and wages fixed by the state, and there may arise difficult problems of demarcation. But since the private sector will not be allowed to dominate the economic system but will occupy only a subordinate place therein, there will be no serious menace to a predominately socialist state. The problems of pricing, of the distribution of resources among the various industries, the proportion of the national income that should be saved for further production, the fixing of interest etc., will all emerge as difficult questions facing the administrators of a socialist economy. What should be the safeguards against the exploitation of the public by these nationalised monopolies? It is not possible to deal with these problems within the limits of this paper. All that needs to be said here is that these public monopolies should be allowed to compete with one another for the use of the resources whose prices must be fixed by the state, that some accounting methods should be devised to assess, check and control efficiency and that accounting prices of the factors of production should be fixed to ensure against a misdirection of resources. The Socialist State will allow freedom of choice to the consumer and freedom of employment to the worker. Inequalities will be prevented from becoming a serious menace by taxing all high incomes and rent of ability, and by providing to all a National Minimum.

THE RESERVE BANK AND RURAL CREDIT

By

B. V. NARAYANĀSWAMI NAIDU

The real needs of the agriculturist are stable prices and a proper relation of prices between what he consumes and what he produces. In other words the agriculturist must get sufficient price for the produce he sells to maintain himself on a decent standard in relation to the standard of living of the country. Burgess in his interpretations of Federal Reserve Policy says how this could be achieved by a Central Reserve Bank. "On the one hand it should insure that there is sufficient money and credit available to conduct the business of the relation and to finance not only the seasonal increases in demand but the annual or normal increase in volume which throughout long periods is fairly constant. On the other hand, there should be no such excessive or artificial supplies of money and credit as will simply permit the marking up of prices when there is no increase in business or production to warrant an increase in the volume of money, and credit." Referring to the policy of the Federal Reserve system he continues, "you must not understand from what I say that I assume that the power of price fixing rests or should rest with anyone. It does not. Price changes result from a combination of many influences. So far as the influence of credit is a factor in prices, I am frank to say that I think our policy should be to avoid any development which would promote or encourage simply price expansion or price contraction. We should aim at keeping the credit volume equal at the country's needs, and not in excess of its needs, and then price readjustments as between the various classes of commodities will take place with the least possible disturbance to agriculture or to any other industry. It seems to me that some such policy will permit of that readjustment of the values of the various classes of

commodities to which we must look in order that the farmer may again enjoy that proper balance between the cost of what he consumes and the price he realises for what he produces." So the main objective of Central Banks is the maintenance of monetary stability. The preamble of the Reserve Bank of India Act also says that the Bank has been established "to regulate the issue of bank notes and the keeping of reserve with a view to securing monetary stability in British India and generally to operating the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage."

Monetary stability can be achieved by the Central Bank controlling money and credit. Under modern banking conditions the proportion of actual payments in cash is very insignificant compared with those done by means of credit instruments, which carry a capacity to get liquidated into cash or possess a command over cash. To achieve its objective the Central Bank should be in a position to regulate purchasing power as conditions demand. Hence it is very essential that it should maintain its assets as liquid as possible to enable it to convert them into means of payment. This leads one to examine the nature of the assets that a Central Bank should maintain. Generally the Central Banks maintain short maturity credit instruments which are considered to be easily marketable and promise to be self-liquidating at maturity in a very short time. It is also the general practice for Central banks to hold even long dated Government bonds because they are easily marketable on account of the Government guarantee. While easy marketability and protection against deterioration in value ensure liquidity, it will be unwise for the Central bank to refuse to accept first class securities of any kind as sound assets. Moreover Central banks can keep a portion of their funds safely as illiquid. For these reasons a central bank should also hold agricultural bonds, *e.g.*, long dated land mortgage bank debentures, the principal and interest of which are guaranteed by Government as part of their assets and other first class agricultural paper with one or two signatures. This will be a great help to the agri-

culturists and will go a longway in regulating the prices of their produce.

Under the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act, the Bank has been authorised to help the supply of agricultural credit directly and indirectly. The relevant sections which deal with credit facilities to agriculture are 17 and 18. Section 17(2) (b) of the Reserve Bank of India Act provides for "the purchase, sale and rediscount of bills of Exchange and promissory notes, drawn and payable in India and bearing two or more good signatures, one of which shall be that of a scheduled bank, or a provincial co-operative bank, and drawn or issued for the purpose of financing seasonal agricultural operations or the marketing of crops, and maturing within 9 months from the date of such purchase or rediscount, exclusive of days of grace." Section 17(4) provides for "the making to States in India, local authorities, scheduled banks and provincial co-operative banks of loans and advances, repayable on demand or on the expiry of fixed periods not exceeding ninety days, against the security of. . . (c) such bills of exchange and promissory notes as are eligible for purchase or rediscount by the bank : (d) promissory notes of any scheduled bank or a provincial co-operative bank, supported by documents of title to goods which have been transferred, assigned, or pledged to any such bank as security for a cash credit or overdraft granted for bonafide commercial or trade transactions or for the purpose of financing seasonal agricultural operations or the marketing of crops." According to Section 18 "when, in the opinion of the Central Board or when the powers and functions of the Central Board under this section have been delegated to a Committee or of the Central Board or to the Governor, in the opinion of such Committee or of the Governor as the case may be, a special occasion has arisen making it necessary or expedient that action should be taken under this section for the purpose of regulating credit in the interests of Indian trade, commerce, industry and agriculture, the Bank may, notwithstanding any limitation contained in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (2) or sub-clause (a) or (b) of clause (3) or

clause (4) of Section 17 (i) purchase, sell or discount any of the bills of exchange or promissory notes specified in sub-clause (a) or (b) of clause (2) or sub-clause (b) of clause (3) of that section though such bills or promissory notes do not bear the signature of a scheduled bank or a provincial co-operative bank or (ii) purchase or sell sterling in amounts of not less than the equivalent of one lakh of rupees; or (iii) make loans or advances repayable on demand or on the expiry of fixed periods not exceeding ninety days against the various forms of security specified in clause (4) of that section; Provided that a Committee of the Board or the Governor shall not, save in cases of special urgency, authorise action under this section without prior consultation with the Central Board and that in all cases of special urgency, authorise action under this section without prior consultation with the Central Board and that in cases actions so authorised shall be reported to the members of the Central Board forthwith." Section 19 of the Act prohibits the Bank from advancing money on mortgage of, or otherwise on the security of, immovable property or documents of title relating thereto, or become the owner of the immovable property except so far as is necessary for its own business premises and residences for its officers and servants." Neither agriculturists nor any other individuals can (except when occasion arises for exercising the power of direct discount), obtain credit directly from the Reserve Bank, but must apply for loans to or discount eligible agricultural paper with a member bank (i.e. a scheduled bank or a provincial co-operative bank), who may sell or rediscount the same with the Reserve Bank. The Central Bank in any country cannot ordinarily deal with borrowers directly nor lend directly to customers of scheduled banks nor take the initiative in making loans to banks themselves for the purpose of enabling them to distribute the funds so secured to customers. In fact the accommodation by the Reserve Bank is only a second line of defence which can be called into activity only when the supply of ordinary credit facilities becomes inadequate. Thus the Reserve Bank can extend only short term credit facilities to agriculture

through member banks. Unlike the original bill where there was a limit of one-fourth of the total bills and notes prescribed as the maximum amount of agricultural paper that could be handled, the Bank may now go on discounting agricultural paper without any limit. But there is no obligation on the bank to discount any agricultural paper and the authorities of the Reserve Bank may refuse to accept even a single paper, however it may be.

To avoid any difficulty of the Bank for want of currency in the extension of credit facilities, the Bank under Section 33 (iii) is enabled to hold eligible agricultural paper as part of the assets of its issue Department within the prescribed limit. This will enable the Bank to have at its command an elastic currency to suit the credit needs of agricultural interests. Thus the extent to which the Reserve Bank can afford facilities is very limited. The Bank cannot render any assistance direct or indirect to the extending of intermediate and long term credits to agriculture.

According to Sections 2 (b), 4 (a), 4 (c), and 4 (d) of Section 17 of the Act, the Reserve Bank is authorised to give covers in the following cases :—*

“(a) Loans or advance against Government paper for ninety days to provincial co-operative banks and central land mortgage banks declared to be provincial co-operative banks and through them to co-operative central banks and primary land mortgage banks Section 17 (4) (a).

“(b) Similar loans and advances to provincial co-operative banks and central land mortgage banks declared to be provincial co-operative banks and through them to co-operative central banks and primary land mortgage banks against approved debentures of recognised land mortgage banks, which are declared trustee securities and which are readily marketable.

* Statutory Report, Reserve Bank of India, 1937.

“ (c) Advances to provincial co-operative banks for ninety days against promissory notes of central co-operative banks and drawn for financing seasonal agricultural operations—Section 17 (4) (c) or rediscount of such promissory notes maturing within nine months—Section 17 (2) (b).

“ (d) Loans and advances not exceeding ninety days to provincial co-operative banks against promissory notes of approved co-operative marketing or warehousing societies endorsed by Provincial co-operative banks and drawn for the marketing of crops—section 17 (4) (c) or rediscount of such promissory notes maturing within nine months—section 17 (2) (b) or loans and advances on the promissory notes of Provincial co-operative banks supported by warehouse receipts or pledge of goods against which a cash credit or overdraft has been granted by the Provincial co-operative bank to marketing or warehousing societies—Section 17 (a) (d).”

The Statutory report further says that the Reserve Bank, though prepared to deal with provincial co-operative banks, would not give any promises in advance. The making of financial statements in certain forms and submitting them periodically to the Reserve Bank, allowing the Reserve Bank to inspect them and the maintenance of a minimum balance which would be prescribed from time to time by the Reserve Bank are the conditions on the Provincial banks if they want help from the Reserve Bank to tide over a temporary shortage of funds. Further the Report observes that as the funds are to be returned within the time limit allowed by the Act, the co-operative banks cannot make use of them for the purpose of continuing finance. Above all, instructions and circular letters will be issued from time to time indicating their opinion of the criteria of sound banking which would justify their making advances and also laying down the procedure for obtaining loans and advances when these conditions are fulfilled. They will also be ready to give advice to co-operative banks to organise their business on sound lines. Enumerating the demands of the Co-operative associations the Report says

that it is impossible for the Reserve Bank to supply normal agricultural credit to co-operative banks. Except for advances on Government securities for ninety days they do not accept the suggestion of the provincial banks that cash credit facilities should be extended to them. The Report considers it premature to accept an amendment of Section 17 (4) (d) for the extension of advances against promissory notes of provincial co-operative banks which have gained cash credits or overdrafts for financing the marketing of crops to promissory notes given for loans and advances granted for the same purpose. The Report does not think it desirable to apply to Provincial banks Section 17 (2) (c) which refers to advances for trading in securities. The Report totally rejects the proposal of investment in debentures and considers it safer not even to buy the debentures of land mortgage banks at present. For the present the Reserve Bank has agreed to continue facilities for remittance of funds for bonafide co-operative purposes through Remittance Transfer Receipts at par.

To implement the proposals of the statutory report of the Reserve Bank two circulars were issued by the Reserve Bank, in May 1938 and June 1939. The main points in the circulars are given here. The Reserve Bank will deal with Provincial Co-operative Banks and through them with the eligible co-operative central banks of the A and B classes. Admission to the approved list of co-operative banks is on the consideration whether the business of the Provincial Bank desirous of joining the approved list is on sound banking lines. This is judged by paying attention to the maintenance of an adequate reserve and fluid resources invested in liquid securities; strict separation of short term loans repayable within a year and long term loans, the proportion of the latter to the former not being unduly high; the proportion of overdues and bad debts to total loans and the provision for them; a business-like distribution of the assets in cash, investments, short term loans and long term advances; the rate of interest paid on deposits; and the dividends distributed. After being admitted to the list of approved bankers, the Provincial Co-operative

banks should agree to the maintenance of a daily cash balance with the Reserve Bank—not less than $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ of the demand liabilities and 1% of the time liabilities—should submit the balance sheet and annual report on the lines laid down by the Reserve Bank, submit the audit report and periodical statements prescribed by the Reserve Bank and agree to allow inspection of the Bank by the officers of the Reserve Bank.

Any financial accommodation for the season should be made to the Officer in charge of the Agricultural Credit Department through the Registrar of Co-operative Societies specifying the requirements under Section 17 of the Act. The credit for each Provincial Bank will be fixed by the Reserve Bank at its discretion after considering the position as a whole. The Provincial Bank should send its application at the beginning of every financial year. As the Reserve Bank can deal only with promissory notes or bills drawn for the purpose of financing seasonal agricultural operations or the marketing of crops, Central Co-operative Banks are required to separate their loans made to societies for other purposes from those made for the specific purposes mentioned. The amount on due date of maturity in all cases of loans, advances and rediscounting will be recovered by the Reserve Bank by debiting the account of the Provincial Co-operative Banks. Help to the approved Central Land Mortgage Banks will be in the nature of advice in the floatation of debentures regarding interest, suitable time and so on, grant of loans upto ninety days and advances against approved debentures to Central Land Mortgage Banks and to Primary Land Mortgage Banks coming through them and grant of loans and advances upto ninety days against Government paper to Central Land Mortgage Banks and Primary Land Mortgage Banks coming through them.

Explaining certain points in the first circular, the second circular says that in all essential respects the nature of the business of the co-operative banks is the same as that of the commercial banks. Since co-operative banks lend to agriculturists they should observe a stricter

business principle. Hence the Reserve Bank believes that the assets in the Co-operative Banks should be distributed in the same way as in Commercial Banks. All Provincial and Central co-operative banks should maintain cash cheques and balances with other banks to an amount not less than 10% of the deposits, invest in gilt edged securities upto 30% or 40% of the deposits and lend upto 50% or 55% of their deposits. In the case of emergency, Central banks will be permitted to borrow on their securities invested with the Provincial banks by means of bills drawn on the latter. These bills will be easily rediscounted with the Reserve Bank as the Provincial banks will have sound security backing. Regarding loans the period should be preferably six months as in the case of commercial banks and in no case should exceed nine months. Care should be taken that loans granted for a period over nine months do not exceed the paid up capital and reserves of the bank. Thus members of agricultural co-operative societies will receive intermediate credit upto the extent of the capital and reserves of their own societies as well as the banks without seriously affecting the latter. The co-operative bank, like the commercial bank, should possess adequate capital to win the confidence of its depositors. As it will not be possible to prescribe a minimum capital in the case of co-operative societies, it is recommended that the proportion between owned and borrowed capital should be 1 to 8. The difference between the lending and borrowing rates of co-operative banks should be sufficiently wide to speed the building up of reserves. The Reserve Bank suggests that $\frac{1}{3}$ of the net profit of the banks should be paid into the reserve fund until it equals the paid up capital and later $\frac{1}{4}$ of the net profit.

The Statutory Report of the Reserve Bank of India is indeed an admirable analysis of the problem of agricultural finance in India and the many suggestions they have put forth for the reorganisation of the co-operative movement should be seriously considered for adoption. Of course co-operative banks like commercial banks should work on business principles. But the question is whether in the present stage of development of the Co-operative Societies such a

strict adoption of business principles is practicable. It is only when the primary credit societies take firm root in the soil, develop into multi-purpose societies and embrace the whole life of the villager that the Central and provincial banks can adopt such business principles with regard to co-operative societies. At present the Provincial Bank is saddled with funds and it has invested them in gilt-edged securities because there is no demand for those accumulated funds. The Provincial Bank in the near future will not approach the Reserve Bank for emergency currency unless of course the primary societies are well developed and there is a consequent demand on the Provincial Bank for funds. In short the Statutory Report and the circulars of the Reserve Bank give only sound advice to the co-operative associations as to what they should do and what they should not but fail to take a practical view of conditions in India which are quite different from those of other countries. If the commercial banks of England are able to get accommodation from the Bank of England under very strict conditions it is because the banking habit has been fully developed in that country and there are various kinds of bills which can be safely discounted. Moreover agriculture, like industry, is highly organised in those western countries and an agricultural paper is as good and sound as any other paper. In India there has not yet developed a bill market and in the villages the transactions are solely in cash. The bill habit is to be first developed in the country before the five proposals of the Reserve Bank can be adopted. As already stated in a previous chapter a net work of warehouses throughout the Presidency will go a long way, even in the critical stages, to develop the bill habit in the people. The question is how far is the Reserve Bank prepared to help in the establishment of warehouses. Can the profits from the note-issue department be utilised to any great extent towards the financing of the building of these warehouses? Money spent in this direction would have been, indeed, well spent.

On the assumption that the co-operative societies are well developed on the lines suggested by the Reserve Bank and a bill market

is also developed, the various provisions of the Reserve Bank can be examined. It is a correct attitude on the part of the Reserve Bank that it is prepared to advance only to aid seasonal agricultural operations. When the co-operative societies are well developed, there will not be any demand on the Reserve Bank for normal agricultural operations, for then, the central banks with their own resources and with the resources of the Provincial Bank will be able to meet the normal demand. It is only in an emergency that they will approach the Reserve Bank. In this case to save unnecessary delay and inconvenience central banks should be linked to the Reserve Bank direct. The maintenance by the Provincial Bank of certain financial statements required by the Reserve Bank and allowing itself to be inspected by the Reserve Bank are essential conditions if the Provincial Bank should seek accommodation with the Reserve Bank. But the advice of the Reserve Bank that the Co-operative Banks should not invest more than 50% to 55% in loans and advances but should keep 30 to 40% in Government securities and 10% in cash—principles which are very rigid—is only asking for the sacrifice of easy facility for loans in the interests of extreme caution and safety. This will only increase the lending rate to the primaries. The Co-operative Societies in this Province are slowly reducing the rate to $6\frac{1}{4}\%$ and a rise of rate at this juncture is not advisable. Again, in the matter of financial accommodation, the Reserve Bank requires the Provincial Bank to send its application at the beginning of every season to enable it to determine the line of credit that could be accommodated to the Bank. The difficulty is for the Provincial Bank to determine the demands on it even at the beginning of the season. This clause should be withdrawn by the Reserve Bank.

Regarding the help the Reserve Bank could give to the Central Land Mortgage Bank, it is only advice as to the suitable time for floatation of debentures. Great confidence will be infused into the public if the Reserve Bank undertakes to float the debentures and invest at least a portion of the money in the debentures. It is indeed surprising that the Reserve Bank is a little nervous in the

matter of even buying the debentures which are perfectly marketable with the Government guarantee.

It is suggested that care should be taken by the banks that intermediate credit should not exceed the capital and reserves in primary societies as well as the banks without seriously affecting the latter. The owned capital and reserves of primary societies are very small now and they will not be sufficient at all for the provision of intermediate credit. The Reserve Bank being the lender of last resort cannot advance except on short term and on such Government securities as are considered liquid. If liquidity is due to easy marketability, power is given to many Central Banks in other countries to deal in bonds or other long term securities issued by their own or other Governments. In such case other first class securities guaranteed by the Government of a country should be dealt with by Central Banks. The Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation Bonds of America are eligible for advances by the Federal Reserve Bank. A similar institution should be found in India to deal with intermediate and long term credit. The Agricultural Credit Department of the Reserve Bank of India can easily take up this question.

Section 54 of the Reserve Bank of India Act provides "The Bank shall create a special Agricultural Credit Department, the functions of which shall be :

(a) To maintain an expert staff to study all questions of agricultural credit and be available for consultation by the Governor-General-in-Council, local Governments, provincial co-operative banks, and other banking organisations.

(b) To co-ordinate the operations of the Bank in connection with agricultural credit and its relations with provincial co-operative banks and any other banks or organisations engaged in the business of agricultural credit."

Section 55 (1) of the Act provides: "The Bank shall at the earliest practicable date and in any case within three years from the date on

which this chapter comes into force, make to the Governor-General-in-Council a report with proposals, if it thinks fit, for legislation, on the following matters, namely:—(a) the extension of the provisions of this Act relating to scheduled banks to persons and firms not being scheduled banks, engaged in British India in the business of banking, and (b) the improvement of the machinery for dealing with agricultural finance and methods for effecting a closer connection between agricultural enterprises and the operations of the bank.

It has been lamented by some writers of the orthodox banking school that the creation of such an Agricultural Department in a Central Reserve Bank is against the true principles of Central Banking and would probably clog the smooth functioning of the Central Bank. India, like Australia, being a predominantly agricultural country, a special department of the Central Institution to look after the needs of the agriculturists is quite in keeping with our policy. As the Reserve Bank is the creation of the Government, the Agricultural Credit Department is a quasi government institution under the control of the Reserve Bank. It is analogous to the Federal Intermediate Credit System of the U.S.A. and the Rural Credit Department of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. As the Federal Intermediate Credit System has already been discussed in an earlier chapter, the Rural Credit Department of the Commonwealth Bank may be briefly described here.

In 1925 the Commonwealth Bank Act of Australia was amended to create a Rural Credit Department which was authorised to make advances upon the security of primary produce placed under the legal control of the bank, to “(a) The Commonwealth Bank of Australia or other Banks (b) Co-operative Association formed under the law of the Commonwealth, a State or a territory under the authority of the Commonwealth and (c) such corporations or unincorporate bodies as are specified by proclamation. No advance was made for a period of more than one year”. The Federal Treasury was authorised to lend to the Department an amount upto a maximum aggrega-

tion £ 3,000,000 at any time; the Commonwealth Bank was authorised to issue debentures for the purposes of the Rural Credit Department. Till now no funds have been provided either by the Treasurer or through debentures. The Department's own resources and advances from the General Banking Department have been enough for its present business. Of the net annual profits of the Note-Issue Department 25% was appropriated for the Rural Credits Department upto a total of £ 2 millions. This amount was reached in 1932. Through this Department, Co-operative associations and other prescribed bodies have received advances against such primary produce as wool, wheat, rice, barley, arrow-root, butter, meat, skins, preserved and dried fruits, timber, cotton, wine, eggs, superphosphate, peanuts and osmiridium. The total advances and net profits from 1925 to 1935 have been £60,469,000 and £479,587 respectively. The aim of the Department has been to facilitate the marketing of primary produce in an orderly manner, and to enable the payment of yearly advances to growers. They do not like stocking produce in expectation of a rise in price. The bank enforces this policy by refusing to grant advances to primary producers' groups not getting rid of their product. The bank makes its advances to co-operative organisations who in turn deal with individual farmers. As the success of the scheme greatly depends on a complete knowledge of marketing business the banks take care to equip themselves with all necessary information. The rate of interest of the Rural Credits Department is low. Originally the rate stood at $6\frac{1}{4}\%$ but since the adoption of the Premier's Plan in June 1931, the rate gradually fell and in 1936 was $3\frac{1}{4}\%$. Of the net profits of the Rural Credit Department one-half was to be credited to the reserve fund of the Department and one half to the Rural Credits Development Fund. The Development Fund should be used in such manner as the Board directs for the promotion of primary production. Already grants have been made from this Fund to the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, to the herd production recording and bull subsidy schemes in the various states and for investigations into problems affecting

particular industries, notably wool-growing, dairying, wheat and fruit growing.

The Agricultural Credit Department of India is only a consultative body which studies all questions of agricultural credit and is available for consultation by the Government, the Bank and the Provincial Co-operative Banks and other banks. It has published a series of bulletins on the necessity of reorganizing co-operative institutions. The circulars of the Department regarding the linking of indigenous bankers with the Reserve Bank have already been discussed in the chapter on Indigenous Banking and it need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that on the reorganization of indigenous banking suggested by the Department the Reserve Bank will be prepared to discount their bills directly. But the indigenous bankers are apparently against any such regulation of their methods of business.

Besides being a consultative body the Department should be so reorganised as to provide both intermediate and long term credit to the various associations and banks and to some private individuals. Individual producers will have to be thoroughly organised into associations, pools and the like. Though dealing direct with individuals is alien to a Central Bank, the framers of the Reserve Bank of India Act were not blind to the peculiar needs of India when they introduced Section 18. The Bank should be authorised through its Agricultural Credit Department to make advances for periods not less than nine months and not more than five years. Just as the Rural Credit Department was empowered to borrow from the Government, so also the Agricultural Credit Department shall be allowed to borrow from the Government of India a specified sum and to float debentures. It is not only economically possible but ethically correct that a Government which derives its main sources of revenue from the peasant should be ready to help with money any institution which conduces to his betterment. To build up its capital the Reserve Bank should, for sometime allocate 25% of the net annual profits of the Note-Issue Department of the Bank to the Agricultural Credit

Department. The Reserve Bank can easily invest a good portion of its money in the bonds of the Agricultural Credit Department which will not be for a long period. The investment need not be for five years but under a special arrangement the Bank can invest the money for one year and renew the investment every year. This will give greater security to the investment of the Reserve Bank. In the case of advances to private individuals the Department may lay down that a primary co-operative credit society or a scheduled bank should act as a guarantor. Advances may be made upon the security of land or primary produce stored in the warehouses. In the first place, the Department must make a serious effort in the development of a bill market in the rural areas. The hundi is fast disappearing in this Presidency. It should be standardised and the language of the hundies should be made as simple as possible. Every effort should also be made to popularise usance bills among village bankers and peasants.

Regarding long term credit, the power given to the Agricultural Credit Department does not mean the abolition of the Central Land Mortgage Banks in the various provinces. In fact the establishment of such an all-India institution is only a unifying agent of all the Provincial Central Mortgage Banks. The debentures of these Central Land Mortgage Banks can be guaranteed by the Department. In fact, the Agricultural Credit Department can itself float the debentures for the various land banks. These Central Land Mortgage Banks will then be analogous to the federal land banks of the United States of America and the Agricultural Credit Department to the Farm Credit Administration.

Following the footsteps of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia the net annual profits of the Department should go to constitute a Rural Credit Reserve Fund and a Rural Credit Development Fund, the latter to be devoted to the promotion of Indian agriculture and for the financing of building warehouses at a nominal rate of interest.

It is only through drastic changes in the face of opposition that a well-organised system of rural credit could be developed in this country and in the building of such a system some of the interesting features of rural credit of Australia and America should be kept in mind.

CONCLUSIONS

Extreme pains have been taken to draw pointed attention to the poverty of the Indian peasant, his ever increasing burden of indebtedness, the lack of credit facilities under which he suffers and a conglomeration of credit systems which bewilders him but does not in any appreciable degree help him. Out of this unorganized mass of credit agencies we have been stressing on one important agency of credit, the Co-operative Society. Undoubtedly the salvation of the peasant lies in the proper development of the Co-operative Society which will not only afford him credit but afford him all those facilities to lead a full life. Though facile credit is certainly one of the main agents for curing the ills of the agriculturists, it cannot eradicate them. Credit is a very delicate instrument and will, like a seismograph, register the slightest disturbance in the field of economics. A cotton clause that goes against the interest of India in a Trade Agreement will vitally affect the credit-worthiness of the agriculturist. What the agriculturist needs is a stable price level and this can be achieved by the Central Bank only if it is free to act without any outside pressure. Only in an India which is free to plan an economic programme to her best interest can a policy of agricultural credit play an important part in maintaining stable prices for the agriculturists.

SOME RECENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC FINANCE

By

T. SATYANARAYANA RAO

Introductory

The purpose of this paper is to review very briefly some of the outstanding changes in the theory and practice of Public Finance in recent years.

The financial systems of most countries after the last War were characterised by huge public debts, an enormous growth of public expenditure for debt charges and social services, and the maintenance of high levels of Taxation for meeting this expenditure. Traditional ideas of 'sound finance' required the strict balancing of current revenue and expenditure each year. Expansion of expenditure on non-remunerative works and other purposes was usual during prosperous years and strict economy and retrenchment in bad years. Borrowing was generally approved only for purposes which fetched enough income to pay interest and depreciation charges for the debts.

The Great Depression caused serious dislocation in most financial systems of the world, and compelled people to revise their notions of sound finance. Abnormal shrinkage of revenues and comparative rigidity of expenditure unbalanced most national budgets. Attempts were no doubt made to balance the budgets by increase of taxation, ruthless retrenchment, conversions of public debts and even compulsory revisions of contracts. But these methods could not solve the problem; they accentuated the difficulties of private enterprise and aggravated the already serious problem of unemployment. Except a few Governments like the Government of India, which adhered to conservative views of 'sound

finance' most others allowed consecutive deficits to appear in their budgets. The view that "In some circumstances.....a balanced budget is a pedantic luxury, which a community, hard pressed by sudden and exceptional misfortune can ill afford"¹ has come to prevail.

But this was not all. Among economists who have devoted great attention to problems of the Trade Cycle, a strong section has advocated the use of financial policy to supplement appropriate monetary policy for mitigating business fluctuations. All those who believe in expansionist measures for remedying the depression have generally recommended an increase in public expenditure to stimulate business activity.

The fact that public debts have assumed large proportions and that Governments are to-day the largest borrowers on short and long term has already invested financial policy with great monetary significance. Economists like Mr. Keynes have held that Governments in modern countries are practically in a position to dictate terms to the capital market provided they are determined to do so, and provided a well-planned borrowing programme is followed. The feasibility of this proposal has been practically demonstrated by the ability of the British Government to keep down the rate of interest in spite of the present War.

Financial Policy and the Trade Cycle

The financial policy recommended for mitigating business fluctuations consists of the "passive" policy of continuing normal current and capital expenditure undisturbed, and the more 'active' policy of flexible expenditure particularly on public works. The latter proposal, again, may mean firstly a policy of spacing out public works which are any way needed for social or revenue purposes in the modern world on an increasing scale by central and local authori-

1. Dalton : *Unbalanced Budgets*, p. 12.

ties, in accordance with business conditions. Works should be postponed during boom times and taken up in depression times thus compensating the fluctuations in private business activity. Or, secondly, it may mean an expansion of emergency public works mainly intended to provide employment and stimulate investment, to be financed by large scale borrowing and repaid out of increased revenues in the subsequent period of prosperity.

The case for an expansion of public works during the depression rests on the fact that investment industries are most adversely affected at that time. Entrepreneurs are reluctant to undertake new investment; capitalists prefer to keep their resources in liquid assets. A revival, to be effective must come first in the investment trades. Government can provide the necessary stimulus by borrowing funds at the prevailing low rates of interest, spending them on public works obtaining labour and materials at cheap prices, and creating new employment. It is pointed out that this new expenditure creates not merely a primary increase in employment but also a secondary increase to the extent that this extra purchasing power becomes "new income" in the hands of the newly employed and is spent by them. The relation between the primary employment created and the total increase in employment which results is expressed as the "Multiplier."² Thus a substantial increase in employment can be caused and a basis created for revival of business activity. Incidentally expenditure on unemployment relief would be reduced, and works could be constructed at much lower cost than in boom periods.

The success of a public works policy as a stabilising factor depends on certain requisites. Large quantities of unemployed productive resources should be available and be capable of use; otherwise extra expenditure will only create a rise in certain prices and

2. This concept has been elaborated in the writings of R. F. Kahn, Keynes, and Harrod. For a criticism see U. K. Hicks: *The Finance of British Government*, p. 222.

no increase in employment. Nothing should be done to undermine the confidence of private entrepreneurs; large borrowings for unproductive purposes may easily disturb confidence. Necessary adjustments and cost reductions should not be prevented. The expenditure should be properly timed, long-range plans of public works should be prepared in advance, kept ready for the purpose and be swiftly undertaken. As local authorities are responsible for a large part of expenditure on public works, co-ordination between central and local authorities is absolutely necessary. To avoid international complications an independent currency system controlled and managed with a view to economic stabilisation, has to be maintained.

These arguments in general apply both to a flexible public works policy and to a programme of emergency additional public works, intended mainly as an anti-slump measure. But while most economists are agreed on the desirability of the first plan to the extent it is possible, opinion is sharply divided regarding the second plan. The more radical section of the expansionist school favour the latter plan because a mere spacing out of normal public works may not be enough to create the stimulus necessary for revival. Emergency works may involve loss in the shape of increase of indebtedness and of interest charges but on the other hand we have to take into account the waste of idle resources and unemployment. A large scheme of house-building or road making may not pay, but it adds to social welfare and helps to mitigate the slump.

But several objections are raised against this proposal. Lindahl points out that it raises political problems causing a conflict between the interests of the state and of private capitalists.³ This may lead

3. L. Robbins: *Government Expenditure and Economic Activity in Economic Basis of Class Conflict.*

E. Lindahl: *The Problem of Balancing the Budget in Studies in The Theory of Money And Capital.*

A. D. Gayer: *Public Works in Prosperity and Depression.*

STUDY II OF DR. C. R. REDDY

By Mr. K. Ram Mohan Sastri



C. D. Reddy
24.8.1940.

in bond prices in prosperous times and slump in them when they are unloaded on the market. A. D. Gayer seems to prefer the investment of these reserves in Government bonds purchased from the Central Bank or in Central Bank deposits to keeping them in the shape of cash or gold, as the latter policy may involve deflationary and inflationary effects of too severe a character respectively when reserves are accumulated and spent.⁵

The acceptance of a flexible public works programme as a stabilisation measure, therefore, involves the abandonment of annual balance in the budget. Budgets taken over a number of years should no doubt balance, and if possible the period over which such balancing may be spread should depend on the Trade Cycle. But as the Trade Cycle has no definite period, a period sufficiently long to provide for the vicissitudes of business fluctuations, but not too long as compared with the political tenure of Governments has to be chosen. The budget has, at any rate, to take into account the general conditions of business and employment in determining the scale of public expenditure. Budgetary technique has been suitably altered for the purpose. In most countries it has become the practice to present an income budget and a capital budget at the same time. All borrowed money and its expenditure is shown in the capital budget while the income shows only the payments of interest and provision for repayment of debt.

Swedish economists hold that "financial soundness" requires not merely a balance between expenditure and income in the long run but also a gradual growth in the net assets of the community.⁶ To co-ordinate this aim with the policy of flexible annual balancing new methods of presenting the budget are advocated. The budget should present a comprehensive view of the public economy. For this, the ordinary (or income) budget should include on the revenue side, along with usual items, the calculated interest (or real income)

5. A. D. Gayer : *Public Works in Prosperity and Depression*, p. 394.

6. Lindahl, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

from all capital (remunerative or otherwise) owned by the state and any money received by transfer from the extra-ordinary (or capital) budget to meet a deficit. On the expenditure side it should include the interest on public debt, depreciation charges, provision for increase of capital funds and for amortisation of public debts. The extra-ordinary budget should show on the receipts side all moneys obtained from sinking funds, from other capital funds and from loans; on the expenditure side all expenditure on non-remunerative capital assets, self liquidating capital assets, and any sums transferred to ordinary budget to meet deficit.⁷ (Alternately, the last item mentioned or any surplus in the ordinary budget intended to make up deficits may be transferred from or to a budget equalisation fund). Such a method of presenting the Budget will be in accordance with a flexible balancing policy and at the same time provide a clear view of the finances so that no continuous deterioration may be allowed.

During recent years financing of public works on a substantial scale from loans has been tried in several countries, like Italy, the U. S. A., France, and Sweden. But except in Sweden attempts in this direction were haphazard and not well-planned. Absence of previously planned programmes was a handicap. Even in the U. S. A. where the policy of emergency public works was substantially tried its effect on recovery cannot clearly be ascertained because several other factors were simultaneously at work. In Sweden at any rate the policy has been most systematically adopted ; " the future plans of Capital works of the Swedish central and local authorities are now known for periods of five and ten years in advance."⁸

7. Lindahl, *op. cit.*, particularly the tables on pp. 370, 374 & 380.

8. Budget Deficits In the U.S.A. 1934-35.....3002 (Millions of dollars.)
 1935-36.....4361 ,,
 1936-37.....2707 ,,
 1937-38.....1459 ,,
 1938-39.....3984 ,,

Public Finance and Rearmament

What could not be given an adequate trial in the shape of a public works policy due to hesitancy and financial 'prudence' had in effect to be practised through rearmament. Rearmament provides a better channel of public expenditure for expansionism than public works because its need is not questioned by private enterprise, it does not cause any disturbance of confidence, and it does not compete with private activity. Germany provides us the most amazing example of effective rearmament and economic recovery in recent years. The miraculous achievements of the German machinery of aggression during recent months make several people wonder how a country so much in economic difficulties as Germany was could achieve such a result, and finance it without a breakdown. The simple, though paradoxical answer is that rearmament solved the problem of unemployment, and employment provided the resources for rearmament. It is estimated that the total expenditure on armaments under the Nazi regime could be put at £5000 millions.⁹ When the Nazis came to power unemployment stood at more than six millions. But, the World Economic Survey records, "In Germany: . . . there is at present a real scarcity of labour; and excepting the value of exports there has been no fall in activity in recent months. This high level of economic activity is to be explained by a sustained expenditure by the State, or under the control of the State on armaments, public works and industrial investments under the four-year plan." Thus, the Nazis could realise that the real problem was one of finding use for resources and of finding resources for their chosen purpose,—rearmament. Capitalistic countries all the while went on calculating the 'financial' aspects of solving unemployment. Of course, Nazi rearmament was achieved by a combination of measures: conscription of resources, compulsory labour, complete control of trade and industry, heavy taxation, expropria-

9. *Financial and Economic Realities* in the *Round Table*, No. 119, 1940.

tion of Jews and political opponents, and even forced loans and inflation. Such methods could not obviously be adopted by democratic countries before the War. But it must be said that traditional ideas of sound finance prevented them from adopting bold plans of utilizing the resources at their disposal.

War Finance

The life and death struggle in which Great Britain is now engaged enables us to understand the realities behind the immense problem of financing the war. It is now realised that the problem is one of finding and mobilising the labour, the material, and other resources necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. Such mobilisation could be achieved partly by payment and partly by compulsion. It is necessary to see that out of the total that could be produced (or obtained from abroad by sale of assets, or exports, or borrowing) the State gets what it needs, while private consumption is restricted to the minimum necessary for productive and war effort. For this purpose it is estimated that Great Britain should raise nearly 50% of her national income by taxation, voluntary loans, and even compulsory loans in preference to inflationary finance. Inflation creates unnecessary problems by expanding certain incomes in a proportion greater than that of the rise in prices, reducing the purchasing power of fixed incomes, creating labour discontent and expropriating savings, while it does not in any way add to the resources already possessed or produced. Hence while raising a part of the resources necessary in the shape of taxation and voluntary loans, resort may be necessary even to compulsory loans. Increasing incomes, particularly of the working class are needed to stimulate production for the war; but it is also necessary that private consumption should be restricted to the amount available for the purpose. To avoid inflation and to achieve this purpose, a large part of the income of the working class should be taken away by the state. Compulsory loans are preferable for this purpose to taxation because they

involve the prospect of a return in the future if not to-day and thus provide an incentive for curtailing consumption. This is the central point in Mr. Keynes' proposal for compulsory contributions to be blocked in the shape of savings deposits and released after the war is over. Thus inflation is largely avoided now, and a slump is prevented by providing the released purchasing power after the war when production has to be diverted to ordinary channels. Repayment can be made through a Capital levy, or again by a continued scheme of compulsory loans preferably free of interest. Professor Meredith suggests that a scheme of compulsory interest-free loans should become a permanent feature and should be used whenever saving shows a tendency to out-strip possibilities of remunerative investment; "The amount so borrowed being used either to extend social capital of non-remunerative types or to reduce taxation in ways which will promote increase of expenditure upon consumption rather than increase of savings."

Thus, recent trends in Public Finance have all been towards realising the increasing relation between Finance and economic policy in general and a policy of stabilising economic conditions, employment in particular. Public Finance assumes an important role in mobilising the real resources of the community for social welfare. Mere pre-occupation with the forms and frame work of so called sound finance has given place to practices which appear heterodox like deficits, emergency expenditure programmes, compulsory mobilisation of labour and industries, compulsory loans and proposals for a capital levy.

These developments are of particular interest for us in India because all these years we have watched a do-nothing policy by way of anti-slump measures or welfare programmes. Essential programmes of nation building—we may say, war against degradation

of all types—like education, public works, extension of health services etc., have been held up because of “Financial difficulties”. People are unemployed and resources lie idle when essential works and services are starved. The conclusion seems inevitable that we shall also have to break through the trappings of orthodox finance and initiate bold measures of progress by commandeering available resources for national development.

THE FIFTH REPORT AND ITS AUTHORSHIP

By

B. NATARAJAN

The historic letters of Junius were the subject of a prolonged controversy regarding their authorship. The plays of Shakespeare have similarly given rise to schools of research workers who have left no stone unturned to assign the authorship of the dramas either to Lord Bacon or to Lord Oxford. Buried coffin lids had been lifted and the latest searchlight of the X-ray had been turned on musty portraits. The object in thus discovering the real author of an important work is not one of Pickwickian curiosity. Such a pursuit, if successful, gives the milieu in which the ideas of an author took shape and evaluates for us their worth in terms of personal and subjective experiences. No great work can be understood in full without a knowledge of the forces that made it.

Importance of the Fifth Report

In the days of the East India Company, the British Parliament appointed from time to time a Select Committee, either of the House of Commons or the House of Lords, to enquire into the problems connected with India. One such Committee was appointed in 1810, in view of the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1814. The deliberations of the Committee lasted for over two years and they issued a series of reports on different aspects of the Company's connection with India, such as trade, finance, revenue, etc. Of these the Fifth Report of this 'Select Committee of the House of Commons on the East India Affairs' dealt with the revenue systems so far adopted with special reference to the introduction of Permanent Settlement in the territories just then acquired. The import-

ance of this report lies in the fact that contrary to the cherished expectation of the authorities at Madras and to the opinion so far held by the Directors at home, the report effected a *volte face* in land revenue policy. Till then the favourite theme with the administrators in general was the extension of the settlement inaugurated by Lord Cornwallis to other parts of India. Sir Thomas Munro was the leader of a minority who championed the losing cause, as it then appeared, of Ryotwari. The Fifth Report was a complete triumph for this minority view. It was the Charter for that peasant proprietary system known as Ryotwari.

Rt. Hon'ble John Sullivan, for many years an important member of the Board of Control, rightly said: "The publication of that valuable report may be considered to have formed another epoch in Indian history. A mass of information, highly important, but which had till then been confined within a comparatively narrow circulation, was brought into notice by the committee."¹ The Report has since become celebrated. Four learned editions have so far appeared.² It became the beacon light of later day revenue and judicial administration. Learned counsels arguing on opposite sides swore by it as the true historical record. In the words of Sir Colley Scot-

1. Gleig. *Life of Munro*, Vol. II, p. 7.

2. The original edition in folio was published at the order of the House of Commons in 1812-13. Copies of this became so rare by 1866 that a single copy occasionally fetched upwards of Rs. 50 at auction sales. A second edition, suggested and patronised by Sir Charles Wingfield, Commissioner of Oudh, and edited by Sir Charles Wilkins, was published by Higginbothams, Madras, in 1866. The noteworthy feature of this edition, which had the patronage of three provincial governments besides Wingfield's, was that the appended documents of the report were arranged by R. A. Dalrymple of the Madras Civil Service. A second impression of Wilkin's edition was printed in 1883. The latest edition is that of Ven'ble W. Firminger, which was taken up at the suggestion of Sir Aushtosh Mukerji and published in three volumes in 1917 by R. Cambray & Co., Calcutta. Although Mr. Firminger's introduction

land, "Certainly we could hardly have a more authentic and instructive guide in forming our conclusion, containing as the Report no doubt does, the substance of all the information derivable from the official records and reports in the possession or power of the Company's Government."³ Rt. Hon'ble Sir Barnes Peacock of the Privy Council characterised it as a work of great research;⁴ and earlier in the century, Sir Richard Temple regarded the report as a mine of useful information.⁵ George Campbell described the "well-known" report as a very admirable account of early British administration, the like of which had not been published during the previous forty years.⁶ That this is not an extravagant estimate will be clear to readers who compare it with the two subsequent Parliamentary Reports of 1832 and 1853.

The Report was based on a ground-work of learned papers that have been appended to it. It is this feature that makes its conclusions sound so true and unexceptionable. The appendices, like Shavian introductions, outweigh the text both in length and thought. They include the papers written till then on the subject of land revenue administration by 'giants' like Placc, Hodgson, Munro and Thackeray and, together with the discussion on the comparative merits of the Zamindari and Ryotwari systems, afford a complete insight into the land tenures and revenue administration of the different districts of Bengal and Madras Presidencies.

is highly learned and the edition is improved in many respects, he omits a few important documents taken from later Parliamentary Reports and appended to the second edition such as J. Hodson's Memorandum on the encouragement of cultivation, etc.

3. Sir C. Scotland: *Madras Historical Commission Records*, 1871, Vol. VI, p. 220.

4. Sir B. Peacock: *Law Reports*, 1873-74, Vol. I, p. 314.

5. *Calcutta Review*, 1851, Vol. XV, p. 351.

6. G. Campbell: *Modern India*, (1852), p. vii.

Authorship—Cumming vs. Davis

Before proceeding to study the conclusions of this memorable document it would be interesting to know the author behind it. The Report being that of a Committee was necessarily impersonal in form. The authorship of the Report is attributed by certain authorities to Mr. James Cumming, who in 1812 was a Senior Clerk of the Revenue and Judicial Departments of the Control office, which post he held till his death. Rt. Hon'ble John Sullivan, cited above, when referring to James Cumming says, "He had largely contributed in preparing the Fifth Report presented by the Committee of the House of Commons in 1812; his talents had been unremittingly devoted to the discharge of his public duties, and he died a martyr to his zeal and exertions."⁷ This is corroborated by the historian J. C. Marshman who describes Cumming as one of the ablest officers in the Board of Control.⁸

Officially, the task of drafting the Report had been assigned to Mr. J. Samuel Davis,⁹ then a newly elected Director of the East India

7. *Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons*, (1832) Vol. III, Appendix (Rev.), p. 50.

8. *History of India*, Vol. II, p. 272.

9. Davis had a notable career. He came to India on the staff of the Royal Engineers, and was soon appointed an aid-de-camp to the Commander-in-chief. As he was an excellent artist, he was attached to Turners' Mission to Tibet in 1783-84. In 1799, in recognition of his services he was promoted to the civil service and became the Magistrate of Benares district. He took a heroic part in defending the British citizens of Benares and became the Leonidas of that "Indian Thermopylae" where the Nawab Vizier Ali indulged in an orgy of massacre in 1799. From Benares he was called to Calcutta to fill higher posts. In 1806 he returned to England with a fortune and in 1810 was elected as one of the Directors of the East India Company, in the vacancy caused by the death of Sir F. Baring. C. R. Markham says that Davis joined the Directorate in 1809. This is inaccurate as authentic records give the date of his election as Oct. 10th 1810 (Vide Dodwell and Miles: *Alphabetical list*

Company. According to C. R. Markham, the Select Committee of the House of Commons entrusted Davis with the task of drawing up "in their name the memorable 'Fifth Report on the Revenues of Bengal'." ¹⁰ This was possibly so, as Davis then happened to be a Director of the Company after having spent the best part of his life in India and obtained an intimate knowledge of the condition of the country, particularly of the north. Later writers generally confirm this view. W. F. B. Laurie, writing in 1888, says, "Being requested by a Committee of the House of Commons to draw up a report on the state of the revenues of India, he wrote that very able treatise known as the Fifth Report. But the labour of finishing this in a perfect state within the limited period accelerated a disease already latent in his constitution; for not long afterwards he was taken ill, and gradually growing weaker under the effects of a painful disorder, he died the 16th day of June, 1819, at his house at Croydon, in the fifty-ninth year of his age." ¹¹ *The Dictionary of Indian Biography* also affirms that Davis "wrote the well-known Fifth Report." ¹² J. H. Rivett-Carnac, writing in 1910, also attested that his illustrious grandfather "wrote the celebrated Fifth Report". ¹³ The Venerable Walter K. Firminger had indicated this

of the Hon'ble East India Company's Civil Servants, from the year 1780 to the year 1893, p. xx—1839; also *Memorials of Old Hailebury* by Sir William Jones and others) J. H. Rivett-Carnac mentions that Davis was a Chairman of the East India Company (*Many Memories*, p. 5). This is an error, as Davis is not mentioned in the list of Chairmen or even of Deputy Chairmen of the Company. Davis died in 1819.

10. C. R. Markham: *Narrative of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet*, (2nd Ed. 1879), p. lxxii, n.

11. W. F. B. Laurie: *Distinguished Anglo-Indians*, p. 11. Charles Campbell Prinsep gives the date July 1819 for Davis' death (vide *Record of the Madras Civil Service* p. xii). But Buckland confirms the date given by Laurie (vide *Dictionary of Indian Biography*).

12. Buckland: *Dictionary of Indian Biography*, p. 1906.

13. J. H. Rivett-Carnac: *Many Memories*, (1910), p. 5.

in 1910 and called Davis "The compiler of the famous Fifth Report".¹⁴ In 1917, in his edition of the Fifth Report, he brought this aspect into prominence by adding a note on the subject.¹⁵

The claim put forward on behalf of Samuel Davis for the authorship of the Fifth Report has to be reconciled with that extended on behalf of John Cumming. Samuel Davis being a Director with long experience of Indian affairs was in all probability looked up to as an authority. Therefore the Committee must have informally requested him to draw up the report. He, in turn, would have assigned the work, at least that part relating to Madras (reserving for himself things connected with North India) to a responsible Senior Clerk like John Cumming who had been dealing with Indian revenue subjects for a long time. So that, ultimately the Report must have been drawn up by Cumming, supervised by Davis in the light of his actual experiences in Bengal and finally accepted by the Committee, perhaps after dotting an "i" here and crossing a "t" there. Such a procedure is no unusual event, especially in the history of committee reporting. Behind many a committee's report there is the accumulated wisdom of a forgotten civil service man, as behind every budget of a Chancellor of the Exchequer there is the ripe experience of an expert financial secretary.

Influence of Munro on Cumming

The labour involved in the Report seemed to have told on the health of both Davis and Cumming who are said to have died of the strain involved. Therefore, whoever might have been directly responsible for the final form, it is indisputable that Cumming also had an adequate share in the shaping of the Report, particularly in regard to questions concerned with the Madras Presidency. While

14. G. F. Grand: *Narrative of the Life of a Gentleman long resident in India*, 1814. (Reprint, 1910), p. 313.

15. *Fifth Report* (Firminger Edition), Vol. I.

Davis appears never to have come to this part of the country, Cumming had a knowledge of the Madras Presidency through a very valuable friend, Col. Munro. In the days when Munro was the Collector of Ceded Districts, he was subject to organised opposition from some members of the Civil Service, who seeing that this inter-loper from the military service was entrusted with responsible duties, considered to belong exclusively to them, grew jealous.¹⁶ Therefore Munro, as was then the practice with many a servant of the Company,¹⁷ had to keep up correspondence with some friend in the East India House lest those "tyrants of Leadenhall Street", as the Marquis of Wellesley described the Court of Directors in a fit of passion, should be misinformed.

Munro who left the shores of Madras at the end of the year 1807 on furlough, after a pleasant voyage of more than five months landed at Deal on the 5th of April 1808. After spending in his native land of Scotland a short period of time alternating between pleasure and study, he began to feel bored. "The want of employment began at last to be felt, and he finally removed to London".¹⁸ In London he was in constant communication with important personages connected with Indian affairs, notable among whom was the Duke of Wellington.

It was just then that the period for the expiry of the Company's Charter was drawing near. The question of its renewal came up prominently, as it had come up two decades ago. In those days perhaps the people of England paid more attention to happenings in India than even in the more enlightened days of modern times. The East India Company was a joint-stock concern of shareholders.

16. Arbuthnot: *Memoirs of Munro* (1886 Edn.), p. cxlii.

17. Occasionally this involved the writer in trouble due to betrayal as in the case of Petrie's letter—vide *Letters to the Court Intercepted*; q. v. Letter from Mrs. Petrie.

18. Gleig: *Life of Munro*, Vol. I, p. 380,

The sensational events of war and conquest were daily adding to the increasing triumphs of Imperialism. Men from the East were returning not only with laurels, but also with 'pagoda treës.' These must have made discussion on India a fascinating subject. Public attention began to be directed, with no ordinary eagerness. The doctrine of *laissez faire* was at its ascendancy. Free trade *versus* monopoly for the Company became an academic and public question. Parliament, feeling the pulse of the country, did not embark on any hasty legislation, and as was usual on such occasions set up the Committee of the House of Commons to go into the question in all its bearings. Many distinguished Anglo-Indian officials and other able men who were connected with India were examined by the Committee. Munro influenced the decisions of the Committee in many ways. His oral evidence, as well as written memoranda, went to prove the case for renewal of the Company's Charter for another period on certain conditions, in spite of the fact that he was a convinced free trader.¹⁹ Munro was of opinion that in the particular circumstance, free trade would demoralize British prestige in India. The time was not ripe for it.

This must have secured for Munro a warm corner in the hearts of the Court of Directors, especially when it is remembered with what great authority on Indian affairs he was looked up to in general. "Very many of the articles which appeared in the several Reviews—a still greater number of the pamphlets which came out at the time, were submitted, previous to publication, to his revision; whilst not a few for which others have obtained credit, owe all their merits to him. It seemed indeed as if business, public business, was the atmosphere in which alone he could freely breathe; for even his period of professed relaxation was more than half consumed in attending to matters of high moment".²⁰

19. B. Natarajan, *Economic Doctrines of Sir Thomas Munro*, q. v. Fr. Carty's 65th Birthday Celebration Volume.

20. Gleig: *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 400.

These activities of Munro with his residence at London, while on furlough, are detailed at length to show what a potent influence he must have been in the shaping of the Fifth Report indirectly through his friend Mr. John Cumming, and directly through his talks and writings at the time. His sincere efforts bore fruit. The celebrated Fifth Report came out in 1812, drawing "towards the affairs of India other eyes besides those of its immediate rulers";²¹ and adopting many of the long cherished views of Munro *in toto*.

Main Conclusions of the Fifth Report

The Report reviewed all the connected papers on land revenue administration, weighed the comparative merits of the three systems, Zamindari, Village Lease and Ryotwari, and came to considered conclusions.

The abandonment of Ryotwari system, the Committee felt, was unhappy. Both the Board and the Government at Madras had admitted its beneficial effects with regard to "the acquisition of revenue information, the just ascertaining of the dues of Government, and the rights of the cultivators, the defeating of the interested confederacies of the inhabitants, and the delivering of the inferior from the oppression of the superior ryots."²² Ryotwari was given up too soon, "before all the advantages it was capable of yielding had been duly realized; before it was possible to have investigated, defined and adjusted all the rights of Government, and those connected with the soil; before various other matters relating to the interests both of the sovereign power and the subject had been accurately understood and arranged; and before the mass of the people had become so well acquainted with the genius and spirit of our government, and its just intentions and principles, as should confirm their confidence in it, into a settled and habitual feeling."²³

21. *Ibid.*, p. 414.

22. *Fifth Report* (Firminger Edition), Vol. I. p. 292.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

Ryotwari system fulfilled the canon of adjusting the payment of the ryot to his ability. This principle had "produced the largest amount of revenue that could be collected with justice to the people." Waste lands would be brought under the plough, bringing in its train blessings to the people and the Government alike. The beneficial effects of this system could be seen from Munro's achievements in the Ceded Districts which, in a short interval of time, were restored from a condition of the lowest depression to one of comparative prosperity. "It is therefore a matter of regret" concluded the Committee, "that any circumstances should have existed to render the abandonment of ryotwari settlements necessary". In their opinion the change to Village Leases would be injurious to the welfare of the country, especially by leaving the collection of revenue from the ryots to the renters.

Early influences of the Report on the Court of Directors

In these words the Committee expressed their disapprobation of alternative systems and praised the virtues of Ryotwari system. The Fifth Report was dated 28th July 1812. The Despatch of the Court of Directors prohibiting the continuation of the Decennial Leases and ordering reintroduction of Ryotwari was dated 16th December. Although in that despatch the Court of Directors do not make any reference to the conclusion of the Fifth Report, a comparative study of the two documents easily discloses the fact that the Directors were influenced by the Report even at that date. The trend of reasoning, the documents on which the arguments are based, and the conclusions arrived at are identical. Obviously the Court of Directors had forestalled the Fifth Report and the absence of direct reference to the Fifth Report may be explained by the fact that although the Report was submitted on the 28th July 1812 and ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, it was not till far in 1813 that the actual printed report came out. This is confirmed by the fact that Wilkin's glossary of Indian terms which was added as

a part of the first folio edition of the Fifth Report was "ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 27th April 1813." The Report therefore must actually have come out of the press a little later in the year 1813.

The first reference to the Report by the Court of Directors is found in their Despatch dated 17th December, 1813. Referring to the question of land revenue system to be adopted, they said as they had already discussed their views elaborately in their Despatch of the December of the previous year, they felt relieved of the necessity of recurring to it. "This is a subject which as you will observe on a perusal of the Fifth Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to enquire into the Affairs of the East India Company, engaged their especial attention; and every consideration we have ourselves been able to give to it, and it has much occupied our thoughts, induces us substantially to concur in their sentiments and reasoning on this particular topic."²⁴ It must be mentioned here that the Report roused considerable amount of interest in the public, and Lord Buckinghamshire, who became the head of the Board of Control early in 1812, and his colleagues felt anxious that the course of inquiries pursued by the Committee should be followed up.²⁵ Thus the tide turned in favour of Ryotwari, thanks largely to the influences of Munro on John Cumming, the virtual author of the Fifth Report.

24. Despatch of the Court of Directors to the Government of Madras (Rev.), 17-12-1813.

25. J. Sullivan: *Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons* (1832) Vol. III, Appendix (Rev).

WHY PHILOSOPHY ?

By

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

Not merely in the 'material-minded' West, but even in the 'spiritual' East, no quest has been embarked on without a purpose. It is a truism among us that not even the dullest is appetent without the expectation of some benefit. And our thinkers have been at considerable pains to show that the philosophic quest is neither superfluous nor futile. They have striven to demonstrate in various ways that that quest satisfies an imperious human need which cannot otherwise be satisfied. It will not be the task of this paper to consider or criticise such answers; it will be its aim, however, to tackle what seems an even more fundamental question. Before we seek to answer 'Why Philosophy?' may we not in reason ask 'Why Why'?

The question may be approached in another way. Time was when Philosophy was looked upon as the crown of knowledge, the queen of sciences and so on. With the steady growth of the experimental sciences, philosophy was dethroned and gradually pushed to the background. But even the most hard-baked scientist was prepared to assign some function to philosophy. In the pre-scientific stage men were anthropomorphic, seeking explanations for all phenomena in terms of will and purpose, i.e., in terms of 'Why'. Science has changed all that. It does explain, but its explanation is a 'how'; it is descriptive but in a more organised and systematic way than mere observations can be; its laws are not prescriptions, but descriptions in 'conceptual shorthand' to use a famous phrase of Karl Pearson's. Philosophy has no place in this domain. But there are regions to which scientific knowledge has not yet extended, regions where the question 'Why' still seems legitimate, whether profitable

or not, and here Philosophy may be permitted to weave its cobwebs until the scientific broom can get at them.

The philosopher's reaction to this has been two-fold. The success of science even in its self-restricted task is questioned. Science has in the past laid claim to accurate analysis and description. It is now said that scientific accuracy is but an approximation, a matter of averages, which is good enough for working purposes especially with macroscopic entities, but not a matter of absolute precision in the last resort especially with regard to ultimate constituents. The difference between the exact descriptions of science and the vague speculations of philosophy seems reduced at best to one of degree. Verification of a sort there is in both cases ; and philosophy can claim a higher place because of its wider range.

The other reaction consists in setting-out the importance of the question 'Why'. The scientist may be wise in limiting himself to an understanding of the 'how'; but he cannot afford to ignore for ever or minimise the importance of the 'why.' Descriptions give us but limited satisfaction; a true understanding of what is described seems necessarily to require linking up with ends or purposes. This is specially the case with the phenomena that concern us most closely in our lives—the moral and the social. And if in his study of these the philosopher is led to posit a universal consciousness or purpose underlying all phenomena, the scientist may at best ignore it for his limited purposes, but not quarrel with it or dismiss it as irrelevant ; for the scientist's vision of relevance is very narrow. We philosophers respect the separation of functions; we shall gladly concern ourselves with the question 'why'; we do so, however, in the realisation of the supreme worth of our task, even as compared with that of the scientist. The answer to the question 'Why Philosophy' is that Philosophy alone can answer the question 'Why', and it appears to be a question that cannot be ignored except under certain limitations which should not be lost sight of,

It is this second reaction that I am interested in probing. On this view the difference between the scientific and philosophic quests appears to be one of kind. But is it really so? Has not one of our great philosophers said that 'teleology is but mechanism working backwards'? Let us take a simple phenomenon. A beats his wife. How is the scientist likely to explain this? A beats her, because his passions are not under control, because he has taken drink, because cheap drink is available and he has the money in his purse. If the question is 'why' instead of 'how' the answer may run thus: A beats her, because his anger is uncontrolled, because he lacks the impetus to discipline himself, because there is no worth while end in his vision for the sake of which he should discipline himself, save his money or avoid the liquor shop. The difference between the two explanations lies in just this: While the first leads us on to what is or was, the second brings in considerations of what may be or should be; instead of *propulsion*, we consider *impulsion*. But in both cases we seem to be concerned with some force or forces relatively outside that which is to be explained. This is inevitable; for we are trying to explain a particular as a member of a scheme or system. And unless we envisage the identification of the supposed particular with the alleged system, the latter must remain relatively external and superior to the former. And with this, I would urge, we can get no real satisfaction.

Let us look at it a little closer. A should not beat his wife. Why not? Because she is an independent personality who should not be coerced, though her co-operation may and should be sought. Why may not A coerce another personality? Because he will be put into jail? This will be admitted to be a very poor answer; it ranks no higher than an explanation by *propulsion*. Because he cannot expect others to respect his own personality? This too is an appeal to consequences ranking only slightly above the previous one; the consequences may be envisaged as so remote that they may be neglected; and if coercion can result in the complete extinction of the other per-

sonality (this appears to be the Nazi creed), praise not blame should attach to the coercion. Because to compel another is to do violence to one's own personality? This takes us much nearer to satisfaction; for a deliberate injury to one's own self seem as little intelligible as the deliberate acceptance of a contradiction; and we seem to realise the truth of the Upanishadic seer who taught his wife thus: "Not for the sake of everything, beloved, is everything dear, but for the sake of the self, everything is dear." You may find greater satisfaction from the 'why' than from the 'how'; if you do get it however you will find that you have passed far beyond the narrow confines of the particular self. A is no longer one personality over against another, but a personality inclusive of all other persons in such wise that what affects them affects him too and is realised by him as so affecting. He is the circle centred no longer in himself but everywhere. Only thus can the answer 'Why' be intelligible. Else it will lead to an infinite regress of final causes, which is no more adequate an explanation than an infinite regress of first causes.

With this however, we seem to have rendered the question 'Why' again unintelligible. Purposes and fulfilments have place in relation to 'finite (?)' personalities. But such purposes etc., are linked up with others in an unending chain, so that there is no finality about the final cause. If on the other hand, we make the 'personality (?)' infinite, we avoid this endless dissipation but only at the cost of 'purpose' itself. What purpose or desire can the infinite have? Having all desires realised, what can it desire? *Āpta-kāmasya kā sprhā*? Being itself, this alone is its desire or purpose; hence it is said to be *satyakāmah*, *satyasankalpah*. To the question 'why' it can supply itself alone as answer; and that certainly is not the answer we looked for.

We may put the matter in yet another way. At least according to one school of philosophy, that of critical Idealism, relations are phenomenal; they are not ultimate; any analysis of them inevitably takes us beyond them to the supra-relational. Now, the explana-

tion 'why' is as much relational as the 'how'; it is the direction of the relations that differs, not the validity or the intelligibility. And philosophy that seeks the intelligible should discard the 'why' as well as the 'how'.

This realisation is, however, itself the result of philosophical enquiry. So the question 'Why Philosophy?' admits at a lower level of this answer, that it leads us to realise the futility of all finite explanation, including the 'why'. As a *tu quoque* this answer will take the form of the question posed in the first paragraph 'Why Why?'. At a higher level the answer may be framed thus: the question 'why' admits of no satisfactory answer except when it takes us to the infinite; and then all that is to be explained has to be understood as of the very nature of the infinite, not as linked to it in a relation of propulsion or impulsion. We philosophise, therefore, not because of this or that reason, our training or our cravings, but because it is our very nature to do so. This has been realised by the profoundest philosophers, who like Bradley have found 'the search for Truth a compelling necessity of their very nature.'* And this is where the highest philosophy joins hands with the deepest religion; for the Supreme Being of the latter is not an external power waiting on reasons or occasions, but an inner urge conferring its grace uncaused and unmotivated (*avyākaraṇāmūrti*).

*Dedication of F. H. Bradley's *Collected Essays*.

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION

By

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

I

Religion is as old as man; and however much he might fight shy of it sometimes, he cannot get away from it, for religion is his real life, a light unto his soul and a lamp unto his feet. As the Upanishad says: 'But for the Spirit (whose experience religion guarantees) no creature can breathe, no being can exist.' The God of religion is far and yet near. He is the innermost soul of man as He is the essence of all existence. Man gets intimations of His presence even in his commerce with the world. And it is the task of religion to confirm these intimations and lead man to perfection.

That the religious spirit is innate in the human race may be illustrated even from the experience of primitive man. When the pre-historic man deified natural phenomena and offered worship to the unseen powers, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the first view of things and was conscious of a Beyond. And 'consciousness of the Beyond is the raw material of all religion.' At a very early stage of his existence man discovered that the sphere of his senses was not all that which is. The testimony of the senses is not the only evidence. The physical world is not the only reality. Thus primitive man was able to touch the hem of the garment of the infinite. Whatever stage in the evolution of man we may examine, we find that the religious sense was never absent from the domain of his experience.¹ If he has sacrificed so often the concrete pleasures of

1. "Ethnography knows no race devoid of religion, but only differences in the degree in which religious ideas are developed."—Ratzel.

the world for the impalpable truths of faith, it is because the lure of the infinite is irresistible and therein he finds his natural element.

II

What is that lure, one may ask. What is there in religion which it is impossible to do without? In short, what is religion ?

Attempts have been made to define religion from different points of view. The chief standpoints are provided by the multiple nature of human mind itself. The older psychologists who were obsessed with the tripartite division of mental processes into thought, feeling and will, sought to account for the religious consciousness in terms of the one or the other of these mental faculties. Some thought that the dominating influence in religion was played by the faculty of judgment. Others shifted the role from cognition to feeling. Yet others believed that the will is the predominant factor in religious life. Below the conscious layers of the mind there is a vast subliminal sphere called the subconscious. A great American psychologist, William James, finds the roots of religion in this region. Through the subliminal door, he says, transmundane energies operate within our ordinary world. Following him, many psychologists regard instinctive drives as supplying religious motives. No wonder then that the scoffers of religion should characterise God as a sort of wet-nurse to humanity and religion as a narcotic. Feeling and especially fear, has frequently been regarded as the driving force which pushes man to religion. There is another view which holds that religion arises out of a feeling of absolute dependence. Those who approach religion from the conative side of consciousness say that the religious attitude is an answer to a practical need. Man meets with obstacles in his struggle for existence. He finds himself distressed and his independence in jeopardy, and so he requisitions help from something higher and more powerful than himself. The rise of religion has also been traced to intellectual motives like curiosity, the desire to find a cause of things, etc.

All these definitions are defective because in parcelling out the human mind they ignore its fundamental unity. The compartmentalised view of life is inadequate and it can never give us a comprehensive vision of religious truth. Religion, if anything, must conserve, transform and sublimate all the aspects of mental life. The definitions we have given so far are not so much false as partial, and are comparable to the attempts of the blind men in the story to describe the elephant.

The prophets and God-men tell us that religion is the whole of life, and not a part thereof. The summit of religious experience is the intuition of unity. "The overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is the everlasting and triumphant mystic tradition, hardly altered by differences of clime and creed. In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian mysticism, in Whitmanism, we have the same recurring note, so that there is about mystical utterances an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic stop and think, and which brings it about that the mystic classics have, as has been said, neither birthday nor native land. Perpetually telling of the unity of man and God, their speech antedates language, nor do they grow old."² Religious experience is the same all the world over. It is the crowning glory and consummation of man's existence on earth.

III

It is impossible to brush aside the evidence of the messengers of God. It is illogical to think that we have a right only to believe in the reality of our sense perceptions and not to place our trust in the genuineness of mystic experience. God is as real to the mystic as matter and life are to us. The first question put by Swami Viveka-

nanda, then a youth fresh from college, to Sri Ramakrishna, his would-be master, was 'Have you seen God?' Sri Ramakrishna gave the reply 'I have seen Him. My seeing Him is more real than my seeing you. And, what is more, I can show Him to you.' Such is the testimony of God-men. The experience of God to them is 'as much a fact as a green leaf or the sun is for a dispassionate observer.' The limited understanding of the child cannot grasp the subtle truths of science. But this does not mean that scientific truths are myths. To us who cannot rise above the intellectual level of knowledge, the mystic experience of the saint and the sage appears mythical. But when we too are blessed with spiritual vision (divyacakshus), God will become to us the real of the real (satyasya satyam). Spiritual things are to be spiritually discerned. Higher than the perceptual, imaginative and intellectual ways of knowing, there is intuition which is the instrument of God-realisation. We are not utter foreigners to the intuitive way; for we get its broken lights in artistic experience and in the life of disinterested love and service.

Religious experience is unique in the sense that it removes the barriers between subject and object, knower and known, and the distinctions of space and time. As we remarked above, it is unitive experience. It is integral and undivided, self-certifying and unsublated. Whether the supreme object of religious experience be regarded as the impersonal Absolute or the personal God, there is no room for the pettiness of the ego in that Divine Flood. The experience is 'sovereign in its own rights and carries its own credentials,' says Sir Radhakrishnan, 'It is self-established (svatassiddha), self-evidencing (svasamvedya), self-luminous (svayamprakāśa).' To us it appears to be super-normal. In fact, however, it is the fulfilment of the normal.

A second characteristic of this experience is that it is the expression of perfect freedom. Freedom implies absence of fear. Fear arises when there is awareness of another, suspicion of discord and expectancy of strife. But since religious experience is unitive and

subversive of all limitations, there can be no fear. Hence it is that this supreme state has been called *abhaya*, fearlessness and the end of the religious quest has been defined as *moksha*, freedom.

Thirdly, there is a positive content for this experience. It is not merely a negative state of being free and fearless ; it implies also positive peace (*sānti*) and the highest happiness (*ānanda*). The Upanishad contains the prayer: 'From the unreal lead me to the real. From darkness lead me to light. From death lead me to immortality.' Mystic experience is a fulfilment of this prayer. To the vulgar mind heaven is painted in glowing colours and is described as a land flowing with milk and honey. This is figuratively true. In religious experience man discovers his lost soul, and this certainly means supreme felicity and joy.

The mention of words like 'joy' and 'happiness' should not make us think that religious experience is on a par with sense-pleasures. When creature comforts are attended to, there is a feeling of satisfaction which may be called *pleasure*. When desires which are intellectual and reflective in character are satisfied, there is *happiness*. Higher than either of these is *blessedness* or *joy* which belongs to the universe of religious experience. This is gained not by attaching oneself to sense-objects but by getting away from them. The truly religious man lives *in* the world but is not of it. The very first words used by Śrī Krishna in describing the state of a man who has attained to spiritual wisdom are these: "When a man puts away all the desires of his mind, and when his spirit finds comfort in itself—then is he called a man of steadfast wisdom."

This inner renunciation does not mean running away from the world. In truth, it is only the man of perfection that can see the world in its proper perspective. He enjoys by renouncing—by renouncing the sense of 'I' and 'mine'. He sees the world wrapped in the mantle of God; and his love knows no bounds. It covers not only men but also birds and beasts. The man of spirit prays for the well-being of all creatures. There is this prayer in the

Bhāgavata ; “ I desire not the supreme state with all its eight perfections nor the release from rebirth ; may I assume the sorrow of all creatures who suffer and enter into them so that they may be made free from grief.”

The characteristics of religious experience set forth above are not peculiar to any particular religion. They are found in the lives of all prophets. The essence of religion is the same, though the outer dress may vary, even as human nature is the same in spite of variations in colour and costume.

IV

We have given above an analysis of the religious experience of seers and saints. There are several stages to be traversed before attaining to that level of mystic communion. Three principal stages are usually distinguished in the development of religious consciousness—tribal, national and universal.

Among primitive tribes religion and magic are inextricably interwoven. Things in nature like river and cloud, rain and sun are deified and invested with souls (animism). Man thinks that he is surrounded by subtle and incalculable spirits influencing his actions (spiritism). Special objects like a stock or stone, a claw or even a stray bit of a body are chosen for veneration (fetishism). The spirits of departed ancestors are believed to roam the earth; and worship is offered to them (ancestor-worship). The life of some individual animal or plant is conceived to be bound with the life of the tribe; and so the animal or plant is worshipped and regarded as sacred (totemism). The primitive man sees no vital distinction between the organic and the inorganic, man and animal, mind and matter. The objects of worship are not lofty and the motives for worship are not noble.

The transition from the religion of the tribe to the religion of the nation makes for a widening of man's mental horizon. With the

growth of national consciousness and civilized modes of life religion becomes ethical and reflective. The crude tribal cults with their local prejudices and superstitions are no longer adequate and suitable. Hence the need for new gods and new modes of worship. A sudden break with the old, however, is impossible and will be injurious. And so the infant nation chisels new forms out of old material; on the basis of the nature-worship of the tribe a polytheistic system is built. Great gods are shaped out of the powers of nature revered in tribal religion; and they become now national deities. The process does not stop here. The new gods acquire new attributes. Some of the attributes of the lesser gods are taken over by the greater deities. Ethical qualities come to be attributed to the gods. Some of them are regarded as maintainers not merely of physical order but also of the moral order. As the nation develops in its social relations, the gods also are found to constitute not a crowd but a hierarchy. All the gods are brought under the sway of a supreme God. The process of unification progresses still and culminates in the thought that there is no God but the one God (monotheism). The tendency to unification may take a different turn. Instead of raising one God to headship, a divine principle may be recognised to be working in and through the clan of gods. From this point of view the various gods appear to be but the shifting forms of the one divine principle (pantheism); and the dominating religious idea is: 'The one remains, the many change and pass.'

The religion of the nation can govern only the external acts of the citizen and not his inner beliefs. Conformity and not conviction is what is demanded by a national religion. Religion, whether of a tribal group or of a nation, is mainly a social function. The personal element is lacking. Man receives his religion just as he inherits his property. But religion cannot be kept as a thing apart. In the words of Prof. Whitehead, religion is 'what the individual does with his own solitariness.' The leaders of the movement which made religion a matter of life and death, intimately personal, taking

the first place in the scheme of human affairs, were the prophets. Among all the peoples of the world and in all ages prophets have appeared to raise the tone and timbre of religious experience. Their appeal is direct and their voice imperious. Their teachings bear no vestiges of provincialism, for they speak with the authority of God. Instead of a religion for a tribe or a nation they give a religion for humanity. The details in the teachings of the prophets may vary from place to place and age to age; but the spirit remains the same.

V

All the great world-religions may be regarded as universal in spirit. Some of them were founded by individual prophets. The others are considered to have been revealed to a number of seers. Buddhism, Christianity and Islam are 'founded' religions. Hinduism has no single founder; the ancient seers served as but channels for the transmission of religious truths to humanity. All these religions are universal by virtue of their appeal to the spirit in man. None of them is professed by all the men in the world. There can be no such dictatorial religion. The universality of the world-faiths consists in the provision they make for the perfection of man. Each of them has a system of rituals which, besides shaping the artistic instincts of the individual in the right channels, exert a stabilizing influence over the institutions of the religion, a scheme of ethics to make man morally perfect, a path or paths to conduct the pilgrim to his destination, namely God, and a philosophy to satisfy the most rigorous intellectual demands and serve as a portal to the intuitive experience of the Absolute.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSAL

By

P. T. RAJU

This paper deals with the problem whether our knowledge of the universal is prior to that of the particular or posterior to it. It may be felt by those who do not believe in the reality of the universal that there is here no problem at all. For if there is no universal, the problem of its knowledge does not arise. But even those who do not believe in an eternal universal must accept something like it to explain some of our experiences. To say with the conceptualists that the universal is always a concept or with the nominalists that it is only a name is to go against facts. When nature creates any species of animals, it creates according to a pattern, which is inherent in it and must have as much objectivity as the particular. And to call such a pattern a mere concept or name is absurd. It is true that man may manufacture things according to a pattern, which must at first be an idea in his mind. For instance, before the first chair in the world was made, somebody must have had an idea of it, according to which the physical chairs were made. And so far as things manufactured by human beings are concerned, it would be wrong to regard this universal as belonging to nature itself, and we are prone to regard it as an idea in our mind. For this reason conceptualism as regards universals like that of the chair may be considered to be true. And nominalism may be regarded as true concerning universals of meaningless words like *abedacabra*. But the universal of a horse, for instance, which has evolved in the course of the history of the earth, must belong to nature itself. It is a pattern according to which life appears in the process of evolution. Of course, it is wrong to treat this universal as eternal, for we have no evidence to

show that after a particular species becomes extinct its pattern still survives within nature. On the other hand, from the gradual change of the species we may infer the change of the pattern; and this change may be carried to such an extent that the resulting difference may be one of kind. So the universal of even the horse should not be thought of as eternal.

But there are universals like quality, quantity etc., which are called categories in modern philosophy and which belong to the very structure of thought. And so long as thought exists they will last. To call even these eternal and everlasting will be ungrounded, for we have no justification for saying that thought is everlasting. It is quite possible that the universe may become extinct and with it human beings and their thought. Yet so far as man is concerned, we may say that the categories of thought are eternal in that it cannot work without them. Yet we should not forget that the eternality of the categories is only relative. And these categories are not mere concepts like the concept of chair. They are given to man like the universal horse and so belong to nature itself. They are not artificial like the chair.

It is of course possible to regard the universal chair also as belonging to nature. For man is part of nature and his concepts too must belong to nature. However, we are prone to distinguish between things which are the products of the human brain and those which are the products of nature. And we tend to regard the universal of only the latter as belonging to nature.

II

There is another way of approaching the universal. It may be asked : How do we recognise an object as a chair unless we see the presence of the universal chair in it ? And the universal that is present in a physical chair cannot reasonably be treated as a concept, for it is absurd to think that a concept or thought-form can be found in

the physical chair. We have therefore to say that even the universal chair is an objective fact belonging to physical nature.

This way of approach is generally found in European philosophy and is not absent from the Indian. But it does not seem to be the right one, for it gives rise to the insoluble problem of the relation between the universal and the particular. If the universal exists or subsists in the particular, how is it to be differentiated from the latter? Does it exist in all particulars simultaneously or in one after another? If some of the particulars are destroyed, is a part of the universal that exists in these particulars also destroyed? If it is, is the universal ever changing? These difficulties are endless and insoluble, and every student of European and Indian philosophy is acquainted with them.

The universal should therefore be regarded as the pattern in conformity to which the particulars are produced. It is not meant that this pattern is one of the particulars treated as a type, which is the theory of Berkeley. For even that particular must have been made according to a type, which must be different from it; and this reasoning will lead us to an infinite regress. The pattern is not one of the particulars; on the other hand, every particular conforms to it. It may belong to nature or to thought; or it may be an idea or concept. When we say that it belongs to nature or to thought, we do not mean that nature or thought consciously holds the pattern before itself and then creates or understands. Even Kant does not mean that the mind has at first the idea of the category before itself and then constructs the phenomenal object according to it. The categories are the forms of the spontaneity of thought. And we may say that the universals like horse, cow etc., are the forms of the spontaneity of the process of natural evolution. They belong to nature, exist in it, though we would be wrong in asserting that they are eternal.

III

The universal, therefore, we may say, is a true fact, and the problem now is: How do we come to know it? The conceptualists

and nominalists in European philosophy maintain that we know the universals after we know the particulars. According to the conceptualists, the universal is an idea obtained by abstraction of the common qualities from a number of observed particulars. But it is not necessary for those who maintain that the universal is known *a posteriori* to be conceptualists. For they may even say that the common properties of all the particulars form the universal, and this universal is naturally known after observing a number of particulars. It is against both these views that Hegel contends that nothing remains of the particulars if all their differences are removed just as nothing is left of the onion if all its layers are peeled off. The nominalist position is less tenable; for we do not without reason call a number of things by the same name. And if this reason is an objective fact and not a mere name, it must be a universal which is that objective fact.

The usual objection raised against the view that our knowledge of the universal is posterior to that of the particular is: If we do not know the universal before-hand, how could we have given the name to the particular? This is the objection of the Platonists. This difficulty is avoided by Plato by advocating the doctrine of Reminiscence, according to which every cognition is a recognition or remembrance. Our mind is in eternal possession of all the universals, and the particulars only remind us of them. The knowledge of the particular is really the remembering of the universal, its recognition in the particular. The particular is known only so far as it partakes of the nature of the universal. This view in the beginning of Modern European philosophy appeared as the theory of innate ideas, and these innate ideas were turned into the categories of the understanding and the Ideas of Reason in the philosophy of Kant. Though this view is true as regards universals like the categories and the Ideas of Reason, it is difficult to prove it with regard to empirical universals like the horse and the chair. Nobody teaches me that the thing before me is substantial and that things have attributes, and so the

universals like substance and attribute must be inborn ideas with every man, who always uses them though unconsciously. But when I first come across a particular horse or chair, somebody has to tell me its name, and then in the second instance I can use it. Even if I do not name it because somebody does not tell me its name, I never *recognise* the first horse as a horse, though I do it in the second instance. The doctrine of Reminiscence does not hold true in the case of all the universals.

Even in the case of the categories it is only in a sense that it holds true. For to take literally the statement that the particular reminds us of the universal is wrong. When I perceive that A causes B, I am not reminded of the category of cause, though that category is used by me in understanding that experience. The doctrine of Reminiscence is true only so far as it asserts that in interpreting our experience the category is already used. And it would be wrong if it means also that the category is consciously and deliberately used.

The usual objection, again, to the view that our knowledge of the universal is prior to that of the particular is: Why does not a baby know what an elephant is if it is already in possession of the knowledge of the universal elephant? We have said above that the view that we have *a priori* knowledge of empirical universals is wrong. Even as regards the *a priori* knowledge of universals like the categories, we may be said to have a knowledge of them only so far as they belong to the structure of our thought, and not in the sense that they are consciously held before our minds when we use them. Otherwise, even a child must be able to tell us what causality or reciprocity means.

But when we consider empirical universals like horse and chair this theory has the least support. It is preposterous to credit us with the *a priori* knowledge of all the forms of animate and inanimate things which nature did and will create and similarly with all the forms of things which the human intellect did and will produce.

We may have therefore to say that our knowledge of the empirical universals is in every way *a posteriori*. We know them after we know the particulars, and as they do not belong to the structure of thought, their knowledge cannot be said to be as much prior to that of the particulars as that of the categories.

Even to say that our knowledge of the categories is prior to that of the particulars can be true only in a far-fetched sense. All that can be said in support of the priority of their knowledge is that they are forms of thought, which is generally regarded as the instrument of knowledge. And we shall not be wrong in saying that at least as much effort is needed to understand the nature of thought as to understand that of external objects. For to think is not the same as to understand the nature of thought. If so, we may say that our knowledge of the categories also must be as posterior to that of the particulars as our knowledge of empirical universals, the particulars here being the things interpreted according to the categories.

Here we have to note one point. Priority of knowledge is not the same as priority of existence. Similarly, posteriority of knowledge is not the same as posteriority of existence. The categories belong to the inherent nature of thought, and so their reality may be said to be prior to the objects interpreted according to them. Similarly, the universal horse as the inherent tendency of nature to produce that species may be regarded as prior to many particular horses. The formation of the tendency to produce the first horse may be identical with the production of it. Yet in the case of the other horses we may treat the tendency as prior to them. So also the idea of chair in its first maker may be said to be prior to all the particular chairs. But only in the case of the last universal, that is, the chair, can it be said that priority of knowledge is the same as priority of existence, for existence is only conceptual existence. The categories too, it may be said, have conceptual existence; but this existence, it

has to be admitted, can be known only when thought becomes reflective and makes itself its object, while a concept like chair is known without any such reflection. It is a concept which is at the same time an ordinary object of mind.

IV

If thus both the theories, that our knowledge of the universal is prior to that of the particulars and that it is posterior to it, have each its own defects, what would be the true solution of the problem? A satisfactory answer to the question requires distinguishing between situations. In the case of universals like chair, it is possible for man to have knowledge of the universal before that of the particular. For the first maker of the chair must necessarily have had a general knowledge of it before he made it. The universal of a species may be known beforehand by, for instance, a zoologist. It is with such fore-knowledge that what are called missing links between species are discovered. Similarly, moral and other values which have to be realised and are not actual are known beforehand. But very often in the case of universals like horse I do not know the universal before I see the particular. Similarly, I get the idea of the categories after I make use of them. Even in the case of the chair, for those who are not its first conceivers the universal cannot be known before the particular.

If we do not take into consideration cases like that of the first maker of things like the chair, it would be difficult to support either the view that the universal is known *a priori* or the view that it is known *a posteriori*. The true view seems to be that it is known along with the particular.

It is the nature of our thought to distinguish in every perception between the subject and predicate, existence and form, the That and the What. No object is known simply, but always as something. That is, indeterminate perception, (except for Ramanuja),

so far as empirical cognitions are concerned, is only a hypothetical state and is therefore an abstraction. It can never be a unit of our knowledge. And when a definite bit of our knowledge is taken into consideration, we find in it the above distinction, which in Indian philosophy is the distinction between the *prakārin* and the *prakāra*. It is said that the *prakārin* is the particular and the *prakāra* the universal. It is of course wrong to say that the predicate is always the universal of which the subject is a particular. In the judgment, "The rose is red", red is not the universal of the rose, though it is the form or *prakāra* in which the rose appears to us now. The rose may appear to us in other forms, that is, we may make judgments like "This rose is light" and "This rose is sweet". But we are at present interested in colour, and so the colour is now the form or *prakāra*. One of these *prakāras*, for instance the rose in the judgment, "This flower is a rose", we treat as a universal.

Thus it may be proved that both the particular and the universal are known together. They are distinctions made within the same perception. But so far we have been thinking in terms of the current logic, according to which the predicate is always a universal when compared with the subject. But here a question may be raised which may lead us to reject this logic, though this rejection does not much affect the view that universal and the particular must be known simultaneously.

Is the predicate always a universal? We may admit that every judgment draws the distinction between existence and form, and that the form falls generally on the predicate side. But is this form always a universal? For instance, in the judgment, "The rose is red", is the red the universal red colour or a particular patch of red colour? If supposing we have proof to show that the red here is a particular and not a universal, are we not also to treat the predicate in the judgment, "This is a horse", as a particular and not as a universal? The first reason to show that the predicate is a particular is:

When we negate the judgment, "The rose is red", by saying that it is not red, we are not negating the universal red but a particular red. Similarly, when I say, "That is not a horse but a mule", I am negating a particular horse and not a universal horse. Secondly, in the perceptual judgment, "That is a horse", the horse is regarded as perceived and not simply as thought. And when negated it is the perceived object that is negated. But whatever is perceived must be a particular. The Naiyayika view that the universal (*jāti*) is perceived as subsisting in the particular is wrong because, if the universal is perceived, as it is common to all the particulars and subsists in all of them, all the other particulars too must be perceived. If to avoid this objection it is said that the universal as a form is different for each particular, it would mean that the form of each thing is a particular. Then the form of each object is a particular, and what is perceived is not a universal. Many Kantians like N. K. Smith do not now accept that when Kant treated judgment as a unifying act he meant, as Caird and some others understood, that it brings the subject under the class of the predicate, but that it brings both the subject and the predicate into a unity. Thirdly, when I think of the universal, I think of it as referring to a number of particulars. But if we examine our minds when we make the judgment, "The rose is red", we do not find that we are thinking of all the red things in the world. Similarly, when I say, "That is a horse", I may not be thinking of all the horses in the world. So to say that in every judgment the predicate is a universal is wrong. Of course when a zoologist makes the judgment, "That is a horse", he might be thinking of the class horse. But this judgment is not a perceptual but a classificatory judgment. Unfortunately the language for both the perceptual and classificatory judgments is the same and is therefore a source of confusion. But the classificatory judgment belongs to a higher stage of intellectual activity than the perceptual.

It would be wrong to say that every perceptual judgment is also classificatory. True, to give a thing a name is generally to classify

it. But when a child first sees a horse and affirms the existence of the object in front of him, he cannot be making a classificatory judgment. Even then his judgment must contain the distinction between the subject and predicate, existence and form. And there is reason for saying that he perceives form or determination, for children, when they see a thing for the first time, fight shy of it—which shows that they see a new form.

When we say that the classificatory judgment belongs to a higher intellectual level than the perceptual, we mean that more of abstracting thought is involved in making it. For instance, when I make the perceptual judgment, "That is a horse", I distinguish between the That and the horse, existence and form. But the form is not yet treated in abstraction from existence. It is still seen there in front. But in the classificatory judgment abstraction is made from the particular form. When I perceive the horse my cognition on the subjective side takes on a form (*prakāra*). And the subject that perceives the horses being the same, the *prakāra* remains the same for all perceptions of horses, and through it I come to classify horses. So much of reflection and abstraction is necessary for a classificatory judgment, but need not be present in the perceptual.

But now the question may be raised: Is this abstracted universal form the universal horse? What about the universal according to which nature evolves horses? Is the universal horse a mere concept? The abstracted universal form is of course a concept, and it corresponds to the universal according to which nature evolves horses. Whether the concept has a corresponding reality or not can be decided only by further consideration. We have reasons to believe that the chair, for instance, was first made according to a preconceived idea. But, on the other hand, we have reasons to believe that the horse is not so produced, but according to a tendency formed in nature in the course of its evolution.

We may now answer the question whether the universal does not exist in the particulars. If it does not exist in the particulars, why do we call them by the same name? Is it because we see similarity between them or is it because we see the same thing in all? If they are similar, is their similarity not due to something common? And is not the latter the same as the universal? So the universal, it may be said, must have been perceived and must be taken as existing in the particulars. But the difficulty in regarding the universal as existing in the particular and as perceived in it is that the universal then becomes a particular. Whether we treat the universal as a plan, purpose, datum or function, what is present in one particular must be different from what is present in another, though both are of the same class. And because the structural plans of both the particulars are traced to the same tendency of nature we are thinking of a common universal, just as we have the same concept because both particulars produce the same form (*prakāra*) of cognition. As a matter of fact we perceive neither similarity nor sameness. 'We see just the thing, which is existence with a form'. The idea of similarity or sameness is the product of later reflection. And when the classificatory judgment is made we spontaneously think of the class horse under which the particular is subsumed. In this judgment the predicate is of course not what is perceived but what is thought. And so far as perceived the form of the horse is a particular. But through the form of cognition which this particular horse produces in us we may think of the class of horses and may come to have the general concept horse. Further reflection may show that this concept has a reality in nature. That is, after making the perceptual judgment, "This is a horse", we abstract the particular form and make it refer to all the horses in general. Indeed, we are not treating the particular horse as a type. But we are abstracting the form of our knowledge both from the physical and the psychological existence and then treat it as referring to all the particulars. Here we are extending our knowledge through abstraction. And this

abstracted form is really the idea of an indefinite plurality. The tendency to make such an abstraction is inherent in thought, and is present implicitly even when the perceptual judgment is made.

Now we have to slightly modify the view of the simultaneity of the knowledge of the particular and the universal. When a particular horse is known, it is not necessary that the universal horse also should be known explicitly at the same time. But the tendency to universalise its form is present even then. It is only in this sense that the universal is said to be known along with the particular. The universalising tendency belongs to thought itself; and therefore any universal may be treated as known along with its particular, but not in the sense that it exists in the particular and is cognised with it.

And in fact there is really no universal which exists in all particulars. We have already referred to the difficulty in postulating such a universal. If I invent a new thing I must have an idea of it before it is actually made. And the relation between my idea and the thing is conformity. It is absurd to think that the idea exists in the thing. It is such wrong conceptions that give rise to insoluble problems. Similarly, the relation between the universals in nature and the species is conformity. This is what Plato really means when he says that the particulars partake of the universals, that they are their imitations.

As regards the universals that are forms of thinking, the position is peculiar. Of course they may be used as predicates. For instance, I may say "That is a substance" or "That is an attribute". And the concepts obtained from judgments are similar to those obtained from judgments like "That is a horse". But then this concept is really the idea of the category but not the category itself. The categories are the forms of unity of the subject and predicate but not the forms of predicate under which the subject is subsumed. But now if reality is not of the form of judgment, then the latter

cannot have ultimate ontological validity. If it is asked whether they have not empirical existence on the ground that they constitute our phenomenal experience, here we can only answer by saying that, if they are results of reflection and belong to the superstructure of thought, like mathematics, raised upon some immediate experience, they can have only logical and not ontological validity. If, on the other hand, they constitute even our simple perceptions, they must be regarded as existing. Number, for example, we regard as having only logical validity. But quality may be treated as existing, because it is directly perceived as an object. It is not possible in this paper to take up every category and discuss its ontological status. Of course, all categories may be said to constitute our experience; but the discussion of abstract mathematical formulas too is an experience.

THE CONTENT OF FREEDOM

By

P. S. NAIDU

‘ Two friends of Liberty her praise rehearsed,
But where the one would bless, the other curses;
Freedom to one, means not to be coerced
To one, to be a part of what coerces.’

The cry is now heard from all quarters of the civilised globe that freedom is being destroyed over one half of the world, and that the lovers of freedom should gird up their loins and fight in her defence. The impassioned utterance of General Smuts may be taken as representing, fairly well, the inarticulate feelings of many thinking men to-day. While condemning the anti-democratic spirit which has run amok in Europe, the soldier-philosopher says that it ‘ threatens, not only to replace the individual’s participation in government by a new slavery which is made effective through the curtailing of the freedom of thought, speech, action, and self-expression, but also to substitute for the old spirit of sturdy independence a propaganda moulded servile mass mentality, which, in the end, will kill all creative activity and thereby all possibility of progress in the future’. These words of the great leader make a powerful appeal direct to our heart. We are moved and even thrilled by the liberal sentiments expressed in touching language. But when our spirits have calmed down, the question gradually takes shape in our minds, what is this freedom which we have lost or are losing? What is its content? Of its chameleon-like form we have had some glimpses. But no one has taken the trouble to look inside the *form* in order to find out whether there is any abiding *content* in it. And unless we grasp the content we shall land ourselves in confusion. We shall have to throw up our

hands in despair when faced by the question; What is the freedom that democratic countries are fighting for, and consider it worth while fighting for?

There are two reasons why the various analyses, each brilliant in itself, of freedom have not yielded any fruitful results. The first is that all theoretical discussions (as well as all practices based upon such discussions) have tended to emphasise the objective conditions of freedom to the utter exclusion of the inner psychological springs of freedom. As a consequence of this over-emphasis on the environment, the illusion has persisted that freedom is some kind of tangible but tantalising 'stuff'. The fact is freedom is merely an attribute of behaviour. In the second place, the goal of freedom has never been understood clearly. Sometimes liberty is taken as an end in itself; at other times it is considered to be a pre-condition of 'good life,' the 'goodness' of 'good life' being left undefined. What is needed, therefore, is a psychological analysis of freedom which will fill its empty and ever changing form with rich content. Such an analysis will be attempted in this short paper.

In the well-known accounts of freedom the right of the individual citizen to free thought, speech, and association, and to the free enjoyment of the fruits of his own labour has been upheld. But, at the same time, it has been insisted that such enjoyment of freedom should not interfere with similar enjoyment by other members of the group. There is the rub. Freedom seems to imply a negation of itself. And when this negation is carried to its logical conclusion, freedom gets emptied of all content, and retains only a meaningless form. It is exactly at this point that a psychological analysis is indicated. 'Freedom' is not a noun, but it is an adverb masquerading as a noun. Freedom is 'free behaviour'. Action or behaviour is denoted by a verb, and an attribute of action by an adverb. Contemporary psychology has established beyond doubt that the so-called 'faculties' of man, indicated by nouns in common usage, such as *memory*, *will*, *reason* etc., are fictitious entities, and that the

reality is either an activity or a characteristic of an activity. Freedom is one such noun in common usage, and it stands for certain attributes of human behaviour. Politics, economics and other social studies make free use of these misleading 'nouns', and the sooner the latter are deprived of their illusory connotation, and shown up in their true colours, the sooner will clarity of thinking be achieved.

Freedom, then, is free behaviour, and in analysing behaviour three factors have to be considered:

- (1) the behaving self,
- (2) the body of the self which is the seat of activity and
- (3) the environment in which the self acts through the body.

The third factor has been dealt with thoroughly by political theorists and sociologists. The distinction has been made between the physical, biological and social sections of the environment, and the fact that the question of freedom can arise only in connection with the social environment has been argued out. In fact, the attention given to this aspect of the problem by the non-psychological theorists is so great and exclusive that 'freedom' is conceived solely in terms of the external conditions of freedom. The second factor, the body of the 'free' agent has received some little attention at the hands of the students of sociology and political science. But sometimes they, specially the latter, take up a deterministic or behaviouristic attitude, identifying the body as far as its function goes, with the physical environment, while at other times they look upon it as the seat of real 'freedom'. The confusion in thinking resulting from such shifting attitudes is very annoying; but that is a natural consequence of lack of psychological training.

'Freedom' or 'free behaviour' is unhampered or unhindered behaviour. When we speak of a hindrance or obstacle to behaviour we imply thereby that behaviour has a direction and a goal. This

direction pointing to a specific goal is also implied in two aspects of modern political theory. They are firstly, the insistence that 'freedom' of the individual should be confined to the region delimited by the exercise of similar freedom by other individuals, and secondly, that lower freedom should be suppressed in the interests of the higher. Herein is the clue which we should follow up in our psychological analysis.

In order to understand behaviour, free or unfree, we have to look for its motivating causes, not in the external environment, but in the dynamic structure of the mind of the behaving agent. The real springs of action lie in the mind, not in the external world. Contemporary hormic psychology has completed, in an admirable manner, the task of tracing behaviour to its root causes or main springs in the mind. There are certain innate propensities, such as fear, anger, lust (in the German sense) disgust, sympathy, wonder, assertion and laughter, which when activated impel the organism to pursue a certain course of action in order to reach a specific goal. Let us consider sex-lust which is a very powerful propensity. Under its impulsion the organism will, with great energy and determination, pursue the end, namely, union with the mate. Each propensity, then, imposes a directional effect, determined with respect to the goal to be attained, on the behaviour of the organism. *'Free' behaviour is merely behaviour which is progressing smoothly towards its goal; the goal being prescribed by the innate psychological structure of the mind of the behaving agent.* In the abstract this definition of 'freedom' is complete. But freedom in this sense is possible only for the lone individual, for a Robinson Crusoe on his desert island. In society, he who claims complete freedom of behaviour for himself, and acts on that claim is bound to tread on the toes of others. So, it is that political theorists have found it necessary to delimit the field for the exercise of freedom. The need for such control of freedom will become evident when the structure of a competitive society is analysed.

Under normal circumstances so long as one goes about his business earning his wage, maintaining his family, and pursuing his hobbies or indulging in harmless or inoffensive enjoyments, one is free to do as he pleases. Each individual moves freely along his own line of action towards his own goal. Even so, now and then, in thought at least, each individual sends forth a line of obstruction cutting across the free line of action of his neighbours. Jealousy, envy, covetousness and ambition have free play in the minds of members of social groups. One covets the wealth of another; another is jealous of the natural gifts for leadership which a lucky neighbour possesses. But very soon these hindrances, operating merely on the imaginal level, are withdrawn by their agents, and once again behaviour progresses smoothly.

When we consider a competitive society of the modern type, the situation seems to be entirely different. In such a society, which often goes by the wrong name of a co-operative society, a single object M is desired by many members of the group at once. Consider a mining claim in an uncharted area. He who has the skill to reach the spot first and 'peg out' his claim establishes his right for the exclusive possession of the area. Here, speed of action on the part of one individual has acted as a source of effective hindrance to the behavioural progress of all others, these latter being slower. The behavioural line of I_1 reaches M , while those of others are cut short before the goal is reached. There is another way in which I_1 can succeed in getting sole possession of M . He may threaten I_2 with physical injury if he continues to compete, and thus cut short the latter's line at M_2 , he may buy off I_3 and terminate his line of action at M_3 ; he may deceive I_4 by inducing him to seek another claim. In this way I_1 may have all the hindrances removed by playing upon the different innate propensities of other competing individuals. But there is really no freedom here. The entire course of action is beset with obstacles.

The argument so far has been confined to the level of primitive propensities. It must, however, be pointed out that the immediate

motive to human behaviour is a 'sentiment' (in the hormic sense), and not a crude primal emotion. This fact complicates the problem of freedom still further, for a sentiment is the result of an organisation of many fundamental emotions, and if a single emotion is subject, on the behavioural side, to several limitations and obstacles in a competitive society, then a sentiment will suffer from very many restrictions. Each individual of a group will have built up several sentiments round other members, and round objects in the environment; and all the sentiments will crave for satisfaction. There will be crossings and recrossings of several behavioural lines of action giving rise to hindrances of innumerable types. Freedom, if there is any in such a field of action, is very restricted in scope. Of absolute freedom there is no trace here.

Freedom, then, on our analysis, is freedom of the individual members of a group to act without hindrance in pursuing the goals of sentiments or of primitive propensities. Such freedom is vouchsafed to the individual member by his group only when he does not hinder other members in their pursuit of their own goals. This restriction often ends in determination, and finally in complete negation of freedom. Why are these restrictions imposed? Are they due solely to the presence of other members in the group, or to some other factor? In other words, is freedom an end in itself, or is it a means for an end? The answer to this question is very significant. We are told that freedom is a means for an end. Freedom is freedom for something else. It is not a supreme value. It is a value, but a value which must be estimated in terms of something higher than itself.

We may approach this aspect of the problem from a different angle. If freedom is merely the freedom of the individual to pursue, and reach without hindrance the goal of his own propensities and sentiments, then there will be utter chaos in a society of competing individuals, each one whom is pursuing goals which are bound to conflict with one another. So, it is said that freedom should be exercised in the pursuit of a common goal; rather, society should prescribe

a common end for all its members. 'Good life', 'good society', 'self-realisation' etc., have been held up as the common ends in relation to which freedom is to be exercised. It is with reference to these ends that a distinction is made between lower freedom and higher freedom and the individual is called upon to sacrifice his 'lower' freedom in the interests of the 'higher'. In times of crises, freedom of speech, and freedom of criticism in the press should be sacrificed in order that the higher freedom of the 'good life' to come may be achieved. But what is this 'good life'? I am afraid there is no clear conception in the minds of political theorists of 'good life,' 'good society' or even of 'self-realisation.'

Our discussion so far has made it plain that the springs of freedom are to be found in the internal structure of the mind, and not in the external circumstances of the physical, biological or even the social environment. Freedom, or free behaviour is invariably determined by the innate constitution of the mind of the behaving agent. Action is controlled by mental structure, and this in its turn is determined by innate and acquired factors. So long as man is activated by propensities and sentiments, or so long as he is moved by desire, so long will his behaviour be controlled, willy nilly, by factors which are partly beyond his control. In other words, freedom is absolutely impossible for one who is *in* this world, and also *of* this world. It is useless to speak of freedom in society, as it is constituted at present, with heavy emphasis on the material goods of this world. True freedom can come only by the annihilation of the native propensities and acquired sentiments.

A clear answer to the question relating to the ultimate goal of freedom is to be found along the lines suggested by our psychological analysis. It is now agreed that freedom has a goal. In the West, however, this goal is conceived in terms of the fierce self-regarding sentiment, and self-seeking propensities. A feeble attempt has been made to give some sort of direction to freedom in the Western scheme of social organisation. But so long as the flame of desire

is being fed fiercely by the constant stimulation of innate propensities, freedom is impossible of attainment. So long as one is attached to the objects of this world, so long will he be in bondage. True freedom can be attained only by causing the springs of desire to dry up. Detachment is the only means of obtaining freedom. Hormic psychology teaches us that the primitive and crude propensities get refined in the process of their organisation into sentiments, concrete and abstract. And when these sentiments are arranged according to a scale of values with a master sentiment at the top, then true freedom will be achieved. But what is this master sentiment to be? If, with the West, we take it to be some earthly sentiment, such as self-regard, service, patriotism etc., then we shall soon be caught up in the trammels of desire. If, following the vedantic traditions we make the Brahman-regarding sentiment our final goal, then in the very process of attaining it, all desire will be consumed; all lower freedom will be abolished, and true freedom will be attained. True freedom is *freedom from slavery to our desires*, to the propensities and sentiments which have objects of this earth as their goal. The *Jivan-mukta* is the only truly free person. As he is identical with Brahman, he is also identical with other jivas. His actions, even when he is in this world (but not of it), and moves in it, are completely free. Since the individuals have all merged themselves in Brahman their behavioural lines (pertaining to this world) will all radiate from a single focus, and will be divergent. There will be no crossings between the lines; yet they will be united in their common purpose or goal.

We have shown that the main issues in relation to the problem of freedom have been clouded by a lack of psychological insight. Freedom has been conceived solely in terms of its external conditions as absence of restraint, the inner springs of freedom being neglected. When we examine the inner aspect of free behaviour we discover that, both in theory and practice, the West has failed in controlling the conditions for the exercise of individual freedom

to give direction, point or purpose to the dynamic springs of free human action. The West has also failed to realise that so long as fierce desires and passions, specially the inordinate desire for proprietary right over objects and over bodies of human beings are being stimulated, real freedom will be impossible. The fundamental propensities, whose incessant working is the cause of all unfreedom should be destroyed. And the most successful method of destroying them is to have them gathered up in the Brahman-regarding sentiment. Viewed in this way freedom gets rich content, and direction. Freedom is freedom for attaining Brahman, which is the natural goal of man. Free action will be aimed at the annihilation of desires and the attainment of the state of the Jivan-mukta.

A STUDY OF THE CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF BEAUTY

By

K. C. VARADACHARI

Who has not felt the influence of the skies, the oceans and rivers, the high mountains in their solemn majesty and the deep valleys hiding themselves from the sun? Who has not been dazzled by the lightnings and ravished by the roses? Throughout history there was the attraction of things even more deep and more sustaining than the needs of body and life. Man had always to hold on to this evanescent attraction, as it were, that has appealed to him in many ways and made him a creature of beauty rather than a creature of wants. Beauty has become one of his major pre-occupations and his interest in the theories of beauty is as old as intelligence itself. But whilst the interest in theories of physical existence led to science, the interest in theories of Beauty has led to the arts of creative representation of what have been experienced by man. Beauty which started as an experience of the universe, has perpetuated itself or rather has prolonged itself into Art, wherein it seeks to live a more treasured existence than in the fast moving and changing universe.

Art is of two kinds according as it is merely representative of what have been experienced, or creative of further meanings and suggestions in the featured creations. Instinctive art seeks to convey the actual, whereas creative art seeks to embody the inwardness, the essence, of the real, and its possibilities in the outward nature. Creative art takes even a further step. It conveys the wholeness, of which it is a representative fragment, through which as it were, a total suggestion of universal significance is made. In this sense, creative art is a departure from instinctive art, and later on appears as if it were a different order of art

The realist theory of art is by its very definition an instinctive theory of art. That is to say, all art is mere representation of the actual. But since it is seen by the realists to be something more than mere representation, or play of fancy that is mainly recollective and perceptive, they expound art as the evolutionary discovery of value. Beauty is declared by them to be a tertiary quality, neither in the subject nor yet in the object when it becomes satisfying to the subject. Beauty, which is closely linked up with art, thus, is that which is satisfying. This hedonistic view of Art is valuable in so far as it reveals beauty to be a sort of Purushartha, a goal of man, an end that ought to be sought. This satisfaction however should be such that it is permanent and not evanescent. What is the permanence that can be taken hold of in artistic experience? Idealists consider that it should be the concepts, the non-empirical concepts, that somehow seek an embodiment in the concrete representations. This is impossible except through the concept of Suggestion, (*dhvani* according to Indian writers), but suggestion can be best realized only through symbolic correlations which depend upon an emotional fundamentalism.¹ And ethnic forces govern the specific spiritual connotation of symbols.

All art that is not 'closed' art, that is art that is so repetitive and instinctive that it cannot get out of its patterns of creation, is sustained by and thrives through suggestion, which manifests itself through concrete imagery. Whether this reference is conveyed by paint or dance, music or by representation of emotions and sentiments (*rasa*) which have a language and grammar of their own, universal and instinctive, does not in the least matter. The aim is to realize that wonder and attraction, fullness and superiority, over nature contradistinct from natural beauty wherein we experience an inferiority in ourselves. Beauty thus is the spirit of conquest and freedom, that is realized through understanding of the possibilities

1. Cf. *Hindu Theory of Beauty*, Vol. II; Benares Hindu University Journal,

inherent in nature itself, which lie hidden due to the instinctive pressures of want, preservation and repetition.

1. The nature of the relationship between the perceiver or rather the enjoyer of beauty and the enjoyed is one of great importance in any study of beauty. How do we ever enjoy an object? is as important a question as how do we ever know an object that is other than ourselves? Beauty being specially a way by which we feel rather than know, it is said to be the quality that is felt about any satisfying object. It is something that fulfils a need of the individual, since that is the meaning of satisfaction. But what is this need that is not a want in the sense of physiological or biological needs? The fact remains that we do get at objects and make them subserve our interests; equally it is a fact that we know something about objects however false this knowledge be, but it is a knowledge on the assumption of which we act. Trial and error govern our selections and adaptations. Beauty in so far as it is merely the satisfaction of a certain fundamental need or want is to be deemed to exist more in the subject's reaction to the object rather than in the object itself. But Prof. Alexander and other emergent evolutionists consider that this specific need, that is satisfied by beauty, is a late product, maturing slowly even in man, and in the animals almost non-existing. Thus this quality of beauty which is something felt about a satisfying object, is indeed dependent on mind's discovering it, though to be exact this satisfying nature must be in that object itself in some measure or in objects belonging to that class. Beauty thus becomes a co-ordinate of satisfaction in relation to an object. It becomes a valuation also, a *tertiary* quality, and is a sense of value. It is at higher and higher levels of growth of mind that we begin to experience newer and newer types of value, and progressing from mere need, instinctive and primitive, to selection dictated by the pressure of changing environment, we arrive at pure feeling that is at once a satisfaction and not a need.

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The 'will to present' released from 'the will to strive' or in conjunction with it, is more and more sublimated, as the planes of intelligence unfold larger and larger patterns of the environment and meaning, or is, as it were, poured into the moulds of expression. Values shift from the mere utilitarian to the mere contemplative, and thence to creative representation that at once grants the depth that contemplation gives and satisfaction that the concrete object of perception makes us feel.

Beauty, however, unlike ordinary values, depends not on reactive systems of interest but on the creative systems of interest that really denote the fullest expression of the 'will to power' and the 'will to represent' the inward experience of the spirit of any object. More energy is spent on the adaptation to the environment at higher and higher levels of mental growth, and this adaptation reveals the one supreme fact that it is not the dictate of the environment that is supreme but the dictate of the human freedom which whilst adapting itself yet makes nature its tool, fashions instruments by which it could efficiently control nature. It is too true that this efficiency is no where compared to the powers of nature, but, in our century, we are witnessing the triumph of the spirit of man over nature. Even in the fashioning of instruments which would with efficiency fulfil the reactive system of desires, there is displayed certain spans of interest that are significant of the power-sense. Art is thus born through the power-sense and this innate urge to surpass nature is indeed a profound instinct. Because it is power-sense, does it reveal itself at first as play and then as creation. The inward quality of creative art shows the magnificent effort of the 'will to power', purified and sublimated by the 'will to freedom.'

2. Values, thus, whether they are tertiary or otherwise, whilst certainly emergent in the history of human growth, are for the same reason impermanent or permanent relative to certain fundamental reactive systems. Just as there are planes of consciousness,

so we have relative hierarchy of values. Plato was in one sense right because he regarded ideas as really equivalent to ideals or values, which need realization. Ideals are goals which we seek to attain and as such are objects of pursuit. They are capable of making us adapt ourselves to the goals rather than to the immediate environments and as such point out a way of release from the strident imperative of nature through the subjective attachment and loyalty to the goal. Satisfaction that is transient and of the immediate he asked men to discard, so that satisfaction that is permanent and eternal could be ours. This is not to say that Plato was oblivious of the satisfying nature of the immediate needs and their correlated objects, but what he sought to demonstrate was that life, being a search for permanence, should hitch itself to the permanent. Plato accepts the eternal existence of planes of ideas (or ideals) which time represents in continuity rather than in simultaneity, in succession rather than in space; and in some sense, all realists are prepared to admit the eternal existence of all ideas, concepts, whatever be their modes of 'ingression' into the present or temporal space-time continuum.

Emergent evolutionists do not see any reality in the permanent ghost-existence of concepts, which are hungering after a body of real objectivity. It is impossible to conceive of ideals as fixed and immutable for ever; they are invented by mind as mental evolution progresses forward. The mind cannot at present invent many things. It cannot even dream as to what it shall invent hereafter. The theory of discovering and envisaging or enumerating the ideas is a faulty theory.

The enumeration of concepts or class-concepts that are really the forms of creation that have been achieved so far unconsciously by the life-urge or consciously by human device or even by the creative activity of the Divine which is more of creating rather than a creation, a process that is going on before us rather than a completed product, is impossible on the ground that exhaustive enumeration

is an impossibility, and even if it were possible can be overthrown by any negative instance. Plato thus is wrong in thinking that there could be such an enumeration. An emergent view is a fragmentary view, a cross-sectional view in one sense, and is altogether unsatisfactory. It states that novelties arise but does not explain why they should ever arise. But there is truth in it, viz., that there are more configurative possibilities in human spirit and life than a philosophy, that is mechanical, can ever envisage. The truth about the emergent theory lies in its anticipations of the dynamic possibilities inherent in human spirit and intelligence, and that man can indeed make matter—*mens agitat molem*. Primitive Art has given place to decorative art, and magic² has given place to mysticism, and though both have had their birth from the matrix of magic, they have almost left behind every mark of their ancestry even as man has from the amoeba that was his original being. There has been along with man's intelligence, a symbolic myth-making function, as M. Bergson has shewn, which rescues the human intelligence from becoming fugitive in its ancestral environs. It is true that this myth-making function can be referred to the dream-states, to the unconscious instinctive life of man, his fears and totems and taboos, his social life too, but even the dream-state is a psychological state composed of either preparatory-set for action, or relaxation-state of continued affect after the performance of action. In most cases, it turns out to be an escape-phenomenon manifesting itself in pictorial thinking. The contemplation of the larger needs of the society, the expansion of consciousness that this contemplation entails, the complex conditions of the environment that need the changing or adapting of them to the needs, enforce on the individual a liberation from the immediate leading to autistic thinking or thinking that is sufficient unto itself. But this autistic thinking cannot lead to great Art which is a criticism of life, rather than mere enjoyment of day-dreaming or contemplation. It is possible that dreams are

2. Cf. F. C. Bartlett. *Psychology and Primitive Culture*, Cambridge

merely escape or power-devises on the part of the individual to contemplate his real or unreal or imaginary majesty (*mahima*), but the dream that is realized is the real dream, a dream that has the mark of reality and real power, not the apparitional power of the dreamer. The dreamer of the true has always realized the dream in terms of actual life.³ The Ajanta creations or of Ellora or Amaravati are representations true indeed to the life-stories of Buddha or other Gods, true indeed to the Purāṇas also, but they have been lived in dream and vision and have been carved out or painted or represented so as to speak the universal language of truth. The artist has been the seer of the feature and the transcendent *krānta-darśi*. Seeing beyond, he conserved in the present the most valuable intimations of immortal significance for the entire race. It is amongst the artists that life has realized its fullness and has broken through the ramifications and fortifications of intellectuality. The capacity of the mind that can dive into the future even as it does into the causal varies according to the 'occasion of interests' that the mind is involved in at any period. The intensity is something that marks the tension of symbolic and actual demand for representation of that which has taken possession of the artist's mind. The function of the images in art has been to converge all the forces of imagination and sensibility, indeed of all personality in one unique effort of concentration towards representation. There is needed the factor of quantity of force, which Prof. A. P. Ushanko feels to be necessary,⁴ which, however, turns out to be nothing more than what Prof. Spearman speaks of as the *General factor*. What appears to be true of the matter is that by increasing the stress or tension of the image in the mind by giving it more and more concrete embodiment through the intermingling of significance and meaning (what Prof. Stace calls non-

3. *A Study of Dreams in the Philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja*, Vol. I, i, Annals of Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute.

4. *Philosophy*, Vol. XIV, No. 53.

empirical concepts), it could be made more and more real to the subject who imagines it, who in turn by the overwhelming sense of its reality converts the tension into actual action or representation. In other words, the quantitative formula is that the more the urgency and fullness of significance of the image within, the complexity so to say, the more real it is likely to become. Also the quantitative formula is valuable in so far as it determines the persistency of any myth or symbol in the history of the race itself. This is the point that requires elucidation. The complexity should be such that whilst continuing itself it should be able to absorb more and more complexity either through auto-transformations or through real integration with more and more modern experience. The illustration on this point can be any history of religious thought. The Rig Vedic period reveals in one sense rapid changes in the ethico-symbolism which culminated in the already 'closing mythos' of the Brāhmaṇas. The effort to give new etymology for words itself is a progressive manifestation of the spirit of change in the mythical content of thought of the people. It is seen in full manifestation in the Upaniṣads. The age of the Purāṇas has been the freest manifestation of the myth-making function and the Bhakti cults in their very diverse as well as sectarian manifestations have been more or less products of this activity of liberation from the closed structure of Vedāntic and other trends making them more and more significant. So long as people can utilise the old symbols, that is to say, can make the old symbols stand for the complexity which they discover to be the core of the symbols in the ever new situation, the process of *reliance* instead of *revolt* will last. In the process, however, the symbols would have achieved a concreteness or configuration (*gestalt*) and multi-planal existence almost synchronous with the ethical evolution of the people. Beauty will symbolise the apprehension of this 'complexity' which is otherwise known as *culture*.

We find from the above study of the realistic and emergent evolutionistic theories of beauty that they link up beauty with the con-

ception of value. In doing so they differ from the idealistic school which also considers beauty to be value in a fundamental manner.

3. Idealistic thinkers make beauty dependent upon abstract concepts or essences and moral values and finally on religious experience. But, as we have already said, unless the concepts are what they were for Plato and to the realist George Santayana, and not merely general ideas which are empirical, they can only lead to relativistic solipsism. That the relativistic view is already immanent in the evolutionary theory can be easily demonstrated, but what is still more characteristic of idealistic view is that in addition to being relativistic, it is solipsistic, 'dependent on a mind.' Whilst Beauty is absolutely objective in a sense in the realistic school, it is impossible to make beauty objective in the idealistic school. Beauty is not available except by a *dual* process, leading to the synthesis of objective sensual and subjective conceptual features, the one granting the soul and the other the body of beauty. The ideals which seek incarnation in actuality are not subjective, since their nature is to be '*over there*.' Beauty is an ideal, and because it is that, it becomes increasingly the goal of individual effort and eminently desirable. The goal as fully realized will be completely beautiful when realized because that would be utterly self-revealing of the whole and entirely fascinating. Whilst the idealist claims that the whole and the entirely—realized *end* alone will be utterly desirable, capable of granting supremest delight, it is seen on the contrary that every small artistic endeavour, a portrait, a landscape, a bas-relief, a lyric and from the smallest representation to the largest display, can provoke full and sumptuous delight. The quantity measured in surface covered by a picture or length or other features do not detract from the experience of any one of these neither in their unique wholeness and fullness of experience nor in the satisfaction to the individual.

Every experience wholly and intensely enjoyed is felt to be full and rich and complete. Eternity as it were appears to have been squeezed into a moment, and infinity compressed into a point by the

skill and power of the artistic genius. And 'condensation' is power. Beauty gets all the richness of quality through this condensation or compression of the object's wide significance. This condensation it is that makes for the object flowing out of itself and reveals its dynamic nature. Extension leads to passivity and delay, contraction to intensity and dynamic overflow. The completeness achieved in the unit and point is the device of the aesthetic spirit to contract extension into intention. This is beauty itself in a sense. Exuberance happens because of the contraction. And subjective exuberance is fullness and completeness in an intrinsic moment. It is intuition. Bergson it was who gave the cue to the discovery of the formula of condensation in subjective experience, and intuition is the condensation of the enormous multiplicity of object's vibrations. Beauty that has no quality has never been. Beauty is quality pure and simple. To speak about the quantity of beauty is to speak nonsense. In beauty the intuition condenses not merely the objective multiplicity into the representation in whatever medium, but also it reveals a new dimension in so far as it also focusses into the objective representation the conceptual categories of meaning and symbolic reference displayed in the *ethos*. It is because it is such a transformation through condensation and contraction of quantity into quality, that it appears to be the *power-sense* also. This is the secret of beauty. Thus whilst we shall have to concede to the Idealist that no beauty can ever exist without being a whole, a unity, we deny that it is the all, and entire reality as such. This is not to say that there is no universal reference or significance in each artistic product. What we deny is the necessity to placard the face of the object of beauty the words "Reality being such it is beauty."

4. Every artist knows that a fundamental emotion (*bhāva*) is necessary to provoke this 'condensation.' It is the very nature of emotion to drive the personality, whole and entire, to a focal existence of conative reception. It is the physiological counterpart of all emotion in one sense that determines this unique qualitative reception

with reference to aesthetic experiencing. The self and the object as such are indistinguishably fused into one synthetic experience or *bhāva*. What takes place between the object and the subject is a gradual transference or interpenetration of the subjective into the objective and *vice versa*, an osmosis as it were, and not the loss of both into a third higher entity. The passing into one another or rather mutual reception is the most fascinating part of aesthetic emotion, an emotion that is an utter absorption akin to forgetfulness of the surroundings. It is at once a reception and a projection. This is intuition that has within it the cognitive as well as the affective features. The goal of such an experience is release indeed from the exteriority to which the object and the subject have been restricted. But this is not all. It is this dynamic perception or intuition which has got over or triumphed over the limitations of subject and object, that strives now to represent its discovery in some medium, canvass or marble, myth or music, rhythm or dance. It is clear, as we have said, nothing more is aimed at than suggestion, the *dhvani*, which is the universal characteristic of the object, that 'criticism of life' which grants it an immortal meaning in the mortal and the limited substance of life. The significance that the object acquires in its representation is the *cit*, consciousness of universality, the truth of the object is revealed by its *sat*, the real being as a fact of experience; and the ecstasy or emotion that grants to the mind that receives it a satisfaction that is superior to anything of the reactive systems of interests is its *Ānanda* or delight-aspect of the object. So far from having very clear ideas as to what Beauty is, the moderns have not given us anything except a relativistic conception or an abstract conception, but both of them having struggled with the concept of psychological interfusion, have been able to arrive at the conclusion that Beauty is the satisfying symbol of the object's entering into the consciousness of the individual. But, as we have said, the truth is clear that there are degrees of satisfaction, according to the planes of consciousness, whether it is of the merely physiological vital or reactive or creative.

5. Prof. Spearman's view⁵ in this matter explains the position rather neatly. In the appreciation of beauty we find that whilst there are several factors of the individual entering into our consideration, the one fact of importance is that the object stands out as an object of attention. It is that which is observed, and there is needed a perfect energised-consciousness for correct apperception. The will must be well-disposed towards the object. The central fact about the object is its objectivity. The 'unifocal distribution of attention,' which is the happy phrase of Prof. Spearman, reveals the phenomenon of psychology in intuition. The lack of this 'unifocal distribution of consciousness well-disposed towards the object produces ugliness. There is in each individual an instinct, so to speak, for harmony, for non-conflict, for peace, and for repose. This instinct for harmony is identical with the instinct for Beauty. The search for coherency or harmony with our thought and within our thoughts, with regard to the relationship between subject and object, between our needs and their satisfying objects, are all clear indications of the existence of the instinct for harmony. Satisfaction that manifests itself as fulfilment or achievement of an end is a sign of harmony of the individual with his environment, a harmony that has been achieved undoubtedly through conflict or struggle. Lack of coherent organization of imagination and interest leads to the creation of the ugly. Disordered imagination can never give birth to Beauty.

6. Every theory of beauty has to deal with the theory of ugly as well. Ugliness that is due to lack of coherency and harmony in formal organization is different from ugliness due to morally repulsive nature of the created object or natural object, or even due to conceptual bankruptcy or insignificance. Artists always refer to the first in their world of reference, and they always seek to embody the perfection of the form that is significant in their experience of beauty of an object. It is considered that the ordered imagination of

the Artist regarding an object is however not the consistency with the formulated laws of art but rather the configurational unity or pattern revealing an inner consistency of design and nature. This it is that makes art not wooden and stereotyped according to patterns. Some thinkers especially the idealists like Bosanquet and Stace try to make Beauty a moral valuation. But despite the fact that morals have an allegiance to order just as logicians have, the consistency of Art consists in the unity of its own intuitive imagination. The morally repulsive is ugly only because the social recognition of values is mainly moral, and even logical consistency has to face the censure of the social. Thus, however, great the obligation of art to morals might be, it is art that truly liberates the individual from the patterns of the past that have become accepted standards for all. But the appeal and definition of Keats to the fact that Truth is Beauty, Beauty Truth is strong enough, as strong as the other appeal of Tolstoy and Ruskin that Beauty is Good and Good is beauty. It is this hope that the best in everything is likely to bring about the fullest realization of harmony of all, that makes it possible for the idealist to hold on to the criterion that the most coherent is real, most perfect, most good, and most beautiful. It is almost a mystic's belief in the fundamental harmony of all values, of good, truth and beauty, even here and even now. Benedetto Croce, the eminent sage Philosopher and Artist of Italy, was in an eminent sense the first philosopher of modern times to reveal the interdependence between the concepts of beauty, truth and goodness in terms of mutual re-enforcement or 'dialectic of distincts' rather than terms of opposites. Opposites do unite to form a third and a higher, but distincts do also enforce one another and exist in a profounder manner than the previous. The organic theory is envisaged by Prof. Croce but unfortunately he does not disengage himself from the influence of Hegel in order to consider the biological aspect of the matter. Profoundly interested in History as he was, he does not however concede that in fact the dialectic of distincts is a clear enunciation of the theory of organic fusion of affect into cognition, of

beauty into Truth as body and soul of the object. It is clear from his theory that the universe of affect or beauty to which intuition applies is wider than what the conceptualising consciousness of truth or logical faculty can apply. Equally not all facts of truth can be facts of morality or utility or the practical. The Ugly, according to Croce, consists in the negation of beauty, is the absence of harmony, or is that which needs technical perfection or organization of the affect. He does not, within the field of the Aesthetic, consider the possibility of any other type of repugnance such as moral repulsiveness or logical inconsistency, or even the incapacity of being useful. This is a clear indication of his trying to have every sphere of consciousness autonomous. What is repugnant to sense-intuition or organization by imagination, disharmony in fusion of material received by intuition is the Ugly.

This view is acceptable to all aesthetic autonomists and is certainly satisfying within the limited sphere. But is it possible except through deliberate effort, (and Croce might insist that this abnegation is necessary), not to be influenced by the four dimensional manifold of consciousness-function? Idealism has tended to confuse the four-dimensions by cross-referring and cross-cutting, and as a reproach against such an idealism, Croce's counsel is all to the good. Cross-criticism leads to confusion in regard to the apprehension of the unique in the aesthetic. Bergson's mistake consists in making metaphysical intuition identical with the aesthetic intuition thus making it grant truth, whilst it can grant us only the intimate sense of being, which surely might help in the logicizing of the experience thereafter. Croce is not prepared as an artist to forgive this gross violation of the autonomy of the aesthetic intuition.

7. This special view of Croce has been developed by Prof. Collingwood⁶ to whom beauty is nothing other than the 'imagined,' that is thinking in images. This is identical with the 'intuited

6. Prof. Collingwood. *Theory of Art*, Philosophical Quarterly, Oct., 1940.

through sense' of Croce. In other words, the view of Collingwood is a little relieved from the ambiguity of Croce, whose intuition meant at least an objective experience, even though of objects created by the fancy of the individual. But it is also clear from the general philosophy of Croce that imagination should not be conceived to be *fictional* manipulation or creation. A literal meaning must therefore be given to the term imagination, if solipsism should be avoided. Imagination is dependent, psychologically speaking, on the 'education of correlates,' according to Professor Spearman. Imagination should seek to do what intuition of Bergson is said to do. It is by an effort of will that one enters into the object. And this 'education of correlates' is governed undoubtedly by the principle of the "will to see the real" within the presented object.

8. The dynamic nature of Modern art has been explained to lie in the imaginative understanding from the point of modern science as to the inner nature and form, material as well as psychical, of an object. The outer appearance is a shell covering the inner seething waves of force that are a universe in themselves. To get the eye to see it, the ear to hear the inner sound of the movements their rhythms is possible only to an intelligence that has ceased to reckon the outer appearance. Leibniz's description of the monadic interplays pales before the intra-atomic tribulations and movements, that modern science has discovered to exist within each atom. Just as it was in earlier times when men thought that the goal of art consisted in the representation of the permanence and static quiescence, and at best the human, whose living flash of the eye, the ingratiating smile or the deep cunning of the brow and the melting pathos of the prone, it is in modern times that men think of the dynamism of whatever quality it be, human, intellectual or emotional or the natural. Equally the diagram of curves has been displaced by the diagram of straight lines, and definition by blur, and we find almost an intensity in the contrasts that are intended to reveal the inner dynamism in the very cells and monads of existence. Imagination

thus confines itself to the depth of things, subtle, evanescent and intriguing. Greatness itself has to manifest itself in the manner of the minute and the monad. Invention and intuition here re-enforce imagination in the creation of the significant experience and truth and discovery, independent of any one unilateral attitude. Surrealist Art then is merely the keeping pace with scientific discovery coupled with the imaginative intuition into the interior psychology of all living and non-living things. We add advisedly the word 'non-living' since the line that separates life with non-life is almost non-existent. The Modern theory of Surrealism then is true to the overflowing and dynamic nature of reality or duration itself. The static attitude is as clearly true as the dynamic, because the outer unity that confers the appearance of permanence and quality is as true of the nature of the things as the inner vibrations and thrilling phenomena of radiation and movement and quantity are. We have to arrive at that true art that combines the psychology of inner movement and dynamism with the representation of the psychology of the outer appearance and harmony. The greatest problem of philosophy—'the one in the many'—gets itself represented again in the context of the outer and inner nature of a thing. Thus from the standpoint of Art we find the duality of subject and object resolved by the inter-fusion between the subject and object through creative intuition. It is necessary to bear in mind that the mind is far from being superior to the object always, there happens under certain circumstances the superiority of object over the mind. This does not entail the conclusion that beauty is solipsistic, since the feeling of superiority or inferiority is not of the kind that ensures the autistic self-gratifying conclusion.

The problem of one and the many is again found to occur in the relationship between quantity and quality, and we find that quality is essentially the harmony of the configuration in Beauty, whereas quantity it is that is found to integrate into quality. This thesis is valuable in so far as it shows that all beauty is the realization of the Unity that is the oneness of the many.

The dynamic is maintained in and through the static structure, and though not impervious to the dynamic, the static continues to be the single continuing existence, self-identical and self-fulfilling. Even whilst the structure undergoes modification due to the dynamic inequilibrium, there is just a change of quality which, as we have already said, is just the harmony of the many, and as much a structural-unity as the previous. Beauty in Art consists in the conveying of the structural pattern that has emerged into the consciousness of the individual which he deems to have discovered by himself; the technical efficiency with which he conveys his discovery so as to correspond most fully to his own experience is an integral part of Art, even as the mere suggestiveness by which he points out to the universal meaning, and the criticism of life that he has offered is. For true art, whether it is poetry or prose, music or mere dance, or sculpture or painting is *criticism of life*.

THE ECLIPSE-CULT AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

By

R. SHAMASASTRY

The two most important of the twenty-five categories enumerated by sage Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, are matter and spirit, better known as Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The inanimate cosmic universe is matter and Puruṣa is sentiency acting with and through matter. In the Vedāntic philosophy these two are known as Māyā and Brahma. In Śaivism they go by the names Śakti and Śiva, and in Vaiṣṇavism Lakṣmi and Viṣṇu. Matter is ever-changing, fertile, and productive of whatever Puruṣa needs for enjoyment. These two Primaries are interdependent for perpetuating the world of matter and individual spirits. Without mutual association they are incapable of doing any work and are like the blind and the lame. Prakṛti is blind and cannot therefore see and move in spite of its tremendous motive power. Nor can the lame spirit with all its power of sight move an inch forward. The Sāṅkhya-saptati says :—

“Pangvandhavadubhayorapi samyogah tatkr̥taḥ sargah.”

Their union is like the association of the lame with the blind; the creation of the universe is due to that union.

Speaking of Śaivism Śankaracharya says in the beginning of his Saundaryalahārī :—

“Śiva can bring about the universe only in contact with Śakti; otherwise He can move not even an inch forward.”

Speaking of Brahma and Śakti the Varivasyārahasya, an Agamic work says:—

Viśvasisrikshāvaśataḥ svārdhām śaktim vyalokayat
brahmā.

Bindurbhavati tamindum praviśati śaktistu rakta-
bindutayā.

Etadbindudvitayam visargasanjam hakārachaitānyam.

“Desirous of creating the universe Brahmā looks to Śakti, the other half of His cosmic body; there comes out a Drop. Into this Drop which is no other than the moon Śakti enters in the form of a red Drop; these two Drops constitute Visarga, universal creation, and the Visarga symbol of the Sanskrit alphabet, the soul of the sound ‘H’.”

From the above verse it is clear that the sun and the moon are the female and male seeds of the universe. Though in the Vedas the moon is generally regarded as male and the sun (Suryā) as female, their sexual aspect is reversed in some places; and doubt is also expressed regarding their sexual nature.

It can easily be perceived that being familiar with the principle of the predominance of sexual union in the propagation of species in the world, early philosophers extended that principle to the cosmic universe and identified the sun and the moon as the female and male seeds of the Creator, half man and half woman. This is the cult of sun and moon. The comparison of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, (sun and moon) to the blind and the lame is also derived from the same cult. The sun’s charioteer (the same as the sun of course) is called “Anūru” lame evidently on account of the sun’s slow motion along the ecliptic as compared with the moon’s rapid motion along her orbit. While, however, the sun is the world’s eye in virtue of his light, the moon is regarded as blind, because she has no light of her own, but shines with the sun’s light reflected on her. The simile of

the blind and the lame is referred to in the Vedas. In Rig. IV. xxx, 19 Indra is spoken of as "having restored the one who was blind and the other who was lame, both abandoned by their kin." Here the blind is evidently the moon and the lame, the sun. Their restoration when abandoned by their kin implies their recovery of their light after eclipse. Their kin are the stars which retaining their own light keep to their places affording no help to them when eclipsed. In Rig. I. 112, 8 the Asvins are praised for enabling the lame (Paravraj) to walk and the blind (Rijrāśva) to see (of course after eclipse). Here Paravraj is the moon and Rijrāśva, the sun. In Rig. II. xiii, 12 Indra is again praised for uplifting the blind and the lame. The uplift here like restoration in the other verse refers to their fall when eclipsed.

Prakṛti's three qualities of three different tints seem to have been based on three cyclic lunar eclipses of three tints.

Regarding the three colours of lunar eclipses the Sūryasiddhanta says that if the eclipse is less than half in size, it will be grey; that if it is more than half, it will be black; and that if it is total, it will be dark yellow. The Panchasiddhantika of Varāha-miśra (VI. 9) says :—"During a total eclipse dark yellow is to be declared the peculiar colour of the moon; her colour is dusky in the case of eclipses taking place during the rising or setting of the moon, and waterish in the case of partial eclipses." The Taittiriya Āraṇyaka makes these eclipses cyclic and says :—"Grey (Paṭara), black (Viklīḍha), and dark yellow (Pīṅga) are the characteristics of Varuṇa, eclipsed moon; they appear in the course of a thousand days." The meaning is that lunar eclipses are cyclic and that lunar eclipses of three different sizes and colours appear successively in every cycle of 1000 days. Extending the same principle to solar eclipses also, the Taittiriya Samhitā says as follows :—(1, 2). "Svarbhānu, the Asura, pierced the sun with darkness; the gods desired an atonement for him; the first darkness of his they struck off became a black sheep; the second a bright coloured one (lohita); and the third a white

one.”—It is to be noted how the Samhitā names the solar eclipses : they are called sheep while lunar eclipses are elsewhere termed goats. Referring to the fewer number of lunar eclipses and greater number of solar eclipses in a big cycle of eclipses, the same Samhitā says (VI. 5, 10) “the female goat gives birth to two or three, but the sheep are more numerous.” These cyclic eclipses of three different tints are also called the citadels of the Asuras. The Samhitā says (VI. 2, 3) :—“The Asuras had three citadels; the lowest was of iron, then there was one of silver, and then one of gold.” The name, goat, is sometimes applied to both solar and lunar eclipses.

Having now understood the Vedic eclipse terminology, we may now proceed to consider the meaning of the oft-quoted Vedic verse, on which the Sāmkhyas have based the doctrine of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The verse is as follows :—

“Ajāmekām lohitaśuklakraishṇām bahvīm prajāṃ janayan-
tīm sarūpām.

Ajo hyanyo jushamaṇo ’nuśete jahātyenām bhukta-
bhogamajo ’nyah.”

“The unborn or eternal or she-goat (Prakṛti) is one, though varied in her three qualities of bright, white, and black tints, and is productive of numerous offspring of the same type; one unborn or he-goat (Puruṣa) lies close to her, intent on enjoying her, while another unborn or he-goat leaves her after full enjoyment.”¹

Rajas, Satva, and Tamas are the three qualities. The colours assigned to them are the same as those of the three cyclic lunar eclipses. Creation of the universe is the function of the union of

1. The second half of the verse refers to lunar and solar eclipses. After lunar eclipse the moon is full; but after solar she is hardly visible: she is believed to be eaten up.

Prakṛti and Puruṣa, as stated in the Saptati verse quoted above. In the Vedas new and full moons, especially eclipses, are regarded as Ritus productive of cosmic changes. Eclipses are feared as occasions of double seed, the additional seed being that of the eclipse demon or bull. It is to avoid this double seed that every Brāhman is called to make an ablation into the fire on the Śrāddha or anniversary day of the death of his father and mother, reciting a prayer to Agni to cut off the double seed from contaminating the mother, the mother of the universe. The sun is the mother and the moon is the father.

It may now be stated as a fact that the doctrine of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, Brahmā and Māyā, and Śiva and Śakti are all derived from the eclipse-cult which appears to have been a predominant religion during the Vedic period.²

2. For more information on the subject, see the author's *Drapsa: the Vedic Cycle of Eclipses*, and *Eclipse-cult in the Vedas, Bible, and Koran*.

IS CASTE UNIVERSAL ?

By

A. R. WADIA

It is pathetic to see many amiable Hindus trying to justify the continuance of the caste system on the ground that it is a universal phenomenon and that it exists everywhere. Does it not exist in Europe itself ? Will the son of an English peer admit his barber to his dinner-table ? We are triumphantly asked. But such questions imply a woeful ignorance of the elementary distinction between caste and class. No society can boast of absolute equality among its members, and when we appreciate the need for division of labour it is inevitable that a society divides itself into different classes : the clergy, the nobility, the professional classes, and the masses consisting of agricultural and industrial labourers. To a certain extent heredity operates among these classes, but merely as a matter of convenience. There is nothing in the class system to prevent the elevation of a labourer to the rank of the professional or priestly class, or even to prevent him from rising to be a peer of the realm. Once he so rises all the privileges of his new class are open to him. There may be an occasional sneer at him as a parvenu or a *nouveaux riches*, but intrinsic merit or the lure of gold soon silences these sneers, and they certainly die out in a generation or two. Nor does the distinction of classes prevent the legal marriage of a peer's daughter with her cook or butler, however much such a marriage may be looked down upon and may be intrinsically undesirable even from the eugenic standpoint. A Ramsay MacDonald may be born at the lowest rung of the ladder, but may ultimately end as an honoured guest at His Majesty's table in Buckingham Palace.

Now in contrast to all this what does caste mean ? It means that once a man is born in a particular caste he has to live and die in that caste. However clean and learned a Sudra may be, he is still a Sudra, whose shadow must not fall on the food of the high-caste individual. There can be no exchange of social amenities between members of different castes, and at times, of even different sub-castes. Even on festive occasions like marriage and birth each caste goes on in its own way without exchanging brotherly greetings with members of other castes at a common dinner. In Hindu Law as administered by British courts, apart from the recent acts of the legislature which validate inter-caste marriages, no inter-caste marriage was valid and it was *ipso facto* null and void. The only alternative was concubinage or the emergence of a new caste as has happened for example in the case of the Shagirdpeshas in Orissa, which comprise the offspring of higher-caste men and their maid servants. The Arya Samaj and the Brahmo Samaj have come to the rescue of people who would like to marry outside their caste, but it need not be concealed that the members of these Samajes are themselves looked down upon by the orthodox as outcasts.

The question naturally arises : why is it that caste has such a marvellous vitality, that it has withstood the onslaughts of men like Mahavir and Buddha, and in the end made itself felt even within the ranks of those very reformist bodies like the Buddhists and the Jains and the Veerasaivas ? There must be something in it which has made it the central core of Sanatana Dharma, and made it possible for a dead untouchable saint like Nanda to have his image in the very temple where his piety and devotion alike failed to gain him admittance till the very fag end of his life. It would be worth while to see whether the caste feeling is justifiable from the psychological, biological and ethical standpoints and all these have been urged in the defence of caste.

Psychologically, as all history shows, there is something in human nature which makes for social solidarity by fostering a sense

of aloofness from other social groups. The Patricians and the Plebeians in ancient Rome, the Hellenes as against the Helots and the Barbarians in ancient Greece, the Christian and the Pagan, the Muslim and the Kaffir, the Jew and the Gentile, the White and the Nigger—these distinctions have been writ large in human history, and so the old Vedic distinction between the Aryans and the Dasyus does not become unintelligible as the root from which the subsequent antipathy to the Sudra and the untouchable has developed. In primitive stages of society such sentiments of separateness may have had a value, but as society grows, the perpetuation of such distinctions only leads to a narrowing of human sympathies, in absolute opposition to the spirit of brotherliness for which each and every great prophet has stood. It has to be noted that each state has grown and flourished only to the extent to which it has been able to overcome its internal dissensions. Rome could grow only when the patricians and the plebeians were able to patch up their differences. The failure of the Greeks to combine even in the face of common enemies sealed their fate and they became just a portion of Macedonia and then of the Roman Empire. Where a Muslim like Akbar sought to bridge the differences between the Muslims and the Kaffirs, success crowned his efforts. Where such differences were sought to be emphasised, failure was the inevitable result as the history of Muslim rule in India abundantly shows. The whites of to-day have succeeded wherever they have been able to overcome internal differences, and in so far as their short-sighted policy of accentuating the differences between the white and the coloured peoples continues they are building up material for troubles.

India may well be proud of her contributions to the development of human culture, but her emphasis on caste has made her political history a series of tragedies. Hardly any foreign conquest has been averted in her long history, and every attempt at unification of her diverse creeds and communities has tended to break on the rock of mutual suspicions and quarrels, which really in the

last resort can be analysed as rooted in caste. That sage ruler of Baroda, the late Shyaji Rao Gaekwar, who was served by Dr. C. R. Reddy early in his career—and between their ideas there is such a striking parity—was fully conscious of this evil and had the courage to give expression to it in a memorable utterance:

“The evils of caste cover the whole range of social life. It hampers the life of the individual with a vast number of petty rules and observances which have no meaning. It cripples him in his relations with his family, in his marriage, in the education of his children, and his life generally.....In the wider spheres of life, in municipal or local affairs, it destroys all hope of local patriotism, of work for the common good, by thrusting forward the interests of the caste as opposed to those of the community, and by making combined efforts for the common good exceedingly difficult. But its serious offence is its effect on national life and national unity. It intensifies local dissensions and local interests and obscures great national ideas and interests.”

The Samurai of modern Japan showed marvellous patriotism when in the interests of their country they more or less willingly agreed to surrender their centuries-old privileges and thus paved the way for the birth of that new Japan, which has been the inspiration of all the oriental countries for the last half a century.

Psychologically man has in him a good deal that is unsocial, but as a man he progresses only when this unsocial element in him is curbed by the demands of his social nature. Caste as it has come to be in India is the deification of all that makes for a narrow social individualism and neglects the wider social implications of human nature.

From the biological standpoint eugenics has naturally come to have a great significance for marriage. Mere love, romantic love or love at first sight may have a great poetic value, but none whatever

for the purposes of racial regeneration. From this standpoint the extreme solicitude displayed by Hindus in the selection of marriage partners is easily intelligible and even praiseworthy. But a meticulous and an exclusive emphasis on caste and sub-caste has really tended to be uneugenic. Cousin marriages are generally held to be undesirable by modern eugonists and the Hindu rules against such marriages are wholly praiseworthy, but even here as a matter of mere custom, marriages are permitted, especially in South India between the children of a brother and sister, while cases of a man marrying his own sister's daughter are by no means uncommon. The restriction of a marriage within the bounds of a sub-caste, often very small, necessarily leads to a dangerous amount of in-breeding. Moreover the haste in marrying off a girl before she attained puberty in the pre-Sarda Act days made any bridegroom welcome without due regard being paid to the fitness of the bride for marriage or the fitness of the bridegroom. Genuine eugenics lays great stress on the physical and mental fitness of the parties before they undertake the burden of marriage. Such emphasis literally becomes impossible when mere infants are married off, and so many Hindu marriages in actual fact become uneugenic.

Inter-caste marriages between people having different customs and with a different upbringing may be intrinsically undesirable just as inter-racial marriages are not desirable *per se*. But when two persons belonging to different castes or nationalities or races have had a similar education and a similar standard of life and a similar outlook on life, their marriage does not necessarily spell disaster; on the contrary such a marriage may be even desirable and make for happiness. The rigidity of caste makes even a perfectly eugenic inter-caste marriage impossible. Napoleon, though an upstart from the standpoint of the haughty Hapsburgs of Austria, could effect a legal marriage with a daughter of this same haughty dynasty. But no amount of political or intellectual eminence of a Kshatriya or a Sudra could get him a Brahmin bride.

STUDY III OF DR. C. R. REDDY

By Mr. K. Ram Mohan Sastri



C. D. Reddy
24-8-1940

Ram Mohan Sastri
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noble qualities which an ordinary Brahmin is unable to display. This means that a Sudra by birth is not necessarily a Sudra by his *gunas*. Similarly as a matter of pure theory every Brahmin by birth *must* display qualities of spirituality which are his by definition. And yet even Brahmins will admit that not all of them come up to the level of their spiritual inheritance, i.e., they are not genuine Brahmins in the ethical sense of the term. As soon as this is admitted it follows that birth cannot be the only determining factor in a man's nature, and the rigid foundations of the existing caste system are seen to exist in mere custom and not in logic or life.

Max Muller in his *Chips from a German Workshop* mentions the correspondence between a Brahmin and the Editor of a Madras Indian paper. The Editor admits the cogency of the arguments against caste, but says that the critic does not sufficiently appreciate the importance of universal custom: "Universal custom is more powerful than books, however sacred. For books are read, but customs are followed." With such premises who can argue? But who can deny that such premises imply a mere primitive mentality?

There is a general impression even in the minds of the educated men in the street that caste must be good because Mahatma Gandhi and Sir Radhakrishnan say that it is good. But they should know that there is not a single rule of caste which has not been openly broken by Gandhiji even in the sphere of matrimonial connections in his family of a type which has been taboo for centuries. It has been Sir Radhakrishnan's mission to paint Hindu culture in passages of purple eloquence, and if it has served to gain for India the admiration of foreigners at a time when our stock is rather low, he certainly deserves to be praised and thanked. But in fairness to him it must be said that while praising caste he has not denied the evils which have characterised the caste for the last several centuries. Both these great leaders of India praise caste as they think it existed in ancient times in the days of India's glory. They recognise that in those days

a Sudra could have become a Brahmin in virtue of his spiritual eminence, and of course it is a matter of history that in those days—*pratiloma* marriages apart—inter-caste marriages were freely allowed. But with all their learning they should recognise that the caste of the Vedic age was really what we understand by class to-day. Caste to-day has come to be synonymous with definite marriage and food restrictions, and if the ancient caste system was not synonymous with these restrictions, it is only an abuse of language to praise caste and mislead the half-educated Hindu that these great men really believe in the present-day caste, when in actual fact they do not, whether judged by their teaching or their life. In the interests of India it is a far more honourable attitude that the poet-laureate of India, Rabindranath Tagore, has had the boldness to adopt:

“We have divided and sub-divided ourselves into mince-meat, not fit to live, but only to be swallowed. Never upto now has our disjointed society been able to ward off any threatening evil.”

And the poet continues :

“We are a suicidal race, ourselves keeping wide open for ages—with marvellous ingenuity—gaps that we are forbidden to cross under penalty and cracks that are considered to be too sacred to be repaired because of their antiquity.”

AN INTEGRAL COURSE OF STUDIES FOR INDIAN UNIVERSITIES

By

K. M. PANIKKAR

The most obvious weakness of the courses of study prescribed in Indian Universities is their failure to provide for any scheme for the integration of knowledge. The essence of liberal education, admittedly is to enable students to think independently and thereby to arrive at their own values in matters of fundamental importance to themselves and to society. But in order to enable even the best endowed mind to think independently it is necessary that education should be directed towards an integration of knowledge, and the provision of the essential apparatus for such thinking. In the Indian Universities no such effort has so far been made and the absence of humanistic interest in the subjects prescribed for study is painfully evident to all who have interested themselves in the education problems of India. Even in the case of such subjects as literature and philosophy, for the teaching of which provision exists in our Universities, they are taught only as class subjects without any interest in their value.

There are many reasons for this unfortunate position, which it is perhaps unnecessary to examine in detail. But one or two points may be noted. From the time of Macaulay (1833 to the first years of the Great War) the Universities in India were dominated by the feeling that there was nothing in Indian classics worth studying. A classical academic course based on Latin and Greek was impossible in the conditions of India; and following Macaulay, the Missionaries who controlled educational thought could not imagine a course of classical studies which would attempt to combine Indian thought

with European humanism. Secondly, the degree courses in India are in fact no more than the completion classes of the secondary school and not college classes at all. The utter inadequacy of the secondary school course and the inefficiency of teaching in the school classes, leave the University students with a totally insufficient mental equipment. The result in essence is that the so-called Degree course is no more than the completion of the Secondary course, meant originally to fill the junior ranks of the administrative machinery in India. The bastard origin of the Indian Universities—the result of an irregular and unhappy union, between the passionate desire of the Missionaries to bring Christ to India through the schools, which it was fondly hoped would provide the necessary leaven for the break up of Indian society, and the indifferent and casual calculation of the Administrators for a steady supply of young men not too well educated but with a sufficient knowledge of English for carrying on the work of Government, is still writ large on its mis-shapen product. There was no desire on either side of this dubious parentage to work out a course which would produce for the country an elite, a minority capable of guiding the thought of India.

The late Sir Asutosh Mukherji realised this difficulty and frankly worked on the basis that the colleges in India were no more than High Schools. He endeavoured to convert the Degree examination of the Calcutta University to be the equivalent of a School Leaving Examination. His idea was to confine the genuine University teaching to Post Graduate work. The Post Graduate Department of the University was enlarged and liberally endowed and it became possible in consequence to devote considerable attention to higher studies both in the Scientific and Humanistic fields.

Where the Calcutta University failed was in not providing a comprehensive background for its higher studies. Research work and higher studies can only be in specialised fields. Without a general training on lines which would encourage clear thinking and

give to the mind a conception of human values, research, however efficiently carried out, will only be mechanical and its results unrelated to the general progress of thought. Where our Universities have failed is in evolving a scheme, which apart from any knowledge which it might impart to the student, would give him if not his values in relation to society, at least the apparatus by which he could arrive at such values.

For this purpose what is required is a course which will combine at the same time a high standard of intellectual training with a wide study of humanities both Indian and European; a course more or less similar to the Greats course at Oxford. In India such a course would have to make adequate provision for Indian classics in place of Greek and Latin, and the course should have as its object a synthesis of thought rather than an emphasis on Western or Eastern traditions. The essential difference between the Greats course at Oxford and the course suggested below is that so far as European thought is concerned the emphasis is laid not on the Classical but on the modern period, from Erasmus to Green, so to say. So far as the purely Indian side is concerned it will be necessary to emphasise both the Classical and the modern periods.

The course should cover a period of three years and be divided into *two public examinations*: the first public examination normally to be taken at the end of one year, and the second at the end of the third year. No candidate should be allowed to appear privately.

First Public Examination.

One of the following Classical languages.

(Standard pass B.A.) 2 papers

Sanskrit

Pali

Prakrit

Persian

Arabic

One of the following subjects :—2 *papers*.

Logic

Psychology

Anthropology

A period of European civilisation to be chosen from the following :—

(a) Renaissance and Reformation

(b) Catholic Reformation

(c) The Enlightenment and the French Revolution

(d) Liberalism.

One modern Indian language (not being the mother tongue of the candidate).

(Texts and Composition).

This course is perhaps more difficult than 'Honour Mods,' but it is necessary to remember that the back ground requires much greater strengthening in India than in English Universities. My model for the first public examination has been a combination of Tripos part I and Honour Mods.

Final Public Examination.

(Each subject to be studied up to Honours standard).

One subject from among the following :—

Hindu Philosophy

Mahommedan Religion and Philosophy

Buddhist Religion and Philosophy.

One subject from among the following :—

Economics

Modern European History (from the fall of Constantinople)

English Constitutional History

History of the British Empire (from the independence of America)

Geography

One subject from among the following :—

Political Science

Jurisprudence

Philology

English language and literature.

One modern European language other than English.

French

German

Italian

Russian

Spanish

This means a combination of four subjects for the final examination. The groups have been so worked out as to make it impossible for candidates to offer only such partial groups as (a) History, Economics and Political Science, (b) Logic, Psychology and Philosophy etc. To the two middle groups, Mathematics, Science subjects and other modern courses of study may be added as optionals without affecting the character of the course suggested. The essential point is that the study of such subjects as Economics, History, Mathematics should be tempered and liberalised by a proper emphasis on philosophy, literature and other subjects with a more humane appeal.

Of course much depends on how the subject is approached. Thus for example, in the case of political science, it should have to be provided that apart from the study of European thinkers from Aristotle to Laski, the student would have to be familiar with Indian political thought from the Mahabharata to modern times. In the same way Hindu philosophy should not be treated as a water-tight compartment but as a subject which should be studied in relation to modern thought.

It may be argued against this scheme that it overloads the student with languages; that a minimum of four languages, one classical, one modern European, one Modern Indian and English, besides the student's mother tongue, is too much for the intellectual capacity of students.

This sounds formidable but in fact it is not so. English and the student's own language are already there. The other Indian language is not a matter of difficulty. For a Gujarati to study Hindi or for a Bengali to study Marathi is not like an Englishman studying German or French. An under-graduate at Oxford or Cambridge has equally to study at least two classical languages and one modern language. Though on paper the languages may look too many, in fact the only serious addition is the Modern European language. This is to my mind essential, for, without the knowledge of one of great modern European languages, the appreciation of European life and civilisation will remain partial and onesided.

It would no doubt be a line of criticism that a course such as I have formulated above will be too difficult for the ordinary student. This is not denied. Academic education is really meant for the well-endowed. After all so far as the Greats are concerned, only a small percentage of even the serious students at Oxford go up for that difficult study. Apart from those who take "Groups," some of the Honours schools such as History, Literature, Jurisprudence and Theology attract a large proportion even of serious minded boys from public schools. Only those who feel that they want a more complete education will choose a course such as I have indicated. But what is more important is that the University should provide such a course for those who desire to go up for it, for really speaking the University is for such people and we should not forget this essential fact.

Another line of criticism would be that such a course as I have suggested here could not be entrusted to the Staffs now manning our Universities. This is undoubtedly true. But if we are to make a

beginning in one University, I have no doubt that teachers with the necessary ability and imagination could be recruited in India. If it is found that we have not the necessary material in India, we have after all the whole Empire to recruit from in the first instance.

Such a course as I have sketched out above would to my mind help to bring about a real synthesis of culture in India. It is not that Indian Humanism has died out; the amazing activity in the modern Indian languages clearly shows that it is still a living force. But the influence of European thought on this aspect of India's intellectual life is really not very great. While Indian languages have drawn a great deal from the *forms* of European literature, they still keep their exclusiveness in the world of ideas. The reason is that European thought in its essentials has not touched the mind of India. Indian education has made no attempt to bring home the thought of Europe and the unreality of what is learnt at college has been a stumbling block in the way of providing a real sustenance to the mind of India.

It is only by the introduction of fresh streams that the stagnant pool of Indian thought can be made to overflow and fertilise a naturally rich soil. Where the synthesis has taken place the results have been amazingly rich and varied. In the realm of thought the two outstanding and genuinely Indian minds to-day are those of Sri Arabindo Ghosh and Dr. Ananda Coomaraswamy. Arabindo Ghosh knew neither Sanskrit nor Bengali till he was 23 though to-day he is undoubtedly the most significant philosopher and thinker in India and the greatest interpreter of the Upanishads since the time of Sankara. The case of Ananda Coomaraswamy is equally significant. Born in England and educated entirely in Europe he took up his Indian studies only after 25. To-day, apart from being the foremost and universally recognised authority on Indian Art, he is also an interpreter of singular originality in the field of Buddhist and Upanishadic philosophy. These are, strangely enough the only two genuinely great minds in the fields of humanism that Western con-

tact with India has produced in our generation; and both are men whose training was *exclusively* European to start with.

Tagore, Iqbal, Subramania Bharati, Prem Chand and other writers in the Indian languages, though undoubtedly influenced by their study of western models, cannot in any way be said to be the outcome of the contact between India and Europe. Their inspiration is purely Indian, though they may have in some cases borrowed the form from Europe.

The necessity to-day is for a wider synthesis of European and Indian thought and that will become possible only when the classics of both are studied together. It is only if a Hindu who is saturated with the thought of his people, or a Mussalman who is a scholar of Islamic subjects, studies European thought and *vice versa* that any synthesis is possible. Our difficulty to day is that Indian students who try to understand European thought are totally ignorant of their own cultural inheritance and those who are scholars in the orthodox manner have no opportunity of studying in our Universities. What is required is that a way should be provided where both can be studied together and this is what the course sketched out above seeks to do.

THE TEACHING OF LAW AT INDIAN UNIVERSITIES

By

GANGANATH JHA

People learned in Law have remarked that India has not produced a great jurist, and also that our Law graduates on leaving the University have no knowledge of Practical Law. If this is so, the cause of this lies in the fact that our Universities have so far undertaken to do too much. They try to provide teaching which will serve to produce the practical lawyer as well as the legal scholar. And yet human capacity and time being limited, the courses of study presented have had to be a most undesirable 'mix up'. The two or three years spent over a course of study therefore produces neither the practical nor the scholarly lawyer.

The remedy lies in the division of these two functions. While the Universities should confine themselves wholly and exclusively to the training of the scholarly lawyer, the training of the practical lawyer should be undertaken by the High Courts with their Bar Councils. For want of funds, there may be some co-ordination; but in no case should the University degree by itself qualify the graduate for the legal profession. For this he must pass through the training provided by the Bar Councils. Some sort of an attempt at such co-ordination is being made through the provision that the University graduate should work under a senior for a year or so before he becomes qualified to 'practise' on his own behalf. But frankly speaking, there is not much of a training acquired 'under a senior.' The training at the hands of the Bar Council should consist of work upon the various Codes of Procedure, etc., which take up most of the time of the LL.B. student, and which only hamper his work towards scholarship.

The suggestion in short is that the Course of Study for the University Law Degrees should be entirely theoretical; and those who wish to enter the profession as practitioners should be trained and taught in the practical subjects and also examined therein by the High Court through its Bar Council.

The Universities will thus be relieved of the unweildy Law classes and the scores of teachers required for them, and thereby enabled to concentrate upon the purely theoretical and higher teaching of Law. As this higher teaching will not give any additional status in the practising field, the number at these classes will always be well within proper limits, so that the teaching of Law shall no longer be the 'farce' that it is at most of our Universities.

ANDHRA ART

By

SUNITI KUMAR CHATTERJI

In 1927 I paid my first visit to Madras, and I made my first acquaintance with late medieval Telugu painting when quite accidentally I came across among the paintings in the small Fine Arts collection in the Madras Government Museum a coloured picture of the miniature class of scenes from the story of Kṛṣṇa. During a subsequent visit to Madras, Mr. T. N. Ramachandran who was then in charge of the archaeological and fine arts collections in the museum showed me another painting of the same school which was in his office room. The general effect of these pictures was highly decorative—on the red ground the figures and the foliage were drawn in conventionalised but strong and bold outline, with strong colours laid flat. One was reminded of the early North Indian painting of the 14th-16th centuries, as in the old Gujarati miniatures, primitive Rajput pictures, Orissa paintings on cloth, and Bengal manuscript-covers. There were little legends in Telugu characters. I have never seen these pictures reproduced but they fully deserve being made accessible to the public through coloured reproduction, with notes and comments on their provenance, subject, authorship and style. They present quite a remarkable phase of medieval Indian painting in the Deccan and South India.

The little picture which I first saw in 1927, depicting the *vastra-haraṇa-līlā* and other episodes connected with Kṛṣṇa's sojourn at Vṛndāvana, was quite a revelation to me about the great quality of the pictorial and other plastic arts of the Telugu country. We know something about the artistic achievements of the South mainly through the magnificent sculpture of the Tamil country—through

the epic Pallava sculptures in stone, the mystic and romantic Coḷa stone and bronze figures, and through the more decorative sculpture of the subsequent periods, culminating through the Vijayanagara sculptures into the 17th century Madura School. As a prelude and an inter-chapter, the early sculpture of Amarāvati within the Andhra country and the medieval highly ornate Hoysāla art of Kārṇāṭa are added, and this completes our idea of South Indian art. The sculpture of the Kannaḍa country has gradually come to its own, thanks to the studies and monographs made available to the public by the Archaeological Department of the enlightened Mysore state; and the states of Travancore and Cochin appear to have entered enthusiastically into the task of conserving and studying the art of the Kēraḷa country. But the contribution of the Andhra country to the art of South India in particular and of India in general is a subject about which we know very little. This is a history which requires to be narrated, and Andhra should come to its own beside Drāviḍa, Kēraḷa and Kārṇāṭa in the symphony of Dravidian India enriching the artistic expression of India as a whole.

This history has been quite a glorious one—as glorious as that of any other province. The ancient Buddhist remains at Jaggayyapeta, Nāgārjunakoṇḍa and Amarāvati in the middle of the Telugu country with their superb reliefs in marble dating from the early centuries of the Christian era are believed to begin the history of sculpture and other fine arts in Eastern Deccan, and Guḍimallam within the Southern Telugu country with its well-known *Lingam* with the Śiva figure on it shows that even before the Christian era art was well-developed among the ancestors of the Telugus. The Buddhist art of Amarāvati and contiguous places, twin sister of the contemporary art of Mathurā with its characteristic *yakṣiṇīs*, is one of the most glorious achievements of the Hindu people: the Amarāvati *stūpa* formed a veritable Parthenon for India, and for Asia. These sculptures, which now form some of the most precious treasures of the British Museum in London and of the Madras Museum, give us a

unique picture of India 1800 years ago, and present us with a slim handsome type of Indian manhood and womanhood which for sheer beauty and elegance of a stately and romantic character has not been approached anywhere else in India, except perhaps at Mathurā. The life of the times in city and court and in village and hermitage has been depicted in low relief on a hundred marble slabs. How finely tall and graceful are the men, and how divinely sweet the women, in their scores of attitudes which set off so exquisitely their *svelte* forms! The art of Amarāvati is certainly the culmination of a tradition which must have been flourishing vigorously on the soil of Andhra-land for centuries. We have the Guḍimallam Śiva as a representative of this lost earlier art in the South. The Orissan sculptures of Khaṇḍagiri and Udayagiri going back to pre-Christian times and representing the Eastern Indian counterpart of Sanchi and Bharhut, particularly the fine narrative friezes of the cave dwellings at Udayagiri, may represent ancient Andhra sculpture of the North in its first period of glory: for did not Orissa form part of the Kalinga empire, which was conquered by the mighty Aśoka, and were not the Kalingas Telugu (or ancient Telugu) in language and culture? Orissa, like a good part of Bengal, was non-Aryan in speech down to the middle of the first millenium B.C., and in the 2nd century B.C. the powerful king of Kalinga or Orissa who invaded even Gangetic India was known by a name, *Khāravēla*, which appears to be Dravidian (**Kāra* or *Kār*= 'black', and **vēl*= 'lance,' 'he of the black lance : ' in Sanskrit this would be *Kṛṣṇarṣṭi*: see *Vyāsa-sangrahamu*, A Miscellany of Papers presented to Rāo Sāheb Mahāmahōpādhyāya Giḍugu Venkaṭa Rāma-mūrti Pantulu Gāru, Guntur, 1933, pp. 71-74: 'Khāravēla' by S. K. Chatterji). The early Andhra sculptures in what is now Mahārāṣṭra can similarly be described as the work of a Dravidian people, now Aryanised in speech, who were identical with or closely allied to the ancestors of the Telugus.

After this glorious period of early history we have a silence for many centuries, until we are in the midst of the Turki-Pathan period

of Indian history. The architectural and sculptural history of Andhra-land is badly known because there has never been a systematic study of the temples in this part of India. Besides, Andhra serves as a highway from Northern and North-eastern India to Kārṇāṭa and Tamil Nāḍu, and excepting Siṃhācalam near Waltair, and Tirupati in South Andhra, and the Gōdāvarī river near Rajahmundry, there are few shrines, and holy places of All-India fame in the Andhra country. Yet Andhra-land appears to possess a series of temples only less important than those of the Tamil country. The Warangal temples with their most beautiful and characteristic sculptures have attracted the attention of a wider public, thanks to the publicity section of H. E. H. the Nizam's Railway Service and his Archaeological Department. These and other late medieval sculptures of Andhra-land, e.g., at Tadpatri and elsewhere, present a distinct school worthy to take its stand besides other provincial schools of medieval India, like the Pāla and Sēna schools of Magadha and Bengal, the Cēdi of Eastern Hindustan, the Hoysāla of Kārṇāṭa, the medieval school of Orissa, that of Rājputāna, etc. Only this has not been taken up by some competent authority (we can say that of most other medieval schools: we have Rākhāl Dās Banerji's and Nalinikānta Bhaṭṭaśāli's invaluable works on the Pāla and Sēna schools, but we are lacking in a similar monograph on the post-Pallava sculpture of Tamil-land, for instance), and its masterpieces; except a few from Warangal, have not been made known to the interested world. The joint efforts of the Kannaḍas and the Telugus, sustained by the Tamils, built up the great Vijayanagara empire, and it seemed as if these Dravidian-speaking Hindu peoples became conscious of a common South India Hindudom under the Vijayanagara rulers whose task it was not only to preserve the Hindu heritage for two centuries and more against the onslaughts of the Islamised Indians from the North who were settled in the South, but also to extend it in all directions—philosophy, literature and art included. A wonderful linking up of the Kannaḍa, Telugu and Tamil cultures was the result of this, supplying to Andhra, Kārṇāṭa and Drāviḍa

their characteristic bases or forms of a Brahmanical Dravidian (or South Indian Hindu) life (as opposed to the 'Aryan' or North Indian—this latter with its strong dose of extra-Indian Perso-Islamic elements) which still obtains to the present day.

The medieval stone sculpture of Andhra-land appears to possess its peculiar *cachet* which marks it off from the contemporary Tamil stone sculpture. The images of the gods and goddesses present slightly different anatomical conventions which give us taller and slimmer figures with certain exaggerations in the bust and the hips in the case of the female figures. The profuse ornamentation appears to be to some extent restrained. A distinctive Telugu school of metal sculpture grew up, rivalling that of the Tamil country, and it produced a number of masterpieces among which are to be mentioned the statutes of King Kṛṣṇa-dēva-rāya and his two queens Cinna-dēvi and Tirumala-dēvi at Tirupati temple, besides a few other statues in the same style, and the remarkable series of small bronzes of gods and goddesses from Guntur district which are now in the Madras Museum.

The confluence of Vijayanagara art and culture was made up by the three streams of Andhra, Kārṇāṭa and Drāviḍa meeting together, no doubt, and through this union a good deal of what may be called 'inter-Dravidian' cultural exchange no doubt took place: but the peculiar genius of each of these Dravidian-speaking peoples, enriched in this way, survived. The prestige of the Telugu element at the court of Vijayanagara made for a little more intense Andhra influence, but the Andhras themselves were also influenced by the art and sculpture of Tamil-land. But Andhra pre-eminence in the music of South India (which bears the name of 'Kārṇāṭa' music at the present day, from the extended sense of Kārṇāṭa which we find in the English *Carnatic*) is well-known: this culminated in the personality of Tyāga-rāya, the Tāna-sēna (Tān-sēn) of South India, during the first half of the 19th century—his songs on Rāma are sung by Tamil and Kannaḍa exponents of classical Hindu music as fitting in in a remarkable manner with the classical modes.

If the history of what may be called "great art"—namely, architecture and sculpture—is still to be written that of the "minor arts" has not yet been thought of. Painting in South India is found in its complete form at Sittannavasal in the Southern Tamil country, within Pudukōṭṭai state; and subsequent to these frescoes, for a number of centuries, except for specimens of late medieval wall-paintings of Jaina inspiration from near Conjeeveram described by Mr. T. N. Ramachandran, the history of painting in Andhra, Karṇāṭa and Drāviḍa is obscure. Andhra-land developed an old Indian art-craft in a new direction—that of printing cloth in many colours by means of blocks. Whole scenes of religious legend and contemporary life were in this way found to be impressed in colour from wood-blocks upon cloth, and some of these, dating from the 16th century, are like elaborate paintings. The tradition has been carried down to our day at Masulipatam and elsewhere, the printed chintzes of which place have been famous both in India and outside India for some centuries past. Painting on paper took a new line of development, and as paper was a foreign commodity, North Indian influences as a result of contact with Deccan and North Indian Muhammadans, with Rajputs and with Marathas, were in the course of things in a new material requiring a new technique. The restricted employment of paper owing to the common use of the palm leaf to write books prevented the development of miniature painting to the same extent as in Northern India. The colour-printed screens and hangings frequently depicting scenes from mythology and legend took the place of wall paintings, and were a substitute for pictures painted on paper. With Coomaraswamy, we may express the regret that the art of coloured printing on cloth did not suggest to the people of India, in the South as in the North, the art of printing books and book-illustrations—it was "an opportunity just missed." Small miniatures, highly conventionalised, on cloth stiffened with some gum preparation, including charming playing cards, were a characteristic form of artistic craft which was found in Andhra-land

(and still lingers in some of the southern districts), as much as in Orissa and Western Bengal.

Side by side with printed cloth, brass figures formed another craft in which the artistry of the Andhra people found a congenial expression. The brass figures of Indian soldiers from Vizagapatam dating from the 19th century which are in the Indian Museum at South Kensington in London, show a refreshing *élan* in the depicting of men and horses and camels; in spite of the exaggerated proportions and a certain deliberate grotesqueness of expression, they are finely modelled, and, in the words of Sir George Birdwood, "display the whole gamut of military swagger in man and beast." Ivory sculpture in Andhra-land appears not to have attained to that excellence which it did in the early days in the Tamil country and in the present day in Travancore and Mysore; at any rate, we do not know of any such beautiful specimens of old ivories as one can see in the collections of Tamil country shrines like those of Srīraṅgam (Trichinopoly) and Aḷagarswāmī (near Madura).

There are other industrial arts which are to be found in the Telugu country as in other parts of India, and an inventory of these with a statement of whatever artistic achievement is noticeable in each art or craft, is necessary.

It cannot be said that we have full and detailed studies of all aspects of artistic endeavour in the different provinces, and that Andhra-land is particularly remiss in this. We have, however, some good books on certain forms of art in the other areas, but scarcely any on Andhra art in any of its special forms. Yet, as I have said before, when one thinks of the Amarāvati friezes, the Warangal sculptures, the Tirupati portrait statues, the 16th century colour prints on cloth, the Guntur bronzes, and the late Telugu pictures of *Kṛṣṇa-līlā* described above, one feels that the Andhra people have contributed their quota to Humanity's Common Treasury of Art that is ageless, and that a narrative and critical history

of this contribution, together with analogous matters, should be attempted even in parts.

Andhra influences penetrated into the art of 'Āryan' India also. Orissan sculpture and painting, and probably also the Orissan dance, show South Indian or Dravidian traits in late medieval times. Ganjam was a meeting place for Orissan and Telugu cultures. The *Baitāl Deul* or 'Boat-shaped Temple' of Bhuvaneswar shows Dravidian features which would appear to have come *via* Telugu-land. The *Tēli-kā Mandir* in Gwalior Fort is nothing but a temple in the *Telingā*, i.e., *Telugu* or Dravidian style, *Tēlingā Mandir* evidently being changed by folk-etymology to the Hindi *Tēli-kā Mandir* or 'the Oilman's Temple'. Dravidian influences penetrated to Bengal, particularly when Rājendra Coḷa led his conquering expedition into West Bengal early in the 11th century. A number of *Vīrakkals* or 'hero-stones' in Bankura district and elsewhere are probably the mementoes of Coḷa warriors who were killed in Bengal. The dynasty of the Sēnas, which disputed the power of the great Pālas in Bengal and ousted them from Bengal in the 12th century, is described as that of *Karṇāṭa-kṣatriyas*, and in Mithilā or North Bihar we have a dynasty called the *Karṇāṭa* dynasty started by Nānya-dēva in the 12th century. The greatest king of the Sēna dynasty bore the typically Deccan name of *Ballāla*. We do not know anything about the place of origin and the antecedents of the Sēna family, excepting that they were of *Karṇāṭa* origin. Now, it strikes me that the term *Karṇāṭa* referred vaguely to Deccani or South Indian, or Dravidian, as opposed to Āryan-speaking North Indian: like the present day use of the term *Madrasi* in North India, to mean any southerner, a Dravidian speaker as opposed to a speaker of some Āryan language, a Telugu or a Kannaḍa, a Tamil or a Mālayāli indiscriminately. The *Karṇāṭa* way of doing the hair among women is mentioned frequently in Middle Bengali literature, e.g., *Kānaḍa chānde kabari bāndhe* 'does up her hair (in a knot) in the Kannaḍa manner.' The worship of the Snake Goddess *Manasā* appears to have come into

sudden prominence in Bengal during the centuries immediately following the Turki conquest, c. 1200 A.D. The name *Manasā* is not old Sanskrit, and it is not good Sanskrit either, but one is reminded of the Telugu *Mantsammā*. *Visa-harī*, 'she who removes poison' is an euphemistic name for *Manasā*, but in Middle Bengali literature the Merchant Cānd, who as a devout and passionate worshipper of Śiva, was for a long time a hater of *Manasā* (who was anxious to enlist his support to spread her cult), used to call her disparagingly *Kāñī Cēngamuḍi* (or *Cēñ-muḍi*) 'the one-eyed *Cēnga-muḍi*'. The word *Cēnga-muḍi* (*Cēñ-muḍi*) is not satisfactorily explained—it is taken to mean 'she who has the head (*muṇḍa*=*muḍ*) of a *cēnga* or *cēñ* fish.' But can this word be a Bengali modification of Telugu *jamuḍu*='the cactus plant'?* The cactus is sacred to *Manasā* in Bengal; and both *Mantsammā* and *jamuḍu* (in some earlier form?) may have come to Bengal from Andhra-land, whence the cult of the Snake Goddess might have received some impetus. Were Telugu soldiers who came with Rājendra Coḷa—the prototype of the "Telinga sepoys" who came with Clive to Bengal in the 18th century—responsible for the spread of the *Mantsammā-Manasā* cult in Bengal, after some of them had stayed on in the province?

Inter-provincial culture contacts in India, particularly when the Modern Indian languages both Aryan and Dravidian were developing and laying the foundations of present-day provincial speeches and cultures, are an important subject for study, and a good deal in the literary and artistic spheres may be seen to be the result of influences from a sister province. The North has influenced the South in many ways, and the South too has influenced the North. Present day Hinduism is largely the creation of the great Ācāryas of the South—Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. South Indian inspiration gave

*Professor Kshiti-Mōhan Sēn Śāstrī of the *Viśva-bhāratī* suggested this connexion between the Telugu and the Bengali words in one of his Bengali papers some years ago.

a great Dravidian temple at Brindāban in the 19th century, and new one in the same Tamil style at Pushkar in the 20th. It is no wonder therefore that Karṇāṭa and Drāviḍa and other South Indian influences, including that of Andhra, in Religion and Art should have come to North India.

The work of the Archaeological Survey both in British Andhra-land and in Nizam-Shahi Andhra-land should be supplemented by the Andhra University. The preparation of an inventory should at once be taken in hand of all important temples, all places for sculpture, within the territory inhabited by the Telugu people. Books of reproductions giving pictures of important shrines and sculptures, whether *in situ* or in public and private collections should be published as part of a regular programme from one or more Andhra organisations. All this will be expensive, and nothing as yet has been started along these lines by any Indian university, except, perhaps, by the University of Calcutta, which is preparing a series of reproductions of Bengal Folk Art under the editorship of its professor of Indian Art, Mr. Shāhid Suhrawardy. But a beginning may be made by some competent scholar or scholars, who must give us one or more specialised or general monographs on various aspects of art and the artistic crafts in the Andhra country.

RURAL RECONSTRUCTION IN THE NETHERLAND EAST INDIES

By

H. J. SCHOPHUYS

There are two main divisions of the Netherland East Indies, namely Java, and the Outer Provinces which include Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East (Celebes, the Small Sunda Islands, and the Moluccas). In contrast with the Outer Provinces, Java possesses a civilization of considerable historical significance. The virginal dreams of the Indonesian soul, prevailing in the Outer Provinces in an abundant wealth of charming expressions, have attained in Java a fairylike refinement of art and life through the medium of an aristocracy which has at the expense of the ancient Indonesian village democracy evolved from the close spiritual intercourse of Java with China and Hindustan for more than ten centuries since the beginning of the Christian era.

In the fifteenth century the pacific penetration of Islam hastened the fall of the Hindu-Javanese kingdoms which had been already in decadence. The puritanic tendency of this religion destroyed the Hindu-Javanese civilization, but not the spirit of refinement, the aristocracy, and the feudal structure. In Middle Java where the roots of Hinduism penetrated deep into the animistic soul, the Muhammadan influence has created a quaint plant—the syncretic *agama djawi* in which elements of animism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Muhammadanism are intermingled and unified in a *tantrik*, mystical way, and a fund of enchanting magic remains as an inheritance from the prehistoric past.

The audacious, rationalistic spirit of Western civilization has invaded in modern times the virginal charm of Indonesia and the

refined beauty of Java, which cannot, however, be conquered save by the sympathy and affection of a Snouk Hurgronje, an Abendanon, a Holle, an Adriani, and a Kraemer. The Indonesian youth who has been educated in a purely Western way is becoming conscious of his increasing alienation in speech and thought from the national civilization. He is anxious to make amends and seek his way back to the heart of the common people by means of national, social service. The late Dr Soetomo, well known all over the Netherland East Indies and abroad, set a brilliant example of sacrifice for the uplift of his country; and though the cry for *swadesj* has died away, this catchword and Dr. Soetomo's organization have encouraged the producers, animated the corporate life and stimulated the co-operative movement.

In the field of education Ki Adjar Dewantara is a well known personality. By birth a prince of the Court of Ngayogyakarta, he has devoted himself to educational work and initiated a new educational system called the *Taman Siswa* on a national basis. This system, widespread over Java and the Outer Provinces, represents a reaction against the rationalistic education on a Western basis which ignores the existence of an Indonesian and Hindu-Javanese culture. The scales seem, however, to have turned too heavy to the other side. Teachers at the *Taman Guru* (seminary) and *Taman Dewasa* (high schools) of the *Taman Siswa* care too much about moral education which consists in philosophizing in a typical Javanese way with a mystical syncretism of Western ethics and sociology, and too little about the knowledge and common sense required by the society and practical life. The training given under this system is too vague for the *gurus*, especially for those who are sent to far and isolated stations, where the movement not rarely degenerates into a pitiable diletantism.

The scientific interest in the national civilization, and the love of national traditions, arts and spiritual life have found expression in the Java-Instituut. This institution was founded in Nagayogyakarta about twenty years ago and is now presided over by Pangeran

Aria Prof. Dr. Husein Djajadiningrat. The evenings dedicated to the fine arts in the museum *Sana Boedaja* in Ngayogyakarta, and the periodical *Djawa* give evidence of a close and fruitful collaboration between the Dutch and Indonesian votaries of science, theosophy and arts, and form a valuable supplement to the activity of the Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Royal Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences). The awakening of national consciousness in the hearts of the modern youth gave birth last year to a daughter-society called the *Krida Beksa Wirama* for the development of Javanese music and dance under Pangeran Aria Tedjakusuma of Ngayogyakarta.

The *Taman Siswa* as a reaction against Western education, and the national character of the *Krida Beksa Wirama* have their counterpart in the cosmopolitan spirit of a group of young literators around Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, who are averse to "national provincialism" and aim at the resuscitation of Indonesian civilization, and the renovation of the Malayan language as the "bahasa Indonesia," the Indonesian *lingua franca* and cultural language, so that the Indonesians may be able to participate as a single unit in the concert of nations at an early date. The increasing number of politicians, economists and technicians are striving for the same end with more or less interest in artistic, linguistic and literary problems, having in mind a healthy commonwealth of the Netherland East Indies. The institution of the *Balai Pengetahuan Masyarakat Indonesia* (Meeting House of Knowledge of the Indonesian Society) has facilitated the meeting of men and women of different creeds and thoughts for a better understanding of one another; and the growing University with its faculties of medicine, law and literature, and the Colleges of Agriculture and Technics have been a living fount of light and force to the young generation.

Nevertheless, much remains to be done; and we venture to think that it is the sacred duty of the Government and the national leaders to investigate the cultural, social, and economic life in different parts

of Indonesia in order to devise the right ways of rural reconstruction, which forms an integral part of the nation-building programme in every country in the East. In the last decennium scientific research, economic and social investigations, and technical experiments provided the implements for a successful propaganda. But the difficulty is how to use them and how to prepare the soil that the seed may thrive well in the minds and hearts of a people of seventy million souls. It is impossible for the Government to achieve this task without an efficient organization of its own and the enthusiastic support and serious endeavours of prominent private persons and organizations.

It is not likely that capitalism, democracy, and scientific methods, which are the products of Western individualism and rationalism, should be accepted and assimilated everywhere in the same way. The contents of rural reconstruction, and the methods of propaganda should therefore vary in different regions. The Javanese mind, drowned in an ocean of magic and *tantrik* beliefs, and full of caste-adoration, can be hardly influenced by Western individualism and democracy, which find a more virginal and a more receptive soil in the Sundanese and the Madurese parts of Java and the Outer Provinces. In many regions of Java, more or less as in India, capitalism leads to the enrichment of the landlords, the *hajis* and intellectuals, the people coming from the Outer Provinces, and the foreigners like Chinamen and Arabs, who stand outside the *desa*-organization, while the peasants and labourers, who form a *desa*-community in much the same way as the joint family in India in order bear alike the heavy burden, are left in abject poverty. This state of life is patiently accepted by them as a matter of course, because, as in India, "each individual is born and grows to maturity, he finds his place in society, and has his standard of living, his standard of work and everything fixed." From certain parts of the Outer Provinces, where the feudal lords became too oppressive, people emigrated to Java in considerable numbers. But on the whole Java is too densely populated; and in

recent years the Government has been obliged to organize and finance Javanese emigration to the Outer Provinces on a pretty large scale.

In contrast with emigration which means flight from miserable circumstances in the native country, rural reconstruction stands for the building up of better conditions of rural life at home. The best way is probably to build upon the foundations of ancient organizations such as feudalism and aristocracy, the still existing guilds, and the village community in the centre of Middle Java, the village democracies in the Outer Provinces, and the various associations formed with definite aims, e.g. the *sekaha* in Bali, the *mapalus* in Mado, the *proa-men* associations in Southern Celebes and Madura and the *manteri sawankepala padang* institute in Southern Borneo. Where ancient forms of rural corporate life fail, we may try to found co-operative societies of the Western type on the immanent sentiment of fellowship and responsibility for common interests, as in East and West Java where experiments in co-operation have proved a notable success. In Middle Java one should however be very cautious in making experiments which in most regions mean a social revolution.

By way of illustration we shall give a short description of rural co-operation in Java and the corporative organization for rice-culture in Southern Borneo.

The first efforts to create popular credit associations (peasants' banks) in Java were made by De Wolff van Westerrode, Mesman and others about twenty years ago. But because of slow progress in spite of much enthusiasm the Government preferred to create a banking organization called the *Volkscredietwezen* which has gradually become a purely governmental organization. Comparing this popular credit system with that of British India, Bocke says: "In respect of technique our popular credit organization is certainly more advanced, but this is a virtue that has to be explained out of a lack. The technique could be developed to precision, exactly because nothing was entrusted to interested parties, and no organizational demands had to be respected."

In a more recent publication Boeke says that the character of the Javanese peasant household is hostile to capitalism. This statement is applicable to the Javanese rather than to the Sundanese and Madurese regions of Java. In the introductory part of this article we came to the same conclusion on a consideration of the cultural elements of Javanese civilization. It is also confirmed by facts, because whilst the co-operative movement is most vigorous in East and West Java, it meets with the strongest resistance and opposition in Middle Java. Ir. Subiarto, the Official Agricultural Adviser, who is noted for his keen, personal interest in the peasants and for the simple, unassuming manner in which he moves with them, and under whose guidance the co-operative movement in the Besuki Residency (East Java), has rapidly developed in the last few years has got the experience that in general the Madurese people are more responsive to the co-operative propaganda than the Javanese.

The development of co-operative movement is closely related to agricultural education of which the foundations were laid about fifteen or twenty years ago by Koens, the eminent agricultural adviser and educationist. As a rule, the leaders and the first members of the small-landholders' associations developing into rural co-operative societies are gurus of *desa*-schools and ex-pupils of the *desa*-courses in agriculture. The co-operative movement is most vigorous in Besuki (East Java) and Sumedang (West Java) which are the centres of agricultural education, and it is also making a rapid progress in Madiun (East Java) and Kuningan (West Java). In East Java the close and continuous contact with the ex-pupils of the *desa*-courses has stimulated the growth of a great many small societies with the simple object of producing, selling or sending out co-operatively several agricultural products like paddy, tobacco and cabbage. It has also given rise to a few co-operative credit societies of which the organization and administration are in the main too complicated for simple peasants. In West Java on the contrary there exist co-operative credit societies promoted and guided almost exclusively

by *desa-gurus* who are meeting with more and more difficulties in connection with organization and administration.

The annexed table illustrates the rapid development in the last seven years of rural co-operation in the Besuki Residency. From the figures of this table it is also evident that agricultural education is not a *sine qua non* for co-operation, and that an increasing number of co-operating peasants have no relation at all with the *desa*-courses. Agricultural education, however, has created a spirit of fellowship. This spirit has kept alive the co-operative movement in the first years of experiments which have given us a more adequate idea of the social and economic desiderata namely—

(1) That the local official leaders should by means of personal intercourse acquire an intimate knowledge of the psychology of the peasant and his social and economic circumstances.

(2) That the chiefs of the co-operative associations should be well known and respected in their *desa* or district, so that by their moral influence the members may be bound by solidarity, and the associations may be kept sound by discipline and punctuality in the payment of loans and contributions.

(3) That the task of the leader is by no means restricted to the expansion and control of the co-operative movement, but consists primarily in the consolidation, co-ordination and organization of the existing co-operative societies in order to strive not only for a vigorous corporative life among the small landholders, but also for the foundation of peasants' banks.

(4) That the societies should have sharply defined aims, in the beginning very simple and gradually becoming complex in character.

(5) That the solidarity of the organizations is strengthened by elements of ancient custom and tradition (*adat*), which therefore should not be neglected.

(6) That interest should be evoked and kept awake by popular wit and arts.

In Besuki the association of the existing societies for sending out cabbage to the cities of Java, the Outer Provinces and Singapore resulted in the foundation of the first corporative peasants' bank *Sinar Tani* with a capital of 1800 guilders in April 1939. This bank has a solid basis in the agricultural co-operative societies and is probably more vital than most of the peasants' co-operative credit societies.

It is a curious fact that in Java where the democratic forms of organization rooted in the *adat* have waned, the folklore and the reminiscence of ancient customs connected with rice-culture have become the binding element of co-operative credit and production societies. The ancient Indonesian *lumbungs* for storage of paddy for seed and consumption have returned in several parts of Java. These *lumbungs* should not be confused with the official *desa-lumbungs* which form part of the governmental *Volkscredietwezen*. In East Java the *ketoprak*, a popular theatre full of jest and joke has been used with success for agricultural propaganda; and in the Sundanese parts of Java the popular wit of *sja'ir* and *sisindiran* (chanted recitation and airy badinage) gives an attractive form to the propaganda. In this way the rational agricultural education can assume a national character, and the ancient customs and folklore can be preserved in spite of the rationalization of society.

In the Outer Provinces the conditions are quite different from those in Java. Though the *adat* (traditional customs and morals) may be very austere, there is on the whole more freedom, both social and economic. The average land-property is larger, there is more room for immigration, and the people have in the main a more commercial spirit. Furthermore, there still exist many corporative societies rooted in the *adat*, e.g. the *sekaha* in Bali, the proa-men associations of the Madurese and Buginese people, the *mapalus* in the Minahasa (Manado, Celebes), and the Banjarese agricultural associations intended for clearing the vast moors for the culture of rice and for clearing the big forests for the cultivation of pepper. The *sekaha subak* in Bali and the Banjarese moor-reclaim-

ing associations in Borneo and Sumatra are both forms of organized wet rice culture. The *sekaha subak* form part of the marvellous Balinese civilization and possess a remarkable organization and discipline. The more primitive Banjarese associations, however, have the tendency to relax in discipline when the reclaiming work is done, and have fallen into oblivion on account of political and economic influences in many parts of Southern Borneo, the native countries of the Banjarese people.

In 1929 when I came to Borneo, I found that large areas of wet rice-fields were left to produce far too little through lack of organization to regulate drainage and irrigation, to protect them against floods, and also to maintain the good understanding between the landholders. In former times, about fifty years ago, this had been the task of the *kepala padang*, prominent men in the village originally appointed to parcel out the reclaimed moors. Only the oldest people of the village still remembered this *adat*-institution and they expressed the fervent wish to get it back. As a matter of fact the old people have become the backbone of the new organization, and among them have been elected the new *kepala padang* with the aid of *manteri sawah* carefully chosen by the Official Agricultural Adviser and appointed by order of the District Officer of the Government. Whilst the *manteri sawah* is paid from local funds, the chief *manteri sawah* is paid by the Government and appointed as assistant to the Official Agricultural Adviser. The remuneration of the *kepala padang* consists in paddy voluntarily brought in by the interested landholders.

The choice of the *manteri sawah* is very important. I have started with a band of men drawn from diverse social and occupational groups: Pangeran Abdul Karim, a grandson of the late Sultan of Banjarmasin; Anang Kumis, parented to the upper ten of Amuntai; Haji Abdullah, a clever agriculturist and merchant, a member of the former *Local Raad* (Local Council) of Barabai, and a devout follower of the Muhammadan religion; Idak, a man of the people, zealous, intelligent, and full of wit; Abubakar, a brother of Haji Muhammad

Bakeri, at first Wakil-Mufti (substitute chief of the Muhammadan community), and now Mufti (highest chief of the Muhammadan community) of Kadangan; and Haji Hasim, a pandit. All of them are prominent men, natives of, and by birth, character and conduct most fitted for the district where they have been appointed. Idak has become the chief of the *manteri sawah*, and the right-hand man of the Official Agricultral Adviser. He has been appointed a member of the Bandjarraad by the Governor of Borneo. His task is to co-ordinate the activities of the *manteri sawah* and *kepala padang*, to examine their reports and suggestions, to assist in the planning and carrying out of irrigation-projects and to draw up working programmes for the *manteri sawah* under the guidance of the Official Agricultural Adviser. Every *manteri sawah* receives a copy of his working programme written in the Malayan language and equipped with a clear and distinct map. Thanks to patience, confidence and unflagging zeal, in one decade the institution has developed rapidly and expanded over the whole residency of South and East Borneo. The Groeps-gemeenschap Bandjar which commands an area of *sawah* (wet rice-fields) extending to about 145000 hectare (about 360000 acres) counts 15 *manteri sawah* and about 750 *kepala padang* at the present time. The *sawah*-region under supervision of a *manteri sawah* varies from about 3000 to about 25000 hectare (about 7500 to about 60000 acres) and he has to guide about 20 to 100 *kepala padang*.

Our experience of rural reconstruction in Java and the Outer Provinces of the Netherland East Indies has strengthened us in the belief that it is possible to build a regionally varying co-operative order on the foundations of the ancient social structure and corporative organizations, and to revive through the co-operative movement the ancient customs that have fallen into abeyance. Let us therefore hope that the words of Radhakamal Mukerjee will become true: "It is thus that the forces of renewal will spring from the country population. They will transform, through the guild and regionalist idea, the structure of modern industry and build its characteristic constitution.

They will renew ancient forms of solidarity and evolve a new economic democracy which will be more successful than that realized by State Socialism or by Communism". Rural reconstruction in this style will be attractive to the youth, who on the one hand have a distaste for the monotony of peasant life, and on the other hand have developed a sceptical attitude towards life by too much rationalism. The return of the young intellectuals to the country will give new force to the nation.

Rationalism in methods of investigation and technics should be accompanied by adequate forms of propaganda. On the subject of agricultural education of the people of the Netherland East Indies, the words of Koens, with which I will conclude this article, still hold true and serve as a warning to the youth. "Those who have exercised a notable influence on the activities of the peasant have in the main attained more by suggestions emanating from their words and deeds than by extending his intellectual horizon. Those who have distinguished themselves as agricultural educationists have not belittled the importance of agricultural education of the peasant. On the contrary, they have preferred to serve the cause of agricultural education by means of their suggestive influence."

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DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL CO-OPERATION IN THE RESIDENCY OF BESUKI (EAST JAVA).

Regency	Year	Number of societies	Number of lumbungs	Quantity brought in of 100 kg	Number of paddy quintals	Number of			Total number of members	%	peasants not ex- pupils
						members	peasants	ex-pupils			
Bondowoso	1933	8	8	56	—	17	93	110	±15%	±85%	
	1934	39	39	317	—	49	438	487	±11%	±89%	
	1935	55	55	431	—	87	795	882	±10%	±90%	
	1936	57	57	789	—	106	1349	1455	±8%	±92%	
	1937	71	69	892	—	129	1699	1828	±7%	±93%	
	1938	73	73	950	—	137	1777	1914	±7%	±93%	
	1939	101	101	1080	54	148	1891	2039	±7%	±93%	
North-Jember	1933	8	6	40*	—	110	288	398	±27%	±73%	
	1934	62	17	165*	—	205	1680	1885	±11%	±89%	
	1935	56	19	233*	—	250	1022	1272	±20%	±80%	
	1936	68	22	239*	—	281	1076	1357	±21%	±79%	
	1937	89	30	323*	—	295	1814	2109	±14%	±86%	
	1938	90	30	444*	—	295	2052	2347	±12%	±88%	
	1939	102	49	317	174	295	2007	2302	±12%	±88%	
South-Jember	1936	2	2	19*	—	14	16	30	±47%	±53%	
	1937	5	5	56*	—	25	48	73	±34%	±66%	
	1938	10	6	75*	—	51	245	296	±17%	±83%	
	1939	18	18	21	474	87	370	457	±17%	±83%	

*The quantity of paddy for consumption before 1939 is included in these figures.

DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL CO-OPERATION IN THE RESIDENCY OF BESUKI (EAST JAVA)—Contd.

Regency	Year	Number of societies	Number of humbungs	Quantity of paddy brought in in quintals of 100 kg	Number of members ex-pupils	Number of			% peasants not ex- pupils
						members peasants not ex-pupils	Total number of members	% ex-pupils	
Panaroean	1936	3	5	15	—	33	33	—	100%
	1937	8	8	64	—	127	127	—	100%
	1938	13	13	126	—	213	213	—	100%
	1939	25	25	169	—	350	350	—	100%
Banjuwangi	1936	2	2	—	—	129	129	—	100%
	1937	9	8	113*	—	286	286	—	100%
	1938	23	16	400*	—	1032	1032	—	100%
	1939	26	16	146	295	1267	1267	—	100%

*The quantity of paddy for consumption before 1939 is included in these figures.

